01-03-2009, 03:06 PM
In 209 BC, a roman general 27 years old named Publius Cornelius Scipio captured the richest and greatest punic colony in Spain, New Carthage. It was a legendary siege! But most of the carthaginian army was still in Spain. Scipio marched against one of the two armies and defeated it, near Becula, in 208 BC.
But there were still two powerful carthaginian generals with two great armies in Spain: Hasdrubal Gisco, the punic commander who survived to Becula, and Mago Barca. The two, seeing that each other couldn't, alone, defeat Scipio, joined forces with each other, uniting two armies wich formed a huge, veteran battle force, which marched to Ilipa, defying Scipio to an open battle. The roman young general marched directly against the carthaginians, arriving Ilipa some months later than the carthaginians.
This time, Hasdrubal and Mago had united 50 000 or 70 000 infantrymen, 4000 to 4500 knights and the powerful elephants, in number of 32. The majority of the cavalry was commanded by Masinissa, a numidian prince allied to Carthage. This was the numidian cavalry, spectacular mounted men with no saddle with powerful missiles which they could throw to the enemy in seconds. The infantry of Carthage was made up by, in one side, carthaginian veterans in Spain, and, in the other hand, celtic and spanish allies whose loyalty was doubtful. The allies made up the majority of the infantry, which would cause some quite disasters in battle, but Mago and Hasdrubal didn't quite think that they would do any bad at all, by the contrary, they thought the allies were the most loyal and powerful part of the infantry.
On the other hand, Publius Scipio gained command of 45 000 infantrymen and 3000 knights. His infantry was made up by romans and some allies, but either the romans or the allies weren't strong enough to face the carthaginians. Scipio knew this: his romans were made up either by soldiers of Spain or by soldiers who fought and lost some many battles against Hannibal, in Italy. However, Scipio also knew that these romans had capture New Carthage and had beat the carthaginians in Becula, two years earlier. That's why Scipio continued his journey to conquer Spain, with no reinforcements except some 10 000 roman recruits from Rome. The roman allies were spanish.
Scipio understood that the death of his father and uncle on the hands of the carthaginians, in 211 BC, was due to their allies. In the Battles of Upper Baetis, Gnaeus and Publius (uncle and father of Scipio) separated their armies. They had about 30 000 roman infantrymen and 20 000 allies. When they were engaged by the carthaginians, the allies deserted to the punics' side and the romans lost the battle easily.
When the romans arrived at Ilipa, they immediatly started to build their camp in a hill some 1500m away from the carthaginians, who had built their camp in another hill. Contrary to the custom, Scipio ordered all his infantrymen to build their camp. However, he stationed a small cavalry force behind the infantrymen, so the carthaginians, if they would attack, wouldn't see those same knights.
The carthaginians were surprised by this, thinking that the romans did never do this stuff and that they would never do this. So, Hasdrubal ordered Masinissa to lead his cavalry to the roman camp, in a surprise attack. But as soon as the romans saw them, the small roman cavalry force astonished the carthaginians, and many fell down of their horses. But the carthaginian cavalry was larger than the roman one, and so Scipio sent some legionary reserves to help their cavalry. Soon after, the carthaginians had to retire to their own camp. Some hours later, the romans ended the construction of their camp.
In the next weeks there were many skirmishes between both armies, but never a true battle. This was often used by the armies at that time to weak the enemy, but the own army could lose the skirmish. The romans often defeated the carthaginians in these skirmishes thanks to their velites, the light infantry, but the carthaginians did also win some because of their famous, stronger cavalry.
In one day, Hasdrubal disposed his army in order to face the romans in battle. The carthaginians divided their army with the spanish in both flanks and the cavalry and the elephants in the wings. The carthaginian infantry was located in the center of the army. This formation did often scare the enemy, but it seems that the romans didn't fear their rivals. Scipio ordered his army to dispose in battle formation, with his roman infantry in the center, the allies in the flanks and the cavalry in the wings. It was a formation similar to the carthaginian one, but fearless.
The two armies stayed looking at each other, with no orders of attack, either by Hasdrubal or Mago or by Scipio. Some hours later, at sunset, the carthaginians withdrew to their camp, followed by the romans.
Some days later, Scipio ordered his troops to take their meal sooner than the custom. Then, still at sunrise, he ordered his light infantry and cavalry to attack the carthaginian camp. The roman infantry lined in battle formation in the field, but Scipio changed his usual tactic: instead, he placed the spanish allies in the center and his best roman troops in the flanks, with one legion followed by a wing in each one.
The roman cavalry and velites attacked the carthaginian vanguard. Hadrubal immediatly ordered his army to dispose in his usual battle formaiton: carthaginians in the center, allies in the flanks and cavalry and elephants in the wings. In the previous days, Hasdrubal often disposed his army in battle formation, challenging the romans to an open battle. With these shows of courage, he gained moral near either the carthaginian and the roman army. So, if Hasdrubal didn't respond to Scipio's challenge, he would instantly lose that moral he gained in his previous battle challenges; if he did, he had better chances to win the battle and to return home a hero.
So, Hasdrubal instantly disposed his army. Most of his soldiers didn't even eat, so quick that they had to dispose themselves in battle formation. The carthaginian knights and light infantry got out of the camp in first place. They immediatly went to face the roman knights and velites.
When Hasdrubal saw that Scipio had placed his allies in the center and the romans in the flanks, he stayed more confident than ever before: while the romans would beat their allies, the carthaginians would instantly fight and destroy the roman allies, which was a great advantage in hand-to-hand battle.
When the carthaginians were in position, the first roman legion (commanded by Marcus Junius Silanus and Lucius Marcius), which was in the left flank of the army, rotated to the left, forming a column, and then advanced to the right carthaginian flank, in which there were only spanish allies. Then, the second roman legion (commanded by Scipio), which was in the right flank of the army, did the same, attacking the left flank of the punic army and instantly defeating the enemy. Then, the roman allies ran into the center of the carthaginian army, being immediatly defeated by the libyans and carthaginians there located. Hasdrubal stayed still watching the strange roman moves. There after, his army was defeated, and Scipio won the battle, which decided in which side, roman or carthaginian, Spain would be.
Hasdrubal escaped to Africa, but Mago died in battle. At night, Scipio captured the carthaginian camp, sacking it instantly. Ilipa showed the military genius and bravery-courage of Publius Cornelius Scipio, who returned home a hero, rich, glorious and famous, and who, in the next year, was elected consul. It was after Ilipa too that Rome saw that the Hannibalic War was not such disastrous as the romans thought after Ticinus, Trebia, Lake Transimene and Cannae. Men like Scipio could change the war in one battle: not Ilipa (which, however, changed the face of the war and made Rome a larger territory), but Zama, fought in 202 BC. After Ilipa, many old allies of Carthage changed to Rome's side, including the numidian prince Masinissa, who fought against Scipio in Ilipa and fought with Scipio at Zama. Ilipa was only one of the first battles in which Scipio showed Rome that it was far better than its rivals, like Macedonia, Carthage or the Seleucid Empire.
But there were still two powerful carthaginian generals with two great armies in Spain: Hasdrubal Gisco, the punic commander who survived to Becula, and Mago Barca. The two, seeing that each other couldn't, alone, defeat Scipio, joined forces with each other, uniting two armies wich formed a huge, veteran battle force, which marched to Ilipa, defying Scipio to an open battle. The roman young general marched directly against the carthaginians, arriving Ilipa some months later than the carthaginians.
This time, Hasdrubal and Mago had united 50 000 or 70 000 infantrymen, 4000 to 4500 knights and the powerful elephants, in number of 32. The majority of the cavalry was commanded by Masinissa, a numidian prince allied to Carthage. This was the numidian cavalry, spectacular mounted men with no saddle with powerful missiles which they could throw to the enemy in seconds. The infantry of Carthage was made up by, in one side, carthaginian veterans in Spain, and, in the other hand, celtic and spanish allies whose loyalty was doubtful. The allies made up the majority of the infantry, which would cause some quite disasters in battle, but Mago and Hasdrubal didn't quite think that they would do any bad at all, by the contrary, they thought the allies were the most loyal and powerful part of the infantry.
On the other hand, Publius Scipio gained command of 45 000 infantrymen and 3000 knights. His infantry was made up by romans and some allies, but either the romans or the allies weren't strong enough to face the carthaginians. Scipio knew this: his romans were made up either by soldiers of Spain or by soldiers who fought and lost some many battles against Hannibal, in Italy. However, Scipio also knew that these romans had capture New Carthage and had beat the carthaginians in Becula, two years earlier. That's why Scipio continued his journey to conquer Spain, with no reinforcements except some 10 000 roman recruits from Rome. The roman allies were spanish.
Scipio understood that the death of his father and uncle on the hands of the carthaginians, in 211 BC, was due to their allies. In the Battles of Upper Baetis, Gnaeus and Publius (uncle and father of Scipio) separated their armies. They had about 30 000 roman infantrymen and 20 000 allies. When they were engaged by the carthaginians, the allies deserted to the punics' side and the romans lost the battle easily.
When the romans arrived at Ilipa, they immediatly started to build their camp in a hill some 1500m away from the carthaginians, who had built their camp in another hill. Contrary to the custom, Scipio ordered all his infantrymen to build their camp. However, he stationed a small cavalry force behind the infantrymen, so the carthaginians, if they would attack, wouldn't see those same knights.
The carthaginians were surprised by this, thinking that the romans did never do this stuff and that they would never do this. So, Hasdrubal ordered Masinissa to lead his cavalry to the roman camp, in a surprise attack. But as soon as the romans saw them, the small roman cavalry force astonished the carthaginians, and many fell down of their horses. But the carthaginian cavalry was larger than the roman one, and so Scipio sent some legionary reserves to help their cavalry. Soon after, the carthaginians had to retire to their own camp. Some hours later, the romans ended the construction of their camp.
In the next weeks there were many skirmishes between both armies, but never a true battle. This was often used by the armies at that time to weak the enemy, but the own army could lose the skirmish. The romans often defeated the carthaginians in these skirmishes thanks to their velites, the light infantry, but the carthaginians did also win some because of their famous, stronger cavalry.
In one day, Hasdrubal disposed his army in order to face the romans in battle. The carthaginians divided their army with the spanish in both flanks and the cavalry and the elephants in the wings. The carthaginian infantry was located in the center of the army. This formation did often scare the enemy, but it seems that the romans didn't fear their rivals. Scipio ordered his army to dispose in battle formation, with his roman infantry in the center, the allies in the flanks and the cavalry in the wings. It was a formation similar to the carthaginian one, but fearless.
The two armies stayed looking at each other, with no orders of attack, either by Hasdrubal or Mago or by Scipio. Some hours later, at sunset, the carthaginians withdrew to their camp, followed by the romans.
Some days later, Scipio ordered his troops to take their meal sooner than the custom. Then, still at sunrise, he ordered his light infantry and cavalry to attack the carthaginian camp. The roman infantry lined in battle formation in the field, but Scipio changed his usual tactic: instead, he placed the spanish allies in the center and his best roman troops in the flanks, with one legion followed by a wing in each one.
The roman cavalry and velites attacked the carthaginian vanguard. Hadrubal immediatly ordered his army to dispose in his usual battle formaiton: carthaginians in the center, allies in the flanks and cavalry and elephants in the wings. In the previous days, Hasdrubal often disposed his army in battle formation, challenging the romans to an open battle. With these shows of courage, he gained moral near either the carthaginian and the roman army. So, if Hasdrubal didn't respond to Scipio's challenge, he would instantly lose that moral he gained in his previous battle challenges; if he did, he had better chances to win the battle and to return home a hero.
So, Hasdrubal instantly disposed his army. Most of his soldiers didn't even eat, so quick that they had to dispose themselves in battle formation. The carthaginian knights and light infantry got out of the camp in first place. They immediatly went to face the roman knights and velites.
When Hasdrubal saw that Scipio had placed his allies in the center and the romans in the flanks, he stayed more confident than ever before: while the romans would beat their allies, the carthaginians would instantly fight and destroy the roman allies, which was a great advantage in hand-to-hand battle.
When the carthaginians were in position, the first roman legion (commanded by Marcus Junius Silanus and Lucius Marcius), which was in the left flank of the army, rotated to the left, forming a column, and then advanced to the right carthaginian flank, in which there were only spanish allies. Then, the second roman legion (commanded by Scipio), which was in the right flank of the army, did the same, attacking the left flank of the punic army and instantly defeating the enemy. Then, the roman allies ran into the center of the carthaginian army, being immediatly defeated by the libyans and carthaginians there located. Hasdrubal stayed still watching the strange roman moves. There after, his army was defeated, and Scipio won the battle, which decided in which side, roman or carthaginian, Spain would be.
Hasdrubal escaped to Africa, but Mago died in battle. At night, Scipio captured the carthaginian camp, sacking it instantly. Ilipa showed the military genius and bravery-courage of Publius Cornelius Scipio, who returned home a hero, rich, glorious and famous, and who, in the next year, was elected consul. It was after Ilipa too that Rome saw that the Hannibalic War was not such disastrous as the romans thought after Ticinus, Trebia, Lake Transimene and Cannae. Men like Scipio could change the war in one battle: not Ilipa (which, however, changed the face of the war and made Rome a larger territory), but Zama, fought in 202 BC. After Ilipa, many old allies of Carthage changed to Rome's side, including the numidian prince Masinissa, who fought against Scipio in Ilipa and fought with Scipio at Zama. Ilipa was only one of the first battles in which Scipio showed Rome that it was far better than its rivals, like Macedonia, Carthage or the Seleucid Empire.
Marcus Manlius Varro, born in the Province of Lusitannia
(Antonio Araujo)
(Antonio Araujo)
