Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.

[Renatus]

Alan,

I agree with your general assessment that there was no 'cavalry dash' and that Suetonius marched south with a substantial force.  There are, however, some points upon which which I disagree.  You are probably familiar with my arguments, having followed this thread, but I will reiterate them anyway with some additions.

I do not think that the force that Suetonius took south represents his whole campaigning army.  I believe that, knowing that he was attacking an island of major religious significance and expecting substantial opposition, as well as being a cautious general, he invaded North Wales in force, taking the 2nd, 14th and 20th Legions with the intention of countering opposition by sheer intimidation.  The veterans of those legions, those of 16 years' service who were not expected to fight unless themselves threatened, remained guarding their legionary fortresses, under the command of their respective praefecti castrorum.  When he learned of the threat to Colchester, he detached one legion, the 14th, and perhaps some auxiliaries, intending to rendezvous with Cerialis and the 9th Legion and go together to the relief of the colony or, if Cerialis had felt obliged to tackle the revolt on his own, at least to back him up.  This would take him along Watling Street to its junction with the Via Devana, along that to its junction with Ermine Street and thence to Colchester.  On hearing of the fall of the colony and the defeat of Cerialis, he carried on down Ermine Street but, instead of branching off towards the ruined colony, continued on to London.  This took him through the fringes of the territories of the Iceni and the Trinovantes and these are the 'hostes' referred to by Tacitus.  Going to London down Watling Street would have taken him through the territory of the Catuvellauni, who we have concluded, were not hostile to Rome.

In London, he made an appreciation and, considering that Cerialis' part-legion had evidently been completely overwhelmed, concluded that his single legion was insufficient to confront the enemy and defend London and, therefore, decided to abandon the town.  I have suggested that he had gone northwards up Watling Street to Verulamium, where he could leave the civilians accompanying him and gather reinforcements to take on the rebels.  He needed every man he could get and it is likely that, before leaving London, he had sent messengers to the 2nd and 20th Legions in North Wales and, quite probably, the 9th in Lincoln who, if not demoralised by the loss of those lost under Cerialis, would very likely have been thirsting to avenge their fallen comrades.  These he ordered to assemble at Verulamium.  Messengers were also sent to the fortresses of the 2nd, 14th and 20th Legions calling on the veterans to join him.  The praefecti castrorum of the 14th and 20th complied, but that of the 2nd, for his own reasons, did not.  The veterans of the 20th are mentioned by Tacitus but those of the 14th are not because they had been absorbed into their parent legion.  I believe that, with the rebels advancing towards him up Watling Street, he withdrew westwards along Akeman Street to the vicinity of Tring.  In the event, the 2nd, 9th and 20th could not reach him in time and he felt compelled to offer battle with the troops that he had.  Fortunately, being the careful general that he was, he had reconnoitered a site for the battle which suited his numbers but denied the rebels the advantage of their numerical superiority.

EDIT: Once again, I have been overtaken by other posts