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Battle of Adrianople - Printable Version

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Battle of Adrianople - skookumpete - 07-23-2008

Hello all,

I have written a study of the battle (and events leading up to it), at
http://skookumpete.com/adrianople.htm .

This article attempts to sort fact from fiction, especially by a close analysis of Ammianus's account.

Peter Donnelly

Re: Battle of Adrianople - PMBardunias - 07-23-2008

I have a question you perhaps can answer or lead me to the answer. How crucual a role did the Alanic element play in this battle? What exactly was their place in the group? I see troupes of varying size attached to many of the wandering "germanic" bands and have wondered about their exact role.

Re: Battle of Adrianople - Robert Vermaat - 07-26-2008

Quote: I have a question you perhaps can answer or lead me to the answer.
Honestly? I doubt it, but here goes:

Quote:How crucual a role did the Alanic element play in this battle?

We do not know. There is no information available as to how many Alans were present in the battle. Nor do we know every detail of what the 'Gothic' cavalry (Goths, Huns, Alans and whatnot) actually did at what time. We know they weren't around when the fighting started. We know that their arrival threw the Romans in more confusion (their fiorst attack already being driven), but what the cavalry did afterwards we do not know. maybe they attacked the Roman rear, maybe they went off, persuing the Roman cavalry, maybe they fell apart chasing Romans.

Quote:What exactly was their place in the group?

Unknown. We assume they appeared on the Gothic right flank, due to assumptions about the nature of the battlefield (but we do not even know the exact spot of the battle).

Quote:I see troupes of varying size attached to many of the wandering "germanic" bands and have wondered about their exact role.
Exact role? Unknown. Groups like these, including the Goths themselves, grew when victories were won and fell apart after defeats. Sometimes groups followed rivals, sometimes they remained neutral. And sometimes they allied themselves to the Romans.

Re: Battle of Adrianople - markusaurelius - 08-01-2008

Great read Peter.

Talk about turning points in History....

It is too bad we don't really have any other ancient sources on the battle. You would think that more people would have written about it.

Re: Battle of Adrianople - Thiudareiks Flavius - 08-07-2008

Quote:Hello all,

I have written a study of the battle (and events leading up to it), at
http://mysite.verizon.net/res1bup4/adrianople.htm .

This article attempts to sort fact from fiction, especially by a close analysis of Ammianus's account.

Peter Donnelly

Excellent article Peter, especially the close analysis of the sources. For a more narrative account, with more emphasis on the Germanic side of the battle and on the myth of Adrianople as the "birth of the Medieval knight" see my essay here. It needs some revision, since more analysis on the battle has become available to me since I wrote it. If I can ever remember how to edit Geocities pages I'll write a Version 2.0
Cheers,

Re: Battle of Adrianople - S SEVERUS - 08-07-2008

I have just printed your article. I am going to read it on the train on my way home.

Thank you very much to share this article with us. One laudes to you.

To Vortigern : yep, to bad we know so little of those times.

Re: Battle of Adrianople - Robert Vermaat - 08-07-2008

Quote:Hello all,
I have written a study of the battle (and events leading up to it), at
http://mysite.verizon.net/res1bup4/adrianople.htm .
This article attempts to sort fact from fiction, especially by a close analysis of Ammianus's account.
Peter Donnelly

Hi Peter,

A well-written article. You managed to find some new things for, such as the Open Question. Indeed, that raid has been largely neglected and could answer some questions. But do you believe your answer? Your map of the battlefield shows a line of advance that is clearly separated from the advancing Gothic main army.
Also, i did not find a clear answer to the problem that arises when we assume that Valens was still East of Adrianople when Nike was attacked. Why would he have marched on? To meet with Gratian? If he thinks that the Goths are to his north, then why still march on westwards before in haste turning northeast to meet them. If fear that we may not know all what happened, and what information became available to valens at what time, or how it influenced his actions.

Below are my remarks:
____________________________________

Saphrax et Alatheus

Yes! This was immediately my initial thought after reading your article. Brilliant. We know of a strong (and most likely mobile) raiding force, and we have a strong and mobile force that seems to make the difference in the battle. A good assumption would be that Saphrax and Alatheus were indeed the raiding party sent to Nike.
Of course, even those assuming that the cavalry was foraging may not be wrong. The Nike raid would have been extremely unwise as a blocking action, with the East Roman main army on the march in the area. The Goths may well have meant to cause chaos and at the same time gather food, meant for the main force which would have been on the way to that point.

Anyway, if this is one and the same force, it probably arrives on the Roman right flank, which also puts an end to the confusion (as seen in MacDowall) about how the Roman right wing cavalry seems to end up on the Gothic right flank.

Negotiations

You say the Goths had been sincere throughout the negotiations. I dispute that. Whilst their demands may sound reasonable, there are several reasons to think that their main reason was to delay the Roman attack. One reason is the negotiator, who always was a lowly figure, never a commander or a family member of Frithigirn. Another reason the demanded territory, which the Goths should know was too close to Constantinople for Valens to even contemplate.

Deployment

Then why negotiate? To play for time.
The Goths clearly were not ready for the Romans. As you describe, after the Romans are outflanked there seems to be a rush on new Gothic troops from the camp, and maybe they have arrived (in a continuous stream) from other camps.
The Romans are clearly still deploying, with the left flank cavalry apparently being the rear guard and not yet in place. Valens, I haste to attack, may have been correct in the initial number of Goths as being low. But it’s my assumption that there were more camps, and the Romans may have missed these. Therefore Valens, his army still deploying, may have ben playing for time for the same reason as Frithigirn.

The battle

The left wing that reaches the wagons may be the infantry. The rest of the cavalry that fails to support them may have still been forming up or already commanded away to support the right – anyway, they are not where they should have been. The ‘downfall of the mighty rampart’ is an odd description for a cavalry wing falling apart, but a fitting description of a Late Roman infantry force with corresponding shield wall, being overrun.
Ammianus does not imply that the infantry did not take part in the assault, as you already remarked about the ‘lines coming together’, which can hardly be anything other than the front lines of both forces. This also clears Valens of fighting with exhausted cavalry only, which is a view too extreme in my opinion.

After the right-wing cavalry is destroyed and the left-wing cavalry probably never forms up at all, the infantry is attacked on both flanks. This is when the second line, and eventually the reserves should have been committed, which may have happened because the Batavi are indeed no longer in a reserve position later. At the battle of Strasbourg, a similar thing happened, but Julian managed to stop the cavalry retreat and stabilise the flanks.
It is often assumed by modern authors that the Batavi have fled, but that’s not right as a first assumption, as they were an elite regiment. The supposed cowardly behaviour of a regiment of that name under Valentinian may not necessarily refer to the same regiment, as several regiments of that name still exist when the Nititia Dignitatum is drawn up a generation later. To assume that Valens would reserve such a crucial task to a regiment which he could not trust is unthinkable.

The wings may have been stabilised for some time, but without cavalry it seems that the flanks, the left one first, came into difficulty.
It is often described that the Romans next became encircled a la Cannae, but this is not supported by the text. After the return of the Gothic cavalry we hear no more from it – it may have been dashing after the retreating Roman cavalry, nothing suggests that it returned to take the Romans in the rear. This is also suggested by the apparent ease with which Victor goes off looking for the Batavi, which does not suggest that large number of Gothic forces were attacking the Roman rear at the time. The later and therefore less trustworthy account of Socrates that the whole infantry was surrounded and destroyed may be the root of that idea, as would the comparison of Ammianus of Adrianople to Cannae. However, although the losses were immense, Ammianus also clearly states that a third managed to get away.

What about Valens? Valens clearly took refuge with regiments that you would expect in the second line, which would have been committed at the time. Maybe he even joined the fight. Valens was not a coward, if he'd been wise he'd have retreated to Adrianople. Apparently that was not the what took place, and I can only assume that, since no encirclement took place, he instead followed his second line and reserves into the fray. The evidently hostile later sources could sell that as an act of a cowrd whose bodyguard had left him.
Let’s look at the units involved.

The so-called ‘bodyguard’ named Armigeri are not the Imperial bodyguard. These are indeed the Candidati, of which we indeed learn that (at least some of them) did not abandon Valens. The Armigeri are mentioned in the Noititia Dignitatum as a normal regiment, and therefore we might best think of them as one of the preferred regiments of Valens (as the Ioviani and Herculiani were the preferred regiments of Diocletian). The Armigeri would most likely have been used to stabilise the endangered flanks.

The Lanciarii were also no regular infantry, according to Ueda-Sarson, and could also have been a regiment of ‘preferred’ status.

The Mattiari are indeed described as one of the original regiments using the plumbata, but Vegetius referred to a late 3rd-c. situation, which may no longer reflect the armament of the late 4th c. In fact later sources describe missiles such as the plumbata present among all troops.

Oh, and, ‘targeteers’? Please! What’s a ‘targeteer’ for heaven’s sake? I find that literal Loeb translation of Scutati absolutely abhorrent. ‘Shield-bearers’ would be more literal but still idiotic. However, that description could point to what could, at least initially, have been the function of the regiment. These, too, could have received their name from a function of guarding the emperor. That a certain Barzimeres could be a tribune of the Scutati and still command the Cornuti may also point to such a role.

The end of the battle is therefore not to be looked at as an encirclement after which every Roman is cut down where he stands, but a slow retreat in formation, with heavy pressure on the flanks, which supper enormous losses. But the fact that as large a part as a third of the army gets away must point to an ordered retreat under heavy pressure. This may have been the centre, supposedly supported by the aforementioned elite regiments. However, in the falling darkness all cohesion must be lost. Valens manages, still with part of his bodyguard, to retreat from the battlefield, and large numbers of troops manage to reach Adrianople.

Aftermath

The city closed its gates, to me that’s an unwise and cowardly act. Apparently the fear that the Goths would enter with the refugees must have been great. So what about the fortified camp? Easy – it’s meant for at least three times more defenders, and undefendable by these survivors. The ‘wedge of th 300’, to, I think is misunderstood. Perhaps they made a sally (a wedge is a known infantry manoeuvre) but were encircled? It would explain there dismal end.

Re: Battle of Adrianople - skookumpete - 08-07-2008

Robert, thanks for your detailed reply. There's a lot to think about there, and I'll just put down some initial responses.

Alatheus and Saphrax -- they might have been the initial raiding force, but it is also possible that they had been dispatched toward Nike on the morning of the 9th (though I consider it unlikely that Fritigern would have deliberately divided his forces at this point). In the former case, they would be arriving from the northwest, on the Roman left (presuming they haven't found an alternative route through the hills and have had to go back to the Tonzos); in the latter, from the southeast, or the Roman right. It's also possible that they were grazing somewhere on the higher slopes, and actually returned on both wings -- not an unreasonable scenario when we consider that Ammianus doesn't specify that they were on one wing or the other.

Quote:But do you believe your answer? Your map of the battlefield shows a line of advance that is clearly separated from the advancing Gothic main army.


Well, I do believe that the raid came through the hills somewhere to the east of the Tonzos. The proposed line of march on my map is based on the assumption that the raid was planned and dispatched while the horde was at Kabyle or had just left it. The raiders moved east before crossing the hills, rather than attempting to move east through the hills from the Tonzos valley. But my conclusion is tentative, and I would like to see the ground.

Valens east of Adrianople when Nike was attacked -- this is Delbruck's difficulty, of course, but I think he creates it for himself by not considering the chronology (besides, as I point out in the article, not giving Valens the credit of knowing where his enemy was). The initial raid on the Constantinople road was presumably intercepted somewhere in the hills around Aug. 5. Over the next three days, the horde emerged from the Tonzos gap and then moved slowly toward Nike, but (as far as we know) did not reach it. Valens must have reached Adrianople on the first of those days, before it was clear what Fritigern's next move would be.

Despite including a translation of this whole section of Ammianus, Delbruck essentially ignores the part about "the next three days" and simply places the horde at or near Nike when Valens learns of their whereabouts. Everything else in his narrative follows from this one mistake: if the Goths are at Nike, Valens must be west of Adrianople, else they would have met.

Again I have to make the appeal to common sense. The Romans knew that the Goths had gathered at Kabyle, whence they could reach Adrianople by a direct road. Why would Valens march past the junction of that road, leaving the whole Thracian plain, and his supply lines, unprotected? And would Ammianus really have been ignorant of, or unwilling to mention, such a colossal blunder?

Negotiations -- The province of Thrace lies mostly north and west of Adrianople, so the Goths are not exactly asking to be given lands right at the walls of Constantinople. Their demand is not unreasonable, given that they had been promised land in 376.

The Battle -- you make some good points but it is worth remembering that Ammianus, if I recall correctly, makes only two references to the left wing and none at all to the right wing after it has deployed, and the last we hear of the infantry before the onslaught is that they are in a supporting role (subsidebat). The evidence just doesn't bear the weight of any detailed analysis of who attacked whom, who gave way first, etc.

Aftermath -- I can't agree with you here, at least not on the basis of the text. Ammianus says the 300 were attempting to go over to the enemy (desicscere = desert to), not attack them; and what could they hope to gain by attacking? It doesn't seem likely that they expect to break through the barbarian lines and escape. In any case, the whole point of the story, as Ammianus tells it, is that no one thought about deserting after this incident.

Peter

Re: Battle of Adrianople - skookumpete - 08-08-2008

Quote:The left wing that reaches the wagons may be the infantry. The rest of the cavalry that fails to support them may have still been forming up or already commanded away to support the right – anyway, they are not where they should have been. The ‘downfall of the mighty rampart’ is an odd description for a cavalry wing falling apart, but a fitting description of a Late Roman infantry force with corresponding shield wall, being overrun.
Ammianus does not imply that the infantry did not take part in the assault, as you already remarked about the ‘lines coming together’, which can hardly be anything other than the front lines of both forces. This also clears Valens of fighting with exhausted cavalry only, which is a view too extreme in my opinion.


You have hit the nub of it, and I have had these same thoughts myself. Let me first say that I don't necessarily believe that Valens ordered only the wings into action; only that the text tells us nothing beyond the brief and puzzling description of the action on the Roman left. I think we have to give Ammianus's silences some credibility, and too much that has been written about this battle instead just assumes he left out important details. That being said, it's very possible that in this case he left out (or a later scribe omitted) details about the general movements, but that should not be our first assumption. In other words, our first job is to see if the text works as it stands. Then we can explore other possibilities.

I really want to believe that the cornu contain infantry, but I can't make the text say that. Ammianus is explicit that the wings are cavalry. I won't repeat what I say in the article about what that implies.

As for the main body of the Roman infantry, perhaps they are included in the "lines coming together", but I'm troubled by the presence of that wagon camp in the middle of the battlefield; do the warriors really not want to take advantage of the barricade?

P.S. Yes, the "mighty rampart" is difficult. Hamilton translates: "Our left wing...under pressure of numbers gave way and collapsed like a broken dyke." Rolfe's translation is a bit more literal, because the sense is really that the collapse of an earthwork (agger) is the cause of their destruction, rather than that they themselves are the earthwork. But Ammianus's figures of speech do not bear too much examination.

Re: Battle of Adrianople - Robert Vermaat - 08-08-2008

Quote: Robert, thanks for your detailed reply. There's a lot to think about there, and I'll just put down some initial responses.
Don't hurry, I'm off for 3 weeks. :wink:

Quote:Alatheus and SaphraxIn the former case, they would be arriving from the northwest, on the Roman left (presuming they haven't found an alternative route through the hills and have had to go back to the Tonzos); in the latter, from the southeast, or the Roman right.
Why? I may be confused as too the geography. Would it be possible for you to post maybe a Google maps image with the battle lines drawn on it? I still see the Roman lines going NW-SE. And with that in mind, I see A&S, as the returning raiders, coming from the SE and hence at the Roman right, where the first confused action is taking place.

Quote:Valens east of Adrianople when Nike was attacked
Again I have to make the appeal to common sense. The Romans knew that the Goths had gathered at Kabyle, whence they could reach Adrianople by a direct road. Why would Valens march past the junction of that road, leaving the whole Thracian plain, and his supply lines, unprotected? And would Ammianus really have been ignorant of, or unwilling to mention, such a colossal blunder?
Why indeed? Nevertheless we don't know what was know to the Romans and what not. IF Valens was past Nike when the raid emerged, he was awfully slow over the next three days. He might of course have intended to link up with Gratian first, deeming the Goths to his north a minor thread at that very time. Maybe he expected the main force to the West, we just can't tell.
IF, on the other hand, as you say the Romans knew where Fritigirn was, it would indeed have been a blunder to march past Adrianople. But then, on the day of the battle the Romans are suddenly in such a haste that I somehow doubt that they knew all the information for days before that. They would have chosen the battlefield at leisure, or struck a day sooner if they feared the return of the raiders.

Quote:Negotiations -- The province of Thrace lies mostly north and west of Adrianople, so the Goths are not exactly asking to be given lands right at the walls of Constantinople. Their demand is not unreasonable, given that they had been promised land in 376.
Maybe not unreasonable, but still unacceptable because it's still too close. If they weren't playing for time, then why send lowly negotiators? That by itself was an insult. I recall Valentinian dying of a heart attack or something similar out of rage, due to insolent negatiators?

Quote:The Battle -- you make some good points but it is worth remembering that Ammianus, if I recall correctly, makes only two references to the left wing and none at all to the right wing after it has deployed, and the last we hear of the infantry before the onslaught is that they are in a supporting role (subsidebat). The evidence just doesn't bear the weight of any detailed analysis of who attacked whom, who gave way first, etc.
Agreed. Ammanianus just doesn't give us any details. But most modern commentators completely forego an analysis of how late Roman battle formations would have worked. Cavalry was not the main arm, with infantry 'just' in support. The infantry bore the brunt of the fighting.

Quote:Aftermath -- I can't agree with you here, at least not on the basis of the text. Ammianus says the 300 were attempting to go over to the enemy (desicscere = desert to), not attack them; and what could they hope to gain by attacking? It doesn't seem likely that they expect to break through the barbarian lines and escape. In any case, the whole point of the story, as Ammianus tells it, is that no one thought about deserting after this incident.
Ammianus may have received a report of a misunderstook event. Why go over to the enemy in a battle formation, which is what a wedge is, no more and no less? When soldiers went over to the enemy it seems they inverted their shields. A wedge is for breaking through, maybe that's what they intended? And why would deserters be slaughtered? The goth had in the past accepted many deserters, even members of Valens' bodyguard.

The passage bears all the hallmarks of a misunderstood or garbled event, maybe we should leave it at that.[/quote]

Re: Battle of Adrianople - Robert Vermaat - 08-08-2008

Quote: I really want to believe that the cornu contain infantry, but I can't make the text say that. Ammianus is explicit that the wings are cavalry. I won't repeat what I say in the article about what that implies.
First of all, 'cornu' is not a normal word for a 'cavalry wing, which would have been 'ala', but then Ammianus often uses odd and even anachronistic words. To me, 'cornu' signifies 'wing', nothing more.

Livius used the word to describe a wing:
T. LIVII HISTORIARUM LIBER XXII: xlv:
"Transgressi flumen eas quoque, quas in castris minoribus habuerant, copias suis adiungunt, atque ita instructa acie in dextro cornu-id erat flumini proprius-Romanos equites locant, deinde pedites: laevum cornu extremi equites sociorum, intra pedites ad medium iuncti legionibus Romanis tenuerunt"
Having crossed the river, they were joined by the troops from the smaller camp, and formed their line in this manner: in the right wing, next to the river they placed the Roman cavalry, and adjoining them the Roman infantry; the extremity of the left wing was composed of the confederate cavalry: and, enclosed by these, the confederate infantry stretched to the center, so as to unite with the Roman legions.

Of course you expect cavalry at a wing, which was the normal place for them, but that does not mean that a 'cornu' must be cavalry.

But next, if the left flank which has reached the laager is really only cavalry, how would you explain the lines "And because the left wing, which had made its way as far as the very wagons, and would have gone farther if it had had any support, being deserted by the rest of the cavalry"? Why would cavalry have need of supporting cavalry or else is doomed to failure? Cavalry IS the supporting arm of the wings, they attack the enemy which threatens to surround their troops at the very wings.
This passage alone signifies to me that it is the infantry that reaches the laager. But, since their supporting cavalry has either not formed up or is already engaged elsewhere, they are pushed back. Without cavalry support, they take heavy losses on the flanks and are overcome. This is how each battle would go in theory, at least. the loss of the supporting cavalry on the flanks is maybe not the cause of the defeat, but the key.

Quote:As for the main body of the Roman infantry, perhaps they are included in the "lines coming together", but I'm troubled by the presence of that wagon camp in the middle of the battlefield; do the warriors really not want to take advantage of the barricade?
How large is that camp? Have the Romans attacked the Goths because this is just one of several camps, and the numbers too few to defend it at first? To me it's clear that both sides want to wait because both armies are not ready. So they battle at the (closest) laager, in front of it before ever more arriving Goths start pushing back the Roman lines.

Personally if I was used to fighting in a shield-wall, i would rather not fight among waggons. especially not if my family were inside one of them.

Quote:P.S. Yes, the "mighty rampart" is difficult. Hamilton translates: "Our left wing...under pressure of numbers gave way and collapsed like a broken dyke." Rolfe's translation is a bit more literal, because the sense is really that the collapse of an earthwork (agger) is the cause of their destruction, rather than that they themselves are the earthwork. But Ammianus's figures of speech do not bear too much examination.
I agree, Ammianus may have seen the event like a dam breaking, or the breaking of the dam! Big Grin My preferred reading it the breaking of that very Late Roman infantry formation though, the near-inpregnable shield-wall.

But like I said, no hurry, I'm away for three weeks. :wink:

Btw Pete [mod hat on], please remember your signature , you can find it in your profile - please add your (real) name there. [mod hat off]. :wink:

Re: Battle of Adrianople - skookumpete - 08-08-2008

I don't want to get embroiled in speculation, as the point of my article was mostly to get back to the source and interpret just what Ammianus is telling us. But I'll try to answer a few of your points.

cornu -- please see the article. Ammianus twice uses the word in association with equites. Sure, there may have been infantry on the wing, and that would make the events easier to understand, but the text doesn't suggest it. (BTW, if the left wing at 31.13.2 is not considered to be cavalry, then a reliquo equitatu desertum has to be translated as something like "deserted by what was left of the cavalry" rather than "deserted by the rest of the cavalry.")

Alatheus and Saphrax -- again, please see the article and map. If they were blocked from crossing the hills, they would have had to return to the north, thence east to the Tonzos where they would follow the route of the horde. In this case they would arrive at the battlefield from the northwest, i.e. the Roman left. This is conjecture, of course. But we don't have any reason to think that the raiders ever actually made it to the Constantinople road, which would put them on the Roman right.

By the way, earlier you wrote:

Quote:I see A&S, as the returning raiders, coming from the SE and hence at the Roman right, where the first confused action is taking place.

We don't know where the initial foray by the "archers and targeteers" took place. It seems to get assigned to the right wing just to fill the vacuum in our information about what was happening over there.


Timetable

Quote:But then, on the day of the battle the Romans are suddenly in such a haste that I somehow doubt that they knew all the information for days before that. They would have chosen the battlefield at leisure, or struck a day sooner if they feared the return of the raiders.

Good point, and probably I should have been clearer about how I see things unfolding here. Valens is on the march toward Adrianople, and near it, when he learns of the raid. Having dispatched the two blocking units, he proceeds, probably arriving at the city on that day or the next one. This gives him at least a couple of days during which, as you say, he could choose to attack the horde, which has just emerged from the valley and, as his scouts report, is moving slowly toward Nike. Ammianus tells us quite a bit about what is going on in the camp and in the consistory as this is happening. There is debate about whether it is wise to attack without Gratian's reinforcements. Valens chooses not to attack immediately, but the pressure builds as the horde moves closer and closer to his lines of communication with Constantinople. Finally, realizing Gratian is not going to arrive in time, and seeing that the horde has maneuvered into a position where it can cut his lines at will, Valens chooses to attack.

Wagon camp -- Fritigern himself is clearly inside the camp, or at least behind a barricade, because Richomer is about to set forth for a vallum when all hell breaks loose. There may be warriors in front of the laager, but Ammianus doesn't tell us that or say that Richomer is headed for the enemy lines. It may be that the Goths are deployed to keep the Romans from getting too close to the camp and shooting fire into it, but we just don't know.

Re: Battle of Adrianople - markusaurelius - 08-09-2008

Just to interject. Does anyone know what kind of relief force Gratian was bringing with him? Was that even enough to have turned the tide from an attack by the returning Goth Cavalry? To me this whole thing could have been even worse (if that is possible) if Gratian's army had been wiped out as well.....

Guess today (Aug 9) 1630 years ago the Roman Empire took its biggest loss thus far (imo anyhow).

Re: Battle of Adrianople - Longovicium - 07-27-2009

I know it's a bit late resurrecting this post but I wondered if the article on Adrianople was still available to read for some research I am doing? The link appears to be dead, alas! Any help here would be appreciated as I remember reading it last year and am very keen again to study it as I remember being very impressed by the research in it (flatterer that I am!). Thanks.

Re: Battle of Adrianople - Longovicium - 07-29-2009

Ah, not to worry, I've found it here - http://skookumpete.com/adrianople.htm