Hi Martin. Always a fun topic!
Quote:...but it is a poor strategy if you move with an army to a place where you will inevitably outrun your resources...
I agree, but that wasn't
Hannibal's strategy, IMHO. His strategic designs, not lacking flexibility, was more concealing than revealing. I feel it is a common misconception when many propose the argument of he was a great tactician but poor strategist (how can one be so adept at one and yet narrow-minded at the other, I often wonder; it may be like being a great diver but not being able to swim well :roll: ). Such a notion, quite possibly, alludes to concluding that
Hannibal didn't understand fully the importance of supply, which is bot borne out of his overall conduct. His preparations and intelligence-gathering (in the ancient context, if you will) reveals a Captain-General hardly carrying a huge enterprise with a high degree of baseless optimism.
There are many issues, but I think there's a lot of 'show-no-tell' amid
Livy's eloquence; he shows us more than he directly stresses, and the Republic was in far deeper trouble than many realize.
Hannibal adapted to a circumscribed conduct of defensive movement post-Cannae, and his field army always remained strong, while the citizen manpower of Rome was dropping (according to the census figures, which quite likely also meant people weren't registering, if they were 'available'). Yes - more legions were being mustered with each year (25 was the peak in 212 BCE, IIRC), but the number of citizen legionnaires was dropping each year until 206 BCE. The
socii were having meetings as of 209 BCE, and 'all of Etruria' was on the verge of revolt upon
Hasdrubal's descent into northern Italy - which means a near-certain dose of scaremongering hyperbole from
Livy, but reflects a veracity of Rome nearing the end of her resources, particularly in light of both
Polybius and
Livy apprising us of Rome's request from Egypt for grain on two occasions (215 and 211 BCE, it seems), the second time very likely one of beseeching to Egypt. Moreover - and the record doesn't stress this, but reveals it nonetheless, the prowess of
Philip V of Macedon began to tell, and by
Hasdrubal's ephemeral march in 207 BCE,
Philip had effectively defeated Rome's allies, as well as the expeditionary Romans present, and gained the edge.
Despite the loss of Syracuse by 211 BCE,
Hannibal's dispatched his cavalry officer
Muttines, who began running roughshod over Roman outposts in south-central Sicily in 209-208 B.C (
Livy, Book 27.8.18).
Muttines actually defeated
Marcus Marcellus ('almost a regular battle', as the annalistic tradition conveys it) near the Himera River. What occurred was a bout of nepotism and betrayal, after which the results seeing a Roman triumph on the island far from constituted Roman martial superiority under the conditions. But one can argue it's not all mutually exclusive of each other.
Nothing is ever 'inevitable', IMHO.
Hannibal forged a unique precision instrument out of what his father surely began in Spain, geared to wheel and move in favorable conditions against Roman infantry cohesion centered around weight. This is part of what
Hans Delbrück formulated in elucidating the concept of echelon tactics, substantially (and arguably) borne at Cannae with
Hannibal's extraordinarily executed 'reverse refusal' which effectuated the classic cauldron. He broke up the rigid and linear design of a 'phalanx' into 'companies' which could allow a superior degree of elasticity.
Contrary to some beliefs among students, I feel
Hannibal, albeit not improving his field army's stature, never withered away under alleged Roman sagacious strategy of attrition. He was always keenly aware that he would be restricted with his commissariat of troop numbers once he arrived in Italy with his initial 26,000 men, departing with 15,000 or so, with thousands still with him in the field who refused to continue onto Africa in 203 BCE.
A very thought provoking article on the logistic factor was written some time ago by one
John F. Shean. But he too, I feel, steers away from a truer scenario than he proposes on some points:
Shean,
Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Vol. 45, No. 2 (1996), p. 176,
[indent]
"...Living off the land, or foraging, might satisfy the needs of the army in the short term, but could pose problems if relied upon for extended periods of time. Hannibal planned to win quickly and decisively. For a quick campaign, foraging would suffice. A line of communications stretching for hundreds of miles was not necessary. A careful reading of the sources shows that this, in fact, was what he anticipated and, therefore, he planned his campaign accordingly..."[/indent]I disagree.
Hannibal needed no solid lines of communications stretching back hundreds of miles; it would be much more difficult, but his supreme generalship and action was holding fast in southern Italy when Italic communities were having meetings amongst themselves.
Shean seemingly implies within his paper that
Hannibal was living hand-to-mouth in a very desperate fashion; while the metaphor that 'hunger is a weapon' does not lack an element of truth,
Shean is overly credulous, IMHO, in professing that
Hannibal was not prepared beyond a short-term campaign. Without any doubt,
Hannibal not only 'maintained' his field army throughout the entire time in Italy, but handled it with superb organizational skills and tactical maneuvering in the field, including stunning bouts of celerity (notably his arrival at Capua to scatter the 1st Roman attempt on his prized ally in 212 BCE). Again,
Shean's tantalizing paper is a very substantial contribution to our studies of the great conflict (amorally speaking, of course); he addresses an element which is rarely touched on - the supply of an ancient army on campaign, in this case one away from home for so long. Scholarly attention is voluminously fixed on the fascinating issue of strategy and tactics, including all the plaudits and criticisms lain with hindsight. But the science of equipping and feeding armed forces in the fields can be very technical, its fundamentals understood by only a commissariat with seemingly a degree of esoteric knowledge. Yet perhaps more than anything else, this logistic necessity is what dictates freedoms and constraints to the acts of any army out in the field during a war, and all the discipline, tactical prowess and superior equipment is of little importance without the ability to feed men and animals in the field. There is no question that throughout his entire fifteen years in the fields of Italy,
Hannibal did not destroy '400 cities and kill 300,000 people' (
cf.
Appian,
Roman History, Book 8.63 and 8.134). The fine scholar
B. Dexter Hoyos aptly wrote, 'we must sprinkle a pinch of salt over
Appian's claim' (
Hoyos,
Hannibal: Rome's Greatest Enemy, pp. 77-78).
To reiterate, I feel that the
Livian tradition on Hannibal's career -
viz. he shows us without really telling us an important aspect which comes to light: how
Hannibal organized his supplies and, just as crucially, funds for his armies can only be surmised, but it is clear that his troops seldom had grounds for complaint, let lone mutinous behavior. The reputation for greed that
Polybius mentions and
Livy and other Roman writers stress, may significantly reflect his concern to always to have money to pay his soldiers; he could remember, surely, the stories his father told him of the 'Truceless War', one specific element being the grievances of unpaid men. Funds were sent to him from Carthage in 215 BCE, perhaps too on other and unmentioned occasions (such detachments needed less shipping than troop reinforcements, etc.). But the bulk of his finances in Italy doubtless came from local sources, at times erratically if the looting and the sale of prisoners (sources who yield would lessen over the years) became more pronounced than through allies' contributions. That he suffered no mutinies and no unusual level of desertions, even in the later and defensive years in Italy is another tribute to his powers of leadership. (on record, 1,000 Iberians and 272 Numidians deserted while in Italy).
By the eighth year of the war in Italy crops were still being sown and harvested in Bruttium (
cf.,
Polybius,
The Histories, Book 9.7.7-10), where
Hannibal was slowly becoming more confined; remember, they didn't exactly possess napalm back then, hence the act of destroying the crops in to stymie the enemy's need for victual was simply impracticable then, and we read nothing of
Hannibal's foragers systematically being prevented from gaining supplies. Rhegium had more to be worried about than any other proximate region, as they were isolated in the south as a city still loyal to Rome. To reiterate, both
Polybius, in a fragmentary passage, and Livy tell us of two Roman emissaries to Egypt (the first in c. 215-211 BCE, the second in 210-209 BCE; we read of one emissary between our two main sources, or perhaps two variations of the same emissary, although they state different purposes) in which grain was requested due to the hardships Rome was enduring (
Polybius), and, according to
Livy, they were 'to call to mind and revive friendship' with
Ptolemy IV (
The Histories, Book 9.11a;
Ab Urbe Condita, Book 27.4.10). Clearly, Rome was having serious trouble with her own supply situation, an overt indication of the severe strain
Hannibal was effectuating. However,
Valerius Laevinus was able to utilize Sicilian crops to help the situation in Italy, thanks to the fortunate, for Rome, of the
voltafaccia of allegiance by the tremendous cavalry leader
Muttines (sent to Sicily earlier by
Hannibal in an attempt to stabilize Carthage's recently lost edge in this theater. But
Muttines was demoted out of sheer nepotism (even racism) by the Carthaginian commander, one
Hanno).
Albeit hardly a solid political alliance,
Hannibal's 'Italian League', if you will, should be more identified for its realizations. We unfortunately lose
Polybius for most of the post-Cannae years in Italy, but Livy, whom we have in full, is at times detailed and circumstantial with his narrative of the intense period. But despite his lack of acute detail of how Hannibal replaced his losses and sustained his army, the fact remains clear that he did, and his troops seldom complained, let alone rebelled. He still handed the Romans some defeats (the first Roman attempt at Capua, the Silarus River, two substantial victories at Herdonea, Canusium, etc.) and installed garrisons. His reinforcements from abroad were just a force of 4,000 Numidians, who disembarked at Locri in 215 B.C. (
Livy, Book 23.41.10;
Mago Barca was recently in Carthage, sent by
Hannibal, asking for reinforcements, money, and supplies; the answer was positive). Thus he clearly made viable use of local regions in Campania, Lucania, and Bruttium.
Again,
Hannibal obviously kept a solid army fielded throughout the war in Italy (although he neve could replenish his ranks with crack African infantry) however much it diminished and his fortunes gradually waned as the years went by. From Cannae until around five years later, when two field armies as well as garrisons were operating,
Hannibal, overall, may have had over 60,000 troops in arms between Campania, Lucania, and Bruttium. He clearly replaced losses among his original troops with mostly Italic recruits (mainly consisting of tough and increasingly seasoned
Oscani - or Samnites - and
Bruttii). Mercenaries from outside Italy may have made their way to him, but if so cannot have been very numerous, while for Italians in the Punic army there is a fair amount of evidence from
Livy and
Appian. By 208 B.C., while being dogged by Nero, Hannibal could still send his subaltern
Hanno, still in harness, to raise a fresh army from the Bruttii (
Livy,
Ab Urbe Condita, Book 27.42.16) Also, even as late as 204 B.C.,
Hannibal still defeated the Roman consul
Publius Sempronius Tuditanus near Croton, in a scrappy and running fight (
Livy, Book 29.36.3-5).
But, for all in all, I agree: the Senate was brilliant in the handling of the war effort, akin to a modern war cabinet, particularly where and when to cut their losses under exigent circumstances. It was collective genius triumphing over individual genius. But don't ever think they weren't lucky at times, such as the approach of ten Roman
quinquerenes toward the Greek mainland in 216 BCE, which compelled
Philip V to flee back to Macedon; he was off the coast with 120
lemboi -fast moving galleys which would have made mincemeat in a clash with ten large vessels. He thought the 'Roman navy' was approaching. But he regained his cool, and Rome was out of the Greek conflict by early 207 BCE. However lucky and inadvertent, the swift Roman movements kept
Philip in check at a crucial point
Food for thought, James K MacKinnon
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