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THE BATTLE THAT STOPPED ROME
#16
It is likey the force with him was far smaller than most modern historians have stated. Cassius Dio mentions that Varus did not keep his forces concentrated as was advisable in a hostile country, but dispersed many of his troops to those regions which lacked protection, supposedly to guard various vital positions, arrest outlaws or escort supply columns. Later he mentions that the tribes among whom these detachments were stationed slaughtered them. These forces could be anywhere from 2 to 4 cohorts per legion as well as significant detachments from the cavalry and auxiliaries (each detachment would require horsemen for patrolling and communications as well as auxiliary infantry). Other factors may affect the strength as well. Just a few years prior the legions had campaigned in the region (assume that the XVII-XIX participated) and their strength may not have been brought up fully. Other armies were in Illyria that should have had a higher priority for recruits given the active and costly campaign in the Illyrian rebellion potentially futher delaying the stregthening of Varus' occupation force. Rome seemed to suffer from an adequate number of recruits given the difficulty that was seen in finding more troops after the rebellion and the complaints among the troops themselves that they were being held beyond their normal terms of enlistment.<br>
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If each legion was around 4,000 men and had detached an average of three cohorts (1,200) on the duties described by Cassius Dio and the alae and auxiliary foot detached in similar proportions there could have been as few as 11,000 men -2,800 per legion 900 cavalry and 1800 auxiliaries). Of course it could have been more. It would have been very advantageous to the Germans if they had deceived Varus into detaching as large a force as possible. Given the size of the area and numbers of 'incidents' troops could have been sent to Varus might have sent off as much as half his strength. <p></p><i></i>
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#17
I have been reading these posts with interest, what would some of you recommend to read on the subject?<br>
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Lee <p></p><i></i>
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#18
To all:<br>
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Firstoff, this is the first forum I’ve ever posted to, so please forgive my lack of knowledge regarding procedures, etiquette and so on. That said, it seems there is a lot of interest in the Varusschlacht, but I don’t think this particular section of the overall forum is the place to pursue an ongoing discussion. If there is enough interest and someone can tell me how to do it, we can perhaps transfer this thread to a an appropriate place. However, I’d like to respond to a few points in the short term.<br>
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To JeFFig: I think you are absolutely right-on with everything you say regarding the number of Varus’s fighting forces; I can’t imagine he had more than 3000 men from each of the legions actually en-column. The only thing I would add is that it is further to my mind quite possible that the soldiery he did have along were not completely on a war-footing. Given the perceived political situation, the troops might have considered the entire affair a ‘walk in the sun’ (a nice way to spend the summer rather than mucking about with camp fatigues) and so have been somewhat lax in the military sense. For instance, their dispositions throughout the column, access to additional equipment, replacement weapons and the like may have been made more with an eye to ease, convenience and comfort than to military considerations per-se.<br>
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To Tim: Well, we can agree to disagree here at least- it doesn’t appear either of us has convinced the other to modify his general views. Regarding the ‘presentation’ on the Varusschlacht I mentioned, it was meant for a full hour’s worth of recitation, and runs to eleven closely-typed pages, not including the maps-handout! Even if I cut out the historical fluff (it was delivered to a university seminar group, not all of whom were specialists in the period) it would still be a bit much for even the most dedicated ‘Varusschlact-er’ in the forum. I would still like to E-mail the lot to you for your comments, and will do so if you can instruct me as to the particulars. I can do the same for the moderator of this forum also if desired.<br>
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As far as the battle per-se in concerned, it’s generally conceded in the literature that the Kalkriese site is if anything only the dismal endpoint of the affair- the matter had really been settled on the road in the days preceding. In fact, I have opined elsewhere that the ‘wall’ on the hillside didn’t exist at the time of the Varusschlacht, but was a barrier constructed at a later date by the locals to keep upslope run-off water from from washing out their sandy track between the hill and the bog. The construction (chalk blocks within to stabilize a field-expedient military work plus the ditch on the wrong side? nah….) and location would certainly speak to such. We to this day do exactly the same sort of thing here in rainy, hilly and boggy western Massachusetts. Anyway, I’ve gotten a couple of German scholars interested in pursuing the idea.<br>
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Regarding the battle per-se, I’d like to present herein an account I published elsewhere on just what poor old Varus was up against as a general thing. As I said before, once Arminus exhibited his extraordinary abilities in setting the situation up and marshaling the necessary forces, he didn’t need any further genius in handing the Roman’s a disaster. The mechanics naturally built into the scenario took care of that. Excerpt follows:<br>
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note: The following is excerpted from an article recently written for another website. I should say that in attempting to convey some impressions of the Roman’s experiences under this particular form of attack, I have drawn from my personal experience of having been on the wrong end of a number of ambushes out in the deep boonies while serving in the U.S. army. Admittedly, different times and places, but some things I think never change.<br>
“Generally speaking, a long column that is loaded down with wagons, dependents, etc., was pretty much indefensible. In essence it could either move or fight, but not both.<br>
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If oxen-drawn wagons are included, the first thing to note is that the column is more-or-less bound to roads or at the very least improved tracks, so if the approximate point of entry into an area is known, then all possible routes the column can thereafter take are also known. This means that once they are pinpointed their future movements are predictable, and even if an assailant disengages they can easily be found again. Secondly, seeing as the column is moving at a max. average rate of 2 mph (oxen will not move faster unless literally stampeding) , any decent infantry (who can easily make 4 mph if pushed) or better yet cavalry (horsemen can average 8 mph in reasonable terrain) of the opposition can intercept and re-intercept them handily.<br>
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Consider Varus: If we assume he had 18000 souls in his command, probably around as many as 7500 were ‘non-fighters’. Why? because Varus was not in command of anything approaching an army, but rather a large convoy of heavily-laden non-combatants provided with a strong military escort. Remember, his mission was to establish an outpost of Roman civil government amongst the Germans for an entire summer, the better to overawe them with the benefits of being taken into the Roman fold. Therefore, aside from all the human and material impedimenta of a typical bureaucracy, he had along the entire families of all the senior personnel as well as his own along with their numerous servants and slaves, plus traders, artisans, merchants and assorted lackeys of one sort or another. Many of these civilian types would most certainly not have been walking, and they would further have been taking along all the comforts of home for their extended stay. Read this a lots and lots of extra riding horses, draft animals and wagons. Most of these folks would not have been satisfied subsisting on military hardack while on the road, so we must assume further extra wagonloads of foodstuffs and fodder. Given all of the above, I estimate Varus’s column contained around 5500 pack-mules and 800 wagons along with a large number of remount horses. All in all, it is probable that Varus’s column was at least eight miles long, with perhaps only around ¼ of the total length consisting of fighting men.<br>
All this gaggle would have been easy prey to attack. The troops must have been strung out in penny-packets throughout the length of the column. It would have been very difficult for them to gather together into meaningfully-sized forces in a timely manner, and even once they did- what to strike out at? The attackers always held the initiative -- any number of them could attack anywhere with any degree of severity at any given time.<br>
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The fact is, if one's troops are en-column, one simply can't deploy them rapidly except on either one flank or the other. But what if one's column is several miles long and a message from the commander can only travel along the column's axis, and at the speed of a (at best) trotting horse as well? Let us assume that he wishes to mount an attack on the enemy which is harassing him from one side of the trail and he wants his troops to deploy accordingly, and he sets messengers out to convey his orders. How much delay does a messenger accrue if he has to get round a felled tree, or a clump of wagons backed-up on one whose ox has been shot dead in it's traces, or he has to pass through a zone under attack? Assuming he eventually does find the intended recipient of his message, what does he say if that unit is already deployed, but is defending against an attack from the other side of the trail? Its already been an hour since he left the commander and heaven only knows what the situation is now back there, so what is he to do? Go back with his recipients objections to what is obviously an impossible order under his present circumstances? That'll take another hour.<br>
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A column can be nickeled-and-dimed to death by bands of the enemy ranging in size from a few tens to a few hundred attacking as opportunity permits. All the enemy commander had to tell his guys was to range themselves pretty-much as they pleased along the march-route and attack anything that passed their way. Remember, it would be automatic that the attackers would have a numerical superiority at any given point- at least until reinforcements arrived from up or down the column. If things got too hot, they simply ran back into the bush the way they had come to regroup and catch their breath. The Romans certainly couldn't pursue them very far off-trail without risking being cut off. From the attackers point of view the whole business might have been great fun -- run in and bash a few heads and maybe grab some stuff off a packmule, then withdraw back into the greenery for a snack. Certainly, the Romans weren't going anywhere in a hurry, and the next time the band attacked it might get real lucky and hit a load of laden wagons. Just think of this sort of thing going on episodically- perhaps tens of small encounters occurring along the column length simultaneously for miles -- from dawn to dusk. In the aggregate, Roman casualties would mount steadily all day long. Cohesion of the column would automatically come apart as portions of it were brought to a halt even for a short time, and folks ahead simply kept going. The Romans were totally confined to a well-defined single track, and even without parallel trails smallish bodies of lightly-armed attackers could easily pace the column. The key to understanding the mechanics of the battle is to accept that neither side could easily communicate amongst themselves. For the Romans this meant that nowhere could they gather together a meaningful response. For the attackers, however, it was basically a non-event -- as long as the various bands followed their standing instruction to pace the column and attack as opportunity permitted, they didn't need further communication.<br>
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Meanwhile, the road/trail rapidly deteriorates under an unaccustomed pounding by thousands of animal hooves. Your unit (century, cohort, whatever...) is sandwiched between a panicked crowd of wagons and pack-mules piling up against your rear, and more of the same to the front. You can hear screams and shouts from up ahead, but you can't see round the bend in the trail. The rumor is that the enemy are felling trees across the track, and anyway you don't know how far ahead or behind the next unit of troops is, or indeed what shape it is in. You plod on. Do you pick up that wailing bunch of civilians- some hurt -- grabbing at your legs? or do you leave them be and continue to go forward picking your way round the wreckage of their wagons? Comes an 'open' area, and you can actually form up six-abreast- okay! It's spooky though, because all round you there are sounds coming from the woods. Guys out there crashing around and laughing and shouting, and sometimes you can actually get a glimpse of them, but so what? All of a sudden a whole bunch of them charge out of the woods chucking javelins at you and stabbing out with their spears -- but before you can form up to fight them they are gone again. The Centurion says 'forget it- no pursuit. Too great a chance of getting cut off out there...' Anyway, that's two more of your fellows down- one seriously so, and the other with a leg wound which bodes not well for his traveling prospects long-term. You figure it's only been about three hours since sun-up and that means about eleven more hours of this to get through -- and the enemy warriors are laughing and carrying-on out there in the bush, and now you can hear them crashing around getting ready for another rush……â€ÂÂ
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#19
Ed wrote:<br>
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Quote:</em></strong><hr>If there is enough interest and someone can tell me how to do it, we can perhaps transfer this thread to a an appropriate place. However, I’d like to respond to a few points in the short term.<hr><br>
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I've started [url=http://pub45.ezboard.com/fromanarmytalkfrm1.showMessage?topicID=814.topic" target="top]a new thread[/url] at History and Archaeology and linked it to this one. Perhaps we can continue this discussion there.<br>
Cheers, <p>Tim O'Neill / Thiudareiks Flavius<br>
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