Trench warfare

[Epictetus]

How common was trench warfare in antiquity? And since the devil is in the details, I would define trench warfare as something like: two opposing armies engaging in temporary earthworks and fortifications in the field.

The only instance I can think of is at Dyrrachium, where Caesar tried to bottle up Pompey, but there must be others.

[M. Demetrius]

Would sieges fit the bill? Alesis, e.g.? Maybe not.

[Epictetus]

Well, I was thinking of instances similar to Dyrrachium, where the armies engaged in trench-building and fortifications against each other in the field, away from urban areas or permanently-fortified structures.

[Quintius Clavus]

I can see what is meant with Dyrrachium. The situation at Dyrrachium involved two opposing Roman forces, each furiously digging and fortifying. Caesar was trying to keep the available land around Pompey's camp as small as possible - among the goals was denying him space to graze his cavalry horses, while Pompey's forces were trying to force Caesar's entrenchments outward and further away. Eventually Pompey, through Gallic cavalry deserters IIRC, found out about a weak point in Caesar's trench line and was able to attack causing considerable panic among Caesar's surprised troops. There had been fighting, of course, prior to this last episode.

Thus, as one can see, not the same as the double circumvallation around Alesia or other circumvallations around a fortified place.

[Eleatic Guest]

These are my notes on occurrences of ancient trench warfare:

- Trench warfare: extensive earthworks not only in sieges, but also in battles (masters: Sulla, Caesar). “The recourse to trench warfare, not necessarily associated with the blockade of a city or the fortification of a camp, was a Roman [feature] as distinct from Greek development.”
- “Aemilianus’ fortifications at Numantia, where, as Appian observes, he was the first general to enclose within a wall an enemy who would have been willing to fight in the open field.” (Warry 148); see also Sulla at Chaeronea and Orchomenos
- 28 km earthworks against moving tribe of Helvetii between Lake Geneva and the Jura mountains
- Battle at the Axona river: “ Caesar protected his flanks…” (Warry 161)
- Siege of Alesia (Warry 167-168)
- Dyrrhachium (Caesar B.C. III. 53?, Epirus, 48 BC): earthworks, ditches = ”anticipates protracted twentieth-century struggles amid extensively prepared positions” (Warry 172)
- Philippi (Macedonia): “The camps of Brutus and Cassius were about one Roman mile apart, straddling the road to Asia. A trench, rampart and palisade of the usual militar type connected the two camps, cutting the road and featuring a central gate through which troops from either camp could issue aagainst the enemy and be deployed in the plain beyond.” (Warry 180); Brutus diverting the river into the enemy camp (Warry 181)

[M. Caecilius]

There are a few examples in Frontinus' Stratagems, but all of those I could find involve only one army digging trenches across the battlefield, usually as a means of protecting one's flanks, covering retreat, or trapping an enemy. Quotes are from the Lacus Curtius site (Loeb translation).

I.5.9 When Gaius Caesar led out his forces against Afranius in the Civil War, and had no means of retreating without danger, he had the first and second lines of battle remain in arms, just as they were drawn up, while the third secretly applied itself to work in the rear, and dug a ditch fifteen feet deep, within the line of which the soldiers under arms withdrew at sunset.

I.5.20 20. When Marcus Crassus had constructed a ditch around the forces of Spartacus, the latter at night filled it with the bodies of prisoners and cattle that he had slain, and thus marched across it.

II.3. 17. In the battle against Lucius Sulla, Archelaus placed his scythe-bearing chariots in front, for the purpose of throwing the enemy into confusion; in the second line he posted the Macedonian phalanx, and in the third line auxiliaries armed after the Roman way, with a sprinkling of Italian runaway slaves, in whose doggedness he had the greatest confidence. In the last line he stationed the light-armed troops, while on the two flanks, for the purpose of enveloping the enemy, he placed the cavalry, of whom he had a great number.To meet these dispositions, Sulla constructed trenches of great breadth on each flank, and at their ends built strong redoubts. By this device he avoided the danger of being enveloped by the enemy, who outnumbered him in infantry and especially in cavalry. Next he arranged a triple line of infantry, leaving intervals through which to send, according to need, the light-armed troops and the cavalry, which he placed in the rear. He then commanded the postsignani, who were in the second line, to drive firmly into the ground large numbers stakes set close together, and as the chariots drew near, he withdrew the line of antesignani within these stakes. Then at length he ordered the skirmishers and light-armed troops to raise a general battle-cry and discharge their spears. By these tactics either the chariots of the enemy were caught among the stakes, or their drivers became panic-stricken at the din and were driven by the javelins back upon their own men, throwing the formation of the Macedonians into confusion. As these gave way, Sulla pressed forward, and Archelaus met him with cavalry, whereupon the Roman horsemen suddenly darted forth, drove back the enemy, and achieved victory.

II.12.2. Quintus Sertorius, when in Spain, was completely outmatched by the cavalry of the enemy, who in their excessive confidence advanced up to his very fortifications. Accordingly during the night he constructed trenches and drew up his line of battle in front of them. Then when the cavalry approached, as was their wont, he drew back his line. The enemy following close on his heels, fell into the trenches and thus were defeated.

A fortification race like Dyrrhachium or Second Philippi (Antony trying to outflank the Liberators with his causeway, Cassius building a dam to prevent him), where both armies tried to surround the enemy, seems rather rare; fortified camps, of course, were a standard Roman technique so I would assume that civil wars may have involved both sides sitting around and waiting for an enemy to make a move, if neither side could secure a permanently fortified site first. Philippi certainly is an example of this.

Also, IIRC, the Cherusci may have built fortifications to channel the Roman march and prevent their escape.

[Epictetus]

Thanks! I expected there would be more examples, but I couldn't think of any.

[Robert Vermaat]

The Alamanni used camouflaged trenches to guard their right flank against Julianus at the battle of Argentorate/Strassbourg, AD357.

Belisarius used trenches to guard his front in the battle of Dara against the Sassanid Persians, AD530.

[Vincula]

Thus, as one can see, not the same as the double circumvallation around Alesia or other circumvallations around a fortified place.

this is realy intresting about alesia: http://antoninuspius.blogspot.co.uk/

[Marja]

The Alamanni used camouflaged trenches to guard their right flank against Julianus at the battle of Argentorate/Strassbourg, AD357.

Off the top of my head, there's some controversy, and the Alamanni may have used the aqueduct instead.

As another maybe-example, the Romans tried to starve out a Gothic camp at Ad Salices. I'm not sure whether the wagons should count as fortifications, and there's no direct mention of Roman fortifications, but they had time and reason to build some.

As another maybe, the Strategikon or one of the other Byzantine manuals discusses dropping caltrops from baggage-carts to discourage pursuit. Should caltrops count as fortifications?

[richsc]

It was in one of my books where Roman marching camps were described as "mobile trench warfare".