There are many points that we can agree on and of course everything is in the interpretation
I admit that I am being speculative when indicating that Tacitus had chosen a place to defend when he was in London but having said that I would have thought that as the Governor of Britannia he would have a good understanding of the topography of the land and be prepared for setbacks.
I am not convinced that the Brythons had their families with them – Tacitus does not mention children at all only the wives and of course this reflects the battle on Anglesey where women are mentioned in the ranks of the Brythons by Tacitus
SP would probably move at 15 miles per day with the refugees but the oxen (if they were present) would slow down the Brythons to about 5 miles per day.
If SP left London a couple of days before the Brythons arrived he would have arrived at Verulamium in less than two days (20 miles) whilst the Brythons were attacking London. If we allow 2 days for the battle and sacking of London SP could have been in Bicester by the time the Brythons were leaving London.
The Brythons if they were travelling with oxen would have taken a further 4 days to reach St Albans or 6 days to reach Tring.
In effect SP could have been in Gloucester (a further 80 miles), even travelling at 15 miles per day taking into account the refugees.
The interesting point is that he didn’t do so
It would make sense that if SP evacuated London he would do the same for the people of Verulamium who were protected by Roman Law. It would also make sense to empty Verulamium of any food or weaponry, partly to deny the Brythons but also to feed the people he had with him.
The hills at Tring offer an excellent place to re-group and defend and it is a place that could contain many of thousands of people easily. From here SP could attack the Iceni up the Icknield Way, get reinforcements from the West or North or retire.
If the Iceni and the Trinovantes were heading for home you would think that they would have left London via Braughing and Chelmsford respectively but if after two days of sacking London they left along Watling Street it would have been obvious that they were either, as you say, going to destroy the last Roman town in the South East (Verulamium) or pursuing SP (although they would have no chance of catching him if they were travelling with oxen).
In either case SP obviously made the choice to prepare for battle at a place of his choosing whatever the reason.
At the very least he would have had four days to prepare for battle and possibly 8 days which would have been plenty of time to create a massive defence.
It would also allow time for extra troops to reach him from Cirencester or Gloucester (perhaps the veterans of the XXth and two Cohors of Cavalry the first Wing of the Thracians and the Indus Wing of the Gauls - I know its controversial) plus local auxiliary troops from stations along Akeman Street and Watling Street.
The important issue here is that the site at Tring is feasible for a Londonium / Verulamium attack.
Interestingly if we take John’s proposal that the Iceni marched along a natural “old highway” the Icknield Way is known to have been there and used to cross the country. Church Stowe and Tring are both about 75 miles from Thetford.
So the Tring site would appear to cover two theories.
The Tring site works for the Dunstable theory as well (Dunstable is only a few miles away along the Icnield Way) but is far more defendable than Dunstable
The plateau created by the highest two hills in the Chilterns rises steeply on three sides some 300 feet out of the plain. On the fourth side it is bounded by one of the sections of Grims Ditch along the ridge.
By creating standard defences based on Grims Ditch already there, using artillery and other standard defence features of the marching camp, the plateau is virtually impregnable.
There is enough room to create camps (tented or otherwise) and for horse lines. Water probably was not a problem for either side as there are numerous springs in the area
Possibly the Brythons followed up their overwhelming success at Colchester (the Roman capital), their victory over the Ninth, the capture and destruction of London (the Roman Administrative Centre), the eviction of the Fourteenth from London into the West, by capturing and destroying St Albans the last Roman presence of note in the South East
What they probably were not expecting was Seutonius Paulinus to make a stand at Tring, possibly thinking that they had driven him off.
Once he had established himself there and the Brythons were at St Albans the Brythons had no option but to attack him as their army would have been decimated by SP on their slow march home or onwards towards Silchester.
SP had managed by that one shrewd move to wrest the initiative back from the Brythons since he had been wrong footed by the rise of the rebels.
The plateau has a number of valleys and one based on the Wendover Dean side of the plateau fits the classic description of Tacitus.
This could be reached by the Brythons along Akeman Street and the Icknield Way at Tring.
The valley itself has a mouth of around 1,000 metres and is surrounded by steep sided hills with an Iron Age fort (Boddington) on one side.
[attachment=7795]Tringpics3a.pdf[/attachment]
Tacitus states that the wagons were on the edge of the plain so that the Brythons observing could see the battle.
He even states that the retreating army were hampered in their escape by the “surrounding” wagons.
The following diagrams indicate a possible scenario where wagons are drawn up along the Icknield Way and surrounding hills opposite the possible battle site forming a barrier to swift egress from the battlefield
[attachment=7796]Tringpics3b.pdf[/attachment]
The following diagrams are just an indication of the forces lined against each other.
The lines represent warriors and are based in close order (3 foot per man) trying to give a representative size – I appreciate that the Brythons would not have been drawn up in this type of battle formation.
The idea is to try and give a representation of manpower in each army.
The Brythons are made up (in this scenario) of around 80,000 people plus an undisclosed number of wagons.
The Roman army is broken down into 5,000 Legionaries, 4,000 Auxiliaries and 1,000 Cavalry situated within the valley in front of the plain.
[attachment=7797]Tringpics3c.pdf[/attachment]
Looking at the logistics I am no longer convinced that 10,000 men bursting out of a valley into a host of 80,000 without being totally surrounded and destroyed....
[attachment=7798]Tringpics3d.pdf[/attachment]
So was there more to the battle than is being portrayed by Tacitus as obviously the Brythons lost
I'm not too sure. Your site is well over to the west side of the plateau - if the Britons were coming along Akeman Street from St Alban's, they'd have to very obligingly make a lengthy circuit around to the north to bring them into position facing the Romans. Alternatively, and more easily, they could move straight up the relatively shallow slopes off Akeman Street and due west onto high ground directly behind your Roman position.
While I still like the general vicinity of Tring, this position requires either too many convenient convolutions by the Britons, or the strong possibility of the Roman trapping themselves in a hole. Dunstable blocks the main road north and cannot be easily avoided, but this position would only work if both sides had agreed to meet and fight it out on ground of the Roman commander's choosing...
Quote:I'm not too sure. Your site is well over to the west side of the plateau - if the Britons were coming along Akeman Street from St Alban's, they'd have to very obligingly make a lengthy circuit around to the north to bring them into position facing the Romans. Alternatively, and more easily, they could move straight up the relatively shallow slopes off Akeman Street and due west onto high ground directly behind your Roman position.
While I still like the general vicinity of Tring, this position requires either too many convenient convolutions by the Britons, or the strong possibility of the Roman trapping themselves in a hole. Dunstable blocks the main road north and cannot be easily avoided, but this position would only work if both sides had agreed to meet and fight it out on ground of the Roman commander's choosing...
It is obviously for Deryk to defend his choice of site but two thoughts occur to me:
1. We know that Paulinus chose a position protected in the rear by a wood. We don't know its density but presumably it was thick enough to bar the Britons from approaching from that direction. Further, Paulinus was at pains to ensure that there were no enemies to his rear. This is consistent with the Britons having arrived in the vicinity along Akeman Street, i.e., from behind him.
2. If the Britons were aware, as they clearly were, that there was a powerful Roman force, albeit inferior in numbers, that could threaten them, they would be likely to want to eliminate it. If that force was offering battle in a certain position, they had either to accept or decline. If they were so confident of their superiority in numbers that they were prepared to place their womenfolk where they could watch the fun, it is highly likely that they would have accepted battle in whatever position the Romans had chosen.
Michael King Macdona
And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Quote:Paulinus was at pains to ensure that there were no enemies to his rear. This is consistent with the Britons having arrived in the vicinity along Akeman Street, i.e., from behind him.
Well, we could always put it down to Paulinus's supposed strategic brilliance, but I would think that taking up a position in a closed valley with your back to an advancing enemy would be unwise - these 'woods' are not impenetrable jungles, after all!
Here's a rough sketch to show what I mean - Deryk's Roman position in purple. The Britons (red line) would have to move from point A (on Akeman street) to point B to face the Romans as required. The orange lines show how easy it would be for light troops or cavalry to move up onto the heights and completely surround and dominate the Roman position. Paulinus hasn't got the numbers to occupy the heights and the valley, and Tacitus is clear that he took up his position in the defile. Result - Romans surrounded and attacked from all sides by a vastly superior force:
[attachment=7805]Wendovermap.jpg[/attachment]
This position would only work, I think, if the Britons were coming directly north-west from London along the line of the modern A413.
Quote: . . . these 'woods' are not impenetrable jungles, after all! . . . Result - Romans surrounded and attacked from all sides by a vastly superior force . . .
As I have said, it is for Deryk to justify his choice of site. However, if he is right, the following may be relevant:
1. The area is well-wooded, even today. It was probably even more so in the 1st century. Climax woodland is not the ideal terrain through which to launch a major attack.
2. Paulinus will have drawn up his battle line facing the direction from which he expected the attack. This will probably have been the position of the Britons' camp. If he had the time to prepare that we have postulated, he will probably have already reconnoitred several potential battle sites to cover most eventualities.
3. He was evidently alive to the possibility of attack from the rear and for that reason satisfied himself that there was no threat from that direction before committing himself to battle. It may well have been wise for the Britons to have considered an enveloping attack from the rear and flanks as suggested by Nathan but either the terrain did not permit it or, perhaps more likely, their over-confidence led them to believe that they could overwhelm the Romans with a frontal attack.
Michael King Macdona
And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
I think that Nathan is correct in that this particular position is vulnerable to being surrounded but as Renatus points out the steepness and wooded nature of the valley sides and rear would, in my opinion, have proved an effective barrier especially if defended with calthrops (tribulus) scattered liberally within the woods once the Roman Army and civilians had descended into the valley from their position on the plateau.
It is in places an extremely steep hill and would have been an ideal place for anti personnel weapons not requiring any human support.
The valley on the Wendover Woods side of the “Tring Plateau” fits the classic steep sided valley description with the woods in the rear, with a 1,000 yard width defile that Tacitus describes.
Everything that Renatus postulates in his summation of this site certainly holds water and the conditions are right.
We have in the past accepted this as a fact only looking for a site that fits the description assuming that the result was a foregone conclusion.
Having said this it appears that this configuration is not perhaps as straight forward for a successful outcome for SP as Tacitus makes out.
As Nathan points out it is the huge number of Brythons opposing the Roman Army that is the problem.
Bursting out of the defile into the Brythonic host on the plain doesn’t really work once the Roman army is outside of the valley because of the width of the Brythonic army.
In my opinion the Roman army would have been surrounded and destroyed because the Brythons could not have been contained. (see the diagrams here)
[attachment=7820]Tringpics3e.pdf[/attachment]
So although the valley at Wendover Woods fits the physical criteria is it a valid battle arena?
Possibly not.
It is the sheer number of the Brythons that are in the field – I have only allowed for 80,000, in the diagrams in close order (at 1 meter per man) and even at that scale it is an overwhelming force to advance against.
If we are to believe Dio it was around 230,000.
If we are talking about a host of 230,000 the Brythonic host could have had a front of 145 miles width in close order as a single row as opposed to the Roman line of 7 miles at a similar density.
Small wonder the Brythons were confident.
So the key is to somehow both extend the Roman line and to reduce the Brythonic line to match – certainly a difficult task.
So either SP would have had to have been a superb tactician or very lucky yet Tacitus does say that he was one of the best generals in his generation (Corbulo being the other) so perhaps he was both.
I believe that there is another scenario at the Tring plateau which shows a way that SP proved that he was a great general and used the terrain and subterfuge to his advantage.
To re-inforce the point that the battle site was in this area I would like to review the texts (or rather the implications behind them).
Whereas I believe that we have often under estimated the Brythons, I am now wondering whether perhaps we have also completely misjudged Seutonius Paulinus and thereby misunderstood the reasoning behind his actions.
We often seem to be forcing a solution to fit the actions rather than understanding the reasoning behind the actions.
There are two major questions that have never been satisfactorily answered to my mind, regarding SP’s actions when he arrived in London.
1. Why did he take the refugees with him?
2. Why did he retrace his steps up Watling Street and not escape to the West?
Has Tacitus in order not to outshine his father in law concealed SPs genius or have we missed a point that for a Roman mind would have been so obvious that it would have put into context every part of the texts of both Dio and Tacitus but not to the present day reader?
1. Why did Seutonius Paulinus take the refugees with him?
2. Why did he retrace his steps up Watling Street and not escape to the West?
For my part I have always looked on this in a military context but I have overlooked perhaps the most obvious, which is that first and foremost Seutonius Paulinus was the Governor of the Province of Britannia.
In this guise he had total responsibility for any Roman citizens or people who were supportive of the Roman Administration.
Although we might not appreciate the value of Roman Citizenship, to the Roman readership it would have been paramount and the protection of Roman Citizens would have been assumed.
(This is no real difference to any empire that would want to protect its citizens militarily, from "gun boat diplomacy" of the British Empire even down to the Falklands in our time).
Not to protect his own citizens against the Brythonic uprising, having already lost so many at Colchester would have been unthinkable for the Governor of the Province and indeed unforgiveable as far as Rome was concerned.
Possibly SP would have received information on his way down Watling Street that the Ninth had been effectively destroyed and were sheltering in a defended position and Colchester had been lost.
By the time that he reached Verulamium, it was still intact and by all accounts so was Londinium.
The administrative centre of the Province was in Londnium (that was where Catus Decianus had been based before he fled) and probably still had Roman citizens residing there.
SP may well have needed to get information that could only be got from the administration in Londonium and also would possibly have had intelligence at this stage relating to the disposition of the Brythonic host and perhaps their advance on Londinium.
Taking the army down to Londinium (and perhaps expecting to meet the Second Legion there) once SP arrived he would have reconnoitered the land and perhaps the reference to his “small army” was a reflection that if the Second had been there he could have advanced against the Brythons.
In any case when he realised that Londinium could not be defended or that the Second Legion could not arrive in time, he took all the citizens with him that were not determined to fight or were infirm and could not journey purely because they were his responsibility.
One of the reasons that I have always thought that SP would travel directly West away from the oncoming host was because of the refugees but of course he would also have had to protect the inhabitants of Verulamium, another undefended Roman town with Roman citizens.
In that case returning up Watling Street to St Albans with the refugees would be the obvious move, collecting the refugees from Verulamium and moving to the West along Akeman Street.
He would have had to empty the granaries of both cities to feed his troops and the refugees.
As we believe that other parts of the country may also have been up in arms (perhaps attacking and burning Silchester) to travel with this amount of civilians (those from Londinium and Verulamium) any distance would have been very risky, so the plateau at Tring would have been the nearest defendable position.
On the other hand it might simply have been that SP received news that the Brythons were travelling towards Verulamium from Londinium as he was heading along Akeman Street and again the Tring plateau beckoned.
A good effort with Tring Deryk, it’s now on my long list but not near the top on the basis of the convoluted movements suggested by Nathan (why not the valley marked "Braidnidge Wood on Nathans plan?).
I’ve tried to get my head around the principle of a woodland to the rear to defend Paulinus’ selected site. There are few “woodlands” that would form an effective barrier to British infantry, and in most cases woodland would be a positive benefit to the Brits, no open field deployment or effective cavalry ground which the Romans tended to rely on. The conclusion I have come to (albeit from a CS biased position) is that one of the only “woodland” typologies that makes a worthwhile barrier would be riparian willow alder scrub. Most climax woodland would not be an obstruction, having a nice open floor, this would be particularly true of the beech forests that would be my best guess for the uplands around Tring
Any force moving through the dense thicketed swamps that are willow alder scrub would take an age to move and would have a hell of a job forming up in meaningful numbers before leaving cover. I’m using this argument at CS to suggest that the Nene tributary valleys, that form an almost complete circuit around the “Y” shaped ridge, were, prior to improvement, dense willow alder thickets with broad streams and wide ponds.
If you are down south a great way to experience this impenetrable mess is to go to the southern end of Gunpowder Park and try to get between point 3 and 7 on this orienteering map, they call it impassable, I agree. It’s a landscape typology we have almost wiped out in the UK over 2000 years but must have been common in 61AD.
Hopefully one day we’ll core at CS to see if this habitat was present, it makes a strong case for the eastern approach to the CS complex, rather than the southern one.
1. Why did Seutonius Paulinus take the refugees with him?
I understood he didn’t take them with him, he just didn’t stop them from tagging along if they weren’t an encumbrance. Seems reasonable and they would generally have been hardier than your civvies of today.
2. Why did he retrace his steps up Watling Street and not escape to the West?
His main force was behind him blocking an Iceni move north, he was expecting Legio II and the remains of the IX to join up with them at the pre-determined RV doubling his force, once they were all together he could make a stand or strike at Iceni territory without leaving an open door to the gains just made and garrisoned in the North West. His trip to London was made in the spare time he had whilst he awaited the II and the rest were digging in at the RV to see what the Iceni did next. He wasn’t running away he was positioning himself to strike a fatal blow either at the growing war band or their homeland. Any move west is a move away from his target and leaving his rear and new conquests exposed, and you wouldn't want to do that would you. hock:
The thread is now well past the 20k views, is it just the five of us making all those hits? :woot:
Quote:The thread is now well past the 20k views, is it just the five of us making all those hits? :woot:
Nope, I am sure I am not the only one who finds this really interesting but doesn't have the background knowledge to contribute anything useful.
Adam
No man resisted or offered to stand up in his defence, save one only, a centurion, Sempronius Densus, the single man among so many thousands that the sun beheld that day act worthily of the Roman empire.
1. I have suggested previously that Paulinus’ motive in taking the civilians with him from London was to save those with the wealth and skills necessary for rebuilding the province after the revolt had been suppressed. However, the need to save Roman citizens is equally plausible. The two are, of course, not mutually exclusive. That said, it seems to me that he could have had three possible intentions regarding the civilians: first, to escort them away from the immediate danger and to leave them to make their own arrangements after that; secondly, to convey them to a place of safety and to leave them in the care of the local inhabitants; thirdly, to take them into his own protection and to keep them with him until all danger had passed. The third is, I think, Deryk’s preferred option, although he accepts that it would have been risky. Mine is the second, as I do not believe that Paulinus would have wanted to encumber his army with civilians any longer than necessary and thereby to prejudice its ability to engage the enemy, should circumstances demand.
2. I would formulate this question slightly differently, since our sources do not tell us precisely what route he took or where the final battle took place. I would suggest: ‘Why would he retrace his steps up Watling Street and not escape to the West’. I can see the force of the argument that he might wish to save the citizens in Verulamium as well as those of London but, following my earlier reasoning, I do not see him wanting to add to the burden of civilians that he already carried. On balance, I hold to my view that he expected the rebels to return to their homelands by the most direct routes after plundering London which, as Deryk has pointed out, would not involve their going anywhere near Verulamium. He, therefore, thought that he could safely leave his civilians there and then proceed westwards to rendezvous with his reinforcements.
As to the battle itself, we are not helped by having two sources that describe it completely differently. In my view, although he undoubtedly over-simplifies it, Tacitus’ account is to be preferred. He almost certainly had the benefit of his father-in-law’s recollections, Agricola having been on Paulinus’ staff; Dio’s version, a hundred or so years later, is much more stereotypical. The objection expressed by Nathan and Deryk that, on emerging from the defile, the Romans were in danger of being engulfed by the numerically vastly superior rebel force applies equally to an engagement in the open field and we cannot get away from the fact that, whatever their disadvantages, the Romans won. Ancient sources are notoriously unreliable when it comes to numbers and frequently exaggerate the size of enemy forces. Nevertheless, we can accept that Paulinus was outnumbered, as we are told that he did not have the forces to take full advantage of his victory and a substantial number of the rebels escaped and were prepared to continue the conflict. By taking up a position in a defile, Paulinus was able to nullify the Britons’ numerical advantage and to force them to engage him on the same frontage as himself. It would seem reasonable, therefore, to assume that the Romans did not emerge from the defile until the Britons were in full retreat and less able to offer a consolidated resistance. If we want to allow some credence to Dio’s account, it may be that it was at this point that the Roman force split into three divisions and engaged what amounted to the wings of the rebel army as well as the retreating centre. Even so, as I have said before, in the words of the Duke of Wellington, it was “a damn’d close-run thing”.
Michael King Macdona
And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
1. Why did Seutonius Paulinus take the refugees with him?
2. Why did he retrace his steps up Watling Street and not escape to the West?
Hmm, I think we have actually pondered these points before now!
As for the first, I suggested back here that the refugees were Roman citizens, and Paulinus as governor felt a duty of care towards them (not to mention the potential damage to his reputation if he left them to die...) I wonder now whether the majority of the citizens in the province at this date might have been army veterans, and thus quite acquainted with military marching...
Quote:The valley on the Wendover Woods side of the “Tring Plateau” fits the classic steep sided valley description with the woods in the rear, with a 1,000 yard width defile that Tacitus describes.
I'm increasingly of the opinion that Tacitus's description of locum artis faucibus (the 'defile feature') is intended to be as much strategic as topographic. I believe it's likely that the latin word in this case is related to a throat, gullet, or pass - like the vestibule (faux) at the entrance to a house. I.e. a place where a road passes through or over high ground and is constricted on both sides. This position would allow a small force to oppose a larger one - the phrase angustias loci (the 'narrowness of the place') is otherwise used by Livy to describe the pass at Thermopylae and a narrow street in a city battle (we've discussed this before too!...)
So the location in question would not be a closed valley or ravine, but a strategic pass where Paulinus could block the Britons' route.
Of course, since only a few places (Dunstable, Bagshot, Virginia Water and Arbury Banks, perhaps) fit this model, I may just be inventing criteria to support my own theory! :whistle:
So the location in question would not be a closed valley or ravine, but a strategic pass where Paulinus could block the Britons' route.
you definitely have your Dunstable glasses on with that one Nathan.....far too subtle a reading to rule any sites out that were a "closed valley" you're just trying to start a fight to get viewing figures up again :-P if it's a vestibule it's an entrance to something, a closed valley with a fort at the top would fit that bill.
hock:
