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Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.
Tacitus refers to SPs "Little Army" and "Scanty Numbers".

As SP eventually lined upwith around 10,000 men do we have any idea of the numbers that he had with him him in London? Presumably less than 10,000 men.

Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
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Can't resist adding a few notes to the points above!


Quote:If we took 5 to a wagon that would be around 34,000 wagons.

I doubt every family had their own wagon, actually. Patterns of property ownership in Iron Age British society are an unknown to me, but I would guess only one family in ten had wheeled transport.


Quote:Also regarding the people slaughtered in Colchester, London and St Albans – 70,000. Obviously Colchester took the brunt but how many were living there in the first place?

Interesting article from the Museum of London here:

Estimating the Population

Population in AD61 is estimated at 10,000 - and that's based on figures from the probably much denser settlement of Pompeii!

Colchester would have been bigger, St Albans much smaller, but I don't think we're looking at more than 15-20,000 potential civilian casualties maximum.


Quote:So SP would have felt safe entering his lands and also Boudica would have no problem invading the Atrebates territories.

I could mention here that St Albans was the only known municipium in Britain at the time, and shows evidence of early Romanised urban growth. If Paulinus was casting about for friendly natives with a 'special relationship' to Rome, he wouldn't need to go as far as Silchester! ;-)
Nathan Ross
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Nathan wrote:


I doubt every family had their own wagon, actually. Patterns of property ownership in Iron Age British society are an unknown to me, but I would guess only one family in ten had wheeled transport.

Of course all we need to know now is the number of families and how big they were Sad

Nathan wrote

Colchester would have been bigger, St Albans much smaller, but I don't think we're looking at more than 15-20,000 potential civilian casualties maximum.

This seems to be a much more reasonable number - Thanks for this.


Nathan wrote:

I could mention here that St Albans was the only known municipium in Britain at the time, and shows evidence of early Romanised urban growth. If Paulinus was casting about for friendly natives with a 'special relationship' to Rome, he wouldn't need to go as far as Silchester!

Interestingly St Albans was made a municipium when Caratacus attacked so was possible a political statement rather than much else however you are right. In this case though, could they rely on the population and perhaps SP had already seen that the locals (apart from the rich)were not that pleased to see them as Tacitus indicates.

So why did SP go to Silchester and not St Albans?

Firstly I have a problem with the idea that the Iceni and the Trinovantes strategy originally included marching on London. The Brython's military strong points were made up of ambush and siege. Typically their successes were in opportunism, striking at poorly informed marching columns and not in full frontal attack. In effect they practiced guerrilla warfare.

The Roman Army on the other hand like the Super Powers of today preferred to fight "toe to toe" and the difficulty (as in today's Afghanistan or the Iraq War)was actually getting the enemy to "stand and fight" mainly because the Romans always won because of superior weaponry and tactics.

The one way that the Romans could get people to fight them in a "battle" was to march onto the homelands of their enemies and destroy them until people came and fought them.

In AD60 they had been doing this for 17 years in Britain; the locals would have known this and perhaps we can see this in the way that the Ninth Legion were destroyed on the borders of the Iceni on their way to Colchester in a typical Brythonic ambush.

The Iceni and Trinovantes were prepared and I believe that they were expecting Seutonius Paulinus to march on them perhaps at Colchester and also at Thetford. For them to have marched on London would have left their own lands, which they had literally just taken back from the Roman State open to attack with no one there to defend them.

This seems to be supported by the fact that SP was able to travel 250 miles (which if he was mounted would have taken at least 8 days after Colchester was burnt to the ground) or if he had infantry about a fortnight just to get to London.

It may have taken longer.

He apparently only had a "little army"(perhaps the Batavians - a mounted general utility force and some infantry perhaps 3,000- some men would have been lost in the fighting at Anglesey, some would have been left to garrison Anglesey and the wounded would have been left at Wroxeter).

This perhaps would have left him with 6,000 men (we cannot assume that the Twentieth were with him at this time) a big enough force if the Ninth and the Second had joined him giving him a large army to take back the territories lost.

He must have been devastated when no one turned up and no doubt would have waited, sent more messages before making the decision to abandon London.

The Brythons were no doubt waiting for him to attack and had the access roads to their borders covered but he never came.

The first they would have known that something was different to the normal was when they saw the smoke rising from the granaries and armouries as SP left with the refugees leaving only those who wanted to fight for London or those who were too infirm. There would not have been many as most rich refugees (like the Procurator and his cronies) had already fled.

Tacitus states that he lost a town to save a Province but the reality is of course that he had to regroup. He was prepared to leave London and the East of the country to its fate and seems to have decided according to Dio to retire for the season.

At this point apart from the recent losses at Anglesey and part of the Ninth Legion he has 6,000 troops with him and about 30,000 troops scattered around the country but mainly in the North and West.

To put a good distance between himself and the main rebellion he goes West on the road to Silchester. If he goes North he can be cut off from the East by the Iceni and the Trinovantes using their warbands that are guarding their frontiers.

If he goes to Silchester he immediately gains at least two days start over the Brythons (remember that he has refugees so is likely to be travelling at 10 miles per day or so). First Stop Syon Park, then Staines, Caesars Camp at Bracknell and then Silchester.

The Brythons only realise he has gone once their scouts get back. It is my contention that the Trinovantes war bands march on London and the Iceni go to St Albans to cut off SP. At London the Trinovantes meet limited resistance and destroy the place and its inhabitants no doubt furious that there are no supplies or armament.

When the Iceni war bands reach St Albans it has been evacuated and the gtranaries have been emptied. They burn it.

Interestingly Tacitus states that the Brythons did not attack the well defended places but equally the Romans did not attack the Brythons.

Now both War Bands have a problem. They are not geared up for pursuit because they were waiting for SP to attack and therefore have not stockpiled food for travel.

It is my supposition that this is what SP had planned on. He thought that they had no food and would therefore be satisfied with looting these two towns and then return back home.

SP not for the first time, under estimated the Brythons. They were determined to continue with their campaign. The Romans were weak, spread all over the country, the nearest army only had 6,000 men and they were leaving without a fight.

The Brythons would have had to send for supplies to get baggage trains to the warbands with wheat and fresh meat where possible. This would have taken about a week to get the supplies to the army. Water was not a problem in either city.

The scouts by this time would have reported that SP was in Silchester so both armies would have proceeded there one following SP via Staines and the Iceni going down in 10 mile stages using local water holes / rivers via Rickmansworth, crossing the Thames at Cookham, then on to Twyford, then Theale and finally meeting at Silchester around 2 weeks after SP had arrived - only to find that he had fled again - three days previously.

SP of course would have realised that his plan of retiring for another season was not going to happen once he realised that the armies had not returned home but were continuing westwards. His troops and the refugees would have been rested for a few days and he would have realised that it would take several days for the Brythons to reach Silchester but that it wasn't defendable and any way he had a place in mind 25 miles away.

We will never know if SP set fire to Silchester or whether the Brythons did but sgain the archeology supports destruction around this time but cetainly in later days this area was rich in wheat production (much being stored in the later fort at Cunetio) so it may have been part of a scorched earth policy to deny food to the Brythons who were perhaps also running short by now.

Perhaps the civilians from Silchester were evacuated or fled to the South and the Roman Army left for Cunetio one days forced march away.

SP sent to the local forts for reinforcements from Gloucester (2 days from Cunetio) , Bath and Cirencester (around 1 day from Cunetio)to meet him at Cunetio.

It is my supposition that the auxilliaries came from Silchester, two Allae from Cirencester and Gloucester and the Twentieth either from Bath or Gloucester.

If he had 6,000 men in London,then 2,000 of the Twentieth, 1,000 Auxilliaries, 1000 Cavalry which would bring him up to 10,000 men.

The Fourteenth and the Batavians would have 4 days to prepare the site before the Brythons arrived to find SP backed into a corner in a siege position based around an old hillfort and the Brythons had the water!

The rest is history Wink

Like so much concerning Boudica this has to be conjecture but there is nothing here as far as I can see that conflicts with the written word or the archeology as we know it at this time......

Something to mull over for the weekend.......

Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
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A plausible scenario, Deryk!

However, I wonder why, if the Iceni etc were so keen to protect their territory, they'd all trek off to a site 100 miles west of their borders?

I'm still not convinced that Cunetio fits the description given in Tacitus, for all the reasons mentioned above - but we'll have to agree to differ on our interpretations.

As you say, all is conjecture! :-)
Nathan Ross
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Hi Nathan

Thank you

Surprisingly enough Silchester is only 95 miles from Colchester via London AND 95 miles from Bury St Edmonds via St Albans - although to Cunetio it was another 20 miles.

To get to Dunstable via London from Colchester is 85 miles or so.

If the Brythons were on Watling Street they were chasing the Romans...... as they would have been had they gone to Silchester or Church Stowe.

You ask why?

Things had obviously got really bad for the Brythons to rebel to such an extent. Possibly the attack on Anglesey was the final straw which was an assault on the old laws and religion - an emotive subject at the best of times, see today's news.

They were prepared to take on the might of Rome but the might of Rome was in disarray and they saw an opportunity to destroy the Governor, the Procurator had already been driven out with many rich Romans and others had been defeated, the Roman capital had been destroyed and the Ninth Legion (or part thereof) had been destroyed. There were few soldiers in the East and South and not enough to worry the Brythons even those holed up in their forts including Cerialis.

The small Roman army was in retreat and if they could be destroyed perhaps the Romans could be driven out. It was a huge gamble in the first place but the stakes were huge as well.

Their only mistake was to underestimate the genius of SP who managed to turn a position of retreat and supposed siege into a full blown battle scenario at a site where numbers actually werea hindrance rather than an advantage.

Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
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Here are a few random thoughts that occur to me as a result of recent posts.


Quote: I could mention here that St Albans was the only known municipium in Britain at the time, and shows evidence of early Romanised urban growth. If Paulinus was casting about for friendly natives with a 'special relationship' to Rome, he wouldn't need to go as far as Silchester! ;-)
St Albans would hold few attractions for Paulinus. He knew from his journey to London that the country to the north was hostile, even if not in active revolt; the east was in open rebellion and, with the rebels about to occupy London and its environs, withdrawal to St Albans would leave him in danger of being cornered in a small pro-Roman enclave, surrounded by the enemy. If the troops that he had with him were insufficient to defend London, they would have been no better able to defend St Albans. Going to St Albans would have been potentially suicidal.


Quote:Firstly I have a problem with the idea that the Iceni and the Trinovantes strategy originally included marching on London . . .The Iceni and Trinovantes were prepared and I believe that they were expecting Seutonius Paulinus to march on them perhaps at Colchester and also at Thetford. For them to have marched on London would have left their own lands, which they had literally just taken back from the Roman State open to attack with no one there to defend them . . . The Brythons were no doubt waiting for him to attack and had the access roads to their borders covered but he never came.
It is clear that Paulinus was expecting an attack upon London. He must have had grounds for this and the obvious explanation is that the rebels were advancing upon it. If they were intent upon plunder and revenge, as seems to be the case, their targets are likely to have been the most Romanised centres of population: Colchester, St Albans and London. If they feared Roman retaliation against their homelands, they are more likely to have returned than to have hung around waiting for Paulinus to make the first move.


Quote: He apparently only had a "little army"(perhaps the Batavians - a mounted general utility force and some infantry perhaps 3,000- some men would have been lost in the fighting at Anglesey, some would have been left to garrison Anglesey and the wounded would have been left at Wroxeter).

This perhaps would have left him with 6,000 men (we cannot assume that the Twentieth were with him at this time)
The fact that Paulinus decided against trying to defend London implies that he had at least given this some consideration. That in turn implies that he had a reasonably substantial force with him and that this included a significant number of infantry. I see him having all the legionary troops with him that he later had at the final battle. He may have subsequently collected a few additional auxiliaries but I do not see him being substantially reinforced between his leaving London and the final battle.


Quote:Tacitus states that he lost a town to save a Province but the reality is of course that he had to regroup. He was prepared to leave London and the East of the country to its fate and seems to have decided according to Dio to retire for the season.
Paulinus was prepared to surrender London to the rebels but, if this was in order to save the province, he must have left them something worth having. This suggests that London was left intact with its stocks of booty. He no doubt hoped that the rebels would either halt their advance there and occupy London or be satisfied with their plunder and return home. At least, he may have expected that the sacking of London would delay them sufficiently to enable him to link up with the troops, including leg II Aug, that he had ordered to join him.

Too much emphasis must not be put on ‘season’ in the Loeb translation; this is just the translator’s choice of word. In the original Greek, the word kairos does not imply the campaigning season; it means ‘the right season’, ‘the right time for action’ or ‘the critical moment’. In fact, it would have been unwise for Paulinus to delay taking retaliatory action until the next year, as this would have given the rebels the chance to consolidate their gains and to persuade other tribes to join them.


Quote:We will never know if SP set fire to Silchester or whether the Brythons did but sgain the archeology supports destruction around this time but cetainly in later days this area was rich in wheat production (much being stored in the later fort at Cunetio) so it may have been part of a scorched earth policy to deny food to the Brythons who were perhaps also running short by now.
We do not know that Paulinus adopted a scorched earth policy and it is most unlikely that he would have done so in the territory of the Atrebates, if he wanted to retain the loyalty of Cogidubnus. Similarly, it is highly unlikely that he fired Silchester. If Silchester was threatened by the rebels, one would expect Cogidubnus to have marshalled forces to defend it. We hear nothing of this but the nature of our sources is such that they probably would not have mentioned it anyway. Nevertheless, there is nothing to suggest that the rebels met any form of opposition before the final battle and the reason for this may be that they had not penetrated far into the territory of the Atrebates before the battle took place. Personally, I believe that the battle took place somewhere east of Silchester but, unfortunately, I cannot offer a site.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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Hi Renatus - many thanks for the comments...

Renatus wrote:

It is clear that Paulinus was expecting an attack upon London.

I think that the very act of SP leaving triggered the attack on London as Pualinus realised it would due to its being undefended. Also the Brythons could leave their homelands because there was no longer a threat to their territories.

Renatus wrote:

That in turn implies that he had a reasonably substantial force with him

It is Tacitus who mentions the "small army" and "scanty numbers" and compares it to the lost Ninth Legion and that care needed to be taken. Seutonius Paulinus obviously did not think that he had enough men then to fight or to approach the Brythons even in a fixed battle, so what changed his mind to decide to fight with the same number of men and an increasing number of the enemy from 120,000 to 230,000 (Dio).

Renatus wrote:

Paulinus was prepared to surrender London to the rebels but, if this was in order to save the province, he must have left them something worth having.

Static booty may have been left, although the people who could leave would have taken their portable wealth with them especially the Procurator and his cronies who would have taken the wealth they had confiscated. SP would have either taken the grain and armaments or destroyed them. To not to do so would risk giving an edge to the rebels which he could not afford.

Renatus wrote:

If Silchester was threatened by the rebels, one would expect Cogidubnus to have marshalled forces to defend it. Personally, I believe that the battle took place somewhere east of Silchester but, unfortunately, I cannot offer a site.

I think that Cogidubnus probably did work with SP and supplied the auxilliaries for the final battle that Tacitus mentions. Whether he allowed Silchester to be burnt is a moot point but it is reasonable to expect that it was evacuated.

Regarding the site - that's what we are all loooking forward surely. :wink:

Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
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Quote:I think that the very act of SP leaving triggered the attack on London as Pualinus realised it would due to its being undefended. Also the Brythons could leave their homelands because there was no longer a threat to their territories.
The abandonment of London looks like a desperate measure that would only have been taken as a last resort, such as an imminent attack. There would have been no point in leaving it otherwise. As to the Britons, they were on a roll after their successes at Colchester and against the Ninth Legion. It is unlikely that they would have hovered on the outskirts of London waiting for Paulinus to move. Seeing that he had insufficient troops, they would surely have attacked. If they had retired to protect their homelands, they would have been miles away from London and no immediate threat.


Quote:It is Tacitus who mentions the "small army" and "scanty numbers" and compares it to the lost Ninth Legion and that care needed to be taken. Seutonius Paulinus obviously did not think that he had enough men then to fight or to approach the Brythons even in a fixed battle, so what changed his mind to decide to fight with the same number of men and an increasing number of the enemy from 120,000 to 230,000 (Dio).
I assume that by "small army" and "scanty numbers" you are referring to Ann. 14.36 (modica manus) and Ann. 14.33 (infrequentia militis) respectively. The second of these, dealing with troops in London, need only mean 'insufficient number of soldiers'. The first (if I have identified it correctly) is pre-battle rhetoric ("We few, we happy few, we band of brothers" sort of stuff) and, in any event, modicus means 'middling, average, not excessive'. As to the number of Britons, Dio's figures are unreliable but let us assume that he has the proportions about right. The first figure represents the force that Boudica had at the beginning of her campaign, the second the number at the final battle. The first, therefore, would be the Iceni alone, the second the Iceni and Trinovantes combined. This second figure would represent the number threatening London, whether you assume (as I do) that the two tribes combined and approached from the east or that the Trinovantes approached from the east and the Iceni came down Watling Street. From Paulinus' point of view, nothing had changed in terms of numbers. The difference was that he had given up hope of being reinforced by the Second Legion and that he had chosen a tactically more advantageous site for the battle.


Quote:SP would have either taken the grain and armaments or destroyed them. To not to do so would risk giving an edge to the rebels which he could not afford.
Paulinus would certainly have taken or destroyed the weapons but I think that he would have left the foodstuffs in the hope that collecting it would delay the Britons or that it might satisfy their lust for plunder, so that they returned home leaving him free to gather his forces for a counter-attack.


Quote:Regarding the site - that's what we are all loooking forward surely. :wink:
Of course but we have to accept that we will probably never identify it with certainty. The best that can be offered are possibilities.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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Hi Renatus

Many thanks for the posts. At the end of this I expect we are going have to agree to differ on our interpretations but it is worth exploring all sides.

Renatus wrote.

The abandonment of London looks like a desperate measure that would only have been taken as a last resort, such as an imminent attack. There would have been no point in leaving it otherwise. As to the Britons, they were on a roll after their successes at Colchester and against the Ninth Legion. It is unlikely that they would have hovered on the outskirts of London waiting for Paulinus to move. Seeing that he had insufficient troops, they would surely have attacked. If they had retired to protect their homelands, they would have been miles away from London and no immediate threat.

The proposition here is that Paulinus when in London is under immediate threat but that is not necessarily the case.

Paulinus may have some flaws but he was one of, if not the best general of his generation. This was not a man who needed to take "desperate measures"; he planned for all eventualities.

I suppose we should ask ourselves why did he go to London in the first place? Was it because that was where he was to meet the Second or perhaps where he expected the Procurator to be so that Paulinus could get up to date information of the situation?

Once again there was no one there. Not the Second and not the Procurator, most of the portable wealth would have been loaded onto ships, the rich and powerful would also have gone and London was left probably with no government to speak of.

His original plans of marching on the Brythons to force them to fight him were in chaos and London was obviously undefendable.

To say that the Brythons were “hovering on the outskirts of London” is not my interpretation but that they were in fact defending their borders and ready to move to intercept his column/s on the march.

After 17 years of watching how the Romans operated (which was to march on an enemy’s territory to force them in a battle to defend it) the Brythons had changed their tactics to one of guerrilla fighting and siege warfare. They had obviously been successful at this as the Romans after 17 years still had not conquered the far West or the North.

Also to assume that the Brythons were savages and uneducated would seem to go against what archaeology has unearthed.

The Brythons were expecting the other Legions from the West to join Paulinus and march on their territories to exact revenge, as would have been a typical Roman tactic (exactly what the Ninth did).

It is my supposition that Tacitus tells us of SP’s dilemma, the risk of advancing on the Brythons with too few men and get caught out like the Ninth, try to defend London once the Brythons realised that no one was coming to re-inforce him or to abandon London to its fate after destroying the armouries and any grain that was left so that the Brythons would have to re-provision to continue their journey past London.

The latter option allowed him to choose a better place to defend, buy him time to get re-inforcements at a “later time”.

Renatus wrote:

I assume that by "small army" and "scanty numbers" you are referring to Ann. 14.36 (modica manus)
and Ann. 14.33 (infrequentia militis) respectively. The second of these, dealing with troops in London, need only mean 'insufficient number of soldiers'.


We both agree that he had insufficient men to carry out his preferred options.

Although like most people I think that DIo’s numbers are suspect, I think that the increased number of Brythons refers to just before the final battle and includes a number of tribes.

Regarding the site – I totally agree with you unless some huge confirmation is found and that is unlikely however at least we can narrow down the sites – or find others?

Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
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Quote:I think that the very act of SP leaving triggered the attack on London as Pualinus realised it would due to its being undefended. Also the Brythons could leave their homelands because there was no longer a threat to their territories.
Quote:The abandonment of London looks like a desperate measure that would only have been taken as a last resort, such as an imminent attack. There would have been no point in leaving it otherwise. As to the Britons, they were on a roll after their successes at Colchester and against the Ninth Legion. It is unlikely that they would have hovered on the outskirts of London waiting for Paulinus to move. Seeing that he had insufficient troops, they would surely have attacked. If they had retired to protect their homelands, they would have been miles away from London and no immediate threat.
I think the abandonment of Londinium was a master stroke. If the Britons were indeed out for revenge and plunder (which seems very likely), Paulinus may have counted on the British army to dwindle after the sack of Londinium. As would have been the case with any 'mob army' of the day without a strong control, warriors would have left for home to secure their share of the plunder. Also, with Londinium gone, there would have been no major Roman town left. The enthusiasm of the Britons can be expected to have dwindled a bit, as no doubt some of them were not in it for national pride but mainly for personal gain. A good commander like Paulinus may have banked on that.
Quote:After 17 years of watching how the Romans operated (which was to march on an enemy’s territory to force them in a battle to defend it) the Brythons had changed their tactics to one of guerrilla fighting and siege warfare.
If they indeed did so, this had not been passed on to the Iceni or their allies, who came at the Romans in a classic ‘mob-army’ fashion.
Robert Vermaat
MODERATOR
FECTIO Late Romans
THE CAUSE OF WAR MUST BE JUST
(Maurikios-Strategikon, book VIII.2: Maxim 12)
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Robert Vermaat wrote:

If they indeed did so, this had not been passed on to the Iceni or their allies, who came at the Romans in a classic ‘mob-army’ fashion.

I think that we can all appreciate that the Brythons were fighters.

17 years previously they had fought 40,000 Romans at the Battle of the Medway and kept them at bay for 2 days. They lost one of their major leaders but still did not give in. This is remarkable and impressive display of Celtic / Brythonic fighting prowess.

Caratacus takes the fight to the Romans and manages to beat them for years until he himself is beaten in a fixed battle before being betrayed by a Client Queen.

Was it an Iceni army that was beaten by Scapula's son in AD48?

Yet for some reason when the Brythons lay siege to and destroy Colchester they become a "mob army" out of control. Yet when Roman soldiers are allowed to take a city and run riot for a few days it is perfectly acceptable.

It seems that the Roman propaganda machine thrives 2,000 years on.

What proof do we have that the Iceni or the Trinovantes was a "mob army"?

Was this any different to the English Civil War before the introduction of the Model Army?

Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
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Quote: It seems that the Roman propaganda machine thrives 2,000 years on.

Kind Regards - Deryk


Are you serious? Or are you just indulging in forum trollism?

I've resisted for a VERY long time but as you insist on calling the native tribes of Britannia "Brythons" one knew where your sympathies lay from the beginning.

A thread which started with a good discussion onto the various battle sites has been turned into a farce.
Moi Watson

Life should NOT be a journey to the grave with the intention of arriving safely in an attractive and well preserved body, but rather to skid in sideways, Merlot in one hand, Cigar in the other; body thoroughly used up, totally worn out, and screaming "WOO HOO, what a ride!
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Vindex wrote:

Are you serious? Or are you just indulging in forum trollism?

I've resisted for a VERY long time but as you insist on calling the native tribes of Britannia "Brythons" one knew where your sympathies lay from the beginning.

A thread which started with a good discussion onto the various battle sites has been turned into a farce.


I can only thank you for your patience......and good manners in allowing me to prattle on :wink:

I would have thought by denigrating an enemy you are actually reducing the acheivements of the Roman generals who actually overcame great odds and showed magnificent generalship.

I doubt if the soldiers who fought the Brythons (or Britons or Tribes) would have thanked anyone for saying that really they weren't doing anything special after all they were only fighting a bunch of savages....

As for propaganda, most civilisations would be proud that 2000 years later their version of events was still not being questioned.... but most people would agree that both Tacitus and Dio were writing for their chosen audiences to make a point in their own times....

As someone once pointed out Britannia was THE posting if you wanted to fight.......

There have to be two sides otherwise there is no battle and no battle sites and we have to understand both sides if we are to understand why the battle site was located in a particular place.

I was under the mistaken illusion that the idea of this thread was to try and understand where the battle site might be using a balanced view where possible.

As far as I am aware the battle site has not been found and therefore exploring the texts, testing the interpretations, translations and trying to fit scenarios to them and to see if it fits the archeology or is disproved by it or indeed disproved by others interpretations is part of the challenging and enjoyable process.

The problem of the "mob army" theory is, that although you could apply it at Colchester at a pinch it starts to weaken by the time it gets to London and fades to insignificance days or weeks later when the final battle is fought at Mancetter, High Cross, Dunstable, Virginia Water or indeed Cunetio - well that is my theory - but I am not going to convince you of that.

If once again you feel that I have insulted you by stating how excellent I believe that SP's generalship was by firstly taking a disastrous situation when he arrived in London and turning it to his advantage, to recognising the danger he faced by advancing on the rebels homelands with a limited force, by choosing his preferred battle site, the genius of abandoning London, the skill of managing to get the opportunity to destroy the Iceni, Trinovantes and assorted other tribes (Brythons) in the field and finally his execution of the battle plan against overwhelming odds, I can only apologise.

As to your remark about trollism, probably it is time for me to return to my cave and observe from afar...... as you would no doubt prefer from your comments.

Many thanks to the others of you who have given me a huge amount of pleasure with your well informed and convincing insights......

It has allowed me to change some of the views I held when I joined the board a few short weeks ago.. and has improved my understanding by far certainly of the possibilities of Dunstable, Church Stowe and even - dare I say it - Cunetio. Smile

Kind Regards - Deryk
Deryk
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Deryk,

I will try to deal with the points in your prepenultimate post in a single narrative, rather than piecemeal as we usually do, and hope that your threat to retire to your cave was made in jest.

London was a major commercial centre, perhaps the major commercial centre, in the province. It was a wealthy town and thus a tempting target for the Britons. For the Romans, it was probably the administrative, as well as a mercantile, centre and, therefore, not to be given up except in the most dire of circumstances. Its significance, therefore, was both material and symbolic.

It was the next obvious objective for the Iceni and Trinovantes after the fall of Colchester. If they had not proceeded with their campaign but had withdrawn within their tribal boundaries to await Roman retaliation, they would not only have lost the impetus generated by their earlier successes but would have handed the initiative to the Romans. If their ultimate goal was to drive the Romans from the country, they would have needed the assistance of the majority of the other British tribes. To gain this, they would need to have demonstrated that they were carrying the battle to the Romans and that they were doing so successfully. If they had merely freed their own territories from Roman control and then remained within their homelands, it would have indicated to the other tribes that this was simply a local dispute and they would not have been encouraged to join in. Moreover, Boudica might have been quite keen to get into the territory of the Atrebates to demonstrate to the other tribes what happened to those who backed the wrong side.

Tacitus tells us that, when Paulinus reached London, he was uncertain whether to use it as his base for operations (sedem bello) because of the insufficient number of his troops (infrequentia militis). It therefore seems most likely that his original intention had been to launch his counter-attack from there. As you suggest, he is likely to have ordered the Second Legion to rendezvous with him there and, when it was clear that it would not do so, he had to rethink his plans. He had three options. First, he could have marched out to confront the advancing rebels with the forces that he had but, in doing so, he ran the risk of suffering the same fate as Cerealis and the Ninth. (Incidentally, the Ninth was not attacking the rebels’ homelands, as you seem to suggest. Tacitus makes it quite clear that it was advancing to the aid ( in subsidium adventanti) of Colchester. As a further digression, it is most unlikely that the Romans would consider launching a punitive raid into the enemy’s territory whilst it still had an army active in the field. They would defeat the army first and then take retaliatory action against its homeland to deter future insurrection – I think the term is atrocitas, which says it all. The only reason to launch such an action while the enemy army was undefeated would be to raise a siege. There was no siege of Colchester. The town had no defences and was overrun immediately. The colonists held out in the temple of Claudius for two days but that can hardly be called a siege.)

The second option open to Paulinus was to remain in London to await reinforcements but, if they did not arrive before the rebels (and it seems almost impossible that they could have done so), he would have been left trying to defend the town with inadequate forces. The third option was to withdraw.

It is difficult to ascertain the precise reasoning lying behind Paulinus’ decision, as Tacitus puts it, “by the loss of one town to save everything” (unius oppidi damno servare universa). He may have hoped that, having seized and plundered London, the rebels would be satisfied and return home (Robert makes the excellent point that, once they had secured enough plunder, the less politically committed elements of the rebel army would tend to drift away). He may have hoped that the rebels would waste enough time in plundering the town to enable him to link up with his reinforcements. Or (and I am beginning to favour this explanation) he may have decided simply to preserve his army for future action, even if this meant exposing the town to occupation and devastation. Coupled with these explanations is the question of whether Paulinus would have destroyed the stocks of grain and other foodstuffs before departing. If he did not, the rebels might have been able to seize enough to see them through the winter and thus be encouraged to return home. Alternatively, the time that the rebels spent in collecting it might have given him the time he needed to join his reinforcements. The danger, of course, was that he would, in effect, be supplying the rebels and enabling them, if they were so minded, to continue their depredations without having to worry about finding food. If he destroyed the stocks, the rebels’ advance would be slowed down by the necessity for them to forage as they went along.

In the event, if Dio is to be believed, none of this worked. The plundering of London did not delay the rebels overmuch and Paulinus realised that they were coming upon him much faster than he had anticipated, forcing him to give battle with the forces that he had unreinforced. He was fortunate and astute enough to be able to choose a battle site that suited his limited resources and disadvantaged the enemy.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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Quote:A thread which started with a good discussion onto the various battle sites has been turned into a farce.
This seems a bit extreme. What's the problem? Nothing I've said, I hope.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply


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