10-08-2011, 07:44 PM
Of course the "relief system" question is critical to any discussion on Roman Battle formations and tactics, so I guess that my answering to Crispvs here is not off topic.
To Crispus (to continue the discussion started in the Whistle thread):
Of course Crispvs, I'd be glad to comment on your model.
The suggested retreat of the front lines through gaps in the second (assistant) line is not limited to the Romans of the 3rd century BC. It was commonplace throughout the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) era too (I know I speak too much of these manuals, but I truly think that their study is critical to any such discussion. Of course, I also mean the works of Aelian, Arrian, Onasander and Asclepiodotus too). How something like that could work is illustrated in these manuals and we have no reason absolutely to believe that the mechanics they present were that different. This serving as an argument that such maneuvers were possible, what is interesting in the Polybian Roman army is that whenever we have the first line suffering in battle we instead see the second line RUSHING to its support instead of the first line retreating as is theoretically (but not practically in battle) described by Polybius. If one studies the descriptions even more carefully, one would see that there is even evidence of (my theory) selective support where it was needed instead of exchanging the whole line (again Zama). This is very interesting, because it is the logical thing to do, the easiest thing to do and the thing least supported by scholars preferring lines exchanging either with a front movement of the second line or with the Polybius supported retreat of the first line through the second to the rear. On the other hand, this seems to be the Greek way of support, so it is always possible that Polybius describes what he thinks happened instead of what actually happened.
If I remember well, in Caesar's work multiple lines are often mentioned. Livy I do not trust at all. His descriptions remind me of later eras, not of the 3rd century BC. If I recall well, he often talks about whole legions in reserve or lined behind each other which resembles Caesar's descriptions but are very far from what Polybius suggests and what is generally accepted as the traditional formation of the 3rd century, that is that ALL legions arrayed next to each other, each one providing both the fighting line and its support.
Not just the front two. They supposedly would also be able to exchange places with the Triarii too. The rest I of course agree with.
We know that when Caesar talks of subsequent lines, he always gives different cohorts forming them. That is, cohorts x, y and z would form the first line, a, b and c the second line etc. That means that each cohort was viewed to be part of its line. In your model, you have each cohort forming two "lines" by having them separated and arrayed as separate units which demands a good interval between them. The reason is that in battle, a part of a line may advance or retreat (what Polybius describes as "snakelike"). If a unit is too close to the advanced unit then they run the risk to get mixed up and lose order. If you want the "posterior maniple" to be linked with the one in front, you should array them in the same (open or close) order, in normal files and ranks. Of course that would beat the whole idea of doing so in the first place instead of just use each one at double depth which would be more logical and practical for command and cohesion reasons. So, instead of having each maniple array 8 deep you can have each one array 16 deep to have the same effect. If you instead have them as separate units then a three line formation would effectively become one with six lines.
True, the first two (or three) ranks bear the main brunt of the battle. But file-closers have been traditionally viewed as among the best, since they were responsible to keep the file in order, to relay orders, to report and fix problems as well as turn around if the enemy should appear in the rear. So, in your models you should count them among the "good" soldiers.
Regarding the javelins, according to the manuals, javelins could be used even over 16 man deep formations but that was considered the maximum. They often used light infantry to do exactly that, so we can safely assume that they would have trained for that. So, it is true that back ranks would possibly hurl javelins, stones or anything they had on them on the enemy, but most possibly, they would be on guard watching rather than opening their bodies to attack and random missile throwing. So, I would be reluctant to accept that the back ranks would keep a constant volley. I would suggest that most possibly, light infantry in the rear would do that.
Of course, the wounded would have been dragged or helped crawl behind (most possibly they simply would have walked behind, since the majority of the wounds, even if fatal in the long run would not have immediately impeded movement). There there would have been medics to take care of them.
Five minutes is too early. A battle would normally last a couple of hours but could last for many hours. If every other army was able to keep fighting for hours, so why wouldn't the Romans be up to the task? I do not see such difficult and potentially dangerous maneuver happening 12 times in an hour. Not even half that. I would suggest that any relief would have happened when its officers deemed it necessary. Might be after 10 brutal minutes or after three hours.
Intensifying their efforts would by no means drive any enemy back. Even the word "back" is relative. They could be 2 yards apart and this would be quite far. Of course, there is a problem here since your model demands to drive the enemy back in order to relieve a fatigued and possibly disordered unit! But their inability to get the upper hand would have been the reason for relieving them! I guess you could propose that by doing that in often intervals, the Romans would be able to keep pressure while wearing the enemy down, but I cannot even imagine running the danger to cause disorder in the line in maybe 20 places every 5 mins, that is 240 such maneuvers per hour... A single mistake would have created huge problems and potential disaster.
You might consider contraction and expansion as evolutions that could be done during combat relatively safely, but (again the manuals) they were considered unsafe and dangerous and their use close to the enemy (let alone during fighting) was strongly discouraged.
I think that your model is very complex to be a valid option in battle. How would anything like that be done if the cohort was actually in trouble? As a mechanism it contains a lot of uncertain variables that makes the whole endeavor very dangerous. For example, it relies on the speedy execution of the maneuver, but what would happen if the enemy was not forced to act as you described? You cannot wait for a confirmation, since then you would not have enough time to complete the maneuver and if the enemy instead pushed forward at that very moment or if the front rankers were unable to perform that well, you would have men pushing forward, men trying to move along the front, men expecting to expand but no room to do so... this is a tactical nightmare. And remember the scale. Doing it once might work, twice, all right, but 240 times an hour? One mistake, a single miscalculation, bad luck could bring disaster.
To Crispus (to continue the discussion started in the Whistle thread):
Of course Crispvs, I'd be glad to comment on your model.
Quote:I may be mistaken in this, but doesn't the detail of exchanging lines to put fresh soldiers in the front line come from Polybius, meaning that it is a practice of the second century BC and one which may not have been in use later, useful as it might seem. Caesar, nearly a century later, on one occasion mentions deciding to put his men into the the traditional three line formation, which recalls Polibius' description but at the same time suggests that other formations (and possibly practices) were in use by this time. What that might mean for formations a century after this is anyone's guess.
The suggested retreat of the front lines through gaps in the second (assistant) line is not limited to the Romans of the 3rd century BC. It was commonplace throughout the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) era too (I know I speak too much of these manuals, but I truly think that their study is critical to any such discussion. Of course, I also mean the works of Aelian, Arrian, Onasander and Asclepiodotus too). How something like that could work is illustrated in these manuals and we have no reason absolutely to believe that the mechanics they present were that different. This serving as an argument that such maneuvers were possible, what is interesting in the Polybian Roman army is that whenever we have the first line suffering in battle we instead see the second line RUSHING to its support instead of the first line retreating as is theoretically (but not practically in battle) described by Polybius. If one studies the descriptions even more carefully, one would see that there is even evidence of (my theory) selective support where it was needed instead of exchanging the whole line (again Zama). This is very interesting, because it is the logical thing to do, the easiest thing to do and the thing least supported by scholars preferring lines exchanging either with a front movement of the second line or with the Polybius supported retreat of the first line through the second to the rear. On the other hand, this seems to be the Greek way of support, so it is always possible that Polybius describes what he thinks happened instead of what actually happened.
If I remember well, in Caesar's work multiple lines are often mentioned. Livy I do not trust at all. His descriptions remind me of later eras, not of the 3rd century BC. If I recall well, he often talks about whole legions in reserve or lined behind each other which resembles Caesar's descriptions but are very far from what Polybius suggests and what is generally accepted as the traditional formation of the 3rd century, that is that ALL legions arrayed next to each other, each one providing both the fighting line and its support.
Quote:Regarding the actual practice of exchanging men, I would prefer to try and build a reconstruction of how it might be done on the basis of things we already know rather than things which are little more than theory. To witt: we know the Roman army used trumpets; we know they could be formed into three lines, the front two of which could in some way be exchanged; we know they had large numbers of projectile weapons in the form of pila and probably slings and arrows; as well as knowing that they trained intensively (which was probably the case in Polybius' time as well, at least during periods of service).
Not just the front two. They supposedly would also be able to exchange places with the Triarii too. The rest I of course agree with.
Quote:Using these factors I would propose the following as a possibility for Caesar's time, using one cohort of 480 men as my example:
The three maniples are stood next to each other, with prior centuries in open order in front, posterior centuries in closed order behind. I assume the frontage to be ten men for each century/maniple, with the most experienced and best equipped men in the front two ranks.
We know that when Caesar talks of subsequent lines, he always gives different cohorts forming them. That is, cohorts x, y and z would form the first line, a, b and c the second line etc. That means that each cohort was viewed to be part of its line. In your model, you have each cohort forming two "lines" by having them separated and arrayed as separate units which demands a good interval between them. The reason is that in battle, a part of a line may advance or retreat (what Polybius describes as "snakelike"). If a unit is too close to the advanced unit then they run the risk to get mixed up and lose order. If you want the "posterior maniple" to be linked with the one in front, you should array them in the same (open or close) order, in normal files and ranks. Of course that would beat the whole idea of doing so in the first place instead of just use each one at double depth which would be more logical and practical for command and cohesion reasons. So, instead of having each maniple array 8 deep you can have each one array 16 deep to have the same effect. If you instead have them as separate units then a three line formation would effectively become one with six lines.
Quote:During the fighting the front thirty men do the bulk of the fighting. As they are more experienced and better equipped they stand far more chance of surviving than many of the more inexperienced and more poorly equipped men behind them, who are there largely to give the formation depth and staying power if the enemy try to push forward. Some of the men in ranks three four and five might throw javelins over the heads of the men in front from time to time if space was available and they were not tightly compacted. Those in ranks six, seven and eight (assuming an eight man depth) could not do so due to the possibility of hitting their own men. Any serious casualties in the front rank would be replaced by experienced well equipped men from the second rank, with the wounded men being withdrawn from the front line in an ad hoc but well practice way. Men who had fallen might be able to be dragged back by men in ranks behind, as is described several times in the Iliad (which of course might not be relevant as it describes warfare several centuries before).
True, the first two (or three) ranks bear the main brunt of the battle. But file-closers have been traditionally viewed as among the best, since they were responsible to keep the file in order, to relay orders, to report and fix problems as well as turn around if the enemy should appear in the rear. So, in your models you should count them among the "good" soldiers.
Regarding the javelins, according to the manuals, javelins could be used even over 16 man deep formations but that was considered the maximum. They often used light infantry to do exactly that, so we can safely assume that they would have trained for that. So, it is true that back ranks would possibly hurl javelins, stones or anything they had on them on the enemy, but most possibly, they would be on guard watching rather than opening their bodies to attack and random missile throwing. So, I would be reluctant to accept that the back ranks would keep a constant volley. I would suggest that most possibly, light infantry in the rear would do that.
Of course, the wounded would have been dragged or helped crawl behind (most possibly they simply would have walked behind, since the majority of the wounds, even if fatal in the long run would not have immediately impeded movement). There there would have been medics to take care of them.
Quote:After a given time (perhaps five minutes) the posterior centuries replace the now tired prior centuries. At a signal from a trumpet, the front ranks of the prior centuries intensify their efforts for a short burst which which cannot be sustained for long but which drives the enemy back slightly, allowing the prior centuries to contract into closed order. This would start in the rear ranks , allowing the posterior centuries to move forward through the gaps being created by the contracting prior centuries. As the posterior centuries move forward the contracted rear ranks of the prior centuries begin to fall back, allowing the posterior centuries to begin to expand towards open order.
Five minutes is too early. A battle would normally last a couple of hours but could last for many hours. If every other army was able to keep fighting for hours, so why wouldn't the Romans be up to the task? I do not see such difficult and potentially dangerous maneuver happening 12 times in an hour. Not even half that. I would suggest that any relief would have happened when its officers deemed it necessary. Might be after 10 brutal minutes or after three hours.
Intensifying their efforts would by no means drive any enemy back. Even the word "back" is relative. They could be 2 yards apart and this would be quite far. Of course, there is a problem here since your model demands to drive the enemy back in order to relieve a fatigued and possibly disordered unit! But their inability to get the upper hand would have been the reason for relieving them! I guess you could propose that by doing that in often intervals, the Romans would be able to keep pressure while wearing the enemy down, but I cannot even imagine running the danger to cause disorder in the line in maybe 20 places every 5 mins, that is 240 such maneuvers per hour... A single mistake would have created huge problems and potential disaster.
You might consider contraction and expansion as evolutions that could be done during combat relatively safely, but (again the manuals) they were considered unsafe and dangerous and their use close to the enemy (let alone during fighting) was strongly discouraged.
Quote: By this stage the prior and posterior centuries would look like interlocking triangles from above. As the middle ranks of the prior centuries contract, the still contracted front ranks of the posterior centuries rapidly move forward between them and release a volley of pila over the heads of the still expanded front ranks of the prior centuries, causing a momentary confusion in the enemy ranks which allows the front ranks of the prior centuries to contract and withdraw while the front ranks of the posterior centuries move forward and expand into open order. With a frontage per century of only ten men, the expansion to open order would take only a second or two, giving a new cohort frontage of thirty fresh well equipped men. While this was going on the middle ranks would throw a further volley over the head of the men in front to cause more discomfort to the enemy while the front line was compromised. As the contracted front ranks of the prior centuries withdraw, the ranks of the posterior centuries would fully expand to open order, closing the gaps between the centuries again to produce a cohesive thirty man wide, eight man deep formation.
I think that with a few days' training, such an operation would be relatively easy to achieve and would possibly take about a minute to carry out.
Meanwhile the three prior centuries would draw back a little way to spend five minutes catching their breath and sorting themselves out, before exchanging back to the front again.
I don't think that many trumpet blasts would be required to carry out this operation once the men were used to doing it.
I think that your model is very complex to be a valid option in battle. How would anything like that be done if the cohort was actually in trouble? As a mechanism it contains a lot of uncertain variables that makes the whole endeavor very dangerous. For example, it relies on the speedy execution of the maneuver, but what would happen if the enemy was not forced to act as you described? You cannot wait for a confirmation, since then you would not have enough time to complete the maneuver and if the enemy instead pushed forward at that very moment or if the front rankers were unable to perform that well, you would have men pushing forward, men trying to move along the front, men expecting to expand but no room to do so... this is a tactical nightmare. And remember the scale. Doing it once might work, twice, all right, but 240 times an hour? One mistake, a single miscalculation, bad luck could bring disaster.
