An argument for the pace and not the cubit

[Macedon]

My mistake, please take it up with these people:
Bill Thayer's Website

Translations are fickle things. As I do not read ancient Greek, I am must rely on other's to do the translating for me. As I do not have access to a scholarly library, I primarily rely on online sources. So options are limited. But, where can I find other examples of translations of the same source that match your version? Can you provide other comparative examples that support the translation you provided?

Another example of the above text citing terrain

Unfortunately, there is nothing you can do other than trying to double check whatever you think you really need with the use of multiple translations and even then you cannot easily profess certainty. Most translations are highly stylized and much of what they write cannot be taken at word value. Besides that, most translators have no experience with military terminology. I cannot help you with finding other translations on the web, but I am sure there are aplenty. This is a very usual problem with researchers (even historians) who do not know ancient Greek. What I am saying is that whenever you want to really base a theory on a certain interpretation, you should check and double check with people you trust. You will see that I often post such queries in this forum myself, when I am not sure about the meaning of certain texts I deem important.

Additionally, how can you write this:
"When he realized that the left (of the Macedonians) was broken among the hills..."

and then write:
It nothing to do with the terrain itself.

It seems contradictory. Did terrain play a factor in the Macedonian left being repulsed by the Romans at Cynoscephalae?

Because it is not contradictory. The meaning of this passage, more clear in Greek than in English, is that the left Macedonian wing was still broken (the real word being "divided") because the columns were still arriving and forming. So this is an example of how the word "broken" which both I and the translation used can mislead you into thinking that it was "because of the hills" that this was happening. However, it is not. It is just that the phalanx has not yet unified and its parts are on the hills. Had it been on a plain, it would be "broken in the plains". The main difference in the translations you used and mine is that I strongly support that the text nowhere says that the left wing was formed but was unable to retain cohesion because of the terrain. It is, to me, clear that the Macedonians did not have time enough to form in the first place.

So, the terrain was not a factor that played a role in the phalanx vs phalanx battle. It DID play a role because it probably made it a less quick job to form the phalanx, since less columns could climb up the hills from the camp and so the left wing was not in position as quickly as Philip would have wanted. However, this is an overall tactical disadvantage and not one that has to do with the specific issue at hand.

If Jass (Lyceum) reads that, he can give us his own opinion as to what the text says.

[Bryan]

Macedon wrote:

The main difference in the translations you used and mine is that I strongly support that the text nowhere says that the left wing was formed but was unable to retain cohesion because of the terrain.

Translation #1 from your post (#348903):
the men being hindered by the unevenness and roughness of the ground...

Translation #2 from your post (#348903):
being hindered by the unevenness and roughness of the ground...

Translation from my original post that mentioned Plutarch's passage, quoted from Bill Thayer's Penelope Univ. of Chicago website:
being prevented by the roughness and irregularity of the ground

Translation from the additional source translation I provided in my last post:
in consequence of the inequality and roughness of the ground

(EDIT) Judging by the above translations, I think that terrain did play a factor in the Macedonian left being repulsed by the Romans at Cynoscephalae. This passage seems very similar to Polybius
"...it is acknowledged that the phalanx requires level and clear ground with no obstacles such as ditches, clefts, clumps of trees, ridges and water courses, 6 all of which are sufficient to impede and break up such a formation." (18, 31.5)

So in flat terrain, the phalanx was unstoppable. Unfortunately, at Cynoscephalae and Pyda, parts of the battlefield weren't flat.

[Macedon]

?

Every kind of phalanx was hindered by the unevenness and the roughness of the terrain, Romans included. What does this have to do with the frontal phalanx matches of Macedonian phalanx vs Roman phalanx we are discussing? Of course there are many factors that play a role in a battle and this is exactly what I have been stressing ever since my first post. BUT this is not what we have been debating.

The fact that the Macedonian phalanx at Cynoscephalae was attacked before it had fully formed, partly being hindered to form in time because of the terrain, is not the same as saying that the Roman phalanx defeated the Macedonian phalanx in a head on charge. Isn't it what we are talking about? In the battle, the formed part of the Macedonian phalanx defeated the Roman line, the unformed was defeated by them.

And yes, of course, the Macedonian phalangite is not well armed for single combat. So, in ambushes, in camp fights, in forests etc, they cannot fight well and is at a great disadvantage.

Both in Cynoscephalae and in Pydna the formed phalanx "defeated" the Roman phalanx. So, if you consider the terrain in these plains rough, then the phalanx could defeat the Romans even in rough ground. In both cases the Romans eventually gained the victory.

Another issue worth mentioning is that when one reads "uneven" terrain, one had to be very careful as to what it means. The hills of Cynoscephalae are not an even plain, nor is any hill in Greece. The same applies to many battle-grounds where the Macedonian phalanx excelled (take Sellasia for example). It is a very big mistake to think that the Macedonian phalanx could only operate in what many consider "even" ground. What Polybius considers "open" would to many look broken and rough. Polybius was Greek and he is discussing things from a Greek perspective. In Greece there is almost no stretch of land that most of you people would consider a plain. Even plains are broken and rough, so "rough" here has another, rougher meaning.

[Bryan]

Both in Cynoscephalae and in Pydna the formed phalanx "defeated" the Roman phalanx. So, if you consider the terrain in these plains rough, then the phalanx could defeat the Romans even in rough ground. In both cases the Romans eventually gained the victory.

At Cynoscephalae, the Macedonian right, meaning specific units within the entire phalanx, to include skirmishers involved, defeated the forces of the Roman infantry and Latin/italian Ala they were opposing (Roman left), while on the other side of the battlefield, the Roman units succeeded in stopping or defeating the Macedonians they faced. As the sources indicate in my previous postings state, the Macedonian left was hindered by: the phalanx deploying in the wrong formation which they couldn't fix because of rough terrain. At Pydna, the Romans retreated back to their camp, into rougher ground, and then counter attacked into the gaps created by the rough terrain.

In each of these battles, the victory was won by Roman infantry exploiting, among other things, rough terrain. Additionally, as it was the Roman infantry that caused the victory, and not allied cavalry or elephants or whatever else, the Roman infantry was not "defeated." Roman infantry being defeated means in a consular army, Ala Sinister, Legio I, Legio II, and Ala Dexter were all repulsed and broken/routed.

In regards to terrain, both Polybius and Plutarch both seem to think that the Macedonian phalanx had some issues maintaining unit integrity while crossing rough terrain. As they formed up in a very tight formation, which needed near perfect drill precision to maintain, it is understandable. As to the definition of rough terrain, I was not under the illusion that it mean a small ditch in the direct center of an otherwise manicured grassy field. I mean ROUGH TERRAIN: ridges, hills, saddles, draws, spurs, cliffs, ditches, clefts, boulders, clumps of trees, creeks, rivers, river banks, mud, massive groups of dead bodies, walls...
This:
[img width=550]http://www.mlahanas.de/Greeks/images/Army1.jpg[/img]

didn't do well crossing rough terrain. Therefore, the Macedonian phalanx cannot effectively fight in the majority of the terrain encountered in its locale, AS OPPOSED to its enemies (Galatians, Bactirans, Romans, etc.), who can.

Happy New Year!

[Macedon]

So... I will again ask, my disagreement to your points being irrelevant, what does all this have to do with the question at hand? I think you are objecting to points that no one has made. Was I not clear enough when in my posts I again and again differentiated between the Macedonian pike-bearing phalanx and the rest of the army?

Plus, regarding "rough terrain" and the ability of the phalanx, do you really think that the battles and campaigns of Philip II, Alexander the Great, Purrhus, Antigonus and many others in Greece, the Balkans up to the Danube, Italy and Asia Minor took place on "even" terrain? For some reason, this type of phalanx was invented, utilized and shaped empires in countries with almost no plain to speak of. An adequately trained Macedonian phalanx fared very well in frontal assaults on what is usual "open" terrain in those countries, that is relatively open (not wooded) plains and hills, with a fair number of streams, ravines, farms, boulders etc. I have the same problem with Greeks trying to imagine the terrain where Napoleonic battles took place, from the descriptions (like Waterloo, most of Prussia, Poland, Russia etc)... They read of hills and ravines and stuff and when they see photos they exclaim in wonder "Hey! That is an open, even, plain", of the type that we do not have in Greece. So, yes, of course the Macedonian type phalanx, the Greek hoplite phalanx as well as many many others required as even a terrain as possible in order to be most effective, but this does not mean that the roughness that hindered them is what most people imagine.

Just to be absolutely clear, I do not say that your understanding of what "rough terrain" is is too "non-Mediterranean". I say that most people's is.

[Bryan]

EDIT: Deleted to avoid a pointless debate and further derailing the thread.

[Sean Manning]

Sean,

I think I've understood your query, but I haven't claimed any size for the 'Macedonian shield' (which, as far as I am aware, is normally accepted as a dished round, but anywhere between 1ft and 2.5ft in diameter and yes 8 palms is mentioned which then depends on how large the palm is (3 to 4in)). The only shield width I mention in your quote is the 3ft round parma - which is what the Roman velites are equipped with.

Ok, you meant Polybius' description of the parma at Polybius 6.22 and not his description of some Greek or Macedonian round shield. That was not clear to me. You equate this shield with the Argive aspis, but I'm not sure if the Middle Republican parma had much in common with that shield other than size and roundness ...

It is knowing that, that the Roman troops that were most definitely armed with a shield for their role of skirmishing in a more open order, indeed had a wider shield, that leads me towards the conclusion that the scutum of the heavy infantry is taller and narrower for a particular reason: that reason being that 4ft high is just about the perfect height to leave only a few inches at the bottom to stop in getting caught as you move and only just enough at the top for the eyes to see over before the helmet protects; and is then the perfect width to meet with your neighbours; where each soldier has the prime requirement of keeping it in line with the guy to the right and stabbing out with his gladius whenever a gap is created and maintaining the wall with all discipline.

Like many other shields, the Polybian scutum could certainly have been used in a continuous wall, but it could also be used in other formations or a loose swarm, and I still don't see any evidence that the Romans fought in a continuous shield wall in this period (although I speculate that they sometimes doubled their density to 'three feet' of breadth per file based on the references to this from the first century BCE onwards). I don't know of anyone disputing that the Polybian scutum could protect everything but the face and the lead foot when one crouched behind it with the sword hand back? A basic but reliable article on the merits of different shields for single combat is by Stephen Hand and Paul Wagner in the anthology Spada II.

Edit: Michael's article in Historia does provide some evidence for denser formations in the Middle Republican period and might be a good subject for another thread.

[Mark Hygate]

Thank you all, that was very interesting...

For Macedon in particular,

I was first happy to take your view that a Greek/Macedonian pike-phalanx always beat a Roman opposing one (in our original context), although it caused me to re-evaluate a number of things, I was content to consider your greater knowledge of the actual battles. However, on reviewing your examples, I am not sure I do agree.

Only at Cynoscephalae (of those 3 examples), where the phalanx has formed uphill of the Romans and then 'charges' down in full phalanx formation, does the Roman line suffer appreciably. You may have other examples, and indeed if I ever get the time in the future I will certainly wish to review many battles and see if my organisational construct can lead to a better understanding of the actual tactical manoeuvres used; but at present I would offer this.

My whole original wish to see if my basic understanding of phalanx warfare was correct was then to see if my Roman phalanx idea could stand against it has not necessarily suffered. For the spear- (perhaps lesser) or pike-phalanx (more so) has this singular weakness - that it only remains effective if it maintains a singular and cohesive contiguous line. It is my belief that the maniple/century opposing 'phalanx' (shield-to-shield and man-to-man block) only needs to work for a short and intense period. As long as only one maniple/century can hold (perhaps because there is the one piece of ground that is less to the enemy phalanx's favour), then the enemy phalanx can be broken; at which point the maniples of the second line can exploit it and the enemy phalanx comes apart. That the entire design of the Roman manipular formation is indeed to break up a phalanx and then exploit.


For Bryan,

Thanks for the link to the 'Cut & Thrust' thread, for I was also sure it had been discussed before; but I thought once more it might be better to define terms. For when I espouse the idea of stab/thrust and cut (for which I see the shorter classic gladius with it's heavier waisted point and double-edges perfectly designed for) I am thinking of the placed 'cut' (literally as one cuts meat - by placing the blade and drawing backwards); as opposed to the downward cutting motion that I could perhaps better describe as 'slashing'.

For that's how I see the Roman legionary fighting and being taught to fight. No wasted time with wide slashing moments - but a strict concentration on stabbing forwards with the shortest possible effort and not leaving oneself exposed, whilst indeed sheltering sensibly behind the shield; perhaps gaining a killing stroke with the stab, but also attemtping to cut on the reverse thrust against any exposed muscle and blood-carrier.

It's in thinking this that I would happily dismiss any thoughts of 'virtus' and heroism, for I would ask all to forget any warrior ethic, knightly behaviour or individualism when it comes to soldiers fighting. For they are there to perform only one task - to kill, preferably with minimal losses - and nothing else. It is this aspect that made the Roman military machine what it was. There is a time and place for a bit of heroism, but that's not what you teach soldiers - you teach them to kill in the most efficient method possible.

Shield-to-shield acts to block and blunt, as far as possible, the attack of any enemy; your sword remains hidden. If the man to your right is pushed back a bit, there is plenty of room to strike the enemy in front of him; if you can push a little forward with your shield, then there is now another opening; if you turn your shield just a little to the left, then there is a new opening. The Roman legionary in disciplined formation is simply a meat grinder and you defeat your enemy by him knowing that when that man is next to him, he's going to lose.


For partiularly Micheal,

Thank you so much for the pre-look at your article; whilst my own will be much less polished I hope to put it here for hopefully as much interest. What I would wish to throw in, however, apertains particularly to this thread and is a part of my concentration on the Roman deployment as shield-to-shield.

For it is my contention that it is the densest possible formation that dictates the deployment width; whilst indeed I have no worries in considering the need and use for more open Roman formations, but note that these can all be achieved with changes in depth deployment.

For whilst I have only really speed-read your article and will give it much more deserved review later, I would like to offer this...

That the Roman legion (certainly of the Manipular/Polybian period and quite possibly beyond) has but a single deployment width in mind - and this is one of the great strengths of the Roman army and its legion construct. And that width is 200 men (or 500ft in my view of 2.5ft per man densest). 1/10th of a Roman mile, where each maniple occupies 1/100th of a mile - non-constraining terrain (such as Cannae or at the Ebro) allowing.

The reasoning is simple - that the "triarii, who always number 600" (Polybius Bk VI). It is their number that define the width of a legion.

[Macedon]

The point for me is that you are trying to imagine a manner in which the Romans would be able to stand their ground and push back the phalanx. This, as I see it, is the main issue. Sometimes, the best tactic is to not stand in the way and this is what the Romans did. Even if you believe that the Macedonians would be thrown into disorder should they enter "rough" ground, in order for that to happen, the Romans still had to retreat to it. Keep in mind that, as I already mentioned, I also believe that the "textbook" manner for the Romans to fight in line would be in close order. I only think that in this particular situation, arguments about the solidity, weight and pushing power of the Roman formation cannot be applied. Retreating "epi poda" (by keeping front) was a tactic that won many battles (Chaeronea, 338 BC being one of them), even for the Macedonian phalanx and did not require an open formation, at least from adequately trained troops.

Another point you might want to take into consideration in your line of thinking is Polybius 18.30, that is the assertion that the Roman first rankers were not supported by those behind them, that they did not push the first rankers and they did not join the sword fight.

Oh, and another instance of Romans getting armed with spears to fight Gauls is Polybius 2.33

[Bryan]

Mark wrote:

For when I espouse the idea of stab/thrust and cut (for which I see the shorter classic gladius with it's heavier waisted point and double-edges perfectly designed for) I am thinking of the placed 'cut' (literally as one cuts meat - by placing the blade and drawing backwards); as opposed to the downward cutting motion that I could perhaps better describe as 'slashing'.

[img width=400]http://www.museodelarmablanca.com/gladius_files/gla18.jpg[/img]
The sword on the bottom is the Gladius Hispanensis, the Spanish Sword, that is described by Polybius and was carried by Romans in the mid to Late Republic/Early Principate. Based on recent archaeological discoveries, the blade length ranges from 25"-27", the blades were mostly straight, with some minor wasting, long points, thin blades. Its blade heavy, with a point of balance at generally 5-7" from the guard. It was the sword the Romans carried, at least during their rise to the empire period that you frequently mention, and as you can see, it wasn't short.

[img width=350]http://www.myarmoury.com/images/collect/nateb_swor_var_gladh_a_s.jpg[/img]
[img width=350]http://www.armae.com/Photos/Epees_sabres_glaives_poignards/114PDSW131F.jpg[/img]
A couple of modern recreations of the Gladius Hispaniensis.

It's in thinking this that I would happily dismiss any thoughts of 'virtus' and heroism, for I would ask all to forget any warrior ethic, knightly behaviour or individualism when it comes to soldiers fighting. For they are there to perform only one task - to kill, preferably with minimal losses - and nothing else. It is this aspect that made the Roman military machine what it was. There is a time and place for a bit of heroism, but that's not what you teach soldiers - you teach them to kill in the most efficient method possible.

The modern soldier vs. warrior debate didn't exist in ancient Rome. The Romans were a war like people, who glorified war at every level of their society. I highly recommend you read Ross Cowan's For the Glory of Rome: A History of Warriors and Warfare. Cowan (who is a RAT member) specifically recounts of situations where it is undeniable that the Roman soldier was also a warrior, believing in concepts like virtus and heroism. Please read this book.

Additionally, I would also recommend J.E. Lendon's Soldiers and Ghosts and Simon James Rome and the Sword.

Your assumptions may be flawed.

[Mark Hygate]

Bryan,

We may disagree on the use of 'short' in this context; I'm just using it against the other common Roman sword, the 'longer' spatha; and certainly 'shorter' than many of the Celtic (sic) types.

But as your pictures certainly show - it's actually just perfect for the type of usage I envisage, although as the longest of the styles we see, it does just nicely fit behind a shield when the arm is cocked and the body turned slightly.

As to any sort of 'modern discussion', I am surprised that you are arguing differently of all people. I have no concerns at all that Roman culture (particularly of the Patrician and Equestrian) extols 'warrior virtue' et al, it would be a very unusual military/warrior culture if it didn't.

But, as far as the soldier is concerned, given the discipline we happily believe they were under, I am absolutely 100% positive that their centurions and optio's would not have trained them as 'heroes' - you only need heroes when things go wrong (and that's when they appear); and pre-battle they can be happily psyched up to perform their best. But you train them simply to kill, with the minimum of thought and the maximum efficiency possible - that would have been the entire purpose of many hours at the post; as well as responding to the simple commands necessary to get the century to go where 'I' wanted it to go.

The formal profession of an Army Officer is as a 'manager of violence' - that's what I was taught 30 years ago (even in this rather cultured and wimpy modern era) and I am absolutely certain that applies to the Roman 'officers' in spades.

Remember also that the Romans decried the flamboyance and posturing of the barbarian warrior cultures - you just kill them - stab and kill, or cut and slice and let them bleed to death; as efficiently as possible.

[Bryan]

Mark,

From my own perspective, you seem to be placing modern sensibilities, practices, ideas, on an ancient culture. Efficiency and the extreme drive toward it, which you frequently mention, is a modern idea, brought about in the 19th and 20th century, crossing over from engineering and business into other facets, such as military science. There is a reason that technology is advancing at such a rapid stage in our time. And their is a reason it took so long for the stirrup to be invented. However, the same ideas cannot be given to a culture/group of people that existed two thousand years ago. The Romans, advanced as they were compared to more "barbaric" neighbors they may have been, were still a product of their time. So concepts like The formal profession of an Army Officer is as a 'manager of violence are modern. A modern military officer might see themselves as a manager, (though many others do not agree on that and hate the usage of that word), but the word manager as used by the military comes from senior career minded officers taking business management courses at universities in the 1950s/60s and transferring business terms to military settings. So, while you might see, from your perspective and past experiences (and biases) that the Roman officers managed, they didn't, because that very concept in military leadership is modern.

This goes for the other terms/ideas you are expounding upon. I've brought them up in the past: modern concepts of drill and ceremony, riot training, antiwar sentiments brought about by the horrors of war, managerial/leadership methods, etc. They all have there place in history, but the times of the Romans isn't one of them.

When it comes to the concepts of bravery, heroism, etc., I can pretty confidently state that it is still alive and well today in the military. I've head the whole "soldier vs. warrior" crap for years and don't believe one part of it. A soldier obeys orders but needs to be a master at fighting to succeed, which takes years. A warrior spends a lifetime in martial endeavors, but those same endeavors require some sort of discipline and organization to succeed at.

The combat arms of nearly every military from every single country I've served around still puts a heavy emphasis on bravado, dominance, and concepts like violence for the sake of pleasure. People like going to war, if they didn't, war would have ended long ago. Being in combat myself, I was confused at first because I was told by so many that I was supposed to hate it. In actuality, I and many others, actually enjoyed it, even with the brutality of it. I guess as long as you winning that helps, though. And heroics happened all the time and people did crazy stupid things for the same reason Napolean mentions, that soldiers will do nearly everything to be given a piece of colored cloth. Its a part of warfare, people will always do heroic things and the more martial the people are, the more heroic they will be, because each is deep down competing for one another for attention. The US Army gave a Bronze Star to every single officer who served in a combat zone for a reason. Be like thinking they are heroes.

The Romans were, for the most part, ALWAYS at war, so I find it hard to believe they had a reluctant citizenry to use as soldiers, needing centurions/optios (who come from among them, sometimes directly commissioned with no prior experience), to drill the idea of violence into their heads. These weren't street urchins from the slums of London, with zero martial experience, joining the army for the sake of a ration of rum a day. The Roman yeoman farmer class, that served in the ranks, was as much into war as the rich and powerful. War was one of the chief ways for social advancement; it allowed someone to become rich through loot; a name could be made by someone, even a small landowner could become famous and powerful due to a military career and name. I think a Roman dad/grandpa included whatever preparation necessary way before Gaius the Tyro joined his first unit, (at least until Marius took volunteers from a group of people who would have never have served before, meaning a training plan would have been needed, which coincides with the use of gladiators to train the men in swordsmanship). As a Roman youth, as long as they had some land in their family's name, it meant that as long as they were bodied and between 16 and 46, they were expected to serve in the army for between 6 and 16 years. Why would a member of a culture with a warrior tradition wait till they were enlisted before preparing to learn how to soldier/fight? You seem to envision the centurion as some sort of modern drill sergeant hosting some sort of basic training. Centurions were not always selected due to bravery or even competence or even experience. While some sort of initial training might have been used, it was not standardized throughout the ages, and considering how quickly legions were levied and then rushed off to war during the Republican times, I doubt it was emphasized much by many, which is scary considering how much we now know about the usefulness of training (I am referring to the time frame before Marius/Rutlius Rufus' reforms, before the legions of Cicero's and Josephus' day).

Mark, I've said what I had to say. Please read those books I mentioned in my previous post before you definitively state you are 100% sure on the subject. Instead of reinventing the wheel, read what some other professional scholar and historians have said about the topic. The Roman legion wasn't the British Army, no matter how many British actors play Romans. :wink:

[antiochus]

Bryan wrote:
The Romans were, for the most part, ALWAYS at war, so I find it hard to believe they had a reluctant citizenry to use as soldiers, needing centurions/optios (who come from among them, sometimes directly commissioned with no prior experience), to drill the idea of violence into their heads.

The only time the Romans had trouble with completing the levy was when the infra-classem would boycott the levy as a weapon to gain better political rights. The primary sources have plentiful accounts of the Romans eagerly enlisting in the army. They do have levy problems fighting the Spanish, but this is because of a lack of booty to be made in Spain. Like yourself Bryan, I cannot see a centurion drilling violence into their heads. The Romans did not go to a supermarket to get their already killed chicken or meat for tonight’s meal. They did the killing themselves. They witnessed as children growing up the countless slaughter of animals at every religious ceremony. I read once of a serial killer who confessed that to make it easier for him to kill a human, he practised killing animals first. Surely a father would have passed on his combat experience to his son and taught him how to use his weapons and protect himself. They would need to know this at an early age so as to deal with local bandits and the like. Training on the field of Mars would have involved learning how to move in large bodies and to recognize signals (audio or visual). However, this could also have been conducted in every tribal community. Below is a couple of references concerning Roman bellicosity:

Dio (frg. 8 12) makes the point the Romans were very anxious to surpass in war.

Plotinus 2 6) “War is the natural element of man. To live he must destroy others, and to have wealth he must take their possessions…The necessity for war is as real as for hawks to eat birds or cats to kill mice.”

“the Roman people shall be subject to other people is contrary to divine law: the immortal gods have willed it (Rome) to rule all nations.” Cicero (The Republic 2 10), (Philippic 6 19), (De Divinatione 1 22)

Dionysius (6 32) mentions ambassadors from the Auruncans, inhabitants of Campania, declared to the Roman senate that if the Romans refused to withdraw their garrisons from their territory, the Auruncans would take their revenge. To this the Roman senate replied:

“Ambassadors, carry back the word to the Auruncans that we Romans think it right that whatever anyone possesses by having won it from the enemy through valour, he should leave to his posterity as being his own. And we are not afraid of war from the Auruncans, which will be neither the first nor the most formidable war we have been engaged in; indeed, it has always been our custom to fight with all men for the supremacy, and as we see that this will be a contest, as it were, of valour, we shall await it without trepidation.”

Bryan wrote:
Centurions were not always selected due to bravery or even competence or even experience.

And elected by the men in the century they commanded. So this could mean the man they elected to be a centurion may not have been a centurion prior to this.

Bryan wrote:
While some sort of initial training might have been used, it was not standardized throughout the ages, and considering how quickly legions were levied and then rushed off to war during the Republican times, I doubt it was emphasized much by many, which is scary considering how much we now know about the usefulness of training (I am referring to the time frame before Marius/Rutlius Rufus' reforms, before the legions of Cicero's and Josephus' day).

In 464 BC, after messengers arrived at Rome at around midnight, asking for reinforcements. By daybreak the Romans had assembled ‘about 5000 volunteers,’ both foot and horse composed of the choicest troops. The same day, the other consul marched with his army to help the Romans besieged in their camp. There was no time to train the troops here. Before the battle of Silvia Arsia in 509 BC, while awaiting developments, there is mention of the army training on the field of Mars, but again this could be about moving in large bodies.

[Renatus]

What the devil are we arguing about? Of course, the Romans were a warlike people; otherwise, how did they come to dominate the Mediterranean world? And, of course, instances of personal heroism, such as saving the life of a citizen or being the first over the enemy's rampart, were rewarded. Likewise, there were occasions when a perilous situation was saved by an act of individual bravery, such as that of the aquilifer of the 10th legion during Caesar's first expedition to Britain. However, Roman military discipline was designed to curb natural impetuosity to ensure that orders were obeyed and soldiers kept their positions in the line and did not indulge in unnecessary (and I stress that word) bids for personal glory. Remember the story of Manlius Torquatus, who had his own son executed for disobeying orders and accepting a challenge to personal combat from the enemy commander, even though he triumphed and brought the spoils back to the Roman camp. The tale may be apocryphal but you can bet your boots that it was drummed into the soldiery to stress the importance of obedience to orders and not endangering the army by breaking ranks.

[Mark Hygate]

Renatus/Michael,

And a second thank you - much shorter than I would have replied.


Bryan,

Thank you for taking the time to respond, but I'm simply going to assume a language and cultural barrier as you must be reading in more to my posts than I am writing.

I assure you I am assuming nothing at all - except for a simple anthropological base assumption - that 'man' has not changed appreciably at all in over 5,000 years of recorded history - we are just the same animals as then. (Teasing aside - except perhaps to note that, overall, it is likely that we are currently de-evolving as a species in Darwinian terms for the first time).


To drag the thread back to part of it's point, however, and not re-opening the old Polybian thread, I had one of those bedtime thoughts that might pose a clear question.....

Let us all forget pike- or spear-phalanxes; or even hairy Celtic barbarian types - let us simply take the (not always untrue) scenario of two Roman (or Roman-style) legions facing off against each other and a simple concentration on a 90ft section of the front line.

[Opposing troops are armed the same; there are more troops behind, to the left and right and the flanks are secure. They are trained the same, have the same morale and experience and the swords, shields and armour match]


- The classic 'Polybius' 6ft' legion has 15 men in that 90ft sector

- 'Michael's frontage (4.5ft)' legion, from his kindly posted essay, has 20 men to oppose them

- 'Mark's one pace' legion has 36 men


All other things being equal, which legion would you rather be in?