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RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Hanny - 10-06-2021
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: I'm afraid we'll have to differ on this - the text states, I think, that the soldiers carried "seventeen days' provisions... when they marched forward on their expedition". This was apparently prepared using the grain allotted for twenty days' winter provisions. A portion of it was then allocated to the forts, which caused supply problems later.
Perhaps if somebody would like to look at the text in latin they could clear up this difference in interpretation?
A plain reading of the text show that 20 days was prepared from winter stocks, there are no crops to live off the land, later a portion of the 17 days is put into forts, this means there is at that point 17 days still with them, which also means they have marched for 3 days to have 17 left and then after wards they dont have enough to feed themselves, so your example is yes you can put 100lbs on a mans back and march for 3 days and then remove almost all and cannot feed himself from crops that have not grown yet.
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Fourteen to seventeen days marching ration was apparently standard for the Roman army, carried by the troops themselves. Besides the quote from Ammianus, we also have the Historia Augusta:
Nope, its not standard, its just some examples.
Vestigius tells us the standard 5 hour march made 3 times a month had no supplies carried on the mens backs.Ammianus quote is an example of logistical failure so hardly helps and involves a 3 days march.
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: "During his campaigns he [Alexander Sev] made such careful provision for the soldiers that they were furnished with supplies at each halting-place and were never compelled to carry food for the usual period of seventeen days, except in the enemy's country. And even then he lightened their burdens by using mules and camels..." (HA Alex Sev 2.47.1)
(Note that this implies carrying marching provisions on mules would not previously have been standard practice.)
cogeba is compelled, so the key factor is compulsion or non compulsion, a fair reading of that is that when maneuvering in friendly areas, no extra rations were carried by the legions, as supplies were in camps from which they moved, jus like the 3 training marches a month without rations as its waiting for you in the training camp. We know this was not new methods, as that was how the legions got from rome to Cannae by moving onto supplies rather than carry them with them. Quite simply generals knew that carrying loads was unpopular when it was not necessary to do so and prevented doing so as far was practicable.
When in enemy terr, sure they can carry whatever the circumstances dictate are required, there are no standard circumstances, there are examples of 30 days carried, but they dont include any kit, as it the Legion moving 30 days supplies point to point in friendly terr.
Josephus, says that each Roman legionary carried three days' rations. Livy tells Aemilius Paulus sent Legion of 5,000 men in order to seize the passes into Perrhaebia in 168 B.C.with 10 days rations and there are many such examples of how many days rations were issued.
You say P wants to go 120 miles to Angelsey, 6/7 days march away, waits till June to set out, and gets there in two months, is it reasonable to assume he set out with 17 days rations on the mens back to do so?, if he needs this extra ration why not set out earlier and avoid it. Logistically he does not need anything on the mens back to go to Angelsey, and when he sets out thats all he is expecting to happen, to go 120 miles defeat a numerically inferior force and establish a garrison.
Note, your claim that mules not being used pre 200 is absurd as polybios and Livy refer to the legions use of them centuries earlier.
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: And Cicero:
"how great the labor is of an army on its march... Consider that they carry more than a fortnight's provision, and whatever else they may want; that they carry the burden of the stakes, for as to shield, sword, or helmet, they look on them as no more encumbrance than their own limbs." (Tusc Disp II.17)
Sure why not, there are several instances of 20 days carried, when they expect to need them. Did P, waiting for the crops to be in the fields before setting out, expect to need them when moving through crops on his way to Angelsey, or was he going to live of the land and mule train?
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: So our ancient sources tell us that troops could carry 14-17 days provisions on the march. You, however, using modern military statistics and calculations, claim that this would be impossible without exhausting and crippling the troops, and therefore Suetonius Paulinus could not have done it.
There is a wide from 2 to 20 days rations mentioned, without understanding the context for each we dont know why that number was chosen, but sure they can carry up to 20 days rations on their backs, at a cost of doing so.
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Either your calculations are wrong, or history is wrong. Which should we consider more likely? [Image: wink.png]
The maths is either accurate or inaccurate, you have changed the maths of P with of 15 days carried ( which i used as a high end example but see no reason why he would have seen the need, but used it to show its limitations) to 17 days carried to make your timeline work.
Your time line is wrong, it requires working back from the outcome to get 17 days on mens backs when no such need was present when the campaign started.
Its also wrong at several other places ORBIS* in Sept gives 21.7 days to reach Rome from Boulogne, so a min of 44 days round trip, so Oct 28th at the earliest, legions on the Rhine are 200 odd miles from there, so i see no way for them to cross in late Oct or messages to reach Rome in 12 days.
* https://orbis.stanford.edu/
September 14th . Catus arrives in Gaul and sends a message to Rome, reporting the imminent loss of the province.
October 25th – troops from Rhine garrisons reach the Channel ports and commence a late crossing to Britain.
Again here September 18th – – and to Rome requesting reinforcements.
September 30th – Paulinus’s request for reinforcement reaches Rhine army, and Rome by express courier.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 10-06-2021
(10-06-2021, 08:41 AM)Hanny Wrote: later a portion of the 17 days is put into forts
This is exactly what I've been saying all along. I'm glad you have finally agreed - perhaps you would now care to retract your accusations about inability to read, understand, count, etc?
(10-06-2021, 08:41 AM)Hanny Wrote: P wants to go 120 miles to Angelsey... is it reasonable to assume he set out with 17 days rations on the mens back to do so?
Of course not. See below.
(10-06-2021, 08:41 AM)Hanny Wrote: your claim that mules not being used pre 200 is absurd
It's not my claim - it's the Historia Augusta. Disbelieve it if you like (plenty do!)
(10-06-2021, 08:41 AM)Hanny Wrote: sure they can carry up to 20 days rations on their backs, at a cost of doing so.
Glad you are now willing to concede this!
(10-06-2021, 08:41 AM)Hanny Wrote: The maths is either accurate or inaccurate, you have changed the maths...Your time line is wrong, it requires working back from the outcome to get 17 days
I only mentioned the 17 day ration allowance as an upper limit of what was considered possible. My timeline has Paulinus arriving in London after 14 days, well within that limit.
Paulinus would have marched from Wroxeter around mid June with an army of c.20,000 men provisioned for a three month campaign in Wales, supplies carried on mules and in carts. He would have built roads and forts as he advanced, establishing his line of communication and supply.
Once he learned of the Iceni revolt, he would have supplied an expeditio force of c.6-7000 men with marching rations for 14-17 days, drawing from the supplies remaining for his campaign force. He would then have marched back along his line of communication, 18 standard miles a day, to link up with Cerialis at Godmanchester. He would have known that he could get his force to either Colchester or London within 14-16 days and resupply them there.
So the only remaining question is whether you believe that Roman troops could have marched for fourteen days on the road without pause, or not. I believe they could have done this, and there are examples from our sources of larger forces covering similar or greater distances very rapidly.
Paulinus, knowing that his province was in imminent danger, would have pushed his troops as hard as he dared. Stopping to rest his mules, for example, when Roman citizen lives (and his own reputation) were at stake would not, I think, have even occured to him.
I was looking back through Roth's Logistics of the Roman Army at War, and he goes into the daily ration question in some detail (pp71-77). He estimates 17 days biscuit ration at 18.8kg (43lb) and cites Nicholas Fuentes's estimate of legionary load at 26.6kg (54lb) without rations. Total load would therefore be c.45kg (or 97lb). He refers to Marcus Junkelmann's experimental march of 500km across the Alps with a group of untrained German civilians carrying reconstructed Roman packs of 43-46kg, averaging 25km a day, as evidence that this would indeed have been possible.
(10-06-2021, 08:41 AM)Hanny Wrote: Its also wrong at several other places ORBIS* in Sept gives 21.7 days to reach Rome from Boulogne...
so i see no way for them to cross in late Oct or messages to reach Rome in 12 days.
ORBIS:
Londinium to Roma in autumn by horse relays = 9.9 days (I have allowed 12 days)
Londinium to Ara Agrippinensium (Cologne) by horse relays = 3.1 days (Likewise, I have allowed 12 days)
Ara Agrippinensium (Cologne) to Londinium in autumn by foot, by road = 18.5 days (I have allowed twenty days, after a five day delay, and that still gets them to the Channel more than two weeks before the end of the sailing season).
So in fact the timeline is on the generous side. But my intention was to show what is plausible, and I have done so.
If you still do not believe that this is plausible, provide an alternative.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Hanny - 10-06-2021
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: This is exactly what I've been saying all along. I'm glad you have finally agreed - perhaps you would now care to retract your accusations about inability to read, understand, count, etc?
It was accurate then and remains so, so nope.
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Of course not. See below.Good, cant wait, the suspense is killing me....
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Paulinus would have marched from Wroxeter around mid June with an army of c.20,000 men provisioned for a three month campaign in Wales, supplies carried on mules and in carts. He would have built roads and forts as he advanced, establishing his line of communication and supply.He would?, what makes up this 20000 is a problem as that dont leave hardly any Aux for any other legions in Britain, but hey ho he established a loC and loS back to Wroxeter which as a years supply for a legion, but now has to maintain,20,000 or 4 times what it expects to support, Wroxeter Legionary fort now contain, 990000lbs to sustain this level of manpower you want him to have.
So he has 3 months with him?, what does that look i wonder, 3960000lbs of manpower rations, 200000lbs of water is 4160000lbs. 5000 mules at 190lbs is 950000 leaves 3210000lbs, everyone gets to carry 17 days extra rations, of 748000lbs, leaving 2462000lbs to be on carts, so at 1050lbs a 4 wheeled wagon, thats 2344 wagons pulled by 4700 oxen. Easy they had the 17 days on them from day one, or you need more carts. Nose to tail thats c12 miles of carts, 7 miles of mules and 2 miles of manpower.
Next problem.
Now still 7 camps between it and P in Angelsey, but now you have to supply 20000.
Each day 20,000*2.2lbs rations =44000 lbs, so you need 231 mules to deliver that each day, which means you need 7 of that coming in and 7 of that going back empty, so you need 3234 mules a day for food rations. Roman road is 20 feet in width, so 3 mules width one way, a mule is c7 feet nose to tail, so c5% of the total road net is full of mules each day, so yes you can have that volume on mules or anything else on the road, with ease, but not if you want to have 3 months carried, as that requires 21 miles of road net each day which is greater than the 18 miles between camps.
So by Sept 3, the mules have worked every day to move the rations consumed each day, which leaves P with nothing left over and nothing in stock, thats just to provide each days food.
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Once he learned of the Iceni revolt, he would have supplied an expeditio force of c.6-7000 men with marching rations for 14-17 days, drawing from the supplies remaining for his campaign force.
I see, so now P has 20,000 manpower, but the threat to the province is so great he only takes a third of it with him, but Angelsey is Roman free for 2 decades post Iceni revolt, but was held down by 10s of 000s in your timeline. So, now he loads up 14-17 days rations, so how did that get there?, it needs more mules or human portage, 14 days is 215600lbs, 17 days is 261800lbs, which is now on mens backs, so thats between 31lbs and 37lbs ration on top of kit, your going to want to drink so thats another 10lbs a man which he replaces every day as the logistic fairy is a kind fairy, so kit plus 41 to 47 lbs. To build up 17 days stock to put on the Legions, and your using Aux as legions btw, requires a further 1377 mule trips in addition to the existing ones and a week to do it in.
Or maybe its instead on mens backs from day one, or we need 4620 mules.
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: He would then have marched back along his line of communication, 18 standard miles a day, to link up with Cerialis at Godmanchester. He would have known that he could get his force to either Colchester or London within 14-16 days and resupply them there..His loC and LoS go back to Wroxeter, not Godmanchester, now you want a Cohort sized fort, which may not exist at this time, or a town that was burnt at this time, to have enough food for 7000 men, plus feed Cerialis force of what 3000.This is your cautouse general, marching of to a destination that may not exist,cannot feed the force marching to it if it does exist, leaving him with a max of 6 days rations when he gets there.
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: So the only remaining question is whether you believe that Roman troops could have marched for fourteen days on the road without pause, or not. I believe they could have done this, and there are examples from our sources of larger forces covering similar or greater distances very rapidly.
No Roman army was trained to carry 17 days rations and its kit, and march 18 mpd, it was trained to march 18 mpd with its kit on roads. You think Romans went into hostile land and they marched at 18 mpd cross country with 100ls loads, i think not.
Longest Spec ops with no re supply and carrying 100lbs is a week, D day UK Paras went in with 3 days supplies and carried 140lbs, first wave Inf with 100ls for same 3 days, longest YOMP was the Falklands of 3 days, S Jackson valley campaign of 48 days was a 14 mpd average, on macadamised roads. 1862 Army Officer's Pocket Companion, A Manual for Staff Officers in the Field
A mean average of 20 miles is the proper measure to adopt, remembering that cavalry can, from time to time, clear as much as 30 miles. A column of infantry passes over about two and one half miles in an hour, at the route step, including halts; a column of cavalry alternately walking and trotting will get over six miles an hour. For both infantry and cavalry one day of rest is sufficient after six or eight days of consecutive marching.A Corps of 25,000 men in a similar order, will occupy a space of about two and one-half miles in length, will take a little over one hour to deploy by either flank, and half an hour to deploy on the center
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Paulinus, knowing that his province was in imminent danger, would have pushed his troops as hard as he dared. Stopping to rest his mules, for example, when Roman citizen lives (and his own reputation) were at stake would not, I think, have even occurred to him.
Esp since you have told me that he has everything on the mens backs so has no mules, so no tents, no means to did teh turf and make a camp if needed, ( plutarch tells us the grain grinders had to be abandoned when the mules died, and the army went without bread, so no mules means you cant work the ears of wheat to make anything to eat) and everything else the legions needs that mules carried. It occurred to Engels in his Logistics of the Macedon Army, as he cities Army regs for a min of a 1 day in 7 to prevent sores opening up on baggage animals under load that start on day 5 onwards from breaking down and being un usable. So P would know he gets there and has lost a large number of his transport element to them breaking down and limiting any further logisticallift. Any ho, now you want mules, so your going to have to feed/fodder/water them as well, so staying with engels for baggage animals, we get 10lbs food, 10lbs fodder, 80lbs water a day, let me know how that woks out for you.
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: He refers to Marcus Junkelmann's experimental march of 500km across the Alps with a group of untrained German civilians carrying reconstructed Roman packs of 43-46kg, averaging 25km a day, as evidence that this would indeed have been possible.No disputes you can march in normal kit along a road at 18mpd.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 10-06-2021
(10-06-2021, 05:10 PM)Hanny Wrote: 20000 is a problem as that dont leave hardly any Aux for any other legions in Britain, but hey ho he established a loC and loS back to Wroxeter which as a years supply for a legion, but now has to maintain,20,000 or 4 times what it expects to support, Wroxeter Legionary fort now contain, 990000lbs to sustain this level of manpower you want him to have... 3960000lbs of manpower rations, 200000lbs of water is 4160000lbs. 5000 mules at 190lbs is 950000 leaves 3210000lbs, everyone gets to carry 17 days extra rations, of 748000lbs, leaving 2462000lbs to be on carts, so at 1050lbs a 4 wheeled wagon, thats 2344 wagons pulled by 4700 oxen. Easy they had the 17 days on them from day one, or you need more carts. Nose to tail thats c12 miles of carts, 7 miles of mules and 2 miles of manpower.
By your estimates it would have been impossible for any Roman army to operate in Britain or anywhere else for any length of time.
Meanwhile, I suggest you leave off the ad hominem attacks and ridiculous accusations - which have no place here - and come up with something of your own to contribute.
I repeat - If you still do not believe that this is plausible, provide an alternative.
(10-01-2021, 02:12 PM)[email protected] Wrote: We also know from Tacitus that when the revolt was finally over, some 2,000 Legionaries had to be drafted in from Germania... Many experts state that the majority of these were for Legio IX HISPANA... Legio IX could not have 2,000 dead. The math's simply do not add up.
I'm not sure that Cerialis wouldn't have brought half his legion with him, even if he had to leave the other half to guard the northern approaches. If he was marching into enemy territory he surely would have taken all his available troops?
But you're right that Tacitus doesn't explicitly say that the 9th lost 2000 men: "...two thousand legionaries, eight cohorts of auxiliaries, and a thousand cavalry. On their arrival the men of the ninth had their number made up with legionary soldiers." So some of the 2000 could have gone to make up losses in other legions, as you suggest.
I do wonder whether Cerialis would have marched without any orders from his senior, Paulinus, though - if he did, he would probably have received greater blame for what subsequently happened. His reckless advance on Colchester reads a bit more like the act of an ambitious subordinate interpreting his orders liberally, rather than an entirely independent action. Then again, we know so little about how orders and requests were passed up and down the chain of command.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Renatus - 10-06-2021
(10-06-2021, 05:46 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: I'm not sure that Cerialis wouldn't have brought half his legion with him, even if he had to leave the other half to guard the northern approaches. If he was marching into enemy territory he surely would have taken all his available troops?
But you're right that Tacitus doesn't explicitly say that the 9th lost 2000 men: "...two thousand legionaries, eight cohorts of auxiliaries, and a thousand cavalry. On their arrival the men of the ninth had their number made up with legionary soldiers." So some of the 2000 could have gone to make up losses in other legions, as you suggest.
I do wonder whether Cerialis would have marched without any orders from his senior, Paulinus, though - if he did, he would probably have received greater blame for what subsequently happened. His reckless advance on Colchester reads a bit more like the act of an ambitious subordinate interpreting his orders liberally, rather than an entirely independent action. Then again, we know so little about how orders and requests were passed up and down the chain of command.
I have long held the view that, on hearing of the revolt, Cerialis would have hot-footed it to Longthorpe ready to lead the garrison there against the enemy. I did not think that would be alone in that but am glad that someone else has put it into words. I am doubtful, though, that he would have left any able-bodied men there, when he marched out to the relief of Colchester. He would need everyone available. What he could have done is order a body of men, possibly veterans, to follow him from Lincoln to guard Longthorpe until the garrison returned.
The issue then is when he marched out. If we are right in thinking that Suetonius' plan was to rendezvous with Cerialis and to lead their combined force against the enemy, he would have sent a message to him to gather his troops and wait until he could join him. Cerialis could not have avoided censure for disregarding such an order, unless there was a good reason to do so. As I have said before, it is likely that he realised that the situation was critical and that Suetonius could not get to him in time and, even then, he was too late to save the colony. Despite Tacitus' criticism of him for being reckless, the setback does not seem to have damaged his career and it is likely that those who mattered accepted that he had little option.
As to the allocation of the 2000 legionaries sent from Germany, I would expect that all or most of them would have gone to bring the Ninth up to strength. The figure is very likely rounded up or down and the actual number could have varied by a few hundred either way. However, I feel that it is more likely to have been rounded down. In any campaign, such as Suetonius' assault on Anglesey, there are bound to be casualties but I am inclined to think that these would probably have been made good by normal recruitment. However, when a unit suffered a massive loss, as the Ninth evidently did, my guess is that the inclination would be to direct reinforcements to bring that unit as near as possible to full strength.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Steven James - 10-07-2021
Nathan wrote:
I'm not sure that Cerialis wouldn't have brought half his legion with him, even if he had to leave the other half to guard the northern approaches. If he was marching into enemy territory he surely would have taken all his available troops?
Some years ago Adrian Goldsworthy sent me his paper “Instinctive Genius.” I am not sure if it has been published. Goldsworthy makes some interesting observations about the Roman reactions to putting down rebellions. Goldsworthy writes:
“Caesar behaved in a similar way in the rebellion of 52, gathering whatever troops were available to strike as fast as possible, before moving on to confront another opponent. Once again he was to take the field with small, ill-supplied forces before the start of the campaigning season. As the year went on he continually advanced against Vercingetorix, to Avaricum, Gergovia, and Alesia in turn, putting pressure on the enemy and trying to force a decision. The reaction to the rebellion of 51 was similarly fast and aggressive, with a succession of rapid punitive expeditions being mounted through the winter, employing whatever forces were immediately available. This tendency to seize the initiative and then hold it by maintaining a constant offensive created an impression of force often far greater than the reality of the Roman military strength available at that time. Rebellions were weakest in their early stages, whilst many potential rebels were waiting to see whether or not the enterprise would prosper. Roman reverses encouraged the waverers to join a rising, as the Nervii did in 54, encouraged by the Eburones' success. Even Roman inactivity suggested weakness and encouraged the number of rebels to grow. However, if the Romans could strike quickly and confront the rebels successfully, then they stood a very good chance of defeating the rebellion before it gained momentum. Concentrating a large enough body of troops to ensure success and gathering sufficient transport and supplies to maintain them in the field for a protracted campaign took time, when any delay favoured the rebels not the Romans. The alternative was to gather whatever men were available and attack quickly hoping that the enemy were still weak. These operations were primarily displays of force, attempts to create an impression of such overwhelming strength that Roman success was inevitable. It did not matter if this impression of force was a facade, and that the Roman army was incapable of fighting a full scale campaign and might well be beaten if it encountered strong opposition. When Caesar chose to lead small armies against these rebellions he risked disaster if he encountered strong opposition.
An examination of the Roman reaction to insurrection during the late Republic and early Principate suggests on the contrary that Caesar's campaigns were typical. In the early stages of the Jewish rebellion in AD 66, the procurator Florus attempted and failed to control the uprising with the small auxiliary garrison of the province and the forces of Herod Agrippa II. When news of these reverses reached the Syrian legatus, Cestius Gallus, he mustered all the troops available at short notice and led them straight to the centre of the uprising at Jerusalem, pausing only briefly en route to send flying columns against any signs of open resistance. The army he led was impressive in numbers, but poorly supplied and many of its units were untrained or of dubious morale. In short it was not an army capable of fighting a full scale campaign. When Gallus encountered unexpectedly strong opposition at Jerusalem and his first assaults were repulsed, he was unable to mount a proper siege and was forced into a disastrous retreat. The next year, a properly organised and supplied Roman army returned to reconquer Judaea systematically. Earlier Syrian governors had mounted similar operations to that of Gallus with better results. Both Varus in 4 BC and Petronius in AD 40 had led hastily gathered armies in very short campaigns which were little more than demonstrations of force. In AD 9 Varus reacted to reports of a rising in Germany in exactly the same way, leading an ill-prepared force straight at the supposed centre of the uprising. The Roman force was incapable of dealing with the strong opposition it encountered and was destroyed. Another famous rebellion, that of Boudicca in AD 60, provoked a similar Roman response, Roman commanders choosing to confront the rebels immediately with whatever forces were available, rather than waiting to muster an army large enough to ensure victory. First the procurator Decianus Catus sent 200 poorly equipped men to defend Camulodonum, then the Petilius Cerialis led a vexillation of his Legio IX against the rebels, before finally Suetonius Paulinus managed to defeat the Britons with the field army, still a force of no more than 10,000 men. Both of these examples date to the first century of the Principate and were chosen because they can be described in rather more detail than similar operations dating to the Republic. At least as early as the Second Century BC, the normal Roman reaction to insurrection was to mount an immediate offensive. In 152 BC the Lusitanians rebelled, attacking tribes allied to Rome. Servius Sulpicius Galba moved against them as soon as the rebellion was reported, allegedly force-marching his troops over 60 miles in 24 hours and then sending his fatigued men straight into an unsuccessful action. Pompey's Judaean campaign was as swift and aggressive as any of these operations, but far less risky as the forces at his disposal were numerous, well supplied and trained, and proved fully capable of undertaking the full-scale, formal siege of Jerusalem. All of these operations show the Roman army behaving in a way that was anything but methodical, sacrificing the practical advantages to be gained by delaying to make proper preparations, in favour of striking immediately to create an impression of overwhelming force. It did not matter if this impression was a facade and the Roman force was incapable of fighting a full campaign or beating a strong opponent, since often the enemy was dismayed by the quick and confident response and a spectacular Roman victory resulted. Less often in reality, but likely to be recorded in more detail in our sources, an even more spectacular Roman disaster occurred.”
Also of interest G. Watson “The Roman Soldier” (1969) pages 62-66 writes “In an emergency march they (the Romans) would have carried minimum rations and left behind their entrenching tools and palisade stakes, the weight would have been steadily reduced as they consumed their rations.
Caesar (BG VII 40-41) “four legions without packs marched 50 miles within 24 hours, with a break of 3 hours.”
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Hanny - 10-07-2021
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: By your estimates it would have been impossible for any Roman army to operate in Britain or anywhere else for any length of time.
Nope, im using maths to show the logistical problems of your description of events and why your description is not a believable explanation, as what you describe is logistically improbable. If you dont like your implausible description being pulled apart, then the solution is to only post plausible explanations.
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: I repeat - If you still do not believe that this is plausible, provide an alternative.Its not plausible to anyone who can count or understands how armies logisticaly support themseves.
(09-22-2021, 02:22 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: So in fact the timeline is on the generous side. But my intention was to show what is plausible, and I have done so.
If you still do not believe that this is plausible, provide an alternative.
Ok , how about a timeline that adds 10 days to the time reach Rome and then on to the Rhine, its advantage over your time line, is that it does not involve staying awake 24 hours a day and riding every hour of the 24 and does not use an unfinshed function in Orbis.
We are told the Emperor dispatches the legions, so the order to march to Britain come from him. Augustas changed the system to have the same courier take the important dispatch from sender to receiver, and be able to be questioned if there was anyything more the receiver wanted and had a first hand person to ask, so the top ceiling is measuring day and night transfer, which a single courier cannot do as he cannot stay awake 24 hours a day to ride 250klm a day.
Orbis.
"Mean daily travel distances have been set at 12 kilometers per day for ox carts, 20km/day for porters or heavily loaded mules, 30km/day for foot travelers including armies on the march, pack animals with moderate loads, mule carts, and camel caravans,[18] 36km/day for routine private vehicular travel with convenient rest stops, 50km/day for accelerated private vehicular travel, 56km/day for routine travel on horseback, 60km/day for rapid short-term military marches without baggage, 67km/day for fast carriages (state post or private couriers), and 250km/day for continuous horse relays (Scheidel in preparation). Except for the final option, which is primarily meant to provide an absolute speed ceiling for multi-day terrestrial information transfer, these transport options are predicated on movement during daytime. Adjustment for night travel would produce higher rates but would usually be feasible only in the short term.".
So horse relay is an unfinished function and gives the absolute ceiling. Most books ive read on the courier service of Rome give that ceiling at 150klm a day for important dispatch, going same route as orbis is a 24 day journey, 10 days longer than Orbis.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Hanny - 10-07-2021
(10-07-2021, 12:12 AM)Steven James Wrote:Anyone has been able to download it for decades.Nathan wrote:I'm not sure that Cerialis wouldn't have brought half his legion with him, even if he had to leave the other half to guard the northern approaches. If he was marching into enemy territory he surely would have taken all his available troops?Some years ago Adrian Goldsworthy sent me his paper “Instinctive Genius.” I am not sure if it has been published.
https://www.quia.com/files/quia/users/bernardmason/APReadings/_The_Depiction_of_Caesar_the_General_
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Renatus - 10-07-2021
(10-07-2021, 08:41 AM)Hanny Wrote:(10-07-2021, 12:12 AM)Steven James Wrote:Anyone has been able to download it for decades.Nathan wrote:I'm not sure that Cerialis wouldn't have brought half his legion with him, even if he had to leave the other half to guard the northern approaches. If he was marching into enemy territory he surely would have taken all his available troops?Some years ago Adrian Goldsworthy sent me his paper “Instinctive Genius.” I am not sure if it has been published.
https://www.quia.com/files/quia/users/bernardmason/APReadings/_The_Depiction_of_Caesar_the_General_
Don't worry, Stephen. There are those in this world who can't resist scoring a cheap point.
You make a good point. David Breeze make a similar point at the Roman Army School at Durham a few years ago. I don't remember how the question arose but recall that he took the Jewish revolt as an example. In our case, there would seem to be a tension between Cerialis' characteristic urge for action and Suetonius' natural caution. However, with the fate of the colony at stake, it is possible that even Suetonius would regard it necessary to follow traditional Roman practice. I can see a message being sent along the lines of, ' You try to nip it in the bud. I won't be far behind you.' It may be that, although Tacitus criticised his temeritas , Cerialis avoided censure because he did exactly what was expected of him.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Hanny - 10-07-2021
(10-07-2021, 11:18 AM)Renatus Wrote: Don't worry, Stephen. There are those in this world who can't resist scoring a cheap point.his name is Steven not Stephen.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Renatus - 10-07-2021
(10-07-2021, 01:44 PM)Hanny Wrote: his name is Steven not Stephen.
You're right, of course, but I still await your explanation of what you mean by 'season'.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Hanny - 10-07-2021
(10-07-2021, 02:32 PM)Renatus Wrote: You're right, of course, but I still await your explanation of what you mean by 'season'.Look again at my post with seasons in them, you asked a question i had already answerd.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Renatus - 10-07-2021
(10-07-2021, 03:06 PM)Hanny Wrote: Look again at my post with seasons in them, you asked a question i had already answerd.
I assume that you are referring to your post #1991, which is the one containing the wording that I am querying. As you suggest, I have looked at it again. It is a long post and contains a lot of material that may or may not be relevant to this issue. Frankly, I am none the wiser, so please indulge me and set out in simple terms what you are suggesting. You need not go into great detail; a broad outline will do. Of course, if I have the wrong post, please give me the number of the correct one.
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Nathan Ross - 10-07-2021
(10-07-2021, 07:38 AM)Hanny Wrote: ... So horse relay is an unfinished function and gives the absolute ceiling. Most books ive read on the courier service of Rome give that ceiling at 150klm a day for important dispatch, going same route as orbis is a 24 day journey, 10 days longer than Orbis.
So having referred us to Orbis, you now decide that Orbis is... faulty? Hmm.
However, it is once again your own calculation that is faulty - Orbis gives the route as 2044km (see screenshot), which at your own figure of 150km per day would get our courier to Rome in 13.6 days - only a day or two over my estimated timeline.
Your calculation of 24 days might be right if the courier was travelling about 50 miles per day - the speed of the regular cursus publicus postal service. Military messengers carrying urgent reports could and did travel considerably faster than the ordinary post, of course - in one recorded case a message from Mainz, via Reims in Gaul, reached Rome in only 8-8.5 days, in the middle of winter.
Meanwhile, I continue to await your own projection of how this campaign would have worked, based on your own exaggerated notions of the plausible. Until you provide it, I'm afraid all you are demonstrating is the same generally obnoxious attitude that you have displayed on multiple threads on this board!
RE: Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand. - Steven James - 10-08-2021
(10-07-2021, 08:41 AM)Hanny Wrote: Anyone has been able to download it for decades.
https://www.quia.com/files/quia/users/bernardmason/APReadings/_The_Depiction_of_Caesar_the_General_
That may be so, but Goldsworthy sent me the paper as a Word 97 document, so it has been in my possession for quite a long time.
Steven