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Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.
Nathan, That is an interesting proposition for the battle site but there are a few problems.

1) For reasons laid out in my logistics/hydrology essay (Fig.14) I don't think Suetonius marched north. We've all discussed this already so I'll not further engage on this point.

2) AS Vindex has pointed out, your Dunstable site has the Romans facing the Brits down a narrowing valley. This is a topographic feature difficult to reconcile with Tacitus' (T.) description: A) "an open plain extended" B) "..clinging to the narrow defile c).... rushed OUT in a wedge-like column". T. is describing a Roman front within a defile which
opens out into a plain, not a closing valley with a decreasing flood plain.

3) There is not enough water available to the Romans. The attached map, of naturalised rivers with sufficent flow-rates in July, shows that the River Ver (to the south of the Roman position) is in the hands of the Brits and, in anycase, is spring-fed from a nearby source (Lynch Farm) which means it probably didn't have a flow-rate suffient to satisfy many.

The river source to the north-west of Dunstable is 4ish km away, a round trip of 8ish kms - not really feasible to maintain 15,000 Roman souls and their animals. There are springs outcropping at the base of the north-west facing escarpment but they would be a meagre supply. I'm convinced that Suetonius would not choose a battle site with inadequate water because he could not guarantee an immediate attack by the Brits - he might be surrounded and besieged and that would necessitate a fighting retreat = disaster (typically).

Those are my main points against Dunstable being chosen by Suetonius.

[attachment=3814]Dunstable-nathanross_2012-04-25.jpg[/attachment]


However - as an illustration of how perverse the search for the battle site is - rotate your Roman line through 180 degrees so that it faces NW towards Dunstable town. Now the River Ver is available to the Romans (less than 1km away); the defile opens out into a broader plain, itself limited by 200 metre flanks. This matches T.'s description and makes tactical sense for Suetonius. This is the sort of prospective site you'll find all along the NW facing Chiltern scarp and, when I was being as objective as possible in selecting terrain analysied sites, had to include in my list of possible sites. But, of course, the Romans are supposedly facing the wrong way! And that is the reason why I invoke the 'marching U-turn', or retrograde battle site, as an action and term to describe this possibility. That is, he marched out of London, continued beyond the NW face of the escarpment and then turned parallel to the face and marched along it (Icknield Way) towards his pre-chosen battle site, the defile, ensconced within the NW facing escarpment. Your Dunstable site might just be one of those types which I've missed. Some would say why bother with such sites when they clearly require such convolution of manouever - I answer, because these sites (there are quite a few throughout the southern UK) match the terrain description/criteria and should not be dismissed but instead down-weighted as likely battle sites (see the logistics essay, page 20).

In short, I suspect Dunstable, as you envisage it, does not have a high probability of being the battle site but is probably a good candidate for the type of retrograde site I've outlined. In otherwords, I might have missed it when I first trawled through the original terrain analysis work and, for the sake of objectivity, should re-examine it. Thanks but strewth - more work!

regards, Steve Kaye


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Thanks for the map - very interesting indeed! I suspect, actually, that you've placed my Roman line a little too far to the south-east - I think it should be about a third of the way back towards Dunstable, but I might be wrong. [*Edit - corrected - thanks Steve!]

Anyway - yes, the water supply is a problem indeed here. If, however, Paulinus camped his men around Dunstable, or a bit north-west, the distance to the water source would be halved. You surely know more than most, Steve, about the amount of water a force of 10,000 would need, and how much of it could be carried. Just one thought - given perhaps several days to prepare, could Paulinus have dammed one of those streams to the north-west to provide a reservoir? I don't know if this would help much!

Your idea of the reverse position is fascinating - if we imagine Boudica moving west from London (Paulinus himself could still have withdrawn north, of course...) and then backtracking north-east up the Iknield way towards Iceni country, she would have to pass the opening in the Chilterns at this point. Hmm. This would fit with a longer campaign of mutual manoeuvre and counter-manoeuvre - Paulinus' 'delays' - but with the shortage of evidence I prefer the Ockam's razor approach, being the most direct line between two points!

In fact, this proposed reverse position brings up another potential terrain consideration. After the Roman charge, the retreating Britons found themselves trapped by their own carts (ceteri terga praebuere, difficili effugio, quia circumiecta vehicula saepserant abitus - translated variously as "The rest turned their back in flight, and flight proved difficult, because the surrounding waggons had blocked retreat" (Church & Brodribb) and "The remainder took to flight, although escape was difficult, as the cordon of waggons had blocked the outlets" (Jackson / Loeb)). Might this imply that the 'open plain' was actually closed in on all sides, with one or more 'exits' that could be blocked by wagons? That would argue for a relatively constricted position, rather than a completely 'open plain'. In fact, Tacitus's 'open plain' (apertam planitiem) might refer more to the lack of forest cover, bushes etc than the size or flatness of the area. These considerations might support my suggested position, which certainly has a narrow exit to the south, easily blocked by wagons...
Nathan Ross
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1) For reasons laid out in my logistics/hydrology essay (Fig.14) I don't think Suetonius marched north. We've all discussed this already so I'll not further engage on this point.

I'm really enjoying the re-read of your papers Steve.

I have to call you out on your fig 14 though. In terms of the graphic should Silchester really rank the same as St Albans, London and Colchester as "destroyed towns". The latter 3 get a name check, Silchester is pretty inconclusive in terms of time, cause and lack presence in the threadbare documentation. The map has got me thinking about a Roman perception of keeping the rebellion east of the road lines from Lincoln to High Cross to London, just as a strategic concept.
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Quote:Thanks for the map - very interesting indeed! I suspect, actually, that you've placed my Roman line a little too far to the south-east - I think it should be about a third of the way back towards Dunstable, but I might be wrong.
Your are right. Apologies. Corrected now.

Quote:could Paulinus have dammed one of those streams to the north-west to provide a reservoir? I don't know if this would help much!
Yes. And, that would especially help water the animals. However, you still need the flow rate into the reservoir, i.e. if your beasts suck up more than goes in then you will have a quagmire. Of course, a dam is also useful in restricting the flow to your enemy (assuming the river flows away from the Romans). As an aside, searching for signs of old dams is on my list of 'features' that might help locate the battle site.

Quote:Your idea of the reverse position is fascinating - if we imagine Boudica moving west from London (Paulinus himself could still have withdrawn north, of course...) and then backtracking north-east up the Iknield way towards Iceni country, she would have to pass the opening in the Chilterns at this point. Hmm. This would fit with a longer campaign of mutual manoeuvre and counter-manoeuvre - Paulinus' 'delays' - but with the shortage of evidence I prefer the Ockam's razor approach, being the most direct line between two points!
Firstly, from London Paulinus was retreating. Therefore Rule Number 2 of Campaigning in Russia applies: when retreating don't withdraw back down the road you used to advance (ask Napoleon). That's just one reason why I don't think P. took Watling Street.

Secondly, Boudica and the tribal leaders knew that once they started this bloody rebellion they had to destroy P. quickly. Therefore, B. must follow P. as rapidly and directly as possible, catch him and destroy his force. To fail in that task, or foolishly return home beforehand, is to hand yourself and your family members a death sentence. The rebels understood that if P. escaped with his force to units in the west then he would return, probably in the Spring, possibly earlier and ruthlessly destroy their homelands. "I shall return", General MacArthur, Corregidor, March 1942: and he did, with a vastly superior force and vanquished his enemy. That is what P. would have been thinking and the Brits knew it!

Small third point - when considering some form of Brit return to their homeland you do have to factor in the Trinovantes, not just the Iceni.

Quote: Might this imply that the 'open plain' was actually closed in on all sides, with one or more 'exits' that could be blocked by wagons? That would argue for a relatively constricted position, rather than a completely 'open plain'. In fact, Tacitus's 'open plain' (apertam planitiem) might refer more to the lack of forest cover, bushes etc than the size or flatness of the area. These considerations might support my suggested position, which certainly has a narrow exit to the south, easily blocked by wagons...
If I remember correctly, we discussed earlier what the plain might be, including a 'frying-pan shaped' area within a forest/wood rather than, say, a simple topographic feature. It's probably wise to keep all options open when searching or specifying criteria.

Regards, Steve
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Quote:
Renatus post=311397 Wrote:How, however, could Paulinus guarantee that Boudica would return home when no crops had been planted and her people would have to face the winter without food?
Autumn planting season? Unless we assume that the Iceni intended to abandon their lands and let them lie fallow all year, they would have to return at some point in late summer to sow crops and vegetables for the winter. Denied the suppies they were expecting in London, this would have been a pressing issue!
I don't know enough about ancient agriculture to say whether or not crops suitable for autumn planting were available at that time or not but, even assuming that they were, the impression given by Tacitus is that the Iceni simply went on the rampage without any thought of husbandry, relying upon seizing what they wanted when and where they could. I note the time-scale that you posted earlier but the impression that I have is that this all happened well on into the year and the time for any autumn planting may have passed. I still think that Boudica's strategy (if she even had one) would have been to raid the territory of the Atrebates for supplies, if necessary.

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Renatus post=311397 Wrote:Paulinus could ensure that, in travelling north himself, he did not get too far ahead of Boudica's band, so that, if she made an unexpected change of direction, he would be able to give chase and overhaul her slower-moving column.
I agree. Besides which, Boudica could only advance westwards at the risk of putting her force between two Roman legions - II Augusta somewhere ahead and Paulinus to the north, ready to fall on the British rearguard. Not a pleasant situation for the leader of a tribal horde. Paulinus being 'skillful', perhaps?
This seems to suggest that Paulinus induced Boudica to follow him by threatening her rear. I doubt whether this would have had that effect. So far as the Britons were concerned, they had no cause to worry: they had overwhelming numerical superiority, everything had gone their way so far and they had trounced the legion that that had sought to challenge them. They would have been confident of dealing with anything the Romans threw against them, from whatever direction.

Quote:Another point - Dio says that Paulinus was running short of supplies himself. How could this be if he was marching into the friendly agricultural territories to the west? He also made sure, in chosing his battle site, that he had no enemies to his rear - not a consideration if he was in allied territory. These points only make sense if he had withdrawn north, into the disputed and potentially hostile land beyond St Albans...
Dio's comment about supplies need only mean that the food that the Romans carried with them was running out. Given time, Paulinus may well have been able to negotiate with friendly local tribesmen for supplies but time was one thing he did not have. Furthermore, he could not risk alienating another tribe by foraging in their territory. Tacitus speaks of his choosing a battle-site with a forest at his rear, so that he would only have to face an enemy to his front, but this, I suggest, means no more than that he wanted to ensure that none of Boudica's force circled around and attacked him from behind, not that there was a threat from hostile locals.

The weakness of the case that I have made for the northern route is that it postulates that Paulinus was luring Boudica into a trap on a strategic, as opposed to a tactical, level. The sources indicate the contrary, that he was forced into battle against his will by lack of supplies and the proximity of the enemy (Dio) or that he had decided, for whatever reason, that he could delay no longer (Tacitus). If he had taken the western route, this could mean (as suggested in an earlier post) that he had given up waiting for legio II to join him or, if he had taken the northern route, that he had summoned forces from North Wales but they were taking too long to arrive. Neither of the sources make this last point and it is stretching the evidence too far to place any reliance upon such a suggestion.

It is implicit in all this that I still favour the theory that both Paulinus and Boudica, for their separate reasons, were moving west, not north.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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Quote:I'm really enjoying the re-read of your papers Steve.

Thanks John, very kind.

Quote:I have to call you out on your fig 14 though. In terms of the graphic should Silchester really rank the same as St Albans, London and Colchester as "destroyed towns". The latter 3 get a name check, Silchester is pretty inconclusive in terms of time, cause and lack presence in the threadbare documentation.
I suspect Tacitus chose to mention Cogidubnus rather than Silchester, the royal ally being more important than the provincial town. As for whether I should give equal weight in Fig 14 to the 4 towns is debateable, but I do separate them in the text. Now, if Prof. Fulford would stop mucking about with his dating of the burning in Silchester .... I'm joking, of course. But, for the avoidance of doubt, my preference for the westwards retreat from London is not predicated on the evidence of burning in Silchester, hence all the reasoning in Fig 14 and the text.

Quote: The map has got me thinking about a Roman perception of keeping the rebellion east of the road lines from Lincoln to High Cross to London, just as a strategic concept.
I don't think so - Suetonius has already lost control of that area. Afterall, he marched south to London through hostile territory and the 9th has been routed somewhere in the region. By the time Suetonius leaves London he is thinking about survival - survival of his army is paramount: without that he loses everything and Rome, possibly, loses a province.

Regards, Steve
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Quote:Paulinus was retreating. Therefore Rule Number 2 of Campaigning in Russia applies: when retreating don't withdraw back down the road you used to advance (ask Napoleon).
But Napoleon did - and so have many other commanders throughout history! Not all of them came to grief either... Like so many of these north v west debates we've been having, too much rests on things we don't know; not least the question of how much the opposing forces knew of the strengths and movements of their opponents (Robert's point above about intelligence, of course).

Quote:I don't know enough about ancient agriculture to say whether or not crops suitable for autumn planting were available at that time or not... the impression given by Tacitus is that the Iceni simply went on the rampage without any thought of husbandry, relying upon seizing what they wanted when and where they could....
Tacitus, possibly, is playing on the trope of the thoughtless barbarians a bit here! The Iceni didn't sow crops in the spring because they expected the seize the Roman supplies, which would sustain them over the summer campaign season. But they were still a agricultural society, and unless they were indeed abandoning their lands they would want to return home for winter. Winter crops like wheat, barley, emmer and spelt were sown in October - neglecting to do this would risk famine. (a 1974 article here from Butser mentions winter planting in an Iron age British environment).

Quote:So far as the Britons were concerned, they had no cause to worry: they had overwhelming numerical superiority, everything had gone their way so far and they had trounced the legion that that had sought to challenge them. They would have been confident of dealing with anything the Romans threw against them, from whatever direction.
But I think Steve's point above about the necessity of defeating Paulinus applies here - the Britons may have been buoyed up by the fall of Colchester and the defeat of Cerialis, but wiser heads amongst them would surely have been aware of the much greater forces ranged against them - the majority of which (most of the twentieth, the remaining 3000 or so of the ninth, plus the presumably large auxiliary force Paulinus had assembled for his Anglesey campaign) being still in the north. The possibility of the united British army scattering across the wide expanse of western Britain plundering everything in sight, with a powerful Roman force somewhere to the north poised to strike either their rear or their tribal homeland(s) would be enough to suggest caution, I suspect. Keeping the army together and directing it against an identifiable enemy - Paulinus - in the vicinity with a relatively small body of men would avoid fragmentation and piecemeal defeat. Ironically, it could have been in the best interests of both Boudica and Paulinus to force a confrontation...

Quote:The weakness of the case that I have made for the northern route is that it postulates that Paulinus was luring Boudica into a trap on a strategic, as opposed to a tactical, level... it is stretching the evidence too far to place any reliance upon such a suggestion.
Paulinus' reputation after the campaign (ie the note in Histories) suggests that he was thinking strategically - although this could have been subsequent 'spin', of course! With so little evidence to go on, a fair bit of stretching is required - but you're right that we shouldn't start assuming anything...

Quote:I suspect Tacitus chose to mention Cogidubnus rather than Silchester, the royal ally being more important than the provincial town.
He mentions Cogidubnus in Agricola, and in relation to the initial invasion of Britain. There's also the note that C had been 'loyal ever since this point', which surely means that he didn't support Boudica, but this actually makes it even odder that such a known and named individual should escape mention if his capital city was destroyed by the rebels... Then again, Silchester did have earthworks, so perhaps the rebels, with their dislike of such things, just avoided the place... Confusedmile:
Nathan Ross
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Quote:
Steve Kaye post=311478 Wrote:I suspect Tacitus chose to mention Cogidubnus rather than Silchester, the royal ally being more important than the provincial town.
He mentions Cogidubnus in Agricola, and in relation to the initial invasion of Britain. There's also the note that C had been 'loyal ever since this point', which surely means that he didn't support Boudica, but this actually makes it even odder that such a known and named individual should escape mention if his capital city was destroyed by the rebels... Then again, Silchester did have earthworks, so perhaps the rebels, with their dislike of such things, just avoided the place... Confusedmile:
Thanks Nathan - and you are right, I had forgotten in which book T. mentions Cogidubnus. As for the Silchester burning issue we simply have to hope that Prof. Fulford can find further evidence to substantiate, or not, his tentative suggestions. Having heard him twice he does seem to swing from 'excited' to 'very cautious', even down-playing the topic.
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While we are all back viewing this thread I'd like to ask a question related to finding evidence of the battle site.

First, some background figures and thoughts.

Taking Tacitus' figure of 80,000 British dead (which may, or may not, be reasonable) then we have on the battle field:

80,000 dead = 4853 metric tonnes of bodies = 728 metric tonnes of skeletal material and 2.5 million teeth. Rather stark figures! (Figures are approximations).

4853 tonnes of bodies suggests that the Romans probably left them on the field - too much work to do otherwise unless the Romans used captives to burn and/or bury the dead. And we know Suetonius was keen to suppress the tribes after the battle, even campaigning during the autumn, possiby winter, months. So it seems most likely the bodies were left to rot. If Tacitus' figure is close to reality then this mass of bodies must be one of the largest ever left on a battlefield at anytime and anywhere - surely it must be the largest in the UK? If so, what happens next?

The bodies decay and are scavenged over 1-2 years to leave a mass of scattered bones and teeth - 728 tonnes of them!

The local people might want to remove the remains for religious/social/respectful reasons or the farmers want access to the land. But, collecting 728 tonnes is still a huge task and, equally so, burning and/or burying them. Taking a pragmatic view it might seem more likely that the farmers simply put their cattle/horses/sheep onto the land. The beasts would disturb, distribute, disarticulate, fragment by shattering and bury the fragments by pushing them into the soil. The land would be slowly reclaimed.

Nature and physics would continue to operate on the fragments over the 2k years - chemical dissolution, bioturbation (worms, cattle etc.), frost heave, rain runoff, ploughing and gravity. Over time the fragments would be further fragmented and transported - for example down-slope - such that, like sediments eroded from an outcrop, they would collect in topographic dips, meandering stream beds or down-slope field boundaries. Size is now millimetre and smaller. Of course, much would still be buried on the battlefield but at least some of that huge mass might accumulate as I describe. And 2.5 million teeth are more robust than bone - they may be preferentially transported to the gravitational lows and stratified.

So, finally, to the question which I have tried to have answered by other means but failed:

Do you know of any references/papers/annecdotes/finds related to the finding, or study, of human micro-skeletal/teeth material in a battlefield context?

Just to be clear - I'm not seeking information about mass graves, burials or the more usual findings of macro-skeletal parts, but the micro-skeletal residue of fragmented skeletons.


As a point of interest, there may have been 80 metric tonnes of metal left on the field by the British dead. The assumption is that averaged over the various types of weapons (sword, spear point, axe, adze, various farming and forestry implements), the metal in transport gear (horse and wagon harness etc.) and that carried by warriors and wagons for domestic use (pots, pans, fire tripods etc.) that each of the 80,000 would have 1kg of metal. It seems reasonable to assume that this metal might have been:

a) collected by the Romans and transported elsewhere for recycling (ingots or new implements),
B) melted down on the battlefield and then transported (need a lot of charcoal),
c) stored in military barracks,
d) issued, in part, to tribal allies as a reward.

The crucial point is that the mass of metal would not remain on the field for archaeologist's to find and tracing the likely metal-working sites is just about impossible. Of course, there may be metal that was trampled into the field, and may be found, but the bulk would surely have been collected and removed.

Regards, Steve Kaye
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1. Can we be sure that Tacitus' figure is genuine and not an over estimate to enlarge the smaller Roman force's success. Could the Iceni and any allies field so many even with the addition of their camp followers?

2. Potentially weapons will be removed after the battle:
a) To replace broken/lost weapons by the victors.
b) Remove them from temptation of another bunch of rebels using them.
c) Scrap and other resue value if nothing else.

3. Land clearnace - pigs! Very effective waste disposal system including human remains. Failing that piled up and burnt to remove health hazard and water contamination hazard (useful task for prisoners of war).

4. Depending on the type of ground the bodies are left on (and as we don't know the site of the battle we cannot really comment) certain soil types and conditions mean that the bone will deteriorate without trace over time.
Moi Watson

Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather to skid in sideways, Merlot in one hand, Cigar in the other; body thoroughly used up, totally worn out, and screaming "WOO HOO, what a ride!
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Ancient Warfare Magazine had a couple articles in back to back issues: A-W IV.1 and A-W IV.2 by Stephan Berry - "Bioarchaeology and the Ancient Battlefield". The 2nd one dealt in part with the chemical signature(s) of bone in the soil using the Kalkriese site as its prime example. This was based on soil samples taken in front of the wall, not the mass graves. Kalkriese, while somewhat contested regarding whether a site of the Varus disaster or related to one of Germanicus' battles, is none the less an area that has been relatively undisturbed by large scale human activity since the early years of the the first century A.D. That last statement, I don't think, applies to some of the proposed sites for Boudica's battle with Paulinus.

I am personally fascinated by skeletal remains including the chemical signatures of the same to be found on battlefield sites. I've been sorely tempted by a book on the bones at the Towson Battlefield site in England (which dates much later, to the late medieval period if I recall).

I bring both of the Ancient Warfare Magazine issues with me to the Archaeology Fairs (AIA sponsored) to which we of Legio III Cyrenaica have been and continue to be invited.
Quinton Johansen
Marcus Quintius Clavus, Optio Secundae Pili Prioris Legionis III Cyrenaicae
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Quote:Winter crops like wheat, barley, emmer and spelt were sown in October - neglecting to do this would risk famine.
Forget what I said about the time of year; I was not anticipating these events taking place as late as October. That said, crops planted in October would not be available for harvesting until the following spring, so, even if Boudica's forces were to have made it home in time for autumn planting, it would have been imperative for them to have seized enough to see them through the winter. Apart from the stores that they might have found in London, their best option would have been to raid the territory of the Atrebates, not only seizing food but dealing a blow to an ally of the Romans. From Paulinus' point of view, he would not wish to be seen to abandon a friendly tribe to the mercy of the rebels. Cogidubnus may have been a loyal ally but his loyalties might change if he felt himself let down, if he were not actually overthrown by Boudica and her tribesmen.

Quote:But I think Steve's point above about the necessity of defeating Paulinus applies here ...
That is indeed a point but I somehow do not see Boudica chasing Paulinus up Watling Street in order to bring him to battle - much better to draw him to her by attacking one of his allies.


Quote:There's also the note that C had been 'loyal ever since this point', which surely means that he didn't support Boudica, but this actually makes it even odder that such a known and named individual should escape mention if his capital city was destroyed by the rebels...
I agree; I have never seen Boudica penetrating that far west. Of course, Nick Fuentes saw the final battle taking place in the vicinity of Virginia Water.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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With regard to my question about micro-skeletal remains, I should have mentioned that this is one line of possible investigation for supporting evidence once a prospective battle site has been identified. One man and his auger and microscope might get lucky.

Is 80,000 dead the correct number or not? - I think I've said before that I take the number I'm given because you could parse it any number of different ways and still not know. Sticking to 80,000 does not add 21st Century subjectivity and just leaves 1st century potential bias.

Pigs! - I hadn't thought of those. Actually, I don't want to!

Quintius Clavus thank you for the pointer to Ancient Warfare mag. Sadly the first part is out of stock. I'll try to get copies from the British Library. And, Towton, what a coincidence! Yesterday I was in an email conversation with Malin Holst of YORK OSTEOARCHAEOLOGY LTD about micro-skeletal residues. Malin has conducted much of the bone analysis at Towton. No mention of micro-skeletal remains though. I shall follow-up your reference to Kalkriese - thanks.

Regards, Steve
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I, too, noticed that the issue with part 1 was sold out. However, it was the second part that dealt with the bone residues at Kalkriese.
Quinton Johansen
Marcus Quintius Clavus, Optio Secundae Pili Prioris Legionis III Cyrenaicae
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Quote:That said, crops planted in October would not be available for harvesting until the following spring, so... it would have been imperative for them to have seized enough to see them through the winter.
True, but they'd have to plant the crops in October all the same, or they wouldn't have any food the following spring! They couldn't live forever off Roman plunder :wink:

Quote:I somehow do not see Boudica chasing Paulinus up Watling Street in order to bring him to battle - much better to draw him to her by attacking one of his allies.
'Chasing' sounds a bit frenetic! 'Advancing towards' might be preferable - it's only 30 miles from London to Dunstable (for example), or 8 if we bring Boudica and her main force up to St Albans. Three days by cart, with pauses for looting and pillaging? :-)

*Edit - one more point: I think the surrender of both London and St Albans would already have proved that Paulinus had no qualms about sacrificing land, lives and property. By comparison, Cogidubnus and his people would have appeared very expendable.

Quote:Nick Fuentes saw the final battle taking place in the vicinity of Virginia Water.
I still think Fuentes might have been on the money with this one. I've searched OS and terrain maps all along the Roman road from Staines to Silchester, and only the Virginia Water area has anything like the differences in elevation required to fit our 'defile'. Trouble is, as I've said before, this area is covered in roads and railways and suburbia, with a massive 18th century forest park and ornamental lake stuck in the middle of it! If the battle site lies west of here, it's either a) well to the west, beyond Silchester, b) south - a site on the south downs might be feasible, or c) the terrain was a lot less pronounced than Tacitus implies...

Quote:Is 80,000 dead the correct number or not?
It's probably an exaggeration (besides, who would be counting? seventy-one thousand six-hundred and one, seventy-one thousand six-hundred and two, etc...). But I think we can safely assume a high casualty rate - for one battle to break a rebellion of this size, it must have been massively destructive. Besides, Boudica apparently survived the fight, and could have regrouped her warriors if they weren't all dead, scattered, demoralised and running for their lives...
Nathan Ross
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