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Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.
Thanks Nathan - I'll look into the Roman Temple.

Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
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Hi Nathan

If we look at the cuneus formation that Tacitus mentions, it would seem that the idea of Paulinus would be to smash through the enemy lines or force them backwards in confusion. The depth of the line is critical which will determine the width of the line.

We know that the legionaries could form the cuneus as could the Batavians. That would give around 8500 men (4500 Fourteenth Legion, 1500 Twentieth Legion, 2500 Batavains) + 500 Archers another 500 local Auxiliaries and 1000 cavalry (2 Allae).

8,500 men - 8 deep gives about 1000 yards infantry front.

This front would typically get swallowed up up against a horde.

If that is the case (and of course it is debatable) the topography and the width of the battle area would be key with limited exits from the field. The waggons might limit the depth of the battle field but actually the depth of the "horde" is probably critical.

If it is too deep and crowded they couldn't be turned. If it is open at the sides they can open up and expand again and surround the Romans.

So that seems to indicate that there was space between the Brythonic army and the waggons.

This does mean that there are very few sites that are viable for the battle and that the entrance and exits from the battle site, slopes etc. are all key. That is apart from the defile, plain and access to water.

Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
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Quote:8,500 men - 8 deep gives about 1000 yards infantry front.

We only know that the soldiers were in 'close array' (frequens ordinibus). Maybe each cohort was in three lines of four ranks each, 40 men wide? That puts 12 cohorts into 480 yards, without gaps!

The cuneus is also unclear. But Tacitus could just be describing a mass charge 'erupting' from the centre of the line (velut cuneo erupit).

If the strongest cohorts are at the centre, and the signal given from there, they will naturally charge first, with the cohorts on either side following in sequence. This creates a V-shaped charge with the strongest men at the apex.
Nathan Ross
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The waggons might limit the depth of the battle field but actually the depth of the "horde" is probably critical.



This has set me thinking, the waggon park must have been fairly densely parked up to impede the hordes flight and was being used as a viewing platform. This implies there was;
a) time to park the wagons as a grandstand
b) the wagon park was somehow constrained on the flanks, (possibly by terrain or water courses)
c) the point of predicted impact must have been fairly obvious and at a set range, I suspect it would have to have been within about 400m of the grandstand for it have provided a worthwhile vantage point.

So maybe any test of a site needs to focus on where the wagon park could plausibly be, constrained point within good visual range of the action.

With CS I’m speculating that the Waggon Park was in the base of the valley between Stowe Wood and Weedon Hill. This gives a topographic constraint to the wagon park north and south, and it is in the 400m –ish range. The best viewing site is however slightly south on the west facing flank of the spur on which Stowe Wood is situated. On site it is a fantastic grandstand for the bowl in front Castle Dykes.

So finding a plausibly constrained wagon park location, on the obvious line of retreat may actually prove to be one of the most important diagnostic tools in the hunt. Just a thought, I’d like to hear yours, and your nominations for the wagon park on the respective candidate sites.

I think the battle front issue is probably quite malleable, I ended up making the assumption that it was somewhere between 500m and 1km. It just didn’t seem appropriate to be more precise, we’re not dealing with lab conditions, a terrain that was imperfect and a set of troop numbers we cannot absolutely pin down which were then split into 3 groups with cavalry on the wings.
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Gentlemen

I hate to pour a damper on your fun of speculation and counter speculation but I think that the tangents which have been followed and explored are taking the discussion seriously off course. The logistic tail NEVER wags the combat troop dog and the discussion on the battle ground should use the logisitics as a POSSIBLE influencing factor on the choice of battlefield not the major part of the decision.

Ancient warfare, as much as modern warfare, is conducted because of tactical/strategic planning.

AFAIK the Romans withdrew to a strategic point and waited to join battle with the Britons under the leadership of Boudicca. They were not ambushed, nor were they trapped; they fought on ground of their choosing.

Logistics NEVER dictate a tactical position. They can inform and assist or impede the chances of success but when a general of ANY era decides to stand and fight, everything else is concentrated on making that the main effort.

Soldiers will carry what water they have and drink it accordingly. Cavalry mounts likewise. There's plenty of time after a battle to sort the administration out and modern military "standards" should not be imposed on ancient battle fields. You have to live with the fact that these things happened whatever impossibilities might occur to us.

The fact that the Britons had a large baggage train which we are TOLD was used as a viewing platform was probably an added bonus for the Roman force who were already on ground of their choosing. If the Britons chose to make such a terrible strategic error it just reflects the poor command decisions made by their leadership.

As I have said, speculation is good fun and leads to an interesting discussion if kept realistic and does not treat a professional army as a badly led rabble. Yes, the Britons took advantage of one of the main principles of war, suprise, but they failed on all other counts. (There are, by the way, ten principles which apply to any era).

Sorry to be a party pooper but I think a reality check is required on some of the assumptions being made! (and too many words but my first long post :wink: ).
Moi Watson

Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather to skid in sideways, Merlot in one hand, Cigar in the other; body thoroughly used up, totally worn out, and screaming "WOO HOO, what a ride!
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Sorry for the earlier word count, I will keep this brief.
I'd keep Concentration of Force, Economy of Effort and most of all Flexibility

as my top three, I cannot see how Surprise would come into it if one side is bringing together 10 000 professional troops and the others 250 000 drunken rabble rousers
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I was referring to the attack on the Ninth.

My system is playing up a bit but hopefully you have a message back.
Moi Watson

Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather to skid in sideways, Merlot in one hand, Cigar in the other; body thoroughly used up, totally worn out, and screaming "WOO HOO, what a ride!
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Quote:Logistics NEVER dictate a tactical position. They can inform and assist or impede the chances of success but when a general of ANY era decides to stand and fight, everything else is concentrated on making that the main effort.

Agreed - thanks.

The British probably had a smallish nucleus of warriors, the rest being untrained and poorly armed peasants. Such a force would be incapable of complex manoeuvres, and made reckless by the victory over the ninth. Paulinus played on this by presenting them with a tempting target.

I've mentioned before that we don't have to imagine the wagons sealing off the plain. The fleeing Britons would have run to the wagons, as they held their wives, families and possessions. To Roman eyes this might have looked like they'd trapped themselves - but it's instinctive behaviour in a rout.
Nathan Ross
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Nathan wrote:

I've mentioned before that we don't have to imagine the wagons sealing off the plain. The fleeing Britons would have run to the wagons, as they held their wives, families and possessions. To Roman eyes this might have looked like they'd trapped themselves - but it's instinctive behaviour in a rout.

I have to admit that I think that Nathan has a really good point here and there must have been a time when the warriors realised that they had lost and rushed back perhaps to their waggons to escape WITH their waggons and families.

The point then may have been that it was difficult for the waggons to get away as well and the resulting melee allowed so much killing.

John wrote:

This has set me thinking, the waggon park must have been fairly densely parked up to impede the hordes flight and was being used as a viewing platform. This implies there was;
a) time to park the wagons as a grandstand
b) the wagon park was somehow constrained on the flanks, (possibly by terrain or water courses)
c) the point of predicted impact must have been fairly obvious and at a set range, I suspect it would have to have been within about 400m of the grandstand for it have provided a worthwhile vantage point.


John has a great point about the waggons being able to see the fighting.

If the plain is flat you would not be able to see the action, so the plain must have been on a slope. The other interesting point that he implies is that the Roman army must have been in a position which was both attractive for the Brythons to attack and allows them to draw up their waggons.

Finally the waggons being constrained by the landscape BUT easy to get onto to "plain".

At Cunetio all these points are catered for.


Vindex wrote:


The Romans withdrew to a strategic point and waited to join battle with the Britons under the leadership of Boudicca. They were not ambushed, nor were they trapped; they fought on ground of their choosing.

Cunetio is a position that is highly defendable and a place that can be used for both attack and for escape if necessary......

[attachment=5191]CUNETIOexample3.pdf[/attachment]

Kind Regards - Deryk


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Deryk
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Cunetio
Deryk
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Quote: Cunetio is a position that is highly defendable and a place that can be used for both attack and for escape if necessary......

...and has a river running through the middle of it which one or the other side would have to cross. I would argue that this is far from ideal for an armoured foot soldier and for me discounts Cunetio.

I also think Tacitus may have remembered a river in his description of the battle site.
Moi Watson

Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather to skid in sideways, Merlot in one hand, Cigar in the other; body thoroughly used up, totally worn out, and screaming "WOO HOO, what a ride!
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Quote:Cunetio is a position that is highly defendable and a place that can be used for both attack and for escape if necessary......

True, but...

Ac primum legio gradu immota et angustias loci pro munimento retinens (Annals, 14.37)

which translated as literally as I can manage (with online dictionary!) goes:

At first the legio stood immobile and retained the narrowness of the place as a barrier

(Church & Brodribb give 'clinging to the narrow defile as a defence', of course...)

So - unless you can translate angustias as 'steepness' rather than 'narrowness' (?), the soldiers were in the 'narrow place' rather than standing on top of it!
Nathan Ross
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the soldiers were in the 'narrow place' rather than standing on top of it!
well that knocks out CS and Dunstable I would say.

The Cunetio river issue isn't significantly different the Anker problem at Mancetter and that's been allowed to pass as the best theory for 50 years. However I'm inclined to agree with Vindex, but I would wouldn't I :twisted:
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Quote:well that knocks out CS and Dunstable I would say.

Why? Both have the Roman position within a narrow valley or pass, I believe...


Quote:Mancetter... allowed to pass as the best theory for 50 years.

But not round here! HA Ha Haaa :evil:
Nathan Ross
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Why? Both have the Roman position within a narrow valley or pass, I believe...

I read these both as ridge top positions.

I really like;
At first the legio stood immobile and retained the narrowness of the place as a barrier
In my CS delusion I can read this as holding prepared positions for a while before coming out to play wedgies,
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