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Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.
Quote: Might it be an idea to start a new thread... :?:

You want TWO threads????? Confusedhock: Confusedhock: Confusedhock:

<thump> Heads hits desk.


:mrgreen:
Moi Watson

Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather to skid in sideways, Merlot in one hand, Cigar in the other; body thoroughly used up, totally worn out, and screaming "WOO HOO, what a ride!
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Quote:You want TWO threads?????
Only one at a time! :wink: I was suggesting we leave this one be - but the will seems to be there to carry on...

Quote:"Nathan Ross" and "John1" be restricted to posts that do not exceed 100 words in length and can only post when directly asked their views or have something entirely new to report.
:lol: Yes. I shall attempt to stick to at least the first part of that. Laconian brevity from now on...

Quote:or was he being polite about it getting clobbered from the east?
The position is in a defile, so defensible from any direction except sw-ne along the hilltops, which are inaccessible to wheeled transport :wink:

Quote:one of the problems with the Dunstable site. It is open to attack from both the North and the South.
Any battle position is intended to address an enemy advancing from a particular direction. Lack of 360 degree tactical dominance should not be an issue, I think!

Quote:Would SP have put a legion of his infantry at risk in a hostile territory in a subordinates care?
I mentioned this in point 5 of this post. A position in the Chilterns could act as a deterrent to insurrection in the Midlands. Abandoning Watling Street could allow such insurrection to spread unchecked and split the province. But why 'in a subordinate's care'?
Nathan Ross
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word count 135 FAIL !!!!! :evil:
please edit and resubmit :twisted:
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Quote:word count 135 FAIL !!!!! :evil:
Good Lord, I didn't think anyone would be counting... Confusedhock:

Ah, but you see - the wordcount begins from the remark 'from now on...' - meaning that without quotes it's only 93 :grin:
Nathan Ross
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Nathan wrote:

Any battle position is intended to address an enemy advancing from a particular direction. Lack of 360 degree tactical dominance should not be an issue, I think!

My thought was that (lets say) that he took up positions facing South with the Icknield Way crossing the Watling Street 2 miles behind him this was a very risky position for a general who had ensured that his rear could not be attacked through the woods. The same argument apples if he is facing North and then he would be open to attack from the South as well.

As the A5 goes directly through the battle site this would be unavoidable.

Nathan wrote:

The position is in a defile, so defensible from any direction except sw-ne along the hilltops, which are inaccessible to wheeled transport

Before you get to the defile itself the hills leading up to the ridge on the East from the South allow chariots and infantry to ascend the ridge. (Currently there are roads running West to East up these hills from the valley floor)

I acknowledge that cavalry would have been there but it is likely that we are only talking about 500 on each wing whereas there was a host of Brythons.

Nathan wrote:

I mentioned this in point 5 of this post. A position in the Chilterns could act as a deterrent to insurrection in the Midlands. Abandoning Watling Street could allow such insurrection to spread unchecked and split the province. But why 'in a subordinate's care'?


I have re-read the post 5 and there is a huge amount that we can agree on and I am surprised how much I have picked up in the past few weeks - so thank you.... I will discuss this later with you.

The "subordinates's care" remark is that if we accept that the Fourteenth is left preparing the battle site in the Midlands who is overseeing this work in an acknowledged area of danger?
Deryk
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Quote:if we accept that the Fourteenth is left preparing the battle site in the Midlands who is overseeing this work in an acknowledged area of danger?
Why would they be left preparing the site? Paulinus would surely remain with his legion at all times!
Nathan Ross
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Nathan wrote:


Why would they be left preparing the site? Paulinus would surely remain with his legion at all times

Sorry Nathan I seem to have misunderstood your position and I apologise.

I had thought that you had the Fourteenth Legion following Paulinus after he had gone to have a look at the situation in London but having re-read your "chronology" I can see that in fact you have the whole army going to London. Excellent to see that.

What I have never understood is where the "Veterans" of the Twentieth come from? It has always been stated that the Twentieth were with the Battle Group that went to Anglesey but they are only mentioned in the battle with Boudica.
Deryk
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Quote:What I have never understood is where the "Veterans" of the Twentieth come from?
Iam Suetonio quarta decima legio cum vexillariis vicesimanis (Annals, 14.34).

It was a vexillation of the twentieth, not necessarily veterans. The rest of the legion would be back in Wales or at Wroxeter with the campaigning army.
Nathan Ross
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Having looked at Nathan's excellent summation, I was wondering if we can say that we have moved on at all? So I thought I would have a stab at reviewing what was said and what appears to standing up to the questioning?

Nathan wrote:


1) Security. Arriving at London after his march south, Paulinus was faced with a native uprising of unforeseen scale and effectiveness. His first priority would be to take his troops and the refugees in his train to a strong defensive position. The closest of these was the chalk upland of the Chilterns - and the quickest way of getting there was a two day march back up Watling Street...


The scale of the uprising was indeed of an unforseen and effective nature. Refugees tend to flee from an enemy and if SP was going to battle and trying to attract the enemy to follow him (using the scorched earth policy as stated)he would not have wanted to be burdened with refugees. The other point is why think that the Brythons would not have sent flying columns after his small army now burdened with refugees travelling at 10 miles a day and cut him off before he reached Dunstable via the Icknield way or via the Roman Road to Braughing then to St. Albans?

Nathan wrote:

2) Intelligence. With rebellion all around him, Paulinus could not be sure of any local support. It has been suggested that he might fall back on the lands of Cogidubnus to the west - but while we know that Cogidubnus was loyal (because Tacitus tells us so), Paulinus couldn't be so sure at the time. And even if the king was loyal, what of his people? By marching his troops west, Paulinus would be putting them in open country, in the midst of a native population that could throw in their lot with the rebels at any moment, and depending on the loyalty of a vassal king. The only ground that Paulinus could be certain of was that which he had seen very recently with his own eyes - the line of Watling Street. By withdrawing north, he could maintain his strategic independence and keep his army secure from local threats.

We do know that the countryside that SP had already marched through was dangerous and in turmoil. The Atrebates had been peaceful and thriving for 17 years and Cogidubnus had been installed for a considerable length of time and probably educated in Rome. It would be unlikely that Governor had not already met him. I cannot see that this is a worse place to be than Watling Street or less secure.


Nathan wrote:

3) Reinforcement. We don't know where II Augusta were, or even where they started from (Exeter? Gloucester?). If they were on the road anywhere near Silchester, Paulinus could have waited for them in London. If they were further west, or stationary at home base, then setting out blindly westwards in the hope of meeting them somewhere on the road would be folly. However, by redirecting their march north-east up the Iknield Way, II Augusta could have come up behind Paulinus's static position at Dunstable. Also, of course, the line was open for reinforcement from the north down Watling itself - the rest of the twentieth and the ninth. Cerialis had escaped his own rout with his cavalry intact: quite possibly he fell back on the Neronian fort at Great Chesterford, only thirty miles north-east of Dunstable. Paulinus could therefore have been reinforced from three directions; no other location gives him this possibility.

Perfectly valid, not sure whether Great Chesterton was built at that time (but might have been). There are other scenarios of course of moving men around the country by the available military roads.

Nathan wrote:

4) Morale. Troops tend to become demoralised when retreating. This is true - but Paulinus was certainly retreating whichever way he went! The men of the fourteenth had been based at Wroxeter for (probably) over a decade: they had comrades there, a supply depot, many of them would have had families there, and they would have regarded it as home. By guarding the line of the Chilterns, keeping his army between the rebellion and the road to Wroxeter, Paulinus could keep his troops on ground they knew - a road they had marched many times - and they wouldn't feel they were abandoning their route home either. A march west, on the other hand, into unknown tribal lands that most of his men would never have seen before, would definitely seem like running away!

Not totally convinced but certainly the Fourteenth had been based in forts on Watling Street so many would have felt at home there as well.

Nathan wrote:

5) Containment. Paulinus marched south 'through a hostile population'. So there was insurgency brewing in the Midlands - by leaving the area Paulinus would leave this insurgency to erupt into open rebellion, cutting the country in half and threatening his bases in the north. By keeping a force in the Chilterns he could effectively oversee and threaten the hostile natives of the Midlands, containing the spread of further rebellion.

As the natives had already seen him retreating I am not convinced that they would be that worried about him or felt that once the other force arrived that they would not attack as well. It is likely that it was not just the Iceni and the Trinovantes who fought at the final battle on the Brython's side.


Nathan wrote:

6) Blocking. As an agricultural people, the Iceni and Trinovantes would have had to return to their lands towards the end of summer to plant crops for the winter. So Paulinus knew that they'd have to move north at some point. His 'delay' ('until another season', says Dio - the autumn planting season perhaps?) could have reflected this. By holding a position around Dunstable he could intercept the tribal horde moving up Watling to join the Icknield way, or move eastwards along the Chilterns to block any north-eastern route there.

I believe that the season referred to is the "fighting" season and nothing to do with agriculture. I think that blocking the tribes from planting their crops was not his priority. Destroying them was.


Nathan wrote:

7) St Albans. Tacitus isn't clear about whether St Albans was destroyed before or after London, but since the rest of his account is chronological and he mentions St Albans second, we'd need some reason to suspect it wasn't destroyed second! Paulinus could have fallen back on St Albans from London, and then moved ten miles further into the Chilterns as the British approached from the south.

Certainly possible but St Albans could have been destroyed second but by a separate force or by SP as pert of his retreat.

Nathan wrote:

8.) Fabius Cunctator. As an educated Roman, Paulinus would have a thorough knowledge of the deeds of past generals. His tactics seem to indicate an appreciation for Fabius Maximus 'Cunctator', whose delaying tactics against Hannibal so resemble his own against Boudica. In fact, if Paulinus actually did destroy London himself (as I've suggested), this would fit with a Fabian 'scorched earth' strategy. But the Fabian delay tactic only works if a general keeps his force in close proximity to the enemy, enabling him to threaten their flanks, maintain intelligence on their strength and block their movements. Marching off into the distance, hoping the enemy will come trailing in pursuit, does not fit with this strategic model. By keeping relatively close to London, on the high ground of the Chilterns, Paulinus could block the enemy and strike at their flanks and rear if they tried to move west.

I do believe that SP did use a "scorched earth" policy but literally to deny the Brythons food and to delay or indeed stop their advance. He would appear to be forced into battle because they wouldn't stop hounding him. This was their best chance to defeat him before he could get re-inforcements for his army.

This is why it is strange that he obviously never contacted the Ninth to join him although they were the closest or was it that because they were holding down the Brigantes? Even so you do not hear about the Ninth cavalry at the battle - was this because it wasn't fought near them? Surprisingly why weren't they picked up on route to London.

Nathan wrote:

9) Supply. The burnt Roman grain in the destruction layer in London proves that there were supplies there when Paulinus arrived. He would have taken as much as he could carry when he departed - and, I believe, destroyed the rest himself. So his army would be provisioned, albeit for a short while. He had no immediate need to fall back on native allies (even if he could be certain of them!). Water is more of a problem - but if Paulinus was based around Dunstable he could probably have watered his animals and supplied his men on the low wet ground to the north-west, only moving up to his position on the dry chalk upland when he had firm intelligence of the approaching British.


Agree with the burning, not so sure about the relationship with the Atrebates, plenty of water in the Thames valley.

Nathan wrote:

10) Marching speed. Not Paulinus's but Boudica's, in this case. The British tribal horde was vast and disparate, comprising a number of peoples and probably a number of subordinate leaders. They would have moved very slowly, and possibly not in a straight line either! Colchester, and then London, gave the British firm strategic objectives. After that, Boudica's army was in danger of splitting apart. We know that Paulinus defeated them en masse, so they were still a cohesive force at that point. To suggest a battle location anywhere beyond 50 miles or so of London (at least five days journey for the British) is, I believe, to imagine an unrealistic unity and motivation in the British horde.

All valid points. The horde would move at about 10 / 12 miles per day. I think that if you can keep a group motivated for 5 days you can keep them motivated for 7 or 8 days. (we've come this far lads - us women can do it....what are you men or mice?) Big Grin
Deryk
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Nathan wrote:


It was a vexillation of the twentieth, not necessarily veterans. The rest of the legion would be back in Wales or at Wroxeter with the campaigning army.

Sorry to be picky about this but no one mentions the Twentieth being in Anglesey only that they are in the battle with Boudica.

I would have expected them to have been at Usk, Monmouth and Bath at this time.
Deryk
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Quote:why think that the Brythons would not have sent flying columns after his small army now burdened with refugees travelling at 10 miles a day and cut him off before he reached Dunstable...?
That assumes a lot of strategic knowledge on the Britons' part! In an age before accurate maps, the armies would rely on local guides (Britons) and road distances (Romans). The relative position and direction of the enemy would be largely unknown.

Quote:blocking the tribes from planting their crops was not his priority. Destroying them was.
Same thing - famine kills more people than war!

Quote:no one mentions the Twentieth being in Anglesey only that they are in the battle with Boudica.
Roman governors on campaign would use all the forces at their disposal (Agricola did). We know the ninth and second weren't with Paulinus. That leaves the fourteenth and twentieth.

(79 words, John! Confusedmile: )
Nathan Ross
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Hi Nathan - impressed with the precis... :grin:

Nathan wrote:

That assumes a lot of strategic knowledge on the Britons' part! In an age before accurate maps, the armies would rely on local guides (Britons) and road distances (Romans). The relative position and direction of the enemy would be largely unknown.

I would have thought that the Brythons would have an excellent knowledge of the country and its routes and how long it took to get from A to B (or in this case C - D)

Nathan wrote:

Same thing - famine kills more people than war!

After extensive research I can tell you that disease kills more than either....

Nathan wrote:

Roman governors on campaign would use all the forces at their disposal (Agricola did). We know the ninth and second weren't with Paulinus. That leaves the fourteenth and twentieth.

I was wondering if you wouldn't mind me starting another thread regrading this topic rather than start something here? I'll call it:

Troop Deployment in AD60 /61...
Deryk
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Quote:I would have thought that the Brythons would have an excellent knowledge of the country and its routes and how long it took to get from A to B (or in this case C - D)
Not necessarily. Aside from a few habitual travellers (traders? / bards? / wandering druids?) most people probably had little knowledge of territories beyond a day or two's walk of their home. They might know roughly where a certain road or river went, but no more. This would make accurate strategic planning difficult over any great distance, especially against a moving enemy. The Romans had a similar problem - anything more than a mile or two either side of their road network was terra incognito at this date.
Nathan Ross
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Nathan wrote:

Not necessarily. Aside from a few habitual travellers (traders? / bards? / wandering druids?) most people probably had little knowledge of territories beyond a day or two's walk of their home. They might know roughly where a certain road or river went, but no more.

I have a horrible feeling that we are underestimating these people. Yes it is probably true that the majority of people did not have a great understanding of the overall geography but I have always been amazed that over 100 years before this when Caesar invaded not only were the Brythons read for him at Dover and followed him all the way up the coast but also he had received ambassadors from various Brythonic Tribes whilst he was still in Gaul.

Their intelligence was obviously excellent and they were able to reach the travelling General easily enough.

There were obvious alliances in place - when Commius lands he and his small cavalry force are captured (but not killed) and he is handed back to Caesar. This is not the actions as "painted savages" but of people in control and with good diplomatic reasoning.

Even with the four Legions he had with him in 54BC although he had some success by Caesar's own standards it wasn't the all conquering triumph he might of hoped for. Even the Romans themselves on reflection acknowledge this.

The Brythons managed to organise themselves under Catavaulleni with the Cantiaci and were in communications remotely over distances. Again this shows good skills and understanding of the need for communications at all times.

At Medway in AD43 there were 160,000 British troops under the Britsh Kings of a number of Tribes from as far away as Cirencester all gathered in Kent. The battle lasted for 2 days and allegedly the Romans nearly lost. The battle field had a large river running through it but this didn't stop either side.

So someone on the Brythonic side had the knowledge and skill sets to communicate, organise troop movements and logistics over distances as great as the Boudican Uprising and keep an army in the field for a period of time.

So probably they had a good idea about the need for supplies and how to handle them and in consequence must have had a good overall understanding of the geography.
Deryk
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Nathan wrote:

vexillariis vicesimanis

It was a vexillation of the twentieth, not necessarily veterans.


Here is another definition from the "Smiths Dictionary of Roman Antiquities"


This is the linklink:


http://penelope.uchicago.edu/Thayer/E/Ro...citus.html



The soldiers then demanded that the original arrangement by Augustus should be restored, and that they should receive a full discharge and the bounty at the end of sixteen years; while, in order to calm their wrath, Germanicus proposed to put an end to the disorders of which they complained, and to carry honestly into effect the second arrangement according to which they were to serve in the legion for sixteen years, and then being embodied under a vexillum by themselves to be relieved of all irksome labours, and to be required only to face the enemy in the field (Dion Cass. LIV.25, LV.23; Suet. Octav. 49; Tacit. Ann. I.17, 36, the proposal contained in the last passage being in these words: missionem dari vicena stipendia meritis; exauctorari, qui senadena fecissent, ac retineri sub vexillo, ceterorum immunes nisi propulsandi hostis). The vexillarii or vexilla legionum, then, were those soldiers who, after having served in the legion for sixteen years, became exauctorati, but continued to serve in a company with that legion, under a vexillum of their own, until they received their full discharge. Hyginus states the number attached to each legion as usually about hand or six hundred.

(I would have thought that these perhaps soldiers would have been exempt from a campaign of expansion where younger men would have been more suited but would have been expected to serve in extremis)
Deryk
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