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Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.
(05-22-2020, 09:07 PM)John1 Wrote: Was taking a ferry over the full 220m of the Menai Straight really worthy of commentary in Dio?... Was the Roman Navy really so poor?...Would the Mona action have taken place without Naval support?... Would the occupiers of Britain not have recce'd the island enough to run through the Irish sea basin (crewed by locals)?

Dio is unlikely to have had much idea of the width of the strait - he just knew Mona was an island, and so assumed that P would need to sail back to 'Britain' (as he says). In fact, as P believed at that point that the rebellion was threatening Colchester, there would have been even less reason for him to sail to London...

The Roman Navy was indeed very poor at long distance navigation in relatively unknown waters. We remember Paulinus lost several ships the following year, in what were presumably more regular circumstances. Seriously, nobody travelled by ship if they could travel by land - and the straightest route between Anglesey and London/Colchester is overland. And for a governor and general to be separated from his troops for an unforeseeable period at a time of war would be unthinkable.

As for whether Paulinus had a fleet of some kind with him, interestingly enough Tacitus's account of Agricola's operation might obliquely suggest he did: "[Agricola] formed the design of subjugating the island of Mona, from the occupation of which Paullinus had been recalled, as I have already related, by the rebellion of the entire province. But, as his plans were not matured, he had no fleet." This might imply that Paulinus, who had presumably 'matured' his plans longer, being a plans kind of guy, did have ships.

And in fact Agricola "delivered so unexpected an attack that the astonished enemy who were looking for a fleet, a naval armament, and an assault by sea, thought that to such assailants nothing could be formidable or invincible." - this too implies that those same enemies had previously seen the Romans (under Paulinus) attacking with ships.

However, one would not need a great navy to cross 220m of water, and a 'fleet' of landing barges or even rafts would be more useful for transporting troops. My guess would be that Paulinus brought such craft overland or along the north coast of Wales in preparation for his attack, rather than chancing sending a fleet all the way around Cornwall and up the Irish Sea.


(05-22-2020, 09:07 PM)John1 Wrote: Getting on a boat then marching through enemy country could well be seen as the wonderful resolution couldn't it?

Um, no.


(05-22-2020, 09:07 PM)John1 Wrote: Are you reverting to Literalist Paradista?

Not unless you consider Roman troops marching down a road to be a 'parade' now!

The only people suggesting parades are those who want Boudica and her army to go marching off up Watling Street for days on end, just to fight a battle with a prepared Roman army.

Frankly, this nonsense about boating trips is just underlining how untenable the whole 'recon expedition' idea (and the associated notion of a Midlands battle site) is looking now! [Image: wink.png]


(05-22-2020, 10:41 PM)Renatus Wrote: We did consider Dio's reference to Paulinus taking ship back in October 2012.

Thanks - I knew we'd mentioned it before but couldn't face combing back through the thread!
Nathan Ross
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October 2012 seems to have been a bit of a thread hiatus for me so I have enjoyed a partial catch up on that stuff. However I have not seen anything definitive enough for me to ignore the Ingram/Evans theory. For me it can stay on the table as a viable route to test although I doubt we will ever know his route nor will it point us to the battlefield site. It does serve to provide an alternative to the Cavalry dash and lots of marching equations making that search methodology a bit less credible in my view.

Sorry, we have different process and priorities of interpretation,  I am content with that.
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John1 Wrote:680 mile sail to London ????

6 knots = 7 mph = 4 days sailing to London?

But only if they sailed 24 hours a day. Sailing at night while hugging the coast, as they probably would have done, would be extraordinarily dangerous. It is more likely that they would have beached the boat(s) or found a sheltered anchorage overnight. Assuming that your distances and speeds are correct, this means that a voyage at the time of the summer solstice (16 hours of daylight) would have taken a minimum of 6 days and, at the time of the equinox, a minimum of 8 days. Let's split the difference and say that the voyage would have taken about a week, on your figures shorter than a legion marching but longer than a cavalry dash.

We therefore have three options:

1.  Paulinus proceeds to London with his army. This is the slowest method but means that he is in constant communication with his troops and can react immediately to any situation that might arise. Also, if on arrival in London he finds that the rebels are fewer in number than anticipated, he could give battle immediately. Scouts can ride ahead of the army to report on any problems that might be encountered.

2. Cavalry dash. This gets him to London quicker but with few troops. Some of his men can scout ahead and look for signs of danger and, if he finds his way blocked, he can return to his army. On the other hand, he is vulnerable to ambush or to the enemy getting behind him and barring him from his army. In that event, he might be able to extricate himself but it is more likely that he would be trapped and his small party wiped out. This would leave his army and the province leaderless until one of the legionary legates is able to pick up the reins. He is in tenuous contact with his army, so that, if it encountered unexpected difficulties, a dispatch rider could be sent down to fetch him back. How long this might take would depend on the relative speeds of the two and the availability of remounts.

3.  Sea voyage. He is personally safe from the enemy until such time as he chooses to leave London to rejoin his army but this separates him entirely from his troops. There is no way to maintain contact, no one will know precisely where he is at any given time and he will not know how his army has fared until he reaches London at the earliest. Likewise, he will not know what awaits him in London until he gets there.

Which of these options is a cautious general who likes to leave nothing to chance most likely to choose?
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
6 days is fine, same ballpark. I think we have these three scenarios and that's about as far as we can really go, it is a debate between the three and we cannot know which option was taken, only have preferences/opinions.

I don't think it matters in finding the battle site too much, other than to make the marching maths less deterministic than some proposers have implied in the past.

Maybe the sailing option gave a better chance to test the intelligence about the spread of the revolt. Reports from naval patrols off Sussex, Essex and Kent would be a good/ safe way to test the geography of the revolt, as might passing the traffic at Dubris. THat actually seems a pretty cautious way to approach the front whilst gathering intell.

I swear I can hear Nathan banging his head on his desk from here.
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(05-23-2020, 05:09 PM)John1 Wrote: I swear I can hear Nathan banging his head on his desk from here.

You can indeed.

But I suppose we're all stuck at home with little to do, so we may as well indulge this absurdity a little further...


(05-23-2020, 04:17 PM)Renatus Wrote: But only if they sailed 24 hours a day.

And also if they sailed at a constant speed. The Speed of Ancient Sailing Ships was highly variable, of course - 4.5 to 6 knots was the best possible in open water with favourable winds. Casson revises this to '3 to 4 knots while working through islands or along coasts', which would fit the kind of voyage we're considering here. With unfavourable winds the speed could drop to 1.5 knots, or even less.

Assuming that Paulinus had favourable winds, from the north-east for example, carrying him quickly down the Irish sea he could make the journey to the Cornish coast in a couple of days. But he would then need to navigate the capes of Land's End, whereupon he would find the winds set against him, and would be forced to make the voyage along the south coast under oars. Or vice versa, of course. This would not only be a blistering voyage, but a very slow one.

The account of Rutilius Namatianus gives us some idea of the speed of coastal voyaging - even along, in this case, the well known and relatively safe Italian coast. Namatianus covers at average 36 miles per day between harbours or putting ashore for the night (at that same speed, it would take Paulinus about 20 days to reach London). He also attests to the difficulty of having to row and tack around headlands and islands - he takes an entire day getting around Monte Argentario, for example. Paulinus would have the same difficulties with Land's End and probably the cape of Pembroke as well.

Plus, of course, he would have no idea how safe his landing places might be. How would the locals react to a sudden seaborne arrival by total strangers? Paulinus might be in danger of ending up dead "in fulfillment of some religious ritual demanded by the druids..."!

Assuming he avoided beheading or being stuck in a wicker man, or baked in a pasty, or whatever fate lay in store for unannounced callers in iron age west Wales and Cornwall, and assuming the winds were in his favour at least half of the voyage, and assuming he avoided storms, getting wrecked on the shore, getting blown far out to sea or just plain getting lost, he could still expect to take at least ten days* to claw his way around the coast and up the Thames to London. Only to arrive exhausted, with a handful of men and no idea where his army was or what was going on.

Alternatively, he could have marched with his whole force from Anglesey down to London in only three or four days more. Which is exactly what Tacitus tells he did... Or are we assuming that Tacitus somehow failed to mention this epic daredevil seagoing adventure, and then pretended later for some reason that Paulinus was a risk-adverse type guy who would never do such a thing?

*EDIT - even an open-sea voyage of 680 miles, at an average speed of 3.5 knots (4mph) with 16 sailing hours a day would take 10.6 days.


(05-23-2020, 04:17 PM)Renatus Wrote: Which of these options is a cautious general who likes to leave nothing to chance most likely to choose?

A rhetorical question, of course! [Image: tongue.png]
Nathan Ross
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Nathan Ross Wrote:But it is fascinating to track the evolution of an historical factoid (the idea that Suetonius Paulinus went on a 'hell for leather' recon expedition to London, then rejoined his troops in the Midlands):

Initially suggested by Francis Haverfield c.1900, mentioned in print by Charles Oman in 1910, developed by Donald Dudley and Graham Webster in 1962, further developed (along with the Mancetter site) by Webster alone in 1978, popularised on TV by Michael Wood in 1980 and by Peter Snow in 2004, and subsequently adopted as fact by any number of enthusiasts and historians, including the majority of those commenting on the subject to this day...

I haven't been able to identify anything on the subject by Haverfield before his entry in the 1911 Encyclopaedia Britannica (see below) but Oman in his 1910 'A History of England before the Norman Conquest' certainly refers to Haverfield's opinions as if there was something earlier. In his EB article, Haverfield states that 'Paulinus rushed back without waiting for his troops, but he could do nothing alone.' I was amused by his comment, in relation to the final battle taking place in London, that 'King's Cross had once a narrow escape of being christened Boadicea's Cross'. The article is here: https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/1911_Ency...a/Boadicea
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
(05-29-2020, 08:13 PM)Renatus Wrote: ...anything on the subject by Haverfield before his entry in the 1911 Encyclopaedia Britannica (see below) but Oman in his 1910 'A History of England before the Norman Conquest' certainly refers to Haverfield's opinions as if there was something earlier...

Thanks for the link! I'd come across the 1910 Oman note, and assumed as you did that it relates to something previously published by Haverfield; an (undated?) reference by RG Collingwood also seems to support Haverfield as the originator of the idea. Haverfield's publications and collections of papers stretch back into the late 19th Century, and quite possibly one or another of them contains the origin. Alternatively, I suppose Oman might just have picked it up in conversation!
Nathan Ross
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Haverfield gave the Ford Lectures at Oxford in 1907 on the subject of 'The Roman Occupation of Britain'. These were published in revised and expanded form, as Haverfield intended, in 1924 under the editorship of George Macdonald. The expansions were generally taken from Haverfield's other writings. The second lecture, entitled 'The Geography of Britain and the Roman Conquest', included an account of the Boudican revolt.

In this account, Haverfield deals with Paulinus' journey to London but does not mention cavalry. He simply says, 'Hurrying on ahead of the main body, he reached London.' He goes on, 'Finding that he could not hope to hold the town with practically no troops, he abandoned it to its fate.' After mentioning the fall of the municipium at St. Albans, he adds, 'Meanwhile the Roman commander had fallen back on his main body.' It is presumably from this that it is inferred that Paulinus did not travel alone but was accompanied by his cavalry. Haverfield places the final battle, ' . . . perhaps in the southern midlands, certainly on or near the line of Watling Street'. A footnote indicates that this comes from a letter that Haverfield wrote to The Antiquary in 1914.

Worryingly, Haverfield states that, when the emergency arose, Paulinus 'had at his disposal the Fourteenth Legion, a portion of the Twentieth, and some auxiliaries'. This conforms to Tacitus' account of the Roman troops at the final battle but Haverfield goes on, ' - probably the better part of twenty thousand men', twice the number given by Tacitus. When a scholar, even one as distinguished as Haverfield, shows such disregard for his source material as this, one has to wonder to what extent he can safely be relied upon.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
(06-05-2020, 04:29 PM)Renatus Wrote: Haverfield gave the Ford Lectures at Oxford in 1907

Thanks again! Ive been trying (albeit in a rather lackadaisical fashion) to determine the original source of Haverfield's comment for ages.

You seem to be right about Haverfield's rather hazy details. Meanwhile, it seems that it was perhaps RG Collingwood himself who expanded the idea into the full 'cavalry dash'. In his 1936 work Roman Britain and the English Settlements he tells the whole story, complete with dramatic flourishes: Paulinus "rode for London at full speed with his cavalry" before rejoining his main force "somewhere in the midland forests"...

Collingwood also repeats the note about the troops "at his disposal", although he gets the number right at least. Why he believes Paulinus would have left the bulk of the 20th Legion 'building roads' when there was a major military campaign in progress is unknown; likewise whatever he thinks had happened to the rest of the 9th!
Nathan Ross
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Collingwood is another who plays fast and loose with Tacitus. Compare his account of the final battle with that given by Tacitus. He also advances the ludicrous suggestion that, after defeating Cerialis, Boudica chased him all the way to Lincoln.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
I thought that it might be worth accessing Haverfield’s 1914 letter to The Antiquary as this probably summarises his definitive view of the revolt. It is in Vol. 50 of the journal on pp. 439-440, under the title ‘The Battle between Boadicea and Suetonius’. Unfortunately, it is only available in snippet view in Google Books. However, I have found four snippets which probably cover most of the ground. The first is the beginning of the letter and the others, which join together, are the end of it, the last being followed by Haverfield’s name. There is a gap of uncertain length between the first and the second snippets and some of the wording is indistinct, so it may be worth getting a decent copy of it, once the libraries reopen, to clarify any uncertainties. My reading of what I have found is as follows:

‘In your September number, a reviewer of Messrs. Foord and Gordon’s [sic, the authors are Edward Foord and Gordon Home] England Invaded (London, 1913) discusses the Roman conquest of Britain, and credits me with the “assumption that Suetonius retired on Deva” before he fought with Boadicea.  . . . should like to say that I do not think that I have ever made the assumption in question, though others have. What I have said about the campaign of Suetonius is this in brief: The narrative of Tacitus shows clearly that: i. when the revolt of Boadicea broke out in East Anglia Suetonius was fighting in or near Anglesea with a force not precisely described, but certainly comprising the better part of the 20,000 men then stationed in or near Chester: ii. that he at once posted to the scene of the revolt, moving – very naturally – faster than the main body and reached London with practically no troops: and iii. that he then fell back on his main body, and fought the battle. So far Tacitus. The line of the Roman roads enables us to add that, coming from Anglesea, he must have marched along Watling Street, and his troops must have come up behind him along the same line. The fight must then have taken place somewhere along Watling Street, or near it. It is even possible that it was near Chester, though it is not likely. I prefer my own suggestion, that it was in the southern Midlands. It cannot possibly have been in Surrey, as your reviewer urges, because Suetonius cannot have gone there to meet the troops whom Tacitus says he did meet. Your reviewer does not seem to have grasped either what Tacitus says, or – what matters less – what I have said.’

The ‘southern’ in ‘southern Midlands’ is indistinct but, as it occurs in the publication of the Ford Lectures and that cites the letter, I assume it to be correct. The letter raises a number of questions. Where did Haverfield get the idea that 20,000 men were stationed ‘in or near Chester’ and that these ‘certainly’ comprised the greater part of the force assaulting Anglesey? Presumably, it was the belief in this force that allowed him to disregard the figure mentioned by Tacitus, despite chiding the reviewer for having failed to grasp what Tacitus says. Likewise, the only thing that Tacitus ‘shows clearly’ is that Suetonius was campaigning in the Anglesey area when the uprising broke out. The rest is speculation.

Haverfield may be being unfair to the reviewer in criticising the suggestion that the battle took place in Surrey. The review is also in Vol. 50 of The Antiquary, beginning on p.358, but I cannot access it. It may be worth getting a copy of this too, when the libraries reopen. However, the reviewer may simply have been echoing the book. England Invaded was reprinted in 2014 and is previewed in Google Books. Some pages will be missing but those relating to the Boudican revolt are complete. The authors base their account on another (although probably equally flawed) interpretation of Tacitus. Of Suetonius’ journey to London, they say, ‘There is really no reason to believe, as has been suggested, that he had outpaced his army and had only his escort with him’. I don’t think that any of us would dissent from that, although we would probably disagree with their other assertion that he had his whole force of 10,000 men with him at that time. They suggest, for reasons that I will let you look up for yourselves, that his only major source of reinforcements was the Second Legion and its auxiliaries in the west and that, therefore, he crossed the Thames and withdrew towards Silchester along the route Banstead, Epsom Downs, Headley, Ranmore and Guildford (a rather eccentric way of getting to Silchester, in my opinion). The battle, in their view, took place somewhere on that line.

It will come as no surprise if I say that I do not think much of either Haverfield’s or Foord and Home’s theories.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
(06-08-2020, 08:20 PM)Renatus Wrote: ‘The narrative of Tacitus shows clearly that: i. when the revolt of Boadicea broke out in East Anglia Suetonius was fighting in or near Anglesea... that he at once posted to the scene of the revolt, moving – very naturally – faster than the main body... Your reviewer does not seem to have grasped either what Tacitus says, or – what matters less – what I have said.’

Yes, amazing that he should criticise somebody for not 'grasping' details that he seems to have almost entirely invented! Plaudits for your Googling powers in assembling the quote though.


(06-08-2020, 08:20 PM)Renatus Wrote: Likewise, the only thing that Tacitus ‘shows clearly’ is that Suetonius was campaigning in the Anglesey area when the uprising broke out. The rest is speculation.

Or even that he was campaigning there at the time the uprising was being planned - Dio says he had 'already brought Mona to terms' by the time he got wind of what was happening. Quite possibly - as I think you've suggested yourself up the thread somewhere - the operations had been concluded and Paulinus was back in Wroxeter or even on his way to London on routine business by then.

But so many of these inventions about Paulinus's actions seem to relate to a simple inability to accept that Tacitus's account groups events by location or incident rather than narrating them in strict chronology.


(06-08-2020, 08:20 PM)Renatus Wrote: ...he crossed the Thames and withdrew towards Silchester... The battle, in their view, took place somewhere on that line.

Interesting - I wonder if that was a suggestion floating around generally at the time, or if they came up with it? Shipway sets his battle on the road to Silchester, of course - perhaps this was where he got the idea?
Nathan Ross
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Thanks for all this new stuff, much appreciated. In terms of the "South Midlands" His understanding must surely be Northamptonshire, Warkwickshire or Leicestershire. Unfortunately leaving Mancetter to Cuttle Mill in his frame.

   

I wonder how much this influenced Shepherd Frere when in Brittania he suggested "a site North West of Towcester"
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Nathan Ross Wrote:Quite possibly - as I think you've suggested yourself up the thread somewhere - the operations had been concluded and Paulinus was back in Wroxeter or even on his way to London on routine business by then.

I think that this must be the post you have in mind. Point 2 is the relevant one: #660

Nathan Ross Wrote:I wonder if that was a suggestion floating around generally at the time, or if they came up with it?

What they say is:

'Conjecture has been busy with the direction of Paulinus's march. The old view was that he moved on Camulodunum; the more modern one, followed by most recent writers, is that he retreated on Deva to rally its garrison. Neither, however, commends itself to the authors.'

So it looks like their idea.

John1 Wrote:In terms of the "South Midlands" His understanding must surely be Northamptonshire, Warkwickshire or Leicestershire. Unfortunately leaving Mancetter to Cuttle Mill in his frame.

Bearing in mind the line of Watling Street, I would suggest that his 'southern Midlands' would be North Beds., North Bucks., South Northants. and East Warwicks. He would probably have regarded Birmingham as firmly in the Midlands, which means that Mancetter would be too far north.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
Renatus,

Thank you for your digital sleuthing on Haverfield and Foord together with Home.

Made my week to read of others thinking that Paulinus marched westwards from London.

Slowly the compass turns - to Ogbourne St. George, still my favourite, prospective battle site.

Regards, Steve Kaye
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