+- RomanArmyTalk (https://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat)
+-- Forum: Research Arena (https://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/forumdisplay.php?fid=4)
+--- Forum: Greek Military History & Archaeology (https://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/forumdisplay.php?fid=9)
+--- Thread: New hoplite book (/showthread.php?tid=16779)
Re: New hoplite book - PMBardunias - 05-26-2010
I have a problem with the unquestioned acceptance of the rather unlikely faux retreat and the flat statement that the Hypaspists were sarissaphoroi. Why the Athenians should become disordered in a "step by step" advance, while men walking backwards in front of them were not escapes me.
Re: New hoplite book - Paralus - 05-26-2010
Quote:I have a problem with the unquestioned acceptance of the rather unlikely faux retreat [...] Why the Athenians should become disordered in a "step by step" advance, while men walking backwards in front of them were not escapes me...
Precisely the basis of my words to you re Sellasia and Kleomenes chasing the Macedonians down Olympus for the distance that Plutarch (Phylarchus) would have. I think there might be exaggeration involved - not to mention exculpation if, as is suspected, an Athenian source is involved - in this description.
Quote:[...] and the flat statement that the Hypaspists were sarissaphoroi.
My view is that Philip - leading the right - has the pezhetairoi (hypaspists under Alexander if not so named already) with him on this wing. What little material survives about this battle - for the Greeks an adverse re-run of Plataea - indicates that the sarisa was dominant over the dory. Plutarch describes the Sacred band having fallen facing the points of these weapons. The supposed retreat, under protection of their weapons, would indicate that the hypaspists were sarisa-armed. Hammond's contention is that the Athenians were lured away from and to the left of their defensive position before the hypaspists advanced again. More below...
Re: New hoplite book - Paralus - 05-26-2010
Quote:If you ever get ahold of that time machine please reserve a spot for me!
I would offer the opionion that Alexander was indeed on foot among the Macedonian pikemen of his phalanx's left/defensive wing and center, his father Philip was leading the far right/offensive wing composed of traditional hoplites (hypaspists and mercenaries, the former of whom carried the day with a Spartan-style faux retreat maneuver), and the Macedonian cavalry (what little was present) was engaged across a creek off the far left flank with their Greek opposite numbers and played no significant role in the action until the pursuit phase. Saying this will likely open a can of worms with those fond of Alexander having a larger part (complete with cavalry exploits) or with those who see a more offensive role for the sarissa.
I agree with the view of Alexander on foot and with sarisa-armed infantry on the left. I tend to see this wing as a little more offensive than yourself insofar as its advance was to continue as the right stopped/backed away a little. The Sacred band and the Boeotian hoplites were the pick of the allied force and so the hardest to "crack". Philip seemed to think that the Athenian hoplites - long on tales of Marathon and short of hardened battle experience - would be the easist point for the can opener to be inserted. My view is that perhaps some 14,000 or so Macedonian phalangites took the field and that the Macedonian array was winged in sarisa-armed phalanx troops with a 7/7 or 6/8 ratio to each end of the array. Perhaps even a taxis or two in the middle. The left to deal with the hard nut and the right to open the can up. Hoplites and mercenaries likely filled out the centre stretches.
I agree with the minimal role of the cavalry. It is conspicuous by its absolute absence in the battle narrative tradition.
Re: New hoplite book - PMBardunias - 05-26-2010
Quote:Precisely the basis of my words to you re Sellasia and Kleomenes chasing the Macedonians down Olympus for the distance that Plutarch (Phylarchus) would have. I think there might be exaggeration involved - not to mention exculpation if, as is suspected, an Athenian source is involved - in this description.
A very different scenario played out at Sellasia. Here the Macedonians didn't "faux" anything, they got their buts kicked down a slope. When they reached the flat and their own fresh troops, they rallied and in some form of combined formation advanced anew. I have no trouble believing that the Hypaspists at Chaeronea, which may well have been hoplites at this time, advanced against a superiorly positioned Athenian force, were repulsed, then rallied to face a disorganized Athenian force who could not form up as quickly. I got this notion from somewhere, so somebody has suggested it though I don't recall who.
Re: New hoplite book - Paralus - 05-26-2010
Paul Mac if I recall - though whether his idea or not I don't know.
I well realise a different scenario at Sellasia. "Buts kicked" might be too strong: pushed downslope from a higher position yes; for the distance Plutarch has it, no.
The hypaspists are another thread. I still think that both wings were sarisa-armed here and it's worth noting that, within a very short time, Alexander would take his father's army north to the Danube. Here he crosses - in a scene presaging the Hydaspes 10 years later - with 4,000 infantry. It is no leap of unhinged logic to suppose that the first of those troops across with the king would be his hypaspists - just as at Hydaspes - indeed it is extremely likely . Alexander orders a march forward and adds, for good measure, that these troops flatten the grain with their sarisae held traversely. The infantry, as a point of interest, is commanded by Nikanor. He is, coincidentally, the first attested commander of the hypaspists.
Quote:Arr. Anab. 1.3.6(?) - 4.2
Those who crossed with Alexander amounted in number to 1,500 cavalry and 4,000 infantry.TheY crossed over by night to a spot where the corn stood high; and therefore they reached the bank more secretly. At the approach of dawn Alexander led his men through the field of standing corn, ordering the infantry to lean upon the corn with their pikes held transversely, and thus to advance into the untilled ground. As long as the phalanx was advancing through the standing corn, the cavalry followed; but when they marched out of the tilled land, Alexander himself led the horse round to the right wing, and commanded Nicanor to lead the phalanx in a square.
Re: New hoplite book - Old Husker - 05-26-2010
I think that the old hypaspist argument could go on forever (sigh!), but I still maintain that the bulk of the evidence points to these troops being armed with hoplite gear as both Nick Sekunda ("wearing the dress and equipment of a Greek hoplite prior to Philip's re-armament" - The Army of Alexander the Great, p. 30) and Waldemar Heckel and Ryan Jones (Macedonia Warrior, p. 17-18) suggest, these drawing heavily on portrayals of the battle of Issus on the Alexander sarcophagas. In fact, that artifact is only the tip of the iceberg of evidence supporting hypaspists as being hoplite-armed. This data includes a number of literary references to them carrying large, aspis shields (useful for none but a hoplite set on applying othismos and in keeping with their very name - hyaspist) as well as having the alternate title of doryphoroi (dory carriers) , finds of Macedonian hoplite gear (that likely of Philip and a famous late 4th century B.C. dory butt spike marked as being of Macedonian state manufacture, and the Roman monument for Pydna showing action against Macedonian elites carrying the hoplite aspis (one seen from the front covers the holder's entire upper body and another shown from the back illustrates the distinctive porpax and antilabe suspension) and wielding single-handed weapons (lost now, but logically the dory that would normally accompany an aspis). As for the faux retreat at Chaeroneia, I am reluctant to abandon the ancient sources that specifically indicate this maneuver. Given that we know well-trained troops could carry out this evolution, as the Spartans are said to have done at both Thermopylae (Herodotus) and Plataia (Plato), it seems quite reasonable, especially against inexperienced opponents like the Athenian hoplites of the late 4th century. In picturing this maneuver, it must have begun by back-stepping on signal (however that was transmitted from Philip), but Herodotus indicates that it ultimately involved turning one's back toward the enemy to give an impression of actual flight (this latter aspect echoed in Plato's account, which he put into the mouth of Socrates, perhaps recording an actual conversation that that old hoplite and personal friend had with the Athenian general Laches, who agreed that this action did indeed take place). Regards, Fred
Re: New hoplite book - Old Husker - 05-26-2010
Paralus/Michael,
Your observation that Alexander's small armament crossing the Danube clearly included phalangites/sarissaphoroi is a very important point. My view on this is that the common ratio of hypaspists/hoplites to pikemen in the Macedonian army at this time was 1-to-3, with hypaspists organized in 1,000-man units and phalangites in 3,000-man units, the number of units of each maintaining this same 1-to-3 ratio (3 phalangite units for every one of hypaspists). Thus, the advance force at the Danube was a fully integrated 'mini-phalanx' in proper proportion, its 4,000 heavy infantry including one unit of hypaspists (1,000 elite doryphoroi, undoubtedly the agema of Royal hypaspists under Nicanor, quite likely the king's best 'hoplite leader' and thus future hypaspist commander) and one of sarissa-bearing phalangites (3,000 strong, again likely Alexander's best) plus cavalry for forward/flank work (these latter probably had screening light infantry as well, perhaps organically attached in this era and thus not mentioned separately). With such a diverse force, Alexander was ready to meet any sort of threat by deploying in Philip's standard fashion (hoplites and heavy cavalry on the right for offense, phalangites at center and left to hold the line, light horsemen to seucure the left flank, and light footmen for screening the cavalry on both ends of the line and post-battle pursuit). When deployed for action, Alexander would have taken charge of the left/center of the phalanx (as he had at Chaeronea and would continue to do until such time as he reorganized his methods for the Asian campaign) and Nicanor the right (with his own hypaspists and any Companion horse on hand). This would explain the use of sarissai that is mentioned, as troops armed with this weapon would have made up fully 3/4 of the force's heavy contingent.
As I say, I haven't formally reconstructed the battle of Chaeronea yet; however, I have done reconstructions of the 12 Macedonian engagements in Philip's reign up through the battles on Crocus Plain and at Pagasae in 353 B.C. In wrestling long and hard with these, I have found that a Macedonian system of mixed arms (hoplites, phalangites, shock cavalry, and light horse/foot) seems to offer the most rational explanation for all the raw data and a very plausable description of Philip's fighting style. His son seems to have largely continued this methodology, albeit with some necessary later modifications in adapting it to the much more open terrain he had to contend with in Asia. (One of his changes might have been to eliminate phalangites from his advance parties like that at the Danube, keeping the other elements - including an upgrade to elite Agrianian peltasts among the light foot - and relying entirely on his more flexible hypaspists/hoplites for heavy, line infantry. This, however, it s a pretty tentative thought at this point, being well out ahead of my deep research.) Still, all the foregoing personal opinion having been vented, I nevertheless sincerely remain open to other ideas - any ideas! I've got no private agenda on these issues, only a fervent wish to treat the data as evenly and logically as possible toward letting "the chips fall where they may." Regards, Fred
Re: New hoplite book - PMBardunias - 05-26-2010
Quote:Given that we know well-trained troops could carry out this evolution, as the Spartans are said to have done at both Thermopylae (Herodotus) and Plataia (Plato),
I'm not sure that I agree that this evidence rises to the level of "we know". I have serious doubts that even Spartans as a mass could do this in the teeth of a battle. Perhaps some outrunners could, then come back to the massed ranks. In general it is hard to see what Spartans, being so much heavier and better formed than the Persians, would gain from risking their own disorder to cause disorder in already poorly ordered troops!
Quote:I well realise a different scenario at Sellasia. "Buts kicked" might be too strong: pushed downslope from a higher position yes; for the distance Plutarch has it, no.
You say Potato, I say but kicked, its all good. I actually don't have a problem with the distance is it was down slope. I think backing down a hill is a bit different psychologically that being pushed the same distance on the flat, and once they reached the bottom they rallied on their own formed men.
Re: New hoplite book - Old Husker - 05-26-2010
I think that the concept of the Persians at Thermopylae being "poorly ordered" is one of the myths that have sprung up around the Persian Wars; in fact, this was the problem that I alluded to in Reinstating the Hoplite with regard to Schwartz's shallow investigation into opposing armies (the Persian army in this case). To really know what hoplites could do, it is necessary to have a good handle on what all of their foes could do as well. Actually, the standard Persian formation called for quite a well-ordered array, with a shield wall forward (large spara or gherrhon shields held by two or more ranks of spear-armed men - the source of the term sparabara or 'shield holders' for the standard Persian line infantry), with following ranks (normally to a depth of 10 men - a dathabam, the smallest unit of organization) lacking shields, but armed with spears and bows (the spears being buried in the ground for use of the bow) in the middle and bows only at the far rear (save for the Immortals, who all seem to have carried spear as well as bow).
The design was for the forward 'shield wall' to stop (or at least slow) the enemy, a spearman from behind stepping up to take the shield of any man fallen at the front, while the bowmen farther back continued to bombard and cavalry maneuvered to envelop off the flanks (something not possible at Thermopylae to the Persians' considerable cost). What the Spartans did facing this kind of oppositon in the opening round (first of three engagements on the battle's first day) was to fake retreat, getting the Persians to open up the shield wall for pursuit only to then be cut down as the Spartans spun on command and resumed their attack. This is attested by Herodotus only for the intial action against the Medes and, though it worked more than once (cutting through several separate Persian shield walls, each in front of a fresh unit - hazaraba, the standard field units of the Persian army, each having 600 men in this action - which were set up one after another within the narrow pass). Naturally, the Persians eventually caught on and the faux retreat tactic is not attested at any later point in the Thermopylae story (though the Pesians apparently fell for the same trick at least one more time a year later at Plataia). Deprived of this device, the Spartans then (and the other, less-drilled Greeks from the beginning) had to rely on the slower, costlier, but sure method of spearing/pushing through each new shield wall before putting the shieldless troops behind to rout. (Interestingly, on the second day of battle, the Persians appear to have modified their attack - per Diodorus - by making an assault with a force put together from only shield bearers from several regiments, thus trying in vain to match the Greek phalanx with a fully shield-equipped force of spearmen.)
As to exactly how the faux retreat was carried out, I can only speculate. However, based on what Herodotus and Plato said about it, I believe that it was an evolution that started on command at the back of the phalanx (probably only six deep in the case of the spartiate array at Thermopylae), with each line from the rear taking a practiced step or two back and then turning to begin a quick-step (not running) retreat with their back to the enemy. Thus, when the front rank pulled back in the midst of a bout of spear-fencing (not othismos), it took the enemy by surprise for a few seconds (never having seen anything remotely like this before), allowing the hoplites to rapidly move off while showing their backs (undoubtedly the most difficult part of the action, calling for a good deal of moxy among the Spartan front-rankers). Suddenly realizing that they had apparently won, the foe would foolishly break ranks to pursue, only to encounter a deadly counter-move as the Spartans turned back in unison with their spears and shields, once more doing so from the back first (the back now being the old front rank, which now advanced to re-contact the enemy). I envision Philip's well-trained and seasoned professional spearmen/hypaspists doing pretty much the same thing to the poor amateur and inexperienced Athenian militiamen at Chaeronea. Regards, Fred
Re: New hoplite book - PMBardunias - 05-27-2010
Quote:I think that the concept of the Persians at Thermopylae being "poorly ordered" is one of the myths that have sprung up around the Persian Wars
You are correct! I should not have said "poorly ordered" for I meant closely ordered. Thus the hoplites would be more subject to disorder.
As to the "shield wall", it was almost a field-work! At Mycale: "they set their shields close to make a barricade." The shields were very big and evidently able to be propped up to stand on their own that their primary use was probably in defense from missile fire, but surely they stopped infantry as well, at least for a time: " As long as the Persians' shields stood upright, they defended themselves and held their own in the battle, but when the Athenians and their neighbors in the line passed the word and went more zealously to work, that they and not the Lacedaemonians might win the victory, immediately the face of the fight changed.3] Breaking down the shields they charged all together into the midst of the Persians."
By the way, note in the above that the Athenians were fighting at spear range, then "passed the word" and moved into close-in fighting and pushing. Sound familiar?
Re: New hoplite book - Paralus - 05-27-2010
Just on the original remark Paul, I was referring to your puzzlement at a phalanx reversing and the pursuing Athenians falling into disorder but the Macedonians not. I see the push down slope at Sellasia as something of a somewhat grudging reverse as it is clear both parties kept formation. Had the “but-kicking” down slope been rather precipitous I’d have expected one or the other to break – the Macedonians (in reverse) first. Polybius only mentions the Spartans breaking having been forced out of their “stronghold” (ochuromaton).
Quote:A very different scenario played out at Sellasia. Here the Macedonians didn't "faux" anything, they got their buts kicked down a slope. When they reached the flat and their own fresh troops, they rallied and in some form of combined formation advanced anew […]I actually don't have a problem with the distance is it was down slope. I think backing down a hill is a bit different psychologically that being pushed the same distance on the flat, and once they reached the bottom they rallied on their own formed men.
That’s not the first time you’ve said that to me. If I read that right you’re saying that the first phalanx was driven back down the slope where the second, formed up and ready, “stepped up to the plate” and joined with them in some fashion to drive the Spartans back uphill.
If so, I can’t see Polybius’ account providing any evidence for it. Polybius describes Doson’s left as diphalaggian epallelon – a “double phalanx close one after the other” (or in close order). This doesn’t allow for one phalanx to be pushed backwards and then to rally on the rear one formed up someway down the hill. I might have misread what you actually mean though.
Hey Old Husker/Fred,
I will take up your points re the Macedonian army makeup, ratios and Rzepka – as well as the hypaspists – on another thread I think. As the Gods are my witnesses I do not wish to be taken to task for hijacking a perfectly good thread! We can happily discuss these red herrings to the othismos discussion when I get to inventing the thread.
I would note, though, that Nikanor is only attested as the archihypaspist – not as a commander of the agema. That job would appear to have been handled by Hephaestion (Guagamela) and Seleucus (certainly at Hydaspes). Neoptolemus is the other attested archihypaspist.
I’m not so convinced that the battle scene on the “Alexander sarcophagus” is Issos.
Re: New hoplite book - PMBardunias - 05-27-2010
Quote:Just on the original remark Paul, I was referring to your puzzlement at a phalanx reversing and the pursuing Athenians falling into disorder but the Macedonians not. I see the push down slope at Sellasia as something of a somewhat grudging reverse as it is clear both parties kept formation. Had the “but-kicking” down slope been rather precipitous I’d have expected one or the other to break – the Macedonians (in reverse) first. Polybius only mentions the Spartans breaking having been forced out of their “stronghold” (ochuromaton).
I agree, pro-Spartan hyperbole retracted! I think they both went down rather slowly and cautiously, for a slope can be as disadnatageous in advance as in retreat.
Re: New hoplite book - Old Husker - 05-27-2010
MIchael, I certainly bow to your much superior knowledge on the individuals involved with Alexander's army - that's way past my level of competence (or, more properly, incompetence) at this point! Your doubts on Issus are also well taken. In fact, I've merely followed Nick Sekunda's opinion of the "Abdalonymus Sarchopagus" (The Persian Army 560-330 BC, p. 29-30) in my comments and cannot argue from personal analysis whether it is either another specific battle or more of a 'generic' representation of Alexander's exploits. I openly admit to being a novice still in the world of Alexander (having focused so far on his father's record with only related reference to his son's career as it reflects on earlier gear, organization tactics, etc.). However, I plan (no doubt naively and with considerable trepedation) to push on into that better documented world in the months to come, thus I very much look forward to learning both basics and finer points from yourself and others here at RAT in the 'threads ahead'. Regards, Fred
Re: New hoplite book - PMBardunias - 05-27-2010
Quote:If so, I can’t see Polybius’ account providing any evidence for it. Polybius describes Doson’s left as diphalaggian epallelon – a “double phalanx close one after the other” (or in close order). This doesn’t allow for one phalanx to be pushed backwards and then to rally on the rear one formed up someway down the hill. I might have misread what you actually mean though.
I don't believe the two macedonian formations were in contact, but as he says close in one after the other. This does not change when they are pushed back down the hill- not until the special 'double-phalanx in close order" is formed. Thus, they both go back down the hill, but the rear unit is not engaged in fighting. When the rear unit reached the flat, they made a stand, and the forward phalanx fell back onto them and stopped retreating. At this point there was probably a delay while the Spartans who had done enough 'winning" to normally be victorious attempted to redress their lines and the macedonians formed their double phalanx.
Now the Spartans were faced with a foe who by all rights should have routed, but had not, and was either coming on in some super-dense formation or at least not going anywhere. Cleomenes gamble to win on this flank before he was overwelmed by the Macedonian victors on his left had failed. All Antigonos needed was not lose, but he advanced anyway against a now shaken Spartan phalanx with no height advantage and this time chased them back to their fortifications, while his own right wing came to the attack as well.
This reconciles Polybius and Plutarch's accounts to me.
Re: New hoplite book - Paralus - 05-27-2010
Quote:MIchael, I certainly bow to your much superior knowledge on the individuals involved with Alexander's army…
Whoah there Fred! Waldemar Heckel and Brian Bosworth do not sit at this computer!!
Quote: […] I very much look forward to learning both basics and finer points from yourself and others here at RAT
And it’s a good thing there are plenty of “others” here!
Quote:Your doubts on Issus are also well taken. In fact, I've merely followed Nick Sekunda's opinion of the "Abdalonymus Sarchopagus" (The Persian Army 560-330 BC, p. 29-30) in my comments and cannot argue from personal analysis whether it is either another specific battle or more of a 'generic' representation of Alexander's exploits.
Mine either: I’ve not seen the sarcophagus in real life (more’s the pity). The best online photographic study is here.. Have you Heckel’s paper on the sarcophagus? If not PM me your email address and I’ll email it. Ditto Jacek Rzepka’s paper on Alexander’s army which, by your previous post, I assume you have?