Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.

[Theoderic]

Hanny wrote:

Actually it is.

There are 7 principle* recent Uk works on the subject only one has the whole Army with P go to London, S Kaye, everyone else has him go to recon with a small mounted element.
Barry Horne
Grahame Appleby
John Pegg
Sullivan & Kinsella Clifton
John Waite
Graham Webster

Gutted.....obviously I am unprincipled 

---

We have a direct comparison about a leader marching to confront an attacking army, Harold Godwinson marching the 198 miles from London to York in 4 days and then fighting a battle. We also know that Caesar could march 50 miles a day. So in theory rather than the 14 / 15 days we normally attach to the march from Anglesey to London via Wroxeter and St Albans, it could have taken 2 days to Wroxeter, 4 to St Albans and 1 to London picking up supplies Wroxeter, St Albans and London.

Also interesting that Harold had to let a lot of his army go before the battle at Hastings to go and plant their crops in October.

[Theoderic]

Britannia must have been costing a fortune to maintain an army of around 40,000 men, and was a great drain on the Treasury and this needed to be paid for, as did the speculative loans from the Roman aristocracy including Senecca.

Already at this time there was extraction of Iron from the Weald, Lead and Silver from the Mendips, Copper, Wheat and Slaves would also have been for the taking as well as land at this time with Gold being extracted later. 

The removal of the Client King arrangement to bring the Iceni land into the fledgeling province, under Nero’s estates, must have been quite a military exercise even though it is given little description.

It would have to have been backed up with force and with the full knowledge of Seutonius Paulinus using Catus Decianus to administer the civil actions required by Nero and also possibly Senecca with the Trinovantes to repay the money required to build the Temple to Claudius in Colchester and the wheatfields of the Iceni.

If this was the case it seems likely that the Iceni were stripped of their wealth and lands during the winter of AD60 / AD61 whilst there was an overwhelming local Roman presence.

Seutonius Paulinus must have underestimated, like Scapula before him and have thought that the Iceni were compliant when he left his rear unguarded.

Copper and Gold mines in North Wales were the next obvious military campaign target as well as the wheat fields of Anglesey. The by-product of being able to attack the Druids in their seat of learning was advantageous but unrealistic as an attempt to remove the Druids as they would have had plenty of time to disperse. As a publicity exercise it was superb.

Generally the speed of travel by the Brythonic fighting force was always faster than that of the Roman Army as Caesar found in his expeditions to Britannia.

One of the major problems for Roman Generals was to defeat Brythonic armies completely in a formalised battle but they often escaped to harry the Roman columns through guerrilla warfare using hit and run raids and ambush. A roman marching column was particularly sensitive to this type of attack again as Caeser had found and was born out in the Teutenburg forests in Augustus’ reign.

On every occasion where there was a pitched battle the Romans inevitably won, which makes me think that although the Iceni could have defeated the 9th Legion on their way home, it seems more likely that, as the cavalry were probably at the front of the column and therefore nearest the enemy if there was a face to face confrontation and they escaped, that the column was ambushed with the infantry taking the brunt of the attack whilst in disarray on the march. 

(Below is my estimation of events given the estimated 18mpd for the Roman Army and 10mpd for the Brythons. I have tried to find a reason of why Colchester was completely undefended if troops had arrived from London at Colchester which would have given a few days for either the population to be evacuated or defences to have been thrown up. Also tried to incorporate Nathan's thoughts as well where we occasionally coincide. The days and therefore dates for the march could be reduced considerably (if Seutonius Paulinius had marched his army at 50 mpd, allowing for Seutonius Paulinus to arrive a couple of days before the Brythons in London if that was  their prime objective - although ihe latter seems unlikely seems unlikely).

AD60
September - December:
Prasutagus, King of the Iceni, supposedly wealthy, dies. His will divides the Iceni kingdom between Rome and his own two unmarried daughters. His widow Boudica becomes regent.

Nero decides to dissolve the Client King status to bring the Iceni lands under his total control and in line with Imperial policy.

Seutonius Paulinus obeys the decision and supports Catus Decianus in taking the Iceni lands into the Province as has already been done under Scapula with the Trinovantes.

Boudica disputes the right the Roman’s have to take all her husbands lands and Catus Decianus meets out a severe punishment having Boudica whipped, her daughters defiled, sells her relatives into slavery and evicts the Iceni aristocracy by force and installs tenants into their estates. Once the action had been taken by this insensitive Procurator, Seutonius Paulinus could not reverse events

AD61
January:
Boudica and her aristocracy lay plans to get back their lands and have secret meetings with the Druids to arrange tribal discussions with the Trinovantes, the Catauvelauni and the Coritani.

February:
Secret meetings take place with the Trinovantes to take back all the lands that have been appropriated by Roman veterans from both tribes. The obvious target is the destruction of Colchester to bring in the Trinovantes to the Iceni side and to allow the Trinovantes to reclaim their lands.

Ground is prepared for the spring wheat sowing by the Brythons

The tribes start to re-arm in secret.

March:
Spring wheat sown for tribute to Rome.

Brythons secret rearming continues

Seutonius Paulinus plans with his senior commanders from the 14th and the 2nd Legions for the upcoming campaign against the Decangli and the inhabitants of Mona.

Garrisons are set by SP for Cornwall / Devon, Wales and the North Midlands and East. Half Legions (2,000 men) kept at Longthorpe, Usk and Exeter (6,000 altogether) the rest of the army dispersed to garrison duties apart from the 14th and the Batavians based at Wroxeter.

April:
Rearming in secret of the Iceni and Trinovantes continues

Supplies gathered by SP at Rhyn Park for the invasion

May:
Boudica celebrates Beltaine and establishes herself as the figurehead reborn for the rebellion, if no longer a Queen, now a religious figure.

Rearming of the Iceni continues

War games at Wroxeter for the 14th and the Batavians

June:
Re-arming by the Brythons continues

Seutonius Paulinus, the 14th and the Batavians advance to Rhyn Park from Wroxeter

Seutonius Paulinus marches into North Wales, heading for Anglesey, building roads and bridges and subduing resistence as he marches.

July:
Paulinus continues to advance the 75 miles occupying territory and establishing forts along the road to protect his supply line.

Paulinus arrives opposite Mona and builds his camp

Paulinus builds landing barges at his camp on the Menai Straits

Re-arming continues for the Iceni and the Trinovantes

August:
August 1st  
Boudica celebrates Lughnasadh / Lammas (cutting of first sheaves) (The release of the hare incident - possibly) Iceni begin mustering at Thetford.

Harvest continues

Paulinus invades Anglesey and destroys the Furies

August 12th 
Commander at Colchester sends to Catus Decianus in London for re-inforcements for the Festival of Consulia and tribute from Iceni and Trinovantes

Catus Decianus sends letters to Cerialis and Seutonius Paulinus of his actions.

August 13th 
Iceni, having completed muster of people from the north of their lands, move from Thetford to Bury St Edmunds.

Cerialis receives word that the Festival is going to be much bigger than expected.

The Iceni leave Thetford for Colchester with wagons of wheat as tribute and continue to pick up people and wheat as they go via Bury St Edmunds

August 14th 
Catus Decianus sends 200 lightly armed troops to Colchester 

Seutonius Paulinus receives word that the Festival is going to be much bigger than expected and extra troops have been requested

Paulinus expands his landing area on Anglesey and pushes inland capturing slaves and land.

August 15th Roman troops burning Druid groves on Anglesey.

Attacks on outlying Romanised settlements and villas begin.  News of Iceni mobilisation reaches Colchester.

Commander of Colchester garrison sends to Catus / Cerialis and Seutonius an urgent HELP request for more men due to the of numbers of tribes people on their way.

August 16th The 200 re-inforcements from Catus Decanius arrive at Colchester

The letter for HELP arrives with Catus and Cerialis

Despite the extra troops, the garrison and the veterans living in Colchester no defensive ditches are dug. 

August 17th 
Iceni arrive at Colchester and the Trinovantes join them with their tribute camping and surrounding the city. The final the muster is complete.

Letter for HELP from Colchester arrives at Seutonius’ camp

Cerealis sends letter to Seutonius to saying he has gone to Colchester

Letter sent to Cerealis from Seutonius asking him to wait at Godmanchester

August 18th 
Cerealis takes the 2,000 infantry and his cavalry to relieve Colchester 

Paulinus completes his conquest of Anglesey and begins establishing and garrisoning forts around the Menai Strait and North Wales.

Seutonius receives Cerealis letter saying he has gone to Colchester

Festival Consualia 
Iceni and Trinovantes attack

Temple of Claudius under siege and set on fire

Rest of Colchester sacked and plundered.

Smokeand glow from fires seen from 20 miles away in Chelmsford and by shipping in the Thames


August 19th
Seutonius Paulinus musters an expeditionary force.

The sacking and looting of Colchester continues

Romans taking shelter in the Temple to Claudius are slaughtered

August 20th
Seutonius Paulinus, with c.7,000 men (14th Legion, plus 4 auxiliary units) begins a march of 100 miles to Wroxeter

Seutonius Paulinus on road day 1 (at 18 miles a day for 100 miles = 6 days)

Iceni and Trinovantes finish sacking Colchester

August 21st 
Iceni & Trinovantes leave the burnt out shell of Colchester to go home – fields to till and lands to reclaim

Cerealis’s force is destroyed a few miles outside Colchester (either ambushed or outnumbered by the returning Iceni). Cerealis falls back to his last marching camp and defends himself there.

Seutonius Paulinus on road day 2

Catus Decanius gets reports back of widespread reclamation of land by the Trinovantes and destruction of towns (Chelmsford destroyed) and Roman farmsteads by the Trinovantes. Sends letter to Seutonius Paulinus and Cerelias of the situation and  loads valuables on to ships

August 22nd 
Cerealis sends message to Seutonius Paulinus  and Catus Decanius telling of defeat and the loss of Colchester 

Seutonius Paulinus on road day 3

Catus Decianus receives Cerealis defeat letter and leaves for Gaul

August 23rd
Seutonius Paulinus on road day 4

Seutonius Paulinus receives Cerealis defeat letter

August 24th 
Seutonius Paulinus on road day 5

Catus arrives in Gaul and sends a message to Rome, reporting the imminent loss of the province.

August 25th 
Seutonius Paulinus on road day 6, arrives at Wroxeter.

August 26th 
Seutonius Paulinus replenishes and rests his troops for one day and re-groups

August 27th 
Seutonius Paulinus back on the road to go down to protect St Albans. Day 8 after leaving Mona (125 miles @ 18miles per day = 7 days) down Watling Street.

August 28th 
Seutonius Paulinus on road Day 9 after leaving Mona

Iceni and Trinovantes (moving at 10 miles a day) all back home.

Warrior bands destroying Roman farms, towns and reclaiming their lands. Possibly when Godmanchester destroyed.

Farmers and families tilling for the upcoming sowing of winter wheat in October

August 29th 
Seutonius Paulinus on road Day 10

Brython scouts monitor Seutonius Paulinus movements

August 30th 
Seutonius Paulinus  on road Day 11

Warrior bands deploy at the borders and access points into Trinovantes and Iceni Territory expecting attacks to be launched in the form of reprisals by Seutonius Paulinus

August 31st 
Seutonius Paulinus on Road Day 12

September 1st 
Seutonius Paulinus on road Day 13

September 2nd 
Seutonius Paulinus arrives at St Albans Day 14, Infantry rested

September 3rd 
Arrives in London 12 days after Trinovantes and Iceni leave Colchester and 15 days after he leaves Mona.

Seutonius Paulinus takes Cavalry and mounted Batavians to London on Day 15 to meet with Catus Decianus for a report and finds he has left but is told of the destruction of various towns and roman tenanted farmsteads between London and Colchester and Chelmsford which he confirms by scouting.

September 4th
Seutonius Paulinus, deciding that London cannot be held, orders the inhabitants to evacuate the city. He sends messages to the 2nd Legion detachment at Exeter to march via the Fosseway and Akeman Street, and to the 20th Legion at Usk,  – collective rendezvous at St Albans – and to Rome requesting reinforcements.

September 5th 
Seutonius Paulinus prepares his troops and gathers supplies and weapons at London, destroys warehouses south of the River Thames and burns London Bridge.

September 6th
Seutonius Paulinus retreats from London towards St Albans with refugees and supplies. Order to march reaches 20th Legion at Usk.

Brythonic scouts pick up retreat and inform Trinovante leaders who call for able bodied to muster at London. Couriers sent to Iceni Leaders of developments. Iceni Warbands
sent to St Albans and the able bodied called up to muster at Dunstable at the joining of Watling Street and the Icknield Way. Messages sent to the Catauvelauni and Coritani of impending battle opportunity and muster.

September 6th
Commander of 20th Legion sends to Veterans at Kingsholme to go to Seutonius Paulinus aid as holding down insurrections in Wales

September 7th
Seutonius Paulinus reaches St Albans, Order to march reaches 2nd Legion (under Poenius Postumus) at Exeter. Due to insurrections like the burning at Silchester in the South West, 2nd Legion does not send troops. (Had they been sent they would have arrived in time for the battle)

September 8th
Seutonius Paulinus still at St Albans, sending out scouts and detachments to watch the enemy. 20th Legion veterans, from Kingsholme on the road towards St Albans via Cirencester and Alchester. (5 Days march 18 miles per day)

September 9th
20th Legion Veterans pick up Cavalry Allae based at Cirencester

Letter sent from Seutonius Paulinus to outlying Roman forts to meet at Tring

Seutonius Paulinus sends letter to troops coming from the West along Akeman Street to camp near the (undiscovered fort?) near Tring (possibly near Cow Roast or Aston Clinton) and await for expected re-inforcements from Dorchester on Thames, Dunstable, Towcester etc.

September 10th
Veterans on the road.

September 11th
20th Legion Veterans pick up troops from Alchester.

September 12th
Trinovante warriors and Farmers muster outside London. Seutonius Paulinus  remains at St Albans.  Roman Veterans arrive at Aston Clinton with other troops

September 13th
London attacked and burnt by the Trinovantes

September 14th 
London sacked

September 15th
Trinovantes advance on St Albans.  Scouts report to Seutonius Paulinus who leaves St Albans and marches to Tring fort 1 day journey.

September 16th
Seutonius Paulinus takes troops to the battle field at Pitstone Hill.

Iceni / Coritani / Catauvellauni arrive at Dunstable with their baggage trains. 

September 17th
Trinovantes arrive at an abandoned and bare St Albans. Messages sent to the Iceni at Dunstable to cut off Seutonius Paulinus on Akeman Street at Aston Clinton. Trinovantes advance up the Bulbourne to Cow Roast. Catus’s initial message of disaster arrives at Rome.

September 18th
Trinovantes and Iceni meet at Pitstone Hill to do battle with SP.

Battle is joined. Roman victory. Boudica defeated. Brythons flee back home

September 19th
Paulinus rests his troops after the battle. 

September 20th
Sends messages for the 2nd (from Exeter) and 20th (from Usk) Legions (4,000 infantry) plus distributed forts throughout Wales to join him at St Albans. Messages sent to Rome of victory and asking asking for re-inforcements.

September 29th
Army starts to assemble at St Albans and immediate repairs started.

September 30th
Brythons arrive back home.

October 1st
Crop planting season begins around now, interrupted due to war.

October 2nd
Classicianus ordered to Britain from Gaul as replacement procurator.

October 5th
2nd and 20th Legions of 4,000 men arrive at St Albans

October 10th
Paulinus consolidates army outside London. “The whole army was then brought together and kept under canvas to finish the remainder of the war.”

October 15th
Classicianus reaches Britain as replacement Procurator.

October 20th
Re-inforcements arrive from the Rhine making at the very least an army of 10,000 legionaries, 6,000 auxilliaries, and 2,000 cavalry for the early campaign

October 25th Roman troops spread out across Iceni land burning crops and villages. Boudica takes poison and dies.

November – December

Paulinus sends his main army into winter quarters. Detachments continue devastating rebel lands: “whatever tribes still wavered or were hostile were ravaged with fire and sword.”  Classicianus becomes  concerned that the Province is being denuded of resources pointlessly. Classicianus sends report to Rome complaining of Paulinus’s actions: “no cessation of fighting must be expected, unless Suetonius were superseded.”

Forts re built and new ones started through Iceni and Trinovante lands. 

Iceni driven into the Fens where they continue to wage guerrilla warfare.

AD62
February
Attacks continue in the Fens and several ships wrecked in a storm while supporting land troops in counter-insurgency operations. Classicianus sends report of the losses, and the ongoing severity of Paulinus's actions, to Rome.

March
Nero sends Polyclitus, ordered to investigate the situation in Britain, sets out from Rome with a huge retinue.

April
Polyclitus arrives and sends more favourable report to Rome, then departs Britain.

June
Turpilianus arrives in Britain and replaces Paulinus

July – September
Famine – limited spring sowing undertaken by the Iceni (as many still at war) and the reduced winter wheat sown due to the war on reclaimed estates taken by Rome as their tribute, leave little for the Iceni and cause major famine.

[Hanny]

Hanny wrote:

Actually it is.

There are 7 principle* recent Uk works on the subject only one has the whole Army with P go to London, S Kaye, everyone else has him go to recon with a small mounted element.
Barry Horne
Grahame Appleby
John Pegg
Sullivan & Kinsella Clifton
John Waite
Graham Webster

Gutted.....obviously I am unprincipled

---

We have a direct comparison about a leader marching to confront an attacking army, Harold Godwinson marching the 198 miles from London to York in 4 days and then fighting a battle. We also know that Caesar could march 50 miles a day. So in theory rather than the 14 / 15 days we normally attach to the march from Anglesey to London via Wroxeter and St Albans, it could have taken 2 days to Wroxeter, 4 to St Albans and 1 to London picking up supplies Wroxeter, St Albans and London.

Also interesting that Harold had to let a lot of his army go before the battle at Hastings to go and plant their crops in October.

https://historicengland.org.uk/content/d...rd-bridge/

There are a number of problems with this comparison, first we have no date for when Harold sets out to march north, so its time frame somewhere between Sept. 12-16* to go North to Tadcaster reaching it on 24th Sept, and then moving to engage Vikings on the 25th after marching another 12 miles or so, so there is a wide range for number of days to move the distance for the mounted elements and no way to know were the Fyrds joined the march, as evidenced by those numbers being different in many books. Second we have pretty good data on Caesers armies movement and its 16mpd and never marched in light order, ie without supplies, for more than 7 days, so im afraid those using a compressed 14/15 days for P march have invented a timeline that simply contradicts to much of what we know is possible.

However its clear that to compare mounted movement of Saxon armies mounted movement over friendly lands, with foot movement of legions inc enemy lands, is not going to help understand anything of much use.

*https://geoffboxell.tripod.com/stamford.htm
"News of the attack on and burning of Scarborough around 15 September 1066 by the Viking invaders under King Harald Hardrada, King of Norway, and Tosti the expelled Earl of Northumberland was speedily brought to King Harold Godwinson who was in London. snip"The mounted force met up with elements from the West Mercian and East Anglian Fyrd on the way north."

Second the Huscarls of the Anglo Saxon Army used horses to move and then fought on foot.
https://www.english-heritage.org.uk/visi...-hastings/

" English armies used horses for getting around, but on the battlefield they fought on foot."

https://regia.org/research/warfare/fyrd2.htm
"How Alfred's fyrdmen were equipped is uncertain, although spears and shields still remained the prime weapons. It may well be that this was all the equipment the average burwaran would use, possibly supplied to him by his lord. The fyrdmen, on the other hand were a professional warrior class, drawn from amongst the wealthiest men in the country, expecting to face a well equipped, professional enemy army. The evidence we have suggests that helmets, swords and mailshirts had become much more common by the time of Alfred's reforms, and most of the fyrd would have been equipped with at least a helm and sword in addition to their spear, shield and horse. Many would also have possessed a mailshirt. Some of the more well off burwaran may also have been equipped in a similar way to the fyrd."

Lastly you have confused Harolds release of the fyrd due to inability to feed it, releasing them bring in the harvest on 8th Sept with something else.

[Theoderic]

Hanny wrote:

There are a number of problems with this comparison, first we have no date for when Harold sets out to march north, so its time frame somwhere between  Sept. 12-16* to go North to Tadcaster reaching it on  24th Sept, and then moving to engage Vikings on the 25th after marching another 12 miles or so, so there is a wide range for  number of days to move the distance for the mounted elements and no way to know were the Fyrds joined the march, as evidenced by those numbers being different in many books.

The article you quote states:  "This epic march of 185 miles from London to Yorkshire in barely six days has become one of the heroic icons of English history",  so I can live with a 2 day difference but I have to say that all the references that I have seen previously relate 4 days. Also this was not just the mounted men as they collected the East Anglian Fyrd enroute.

Interestingly the King could only keep the Fyrd in the field for around 6 weeks by law because of their farming duties.

The point I am trying to make is that armies can move far faster than 18 miles a day on a long march when it is necessary, which in this case cuts down the amount they would have to carry in food especially when you are talking about gaining supplies at the longest 4 days at Caesar Speed. 

Harold was moving at least 30mpd. Julius Caesar moved at 50mpd in extremis (and actually recorded as 80mpd on occasions) with his whole army not just mounted troops but with little baggage.
 
These distances were acheived because although the rate of march was about 4mph both commanders extended the marching day considerably, often into the night.

I am not relying on on this speed of march to prove a point just an observation that it could be done and adds another dimension as my theory does not rely on the Iceni / Trinovantes in a race to reach London first as I dont believe it was their prime objective. Regaining and retaining their stolen land however was.

[Hanny]

As i wrote, there are many different number of days used for the march, as we dont know when it started, only when Harold reaches Tadcaster, it follows your example of mounted movem,ent rates, fails to support anything.

You have confused the Great fyrd, which includes the foot, with the select fyrd which is all mounted, you then get confused on when the select fyrd was called up, back in May and held to service till 8th Sept, and what a mounted force can move with a foot mounted one.

You then confuse Caesers movement with a Roman armies movement, and give a rate that no Roman army on foot achieved over a sustained 14 day period, marching longer ( twice as long as Caeser and faster each day than Caeser) than any Roman army ever forced marched without its supply train, and you have to have food to march with.

We have the mpd Romans were achieving in Armenia, the best they achieved was 40 miles in a day, when fleeing for their lives and abandoning all their wounded. https://www.ourcivilisation.com/smartboa...chap15.htm so sorry but your mpd is not going to work.

[Theoderic]

Hanny wrote:

You are confused.....

Well possibly but......why on earth would an established fact suddenly be turned on its head as part of confusion and a march that has always been admired for its speed suddenly be denied?

My understanding has always been that the Harold had his Earls who held their lands on his behalf, these lands were then broken down into smaller areas ruled over by Thegns who in turn had their own warrior bands or Housecarls. The average man, farmers, blacksmiths etc made up the Fyrd which could be called up to serve for a small period. The Fyrd was basically made up of a civilian militia and would be summoned to defend the area nearest the danger, regardless of whether they were mounted or not....but you obviously are a greater expert than I.

I think if you actually look at what Julius Caesar acheived you would see that he did indeed cover huge distances on a daily rate....but I would agree not over a 14 day period ....but then you must in turn be confused as I never said that in the first place.

In both Gelzer and Goldsworthy's work on Caesar, they say one of his key military advantages was how quickly he could move his troops. Both give the number of 90 miles a day.

Caesar did not move his troops at 90 miles a day regularly, only on a few occasions to steal a march on his enemies. 

Still, Caesar did move very quickly through Gaul at all times, but his extremely rapid advances were only done once or twice to maneuver around enemy formations--Caesar was quite well known for appearing in the rear of an enemy army literally overnight. 

Caesar would often march with no baggage and often resorted to forced marches, including use of night marches, which was a key feature of his strategy of movement. While marching to Gergovia, for example, Caesar split his army in two, leaving behind some troops as decoys, and marched through the night without stopping to come around behind Vercingetorix. Against the Helvetii Caesar marched throughout the night to beat them to the Saone. There are claims that Caesar marched nearly 100 miles, not his army. That's simply untrue.
   
Caesar made the march to Lake Geneva in 8 days! A quick look at geography will show this to be a rate of march between 80-100 miles a day, a speed only possibly because of Caesar's insistence on marching through the night. Caesar was able to delay the Helvetii for two weeks with diplomatic talk, giving his men the opportunity to rest--, because they were tired (which is what I propose happened with Seutonius Paulinis army at St Albans) the whole point was to get to the Rhone before the enemy, allowing him to destroy the bridges and force the Helvetii to stop and talk (with Seutonius Paulinus it was to protect St Albans and its Roman citizens).

Nor is such a speed of march impossible for others--Napoleon marched a comparable speed through Italy, slowed down only during the beginning of his campaign by the Alps.

[Nathan Ross]

The point I am trying to make is that armies can move far faster than 18 miles a day on a long march when it is necessary

Another example would be Henry III's march with infantry and cavalry from Nottingham via Grantham, Aylesbury and Kingston to break the siege of Rochester in April 1264 - a distance of c.176 miles covered in eight days, at around 22 miles a day.

my theory does not rely on the Iceni / Trinovantes in a race to reach London first

I'm increasingly coming to agree with you on that, although perhaps for the opposite reason!

As I now see it, Tacitus does not tell us that the Britons advanced immediately on London after defeating Cerialis, and had they done so it would have suggested a degree of planning and intention that I doubt they possessed at first. The conquest of Colchester and the destruction of a Roman relief force would have given Boudica and her followers considerable renown, raised their ambitions, and expanded what had been a relatively local revolt into a much larger uprising.

I'm not convinced by the idea of the Iceni etc returning home after Colchester, although I know we've discussed this before. Letting the rebellion dissipate at that point would seem a mistake. London was undefended and had large supplies of grain, so heading there sooner or later would be an obvious next objective. And it does seem that the Britons did not expect that Paulinus could move his troops quickly enough to oppose them, as he was supposedly tied up in North Wales.

Paulinus 'saved the province with rapid movement', as T says in Agricola. So it was perhaps while the Iceni and Trinovantes were gathering allies and deciding plans for the next move that he got his army down to London.

[Renatus]

To say that Tacitus' account of the revolt presents us with a chronological conundrum would be something of an understatement.  However, I have been trying to get to grips with it in the light of recent comments and I now present my conclusions.  This involves the occasional repetition and, to some extent, modification of what I have said previously.

The first thing to note is that the bulk of Tacitus' account relates to the events of a single year, AD61.  The only part of it that can be said to relate unequivocally to a later period is what he says about the governorship of Petronius Turpilianus.  There are two passages that lead to this conclusion.  First, there is his statement that the revolt broke out during the consulship of Caesennius Paetus and Petronius Turpilianus (Caesen[n]io Paeso et Petronio Turpiliano consulibus).  I will consider the possible significance of this wording later.  The second is the statement that, after the investigation and report of Polyclitus and the debacle of the wrecked ships, Suetonius was ordered to hand his army over to Turpilianus who had resigned his consulship (qui iam consulatu abierat).  These were the last recorded events of Suetonius' governorship and there seems little doubt that they occurred in the same year.  As I have remarked before, the significant word is iam.  Translators have rendered this differently - Church & Brodribb, 'just'; Michael Grant in Penguin, 'recent'; Loeb, 'by now' - but all, together with its literal meaning of 'at this/that time', convey the impression of a comparatively recent event.  Turpilianus would have stood down in favour of a suffect consul in June or July 61 and iam would have been a singularly inappropriate word to use for an event occurring in or after January 62, when even the suffect consuls would have laid down their offices.  All this points to the events leading to the appointment of Petronius Turpilianus as governor occurring no later than the end of 61.  What can possibly be pushed into 62 is Turpilianus' arrival in the province.  This would mean that the order to hand over the army to the new governor was issued in 61 but with the implicit rider, 'when he arrives in the province'.  It is evident from this that I have difficulty in accepting a timeline that has Polyclitus arriving to conduct his investigation during a second year.  This would mean that, as the making of his report, the loss of the ships and the order to hand over to Turpilianus all took place subsequently and Tupilianus laid down his consulship in June/July 61, the revolt must have broken out in AD60, thus reviving the old notion that Tacitus had made a mistake with his dates.  I am fundamentally opposed to the doctrine that anything that we find difficult to understand can be explained away by assuming that the author had made a mistake, rather than acknowledging a possible deficiency in our understanding.  There may be instances in which such a conclusion can be justified but I do not think that this is one of them.

With this in mind, we have to consider the time when the revolt might have broken out, as there is a lot to fit in before the end of the year.  Nathan has proposed that this would be after the harvest in 61 and, further, that that harvest might have been a poor one.  If that were the case, it would presumably mean that a poor harvest would have taken less time to get in than a full harvest and that the revolt could have broken out slightly earlier than would otherwise have been the case.  There is another possibility, however.  The product of a full harvest would surely have been too great for the rebels to take with them and, accordingly, they could have harvested only so much of the crop as they could have loaded on to their wagons.  However, there is an objection to both these scenarios: Tacitus' wording that I have referred to above.  'Caesen[n]io Paeso et Petronio Turpiliano consulibus' means, literally, 'with Caesennius Paeso and Petronius Turpilianus consuls' or, in less stilted English, 'when Caesennius Paetus and Petronius Turpilianus were consuls'.  Taken at face value, this refers to the period when they were ordinary consuls, before handing over their consulships to suffects in June or July and, thus, before the harvest.

To consider when the outbreak could have occurred earlier in the year, we have to take into account two further statements from Tacitus.  First, He says in Agricola 15 that the Britons began discussing their grievances after Suetonius had set out on his campaign to Anglesey; secondly, that news of the outbreak came to him after he had defeated the inhabitants of the island and was engaged in establishing a garrison and destroying the sacred groves (Annals, 14.30).  So, how long did the rebels take in their preparations and how long did it take for Suetonius to reach that stage of his operation?  I am not going to attempt to suggest a detailed timeline but will speak in general terms.  We do not know when Prasutagus died or how long it took Catus Decianus to arrange for the appropriation of the Icenian lands and for his subordinates to accomplish it.  Deryk suggests that it might have taken some time and he may well be right.  Certainly, if Prasutagus' death had to be reported to Rome and for authorisation of the annexation to come back to the province, it is easy to imagine that has death occurred sometime in AD60.  That said, the annexation must have taken place by spring AD61 to fit in with the timing suggested by Tacitus.  Boudica's preparations need not have taken long.  Enlisting the assistance of the Trinovantes would have been relatively easy.  They were the neighbouring tribe and already had grievances of their own regarding appropriation of land.  Engaging other tribes need not have involved organising a grand tribal assembly.  All that was required was to send out envoys with a simple message, 'Prasutagus was a client king and look what happened to us.  You are in for the same or worse, if you do not join us.'  She could then wait until the envoys retuned with pledges of support and then, when she had enough to give her confidence, embark upon the revolt.

Meanwhile, Suetonius was engaged on his Anglesey campaign but we are given few details.  The fighting on the island seems to have been over very quickly.  We may infer from Tacitus' description that the inhabitants threw everything they had into opposing the Romans' landing and, failing in that, had nothing left, leaving Suetonius free to establish his garrison and destroy the groves.  The bulk of his campaign, therefore, would have consisted in marching to the Menai Straits and building the invasion barges.  Being a cautious general, it is unlikely that he set out with less than his full campaign army, deterring any opposition with a massive show of force.  We may see him, therefore, assembling his forces during the spring of AD61 and setting of as soon as he deemed weather conditions to be favourable.  The march need have taken no longer than would have been expected of any campaigning army and he may have been able to take advantage of pre-existing track-ways.  On the other hand, the time taken to construct the barges remains uncertain, depending on their number, design and carrying capacity.  Being able to call on the resources of his whole army for felling trees and building the barges will probably have speeded up the process.  The number will have depended upon how large a force he intended to land on the island and whether he intended to carry it across in one or more waves.  Again, being cautious, he is likely to have used a substantial force and, considering that the enemy would have had plenty of notice of his intentions and appears to have massed on the shore to oppose him, it is likely that he sent it across in one wave.  However, he is unlikely to have used his full army but kept a substantial part of it back, strategically placed to protect his rear.  We know nothing of the design or carrying capacity of the barges but they may well have been little more than glorified punts and, therefore, knocked up quite quickly.  Of course, the longer this process took, the nearer it takes us to the middle of the year for the outbreak of the revolt.

The final issue to consider is the missed planting of crops.  If we suppose that the revolt broke out before the harvest, the missing of planting in the autumn ceases to be relevant.  We then have to consider the possible significance of missing sowing in the spring.  If I understand Hanny's comment in his post #1991 correctly, the natural cycle for cereal is planting in spring for harvesting at the end of the year but this is modified by human intervention in the form of manuring and weeding, which leads to increased yields and, possibly, earlier maturation.  This being so, the lack of such intervention would result in cereal reverting to its natural cycle.  Thus, failure to sow in the spring would mean that there was nothing to harvest in the latter part of the year, after the defeated rebels had returned to their homelands, and this, coupled with the failure to harvest the crop from the previous year, would have led to the famine referred to by Tacitus.

[Nathan Ross]

What can possibly be pushed into 62 is Turpilianus' arrival in the province... Suetonius was ordered to hand his army over to Turpilianus who had resigned his consulship (qui iam consulatu abierat).

It seems that governors usually arrived in their provinces in the summer of their first year of office. Perhaps Turpilianus's appointment was a last-minute decision, taken in late spring rather than the previous year as per normal?

In such a case, might Tacitus simply be telling us that it was by now in fact the following year, and Turpilianus was no longer Consul?

Are there other references to Ordinary Consuls 'resigning' or 'laying down' their consulships and going on to do different things that same year?

Polyclitus arriving to conduct his investigation during a second year... would mean that... the revolt must have broken out in AD60, thus reviving the old notion that Tacitus had made a mistake with his dates. 

Yes, I've began once more to incline towards this particular heresy!

All the more galling as I'd spent so long arguing against the '60/61' dating, and Tacitus is unusually specific with AD61. But sadly it does make a lot more sense of the chronology if the revolt was in late summer-autumn 60, and Turpilianus took over in summer 61.

Does it have to be a mistake on T's part, though? In Agricola there's no mention of the date (or of Prasutagus, or the treatment of Boudica - it seems it took a while for these details to emerge!); could it be that Tacitus, researching the story fifty years later in whatever official source he was using, found all the events of the British revolt listed under AD61, which was the year that Classicianus's full report on Paulinus's military activities arrived and the emperor took the decision to replace the governor? Tacitus might have considered that officially speaking the whole thing happened that year, even if he knew that in fact most of it had happened the previous autumn.

A bit too tortuous, or a possibility? We would have to look at some other examples of Tacitean chronology to work out how plausible this might be.

The product of a full harvest would surely have been too great for the rebels to take with them and, accordingly, they could have harvested only so much of the crop as they could have loaded on to their wagons. 

I tend to think that an agricultural people would never break off a harvest and leave standing crops in the fields. But they had to move fairly promptly; if they waited until the full harvest season was done, the campaign season would be over too, and Paulinus and his legions would be looming over the horizon once more...

A poor and brief harvest is more likely than a deliberately abbreviated one, I think, and makes more sense of the note about seizing Roman supplies.

...failure to sow in the spring would mean that there was nothing to harvest in the latter part of the year, after the defeated rebels had returned to their homelands, and this, coupled with the failure to harvest the crop from the previous year, would have led to the famine referred to by Tacitus.

The problem is that both winter and summer crops were harvested at around the same time - August/September. So if the spring planting was missed, the autumn-planted crop could still be harvested, and famine averted. Tacitus is specific that the famine was caused by missed sowing, not missed harvesting.

If the harvest was bad, and the rebels were away for the sowing season that followed but meanwhile lost what little they had harvested after taking it with them on their failed campaign, they would have had little to sustain them over the winter, nothing to sow the following spring and nothing to harvest the following summer either. Famine would have set in quickly.

I still think this is the only scenario that would create a famine as a direct (or indirect?) result of a missed sowing season.

[Crispianus]

Hanny wrote:

There are a number of problems with this comparison, first we have no date for when Harold sets out to march north, so its time frame somwhere between  Sept. 12-16* to go North to Tadcaster reaching it on  24th Sept, and then moving to engage Vikings on the 25th after marching another 12 miles or so, so there is a wide range for  number of days to move the distance for the mounted elements and no way to know were the Fyrds joined the march, as evidenced by those numbers being different in many books.

The article you quote states:  "This epic march of 185 miles from London to Yorkshire in barely six days has become one of the heroic icons of English history",  so I can live with a 2 day difference but I have to say that all the references that I have seen previously relate 4 days. Also this was not just the mounted men as they collected the East Anglian Fyrd enroute.

Interestingly the King could only keep the Fyrd in the field for around 6 weeks by law because of their farming duties.

The point I am trying to make is that armies can move far faster than 18 miles a day on a long march when it is necessary, which in this case cuts down the amount they would have to carry in food especially when you are talking about gaining supplies at the longest 4 days at Caesar Speed. 

Harold was moving at least 30mpd. Julius Caesar moved at 50mpd in extremis (and actually recorded as 80mpd on occasions) with his whole army not just mounted troops but with little baggage.
 
These distances were acheived because although the rate of march was about 4mph both commanders extended the marching day considerably, often into the night.

I am not relying on on this speed of march to prove a point just an observation that it could be done and adds another dimension as my theory does not rely on the Iceni / Trinovantes in a race to reach London first as I dont believe it was their prime objective. Regaining and retaining their stolen land however was.

Just a few notes re 1066, taken from the combined Anglo Saxon Chronicles (Garmonsway) as these often include dates:

8/9 sept forces on the south coast disband and go home.

no date is given for Harald H's arrivel as far as I can see.

20/9 battle at fulford gate, after being informed of the results of fulford harold travels the distance presumably from london to york in 4 days as I assume he wouldnt have set off untill the 21/9 with his huscarls, gathering the militia en route, google maps gives it as a 65hour walk at 3mph@, so plenty of time to rest en route.

However harold may have started out previous to the 20/9 as the chronicles appear to conflict on the earlier start which includes a forced day/night march before the 20/9, so harold may already have been on his way.

25/9 battle at stamford bridge (5 days later)

28/9 william leaves normandy

29/9 william arrives in England likely at Pevensey.

31/9 (estimated may have been later) harold leaves york, date not given (or I've missed it) but likely a day or too after william lands, 82hrs walk at 3mph, obviously took some additional time to gather the militia as the battle wasn't fought untill:

14/10 battle of hastings (battle), the only thing harold had to do here was trap william on the hastings peninsular for the winter but of course he was killed...

I think if a relatively untrained force can manage these kind of distances in the times given I cannot really see a problem with Roman professionals doing at least as well...

[Theoderic]

Nathan wrote:

Tacitus is specific that the famine was caused by missed sowing, not missed harvesting.

If the harvest was bad, and the rebels were away for the sowing season that followed but meanwhile lost what little they had harvested after taking it with them on their failed campaign, they would have had little to sustain them over the winter, nothing to sow the following spring and nothing to harvest the following summer either. Famine would have set in quickly.

I still think this is the only scenario that would create a famine as a direct result of a missed sowing season.


Nothing however distressed the enemy so much as famine, for they had been careless about sowing corn, people of every age having gone to the war, while they reckoned on our supplies as their own

This statement by Tacitus implies that the Brythons had planned to live off wheat that the Romans were going to use for themselves in the future by capturing supplies from the wheat in granaries held in Roman Towns, knowing that they had not planted enough wheat to last themselves.

This on reflection seems an unlikely scenario.

No farmer would allow under sowing knowing the vagaries of growing food knowing the risk of a poor harvest.

The Brythons exported wheat to Rome before the Claudius invasion probably from Fingringhoe and they were expert at wheat production and trade and would not ignore sowing or harvest times as their very lives and those of their families relied on the wheat.

Then of course Tacitus doesn’t say they didn’t plant corn but had been “careless” about sowing (perhaps enough) corn. 

I think that it was Michael who said the famine could be the following year after the battle and I am now coming around to his way of thinking. 

By the Spring of AD61 the territories of the Iceni and the Trinovantes were Roman Provinces run on the Roman Estate System and owned by Rome, not by the tribes, and the locals were tenants. Therefore the corn that was planted in the winter of AD60 actually belonged to Rome.

The Iceni would however have already stored their grain across their lands from the harvest of the end of the AD60 Summer and would therefore had enough to live off during AD61 up to JUly.

They would have sown the wheat for their consumption in the Spring of AD61 on non Roman Land.

If in the first instance the corn from the Roman Estates (previously Iceni land) was taken to Colchester and then Colchester burnt, the tribes would have had both the stocks from Colchester granaries and the corn that they took to Colchester, plenty of wheat by September AD61, to last them through to July AD62.

If they then planted up the Winter wheat after Boudica lost the battle in October AD61 on the previously held Roman Estates that were now back in their hands the Winter wheat sowing of October AD61 was re-taken by the Romans in the winter of AD61 /62 and the AD62 harvest now was the Roman’s corn.

“While they reckoned on our (Roman) supplies as their own”

The Iceni were still at war (and in fact were not defeated in battle after Boudica) having been driven into the Fens by Seutonius Paulinus. (Supported by the loss of ships
incident)

“People of every age having gone to the war”

Suetonius was retained in the government; but as he subsequently lost a few vessels on the shore with the crews, he was ordered, as though the war continued, to hand over his army to Petronius Turpilianus, who had just resigned his consulship.

The Iceni could not sow their Spring wheat nor access the Roman wheat and therefore had little staple food by August AD62 and although Seutonius Paulinus had handed over his command a famine ensued.

[Crispianus]

This statement by Tacitus implies that the Brythons had planned to live off wheat that the Romans were going to use for themselves in the future by capturing supplies from the wheat in granaries held in Roman Towns, knowing that they had not planted enough wheat to last themselves.

This on reflection seems an unlikely scenario.

"Apart from the fact that the army would never have held enough stores to feed such a large native population"

"A remarkable effect of the fire is that it preserved organic materials which would not otherwise have survived. The conditions had to be right: the objects must burn enough to char but not enough to turn to ash. This suits grain and as a result there are many instances in the Boudiccan debris of charred material of this kind. Charred wheat grain is especially common there being piles of it on the floors in buildings at balkerne lane,culver street and the cups hotel sites" etc...

And goes on to say it was well processed and stored... which suggests to me that the Celts didn't take large quantity's of foodstuffs that where deliberatly stored around the town, which is at odds with the capturing supplies theory...

" The pots had all been smashed as if the britons had gone on the rampage before finally setting the buildings alight"

you can in fact find out what the population of colchester was eating and drinking on the day the town was burnt with a high degree of certainty... a little bit of pompeii...

quotes from: "City of Victory" The British Revenge, P.Crummy

See also: Colchester Archaeologial Reports etc database is searchable with keywords.

Also: https://www.thecolchesterarchaeologist.co.uk/

[Nathan Ross]

you can in fact find out what the population of colchester was eating and drinking on the day the town was burnt with a high degree of certainty... a little bit of pompeii...

Fascinating! I wonder if any of the food or other traces might tell us more about what time of year the destruction took place, as some people claim about Pompeii?

This is from Radford and Gascoyne's Colchester, Fortress of the War God: an Archaeological Assessment (2013):

   

[Crispianus]

you can in fact find out what the population of colchester was eating and drinking on the day the town was burnt with a high degree of certainty... a little bit of pompeii...

Fascinating! I wonder if any of the food or other traces might tell us more about what time of year the destruction took place, as some people claim about Pompeii?

This is from Radford and Gascoyne's Colchester, Fortress of the War God: an Archaeological Assessment (2013):

Maybe the Dates the harvesting season seems to be early August and were on the stalk so potentially could have been transported early, but they may have been from the previous year?

2014 from the Williams and Griffin site: https://www.thecolchesterarchaeologist.co.uk/?p=33680

unfortunatly I'm a bit behind on the archaeology but there may be some indication...

[Theoderic]

Crispianus wrote:

"Apart from the fact that the army would never have held enough stores to feed such a large native population"

And goes on to say it was well processed and stored... which suggests to me that the Celts didn't take large quantity's of foodstuffs that where deliberately stored around the town, which is at odds with the capturing supplies theory.

Ivor, thank you for your observations.

It seems from the evidence that the Brythons only wanted to wipe Colchester off the map, throwing the occupying Romans off their lands and didn’t need supplies.

This also supports the theory that their prime objective was Colchester and not an extended campaign at this time, the real prize was getting their land back.

I have always wondered why the inhabitants of Colchester did not fortify the town if they were concerned about being attacked and did not send away its vulnerable citizens including the old, the women and children. It would appear that unusual activity was apparent but that people were reassured. A request for more troops was made, they were sent and arrived but it seems from the description they were not fully armed, so again if there was an imminent threat why weren’t they? 

Colchester would appear to be at peace and totally unprepared.