Spartan Mora regiments at Battle of Plataea

[Ghostmojo]

Ghostmojo/Howard wrote:

On another subject though, I am not certain, however, Herodotos forgot about the Perioikoi at Thermopylai (as I have said elsewhere on this forum). I'm not convinced they were there in the first place. Leonidas was able to take his personal bodyguard with him as an advance force. He was not able to mobilise the whole army - nor did he have the power to do so. I take that as being an inability to mobilise the Perioikoi as well - unless he merely picked up volunteers along his march (which seems unlikely to me). The Spartan state decided on mobilisation of its citizenry and upon those who were foresworn to follow - i.e. the Lakonian dwellers around, some of whom were yeomanry hoplites like much of the rest of central and southern Greece. Why would they necessarily follow without being forced to by their Spartan masters (unless seized by some panhellenic spirit)? Surely that missing 1000 could be accounted for elsewhere and especially with Diodorus not being entirely reliable. If the Perioikoi had been persuaded, I think a matching figure of 300 might have been more likely - like for like as at Plataia? Is it not also possible approximately 1000 men came from no especially definable origins - just various smaller places within the Peloponnese, and possibly elsewhere, en route to the pass?

....this seems like an attractive idea at first sight, but alas, there are a number of major objections to it. Firstly the 'Constitution' tells us that the King's power was paramount in war, so he had the power to mobilise as many as he thought necessary... and that this was so at this time is proven by Diodorus' anecdote:

Leonidas, when he received the appointment, announced that only one thousand men should follow him on the campaign. And when the ephors said that he was leading altogether too few soldiers against a great force and ordered him to take along a larger number, he replied to them in secret, ....... There were, then, of the Lacedaemonians one thousand, and with them three hundred Spartiates, while the rest of the Greeks( actually Peloponnesians) who were dispatched with them to Thermopylae were three thousand.

Leonidas, then, with four thousand soldiers advanced to Thermopylae. The Locrians, however, who dwelt in the neighbourhood of the passes had already given earth and water to the Persians, and had promised that they would seize the passes in advance; but when they learned that Leonidas had arrived at Thermopylae, they changed their minds and went over to the Greeks. And there gathered at Thermopylae also a thousand Locrians, an equal number of Melians/Malians, and almost a thousand Phocians, as well as some four hundred Thebans of the other party; for the inhabitants of Thebes were divided against each other with respect to the alliance with the Persians. Now the Greeks who were drawn up with Leonidas for battle, being as many in number as we have set forth, tarried in Thermopylae, awaiting the arrival of the Persians.

[translation courtesy Lacus Curtius site]
.....thus Herodotus' missing thousand are almost certainly these 'perioikoi', and it should be noted that the Lakedaemonian Kings had more power over the 'perioikoi' than over Spartans....in a very real sense they were "King's men".
The unknown ( probably Ephorus) source drawn on by Justin, Diodorus and Trogus preserves accurate detail in parts, more than Herodotus who drew largely on Athenian sources, and so is reliable here, especially as it accords in numbers ( 4,000) with the epigram recorded by Herodotus ........

But is Diodoros more reliable than Herodotos? H not only drew upon Athenian sources but also directly upon Spartan - one of whom he categorically lists as a source: a certain Arkhias (a leading aristocrat) who he actually met in Sparta itself. It is of course possible he neglected to mention the Perioikoi but unlikely, as he goes into such detail about contributors to the army elsewhere. Regarding the assembling of the force at Sparta, the occurence of the Karneia has to be added as a context to this since the whole army was forbidden to march until after that festival - plus the Olympic games were also affecting other Greek states' ability to send troops. Leonidas' secret response (according to D) about the 300/1000(?) to the ephors was that 'they were indeed too few to prevent the barbarians getting through the passes, but that they were very many for the deed that they were setting out to do' - which is of course intended to suggest he knew he wasn't returning and believed the oracle (also consider his parting words to Gorgo); although some of this could have been embroidered after the event to suit what happened.

Regarding the King's paramount power in war - some observers suggest during the period of the Persian Wars the king lost the right to declare war (although clearly this may well have been after Thermopylai) and more and more their executive power was shared with the Ephorate (even regarding foreign policy and 'overseer' campaign advice). A clear distinction had long been drawn between the kings power in war and in peace - at home and on the field of battle. They certainly exercised greater power outside the borders of Lakedaimon - but once back inside could be called to account and even trial based upon their foreign activities. Very few kings ever rose to anything we would recognise as autocratic monarchical preeminence - save the pretensions of Agesilaos II and revolution of Kleomenes III. However, their powers are remarkably like certain functionaries of Rome with power over life and death in the battle arena - but severe curtailments within Sparta. I seem to recall that the Spartan assembly (ekkleisia or apella) was at least involved in the decision that Kleombrotos I should embark upon his fateful campaign against Thebes in 371 [size=85:2ryhlavo]BC[/size]. Both Thoukydides and Xenophon suggest the regular function of the assembly in the decisions about warmaking (although Agis II's departure for Mantinea in 418 [size=85:2ryhlavo]BC[/size] seems to have been news to them) and of course the army age-group call-up was the prerogative of the Ephors. There is also the business of King Pausanias having to persuade three Ephors to let him take a Spartan force to Athens, and even the army that marched on Athens in 510 BC was sent by the city under its chosen commander (Kleomenes I).

Whilst not enjoying the virtual absolute power and authority of another Greek basileios like Alexander III or Pyrrhos I - the Spartan kings were clearly more than Aristotle's hereditary generals. Like the Makedonian and Epeirote monarchs, they possessed charisma and of course were more specifically not only of devine descent - but actual high priests themselves with direct connections with Delphi. Leonidas I must have had some conflicting emotions as he considered the various roles alloted to him. Cartledge at least believes Herodotos' assertions that the king could make war on whoever he chose to be false. The constitutional adjustments following fiasco of Kleomenes I and Demaratos in Attika in 506 [size=85:2ryhlavo]BC[/size] surely bear that out. The decision to make war surely would have had to have been agreed by both kings sitting within the Gerousia, and alongside the Ephors? I think Agesilaos II was the first king to be allowed the distinction of commanding both army and navy - the latter previously prescribed to an appointed Navarch.