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Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.
(11-30-2015, 11:22 PM)Renatus Wrote: if he did not yet know that Colchester had fallen, he would have turned off on to the Via Devana before reaching Towcester.

Ah, I see. Assuming the Via Devana existed at that point, would it not involve a detour north from High Cross to Leicester? It seems a bit of a roundabout route - surely quicker to march straight down Watling Street to St Albans and then east?

(11-30-2015, 11:22 PM)Renatus Wrote: I would assume that he would go to the base where the remainder of his legion was stationed.

But if he knew there was an enemy in the field, and his senior commander was advancing to engage it, and he had cavalry with him, would he not have tried to join forces with Paulinus? Unless the rebels had cut off his routes westwards, trekking all the way back north to base with his remaining troops while the province was in danger sounds woefully incompetent!

Meanwhile, for those who like Tring, here's an alternative site in the same vicinity. Aldbury - big defile, wooded hills on all sides, Akeman Street nearby. Big plain in front (Grand Union canal can be discounted, and the Bulbourne would be a very small stream here). Paulinus could have camped his men around Ivinghoe, north-northwest, and marched them over the saddle into the defile when the rebels approached. I've suggested two possible Roman positions, just for fun.

What problems does this site have?

   
Nathan Ross
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Nathan Ross wrote:
Only because there's mid-1st-C burnt debris along that route (as mentioned in the Nic Fuentes article proposing Virginia Water). It seems unlikely that the rebels, having found London unprovisioned, would not have ravaged quite widely, and this was settled agricultural land.

Certainly possible

Nathan Ross wrote:
Your plan has the Iceni continuing up Akeman Street and following it around to the west to face the Romans directly from the north-east, when they could easily have flanked Paulinus or even got behind him by moving up the relatively gentle slopes west of the Bulbourne valley to occupy the high ground that lay between them.

It is a valid point but I would contend that “Grims Ditch” was in fact used as a defence. The ditch itself stretches from the Bulbourne valley floor up and across the plateau to the next valley protecting the flank completely.

Fig: 1

.pdf   ROMANS AT TRING 1.pdf (Size: 167.56 KB / Downloads: 4)

 
As you are aware I do have a problem with the “one valley” scenario proposed by Tacitus but if that is the case the main valley (illustrated) at Tring would work as the topography would stop chariots and any massed infantry from flanking this position. The "ramparts" are steep and hundreds of feet high.

Fig: 2

.pdf   ROMANS AT TRING 2.pdf (Size: 145.07 KB / Downloads: 5)

 
Tring does appear to be the only site to have the ability to host Dio’s scenario of the three divisions I am not sure that Dunstable could but you may be able to convince me otherwise. 

Nathan Ross wrote:

Meanwhile, for those who like Tring, here's an alternative site in the same vicinity. Aldbury - big defile, wooded hills on all sides, Akeman Street nearby. Big plain in front (Grand Union canal can be discounted, and the Bulbourne would be a very small stream here). Paulinus could have camped his men around Ivinghoe, north-northwest, and marched them over the saddle into the defile when the rebels approached. I've suggested two possible Roman positions, just for fun.

I have looked at this before, being so near to Chivery Top but it seems rather “open ended” to me and Paulinus would have ended up fighting on two fronts.

Fig: 3
 
.pdf   ROMANS AT ALDBURY.pdf (Size: 145.69 KB / Downloads: 10)


Again the battlefield would have had a stream running through it (we have no idea of its size at this time admittedly) but we have discounted this time after time (Dorking, Cunetio and Mancetter).
 
Nathan Ross wrote:
Which would imply that the fighting was still ongoing in July/September. That opens out the timescale for the latter stage of the uprising, although we still need time for both Classicianus and Polyclitus to turn up from Rome and make their reports, apparently before Paulinus lost his ships (in late autumn/winter?)


This seems to me to be more plausible although I would have thought that Paulinus lost his ships in early AD62 (which is of course the end of winter) as part of his campaign of finally trying to destroy the Brythons hiding in the Fens.
Deryk
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(12-01-2015, 11:47 AM)Theoderic Wrote: Dio’s scenario of the three divisions

This is tricky to figure out, and my interpretation would be different to yours.

Dio says "Paulinus could not extend his line the whole length of hers... nor, on the other hand, did he dare join battle in a single compact force, for fear of being surrounded and cut to pieces. He therefore separated his army into three divisions, in order to fight at several points at one and the same time, and he made each of the divisions so strong that it could not easily be broken through."

He's still talking about two opposing battle lines facing each other - I think he's implying that Paulinus bunched his own troops into three sections, along the same frontage that would have been occupied by a bigger force, presumably leaving gaps between them.

I don't think it means that he effectively fought three simultaneous battles in different places, which is what I suspect your plan of using different valleys would turn into.


(12-01-2015, 11:47 AM)Theoderic Wrote: it seems rather “open ended” to me

Which is a plus, I think. I'm increasingly convinced that Tacitus's 'defile' was a gap between hills, a pass or a saddle, ideally a through-route that the Romans could block.

This would seem more likely than the idea of Paulinus wedging his troops into a closed valley with no easy route of retreat.



(12-01-2015, 11:47 AM)Theoderic Wrote: Paulinus would have ended up fighting on two fronts.

Only if the Britons could have been in two places at once! [Image: smile.png]

Obviously, I can see the route that circles around this Aldbury position to the west. But any Roman observer could have seen an outflanking move in that direction very clearly too, and Paulinus could have redeployed some of his troops to oppose it.

However, I doubt the Britons would have divided their force at this point. Their advantage was in overwhelming numbers, and they would have wanted to bring all their available strength against the Roman front line, which was clearly visible right in front of them.

They were not a trained army, but a collection of individuals from a warrior culture, who wanted to display their bravery. They'd even brought their wives along to watch... anyone going off on a sneaky detour to attack the Romans from behind would risk missing the main battle - and what self-respecting Iceni warrior would want that?!



(12-01-2015, 11:47 AM)Theoderic Wrote: the battlefield would have had a stream running through it
 

Although whatever kind of stream the headwaters of the Bulbourne might have been in midsummer would lie behind the battlefield, so the Britons would not have to attack across or through it.


(12-01-2015, 11:47 AM)Theoderic Wrote: This seems to me to be more plausible although I would have thought that Paulinus lost his ships in early AD62 (which is of course the end of winter)

I've been thinking over this problem of crops and planting and so on. It's not as easy as it looks!

As far as I can work out, the usual timing is as follows:

October - plant winter crops

April - plant spring crops

July-August - harvest both winter and spring crops

Tacitus says that the Iceni were threatened with famine as they "for they had been careless about sowing corn, people of every age having gone to the war, while they reckoned on our supplies as their own."

If they left after completing the spring planting, they must have assumed they would be home to harvest it by late summer (otherwise why bother?). In any case, the winter crop would be ready for harvest only a short while afterwards.

But if they were planning on returning to a full harvest of both winter and spring crops, why 'reckon on (taking) our supplies as their own'?

So I think it must have been the spring harvest in April that was neglected, as the Iceni had already decided on war and believed that seizing Roman grain (which was presumably stored in military granaries over the winter) would compensate for missing half the harvest in July/August.

Then either the winter crop was spoiled in the meantime, or Roman punitive expeditions burned the winter crops in the fields before they could be harvested in late summer.
Nathan Ross
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(12-01-2015, 12:13 AM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Ah, I see. Assuming the Via Devana existed at that point, would it not involve a detour north from High Cross to Leicester? It seems a bit of a roundabout route - surely quicker to march straight down Watling Street to St Albans and then east?

Actually, it is still shorter:

High Cross to Colchester via Leicester = 110 miles (approx.)
High Cross to Colchester via St Albans = 120 miles (approx.)

However, why take that route?  There is a road between Mancetter and Leicester that cuts out that dog-leg:

Mancetter to Colchester via Leicester = 105 miles (approx.)
Mancetter to Colchester via St Albans = 130 miles (approx.)

(12-01-2015, 12:13 AM)Nathan Ross Wrote: But if he knew there was an enemy in the field, and his senior commander was advancing to engage it, and he had cavalry with him, would he not have tried to join forces with Paulinus? Unless the rebels had cut off his routes westwards, trekking all the way back north to base with his remaining troops while the province was in danger sounds woefully incompetent!

When you say 'his remaining troops', do you mean the cavalry that escaped the battle with him or do you mean his remaining half-legion? When I speak of his going to base, I mean the camp of the remaining part of the legion. He was its commander, after all, and any action that Paulinus required him to take would almost certainly involve the remnants of the legion. Cerialis' proper place would be at its head. I have postulated that the original intention was for Paulinus and Cerialis to link up at Godmanchester and for the combined force to proceed to the relief of Colchester. For some reason, Cerialis felt obliged to advance without waiting for Paulinus to arrive at the rendezvous. However, Cerialis' route back after the battle would presumably have taken him through Godmanchester and, if Paulinus was there or nearby, he would no doubt have made his report to him personally. On the other hand, if Paulinus was somewhere on Watling Street, Cerialis is unlikely to have made a lengthy detour to meet him but rather to have sent him a written report and rejoined his remaining part-legion to await further instructions.

(12-01-2015, 12:13 AM)Nathan Ross Wrote: Meanwhile, for those who like Tring, here's an alternative site in the same vicinity. Aldbury

Yes, they could have had tea at the Brownlow Café and played a round of golf at the Stocks Golf Club while they were waiting! Leaving this (rather obvious) joke aside, I would have no problem with that. I am not wedded to the name 'Tring'; I am looking upon it as an area, rather than a specific location. Aldbury seems to have the same strategic advantages and, if its location eliminates the objections to other proposed sites, I am quite happy to start talking about 'Aldbury' instead.

(12-01-2015, 03:16 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: I'm increasingly convinced that Tacitus's 'defile' was a gap between hills, a pass or a saddle, ideally a through-route that the Romans could block.

This would seem more likely than the idea of Paulinus wedging his troops into a closed valley with no easy route of retreat.

We do, however, have the problem of the wood or forest at the rear of his position. If this was to prevent his being attacked from behind, it would also impede his ability to retreat. Perhaps he took the view that this was an all-or-nothing situation and was prepared to fight to the death, if necessary. As to its appearing to be an open-ended position, we do have to consider that the landscape is likely to have changed beyond recognition over the last 2000 years and that what is open country now may have been heavily forested in the 1st century.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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(12-01-2015, 07:14 PM)Renatus Wrote: why take that route?  There is a road between Mancetter and Leicester that cuts out that dog-leg:

Mancetter to Colchester via Leicester = 105 miles (approx.)

OK, I see this a lot better now, thanks. What are using to calculate your distances - mapping tool?

So if we assume that Paulinus went that way, and met Cerialis - or survivors of his army - at or around Godmanchester as they retreated, how long would it take Paulinus to reach London on the direct road south that passes through Braughing?

How does this fit with trying to meet up with reinforcements from the west? I know you're considering that the Second legion were only a garrison detachment, but we know they were at least intended to join Paulinus somewhere, and didn't. Perhaps others too, from the south Wales border or Alchester. How could they be expected to play a part if Paulinus was over in the east of the country? Not by going up to High Cross, surely - the only other road option is Akeman Street to St Albans and east - which would perhaps make St Albans a better rendezvous point...


(12-01-2015, 07:14 PM)Renatus Wrote: sent him a written report and rejoined his remaining part-legion to await further instructions.

We don't know enough about this to speculate, and Cerialis doesn't seem to play a decisive role in what follows. But I'd be surprised if a Roman commander with troops (I meant the cavalry, not the remainder of his legion) would march five or six days away from the enemy while his own chief was advancing in the opposite direction! Cerialis would have sent a tribune or a messenger to summon the rest of his men, I would think. But it doesn't matter too much.



(12-01-2015, 07:14 PM)Renatus Wrote: what is open country now may have been heavily forested in the 1st century.

Yep. I've already suggested that the Dunstable site was backed by woodland, which apparently survived into the middle ages.

This Aldbury site has the advantage of being surrounded by forested hills (quite possibly the same in the 1st century), except for a gap to the north-west, to one side of the rear of the Roman position, which would allow for a clear retreat if necessary. Of course, there could originally have been trees there too!
Nathan Ross
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"OK, I'll withdraw the word 'random'.  Nevertheless, whatever advantages it may have had in other circumstances, it does not seem to me to be an appropriate place to dig in, with the enemy somewhere between Colchester and London and with Paulinus thinking that he might make a stand in or near London." - Renatus

Thanks, that's big of you. 

For a cautious commander coming in from North Wales it's a pretty big leap to assume he knows the enemy is between Colchester and London and will act on the basis of that unknown "knowledge". I think you overstate the presumption of the Britons location and Paulinus' knowledge or certainty of that.

We are now back to marching distances of a single mass from London and St Albans as a "known", it still isn't, and I don't buy that as the only option, I happily stand alone on that. But if you can countenance that the Britons might not be en masse, or even that cautious Paulinus may have taken decisions on the basis that they may have been in more than one group then maybe, just maybe, he might have considered it wise to pay attention to where the Iceni territory was, both as a threat and as a means to pose a threat. I have made this point before and it is not made again for the benefit of the hardcore, rather for new comers who haven't tracked the last 1000 posts, but do look at the map below. 

No site, Dunstable, Tring or Church Stowe is any further away from Iceni territory than another (other than London). There continues to be no merit in dismissing CS as too distant in Paulinus' calculations (or ours), as neither he, nor we, knew/know whether the Iceni had moved on from Colchester or returned home.  London and St Albans could still have been done over by smaller groups, rather than a host of 230,000. 

All sites are almost exactly 60 miles from Iceni territory, the solid block is the territory according to Rudd, and the radiating halos are 20 miles each.

   
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(12-01-2015, 07:53 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: What are using to calculate your distances - mapping tool?

Nothing so sophisticated, I'm afraid.  Just a ruler applied to the OS Map of Roman Britain and then measured against the scale at the bottom.

(12-01-2015, 07:53 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: So if we assume that Paulinus went that way, and met Cerialis - or survivors of his army - at or around Godmanchester as they retreated, how long would it take Paulinus to reach London on the direct road south that passes through Braughing?

Using my method, the distance is about 56 miles.  So, at 20 miles a day, a little under 3 days.

(12-01-2015, 07:53 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: How does this fit with trying to meet up with reinforcements from the west? I know you're considering that the Second legion were only a garrison detachment, but we know they were at least intended to join Paulinus somewhere, and didn't. Perhaps others too, from the south Wales border or Alchester. How could they be expected to play a part if Paulinus was over in the east of the country?

My notion is that, at that stage, the extent of the revolt was not appreciated and Paulinus thought that, with the Fourteenth Legion and part of Cerialis' Ninth, he would be able to nip it in the bud. It was only after he learned of Cerialis' defeat and, perhaps, after reaching London and making a full appreciation of the situation that he decided to call up reinforcements and moved west to meet them. He may have augmented his basic force to some extent by picking up additional auxiliary troops on his way east.

(12-01-2015, 07:53 PM)Nathan Ross Wrote: We don't know enough about this to speculate, and Cerialis doesn't seem to play a decisive role in what follows. But I'd be surprised if a Roman commander with troops (I meant the cavalry, not the remainder of his legion) would march five or six days away from the enemy while his own chief was advancing in the opposite direction! Cerialis would have sent a tribune or a messenger to summon the rest of his men, I would think. But it doesn't matter too much.

The role of the Ninth after Cerialis' defeat is quite enigmatic. If he had met up with Paulinus and was ordered to bring his legion down, I agree that he would have sent a messenger with a summons to whoever was in charge to join the main force with all speed. That evidently did not happen or we would have known that it was involved in the final battle. Perhaps it still had a role as a blocking force to deter the northern tribes from travelling south to join the revolt, in which case Cerialis would, I think, have gone back to resume command of it.

An alternative scenario is that Paulinus learned of the fall of Colchester and Cerialis' defeat before reaching Mancetter, in which case he probably would have changed his plan and continued down Watling Street to London. In that event, I think that Cerialis would have gone back to the remainder of his legion. If then Paulinus ordered him to join him at the designated rallying point at Tring/Aldbury, he would have been one of the reinforcements that did not arrive in time.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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Nathan Ross wrote:


I don't think it means that he effectively fought three simultaneous battles in different places, which is what I suspect your plan of using different valleys would turn into.

We will have to differ on this point.

Nathan Ross wrote:
I'm increasingly convinced that Tacitus's 'defile' was a gap between hills, a pass or a saddle, ideally a through-route that the Romans could block. This would seem more likely than the idea of Paulinus wedging his troops into a closed valley with no easy route of retreat.

I think that is exactly what the scenario at Dunstable probably is so I am not convinced you have changed your opinion at all.  Smile

It doesn’t mean however that it doesn’t have its merits.

We do have to take Tacitus’ words into account that does imply that the site was “sheltered in the rear by a thick forest” or “closed in the rear by a forest”, unless this can be translated differently.

Dunstable of course had Watlng Street running through it........
 
Nathan Ross wrote:

However, I doubt the Britons would have divided their force at this point. Their advantage was in overwhelming numbers, and they would have wanted to bring all their available strength against the Roman front line, which was clearly visible right in front of them.

I think that we often forget the sheer size of the Brythonic force. Two hundred and thirty thousand people take up a huge amount of room and unless they are condensed and subsequently trapped as in the “defile and surrounding wagons scenario”, it is difficult to contain them.

In the Aldbury battle site scenario you describe, the whole site and the whole Roman Army could have been surrounded by Brythons 25 deep with only 140,000 warriors with the other 90,000 watching possibly.
 
Nathan Ross wrote:
They were not a trained army, but a collection of individuals from a warrior culture, who wanted to display their bravery.

I am not totally convinced of this.

From the writings of Caesar he had high regard for the Brythonic armies that were sent against him.

Also I find it hard to believe that these tribes were less able than the forces that had managed to keep the Roman armies occupied for 17 years.

Caesar remarks how adept the Brythons were at sending in groups of fighters, chariots or cavalry being thrown into battle, engaging and then being withdrawn to be replaced by other groups.

They were also used to fighting from behind barricades.

The methodology was different as the Brythons did not fight like the Roman Legion as a well drilled machine but without substantial cavalry support the Romans were unable to effect substantial victories.

Dio states that the fighting went on for a considerable period before the Romans were victorious.

It was the wagons in this case that were the difference which stopped the Brythons from escaping although 150,000 fled allegedly.

The Aldbury scenario does not allow for this as there are too many escape routes.
 
Nathan Ross wrote:
I've been thinking over this problem of crops and planting and so on. It's not as easy as it looks!
As far as I can work out, the usual timing is as follows:

October - plant winter crops
April - plant spring crops
July-August - harvest both winter and spring crops


As you know I have already investigated this and I agree that it is not as easy as it looks.

I am not of your opinion as it assumes that the Brythons would have planted Spring wheat rather than rely on the Winter wheat as even today 95% of wheat grown in the UK is Winter wheat.

Spring wheat is as far as I can ascertain planted in February or the latest March so it is likely that the Spring wheat would have already been planted before the uprising started.  

 Fig: A

.pdf   UK AGRICULTURE.pdf (Size: 122.15 KB / Downloads: 4)
 
I therefore think that it must have been the Winter wheat that was not planted.
Deryk
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(12-01-2015, 11:34 PM)Renatus Wrote: the distance is about 56 miles.  So, at 20 miles a day, a little under 3 days.

That would work fine then - if Cerialis was defeated around the 20th (using my hypothetical timeline!), he could have met Paulinus at Godmanchester on the 21st or 22nd, and Paulinus could still have reached London by the 26th, ahead of the Iceni.



(12-01-2015, 11:51 PM)Theoderic Wrote: the site was “sheltered in the rear by a thick forest” or “closed in the rear by a forest”, unless this can be translated differently.

Aha - you're right. 'Closed in the rear by a wood' (a tergo silva clausum). There probably was woodland behind the Dunstable site, but was it 'closed'? I like to think the point was that it would hinder attempts by the enemy to outflank the position.



(12-01-2015, 11:51 PM)Theoderic Wrote: the whole site and the whole Roman Army could have been surrounded by Brythons 25 deep with only 140,000 warriors

As you know, I don't believe there were anything like that number of warriors!



(12-01-2015, 11:51 PM)Theoderic Wrote: It was the wagons in this case that were the difference which stopped the Brythons from escaping

Wouldn't that affect your Tring site too? Plus there's always the idea of Britons fleeing instinctively to the wagon park to protect their families - the wagons perhaps don't actually have to seal off the plain...


(12-01-2015, 11:51 PM)Theoderic Wrote: Spring wheat is as far as I can ascertain planted in February or the latest March

It looks like you're using modern estimates. Mine are perhaps little better, but I was going on medieval ones, for which we have more information than for ancient practices, but which are perhaps close enough.

This site, for example, considers that the year's work did not begin until March 25th, with the spring crop being planted in April. While this guy in 1808 was still planting barley in Berwickshire until the middle of May!

I'm still very unsure about this issue, but Tacitus is quite definite that the problem was with planting (because the people had gone to war), not harvesting. Also that the rebels wanted to seize Roman grain.

So why would they plan on getting Roman grain, rather than planting their own, if both winter and spring crops would have been ready for harvest in late summer of 61? A winter crop planted in autumn 61 could not have been harvested before July 62, so unless we're postponing this famine period another 12 months (by which time Paulinus had been superceded) it surely can't have been the winter crop that was neglected?

(* there's always the possibility that the winter of 60-61 was particularly bad (perhaps it killed Prasutagus?...) and the Britons knew they were going to lose most of their winter crop. So their drive to rebellion may have been aided by the prospect of a hungry year, and the tempting granaries of Roman Britain...)
Nathan Ross
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Renatus wrote:


The role of the Ninth after Cerialis' defeat is quite enigmatic. If he had met up with Paulinus and was ordered to bring his legion down, I agree that he would have sent a messenger with a summons to whoever was in charge to join the main force with all speed. That evidently did not happen or we would have known that it was involved in the final battle. Perhaps it still had a role as a blocking force to deter the northern tribes from travelling south to join the revolt, in which case Cerialis would, I think, have gone back to resume command of it.

Tacitus has Boudica state that Cerialis after his defeat was penned up in a fort rather than had escaped back to his Legion. 

For such an important figure (dashing cavalry leader and future Governor of Britannia) not to be mentioned again in any of the documentation would imply that he was trapped and played no further part in the events leading up to the battle.   

St Albans is I believe pivotal as it was the last official Roman municipium and ts ctzens had to be protected. It is also strategically important as it links North to Wroxeter, South to London, East to Braughing and Colchester and West to Alchester and possibly Cookham and Silchester with its road networks.

It always had been strategically important as the seat of Cataulellauni power next door to Wheathampstead.
 
Nathan Ross wrote:

As you know, I don't believe there were anything like that number of warriors!

Even if there were only half the numbers Aldbury would have been surrounded…

Nathan Ross wrote:
Wouldn't that affect your Tring site too? 

Not really because the scenario that I use is a slow build up of tribes congregating and camping below Chivery top however if 150,000 people escaped none of the sites was escape proof.

Nathan Ross wrote:

So why would they plan on getting Roman grain, rather than planting their own, if both winter and spring crops would have been ready for harvest in late summer of 61? A winter crop planted in autumn 61 could not have been harvested before July 62, so unless we're postponing this famine period another 12 months (by which time Paulinus had been superceded) it surely can't have been the winter crop that was neglected?

I am not so sure.

The passage seems to be reflective, a lookback on what happened in later proceedings:

 “….whatever tribes still wavered or were hostile were ravaged with fire and sword”……. then “nothing however distressed the enemy as much as famine, for they had been careless about sowing corn, people of every age having gone to war….”

Tacitus was very supportive of the attacking military and had little time for appeasers such as the new Procurator who had tried to have Paulinus removed because he continued to carry on with the campaign and kill the tribes that had rebelled.

My thought is that Tacitus was saying in Paulinus defence that although his regime was harsh the Brythons suffered far more from a famine which they had brought upon themselves in the first place after he had been replaced.

In other words Paulinus’ Governorship was not as disastrous as some were making out.

Of course you would have thought that the granaries at Colchester would have been looted as everyone retreated to the Temple and possibly had no time to destroy the foodstocks. London and St Albans food stocks on the other hand were probably destroyed or removed by the Roman Army.  


Deryk
Deryk
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(12-02-2015, 01:05 PM)Theoderic Wrote: Cerialis after his defeat was penned up in a fort rather than had escaped back to his Legion.

Ceralis flees to 'the camp' after the battle (Cerialis cum equitibus evasit in castra et munimentis defensus est) and Boudica later says that "a legion which dared to fight has perished; the rest are hiding themselves in their camp" (cecidisse legionem, quae proelium ausa sit; ceteros castris occultari). The word casta could refer either to a marching camp or to a legion fort, I think. Or both - in the first case, perhaps, Cerialis escapes to his marching camp, but the second reference is to the remains of the Ninth legion back at Longthorpe. I don't think there's any way we can know though... As you say, he quite probably wasn't present at the final battle.


(12-02-2015, 01:05 PM)Theoderic Wrote: Even if there were only half the numbers Aldbury would have been surrounded…

I'd give them a lot less than half. Dio's figures are notoriously exaggerated (as with my most Roman historians!) - remember that he claimed 50,000 Roman soldiers died during Severus's campaign in north Britain, and without fighting a single major battle!

If we take Dio's figure as the total of the British host (although how anyone was supposed to calculate it I don't know!), then a quarter to a fifth of them could be warriors - fifty-sixty thousand. That in itself is a huge army.



(12-02-2015, 01:05 PM)Theoderic Wrote: although his regime was harsh the Brythons suffered far more from a famine which they had brought upon themselves

Yes, that sounds right. 'It was their own fault' sort of thing. And the 'ravaging with fire' could cover the destruction of crops in the fields (in which case Tacitus is being doubly disingenuous!).
Nathan Ross
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(12-01-2015, 11:24 PM)John1 Wrote: Thanks, that's big of you. 

Don't mention it. That's me all over - conciliatory to a fault.

(12-02-2015, 01:05 PM)Theoderic Wrote: Tacitus has Boudica state that Cerialis after his defeat was penned up in a fort rather than had escaped back to his Legion. 

For such an important figure (dashing cavalry leader and future Governor of Britannia) not to be mentioned again in any of the documentation would imply that he was trapped and played no further part in the events leading up to the battle.   

Nathan has already given some of the Latin but there is a little more. I will recap slightly on what he quoted:

ceteros castris occultari aut frugam circumspicere

'the rest were skulking in their camps, or looking around them for a way of escape' (Loeb translation)

It seems clear from the context that ceteros does not refer simply to Cerialis or the remnants of his legion but to the Roman forces as a whole. It is rhetorical, of course, but that is to be expected in a pre-battle speech. Castrum is unusual in that, in the singular it means 'a fortified place' but in the plural it means 'a military camp'; in other words, it is plural in form but singular in meaning. However, there must be occasions when the writer wants to refer to 'camps' in the plural, so presumably the plural form has to be used and actually mean the plural. In that event, the reader is expected to get the meaning from the context. I would assume that that is why the Loeb translator renders castris as 'camps'.

It seems evident that Cerialis did not take part in the final battle but it is unlikely that this means that he was trapped and unable to get back to his legion.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
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I've been thinking over Deryk's idea about the crop planting and seasons. I'm starting to wonder whether we're completely out on the dates of the revolt and the final battle.

Tacitus says the revolt happened in AD61 (Annals 14.29). The Britons neglected their planting at that time to go off to war, thinking they would take Roman supplies (14.38).

They could only have thought this at the beginning of the revolt; after the defeat of Boudica there would be no possibility of taking Roman grain. So the revolt must have started around one of the two sowing seasons.

This could have been in the spring of AD61, as I've been assuming - but if so the winter crop would still be available for harvest in late summer, so no famine.

So - what if the revolt started in the autumn of AD60 instead?

Dio (62.7) and Tacitus (Agricola 2.15) just say that the legate was away at the time - so Paulinus could have been in the process of concluding his years' campaign in Wales with the conquest of Mona. This would be around September.

Winter crops would be sown in October, so the revolt was already underway by then.

Paulinus, having already completed his Mona operation when he hears of the revolt (Dio 62.8), marches from Mona in October, gets to London, and falls back somewhere. Dio says he was 'inclined to postpone battle to a more convenient season', which would make sense if this was the brink of winter. It might also explain why he was growing short of food.

The final battle would therefore happen in November of AD60.

Tacitus says immediately afterwards (14.38) that Paulinus 'kept the whole army under canvas to finish the remainder of the war' - which would be appropriate if it was now winter.

The reinforcements from Germany, together with the new procurator Classicianus and later the freedman Polyclitus, would therefore turn up in the spring and summer of AD61. Paulinus would have spent the winter conducting punitive operations against rebels (Agricola 2.16 - many 'still clung to their arms' after the final battle), and these would continue into the following year. Somewhere over the winter, Boudica died.

Classicianus reported that 'no cessation of fighting must be expected' (Annals 14.38) - so this post-battle stage of the war could have lasted six months or more.

At some point in the second half of AD61, then, with the Iceni facing famine as they had not sown their crops the year before, Paulinus was ordered to hand over to Turpilianus, 'who had just resigned his consulship' (Annals 14.39: he was ordinary consul for the first 6 months of that year).

Turpilianus took over the army 'as though the war continued' - which suggests that it was actually over by the late summer. The rebels were perhaps too depressed by impending famine to continue the fight!

All this does seem to explain the crop business quite well, although it means disregarding Tacitus's statement that the revolt itself happened in 61.

It also means that we could be looking for a battle fought in late autumn or winter, rather than summer...

(Dudley and Webster, in 1962, suggested that the revolt broke out in spring AD60 and was over by the summer of that year - I'm glad I'm still not entirely agreeing with them here!)
Nathan Ross
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Nathan Ross wrote:

They could only have thought this at the beginning of the revolt; after the defeat of Boudica there would be no possibility of taking Roman grain. So the revolt must have started around one of the two sowing seasons.

So - what if the revolt started in the autumn of AD60 instead?

Now there's an idea!!!  Maybe even a stroke of genius  Idea

It would indicate that the invasion of Mona was the last part of the AD60 campaign as Nathan says but it is certainly possible and many things do fall into place regarding the follow up including "keeping the army under canvass" rather than into winter quarters.

It does explain the famine and also it makes some sense of the statement "The allied infantry and cavalry were placed in new winter quarters" which may refer to new forts being built in the Trinovantes and Iceni homelands which is archeologically supported.

It also gives time for the continuing war to play out as Nathan says.

It is certainly worth investigating further.

Nathan Ross wrote:

All this does seem to explain the crop business quite well, although it means disregarding Tacitus's statement that the revolt itself happened in 61.


So can Tacitus' statement be disproved at all?

Deryk

     
Deryk
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(12-02-2015, 11:26 PM)Theoderic Wrote: So can Tacitus' statement be disproved at all?    

One of Dudley and Webster's original objections was that Tacitus often conflates the events of several years. But he does seem particularly emphatic here. He could just have made a mistake, of course...

If the revolt was in October or so, it's quite likely that Paulinus had wrapped up his operations in Wales and perhaps even had his troops on the road back to winter camp (at Wroxeter?) by the time he heard of it. That allows him much more time to get to London, perhaps via an attempted march on Colchester first.

If the battle was in autumn or winter, it means that all streams and rivers are going to be flowing much stronger than in most of our estimates so far.

It also means that many of the rebels fleeing the battle may have died of cold and hunger, increasing the death toll.

It also changes the look of the battlefield, of course. From thick foliage, long grass and sun to bare trees, rain and mud...
Nathan Ross
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