10-12-2011, 02:01 AM
Macedon,
to answer all of your questions would require me to write a book which I don't intend to do. But I will answer some:
Yet, the “fighting with intervals” theory is contested by the next quote in the same battle description :
“Still they fought, though no longer in line, yet singly, or in maniples, which faced about to meet those who charged them on the flanks.”, Pol.3.115.12
Again it is not that evident until we read the Greek text :
“οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οὐκέτι φαλαγγηδόν, ἀλλὰ κατ᾽ ἄνδρα καὶ κατὰ σπείρας στρεφόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων”
We tend to read “line” and think of a general battle line. But here we have three different modes of fighting clearly expressed by Polybius!
“they fought not like a phalanx, but as single men or as maniples…”
To me Polybius is describing that the line was facing to the front so if fell to individuals or maniples at the sides to turn to meet the African units flanking them which was insignificant to stop them. Since they were so densely packed, the Maniples from the second line couldn't maneuver effectively to engage them. It also to me implies that there was a gap/interval between the Gaulic line and the formations of Africans on the wings. If not then how were they able to maneuver so freely to perform such a flanking maneuver without being engaged with the Roman lines until the pincer was closed?
Who would give the command for the second line to attack? Would that attack be coordinated or made by single units “as situation demanded”? What would happen if certain units were hard pressed while others were actually victorious, would all be “relieved” or just the ones suffering?
Polybius gives the power to deploy the second line Zama to Scipio. But I think that he got it wrong, the tribunes, legatus and the commander controlled deploying the second lines. My take is that unless told beforehand not to commit the second or third line "without my approval" then it would fall on the initiative of the local tribunes to make that decision. Some units would have help up better than others so the battlefield would have been fluid. It called delegating authority.
Another reason Polybius got it wrong is because it is easier to simplify a multi-hour long battle into a few paragraphs by simplifying the tactics of it. For the sake of telling a story he gives orders from the commander which wouldn't be necessary in real life. Why have former consuls commanding the legions at Cannae? Or why you would even have tribunes in the Army? If you read Polybius then I guess they are their for moral support and to serve as messenger boys since all big decisions come from the commander of the army. Or maybe Polybius simplified it for a better story. Like one man giving a battlefield speech to 80,000 men. Kind of hard to do but sounds better on paper.
to answer all of your questions would require me to write a book which I don't intend to do. But I will answer some:
Yet, the “fighting with intervals” theory is contested by the next quote in the same battle description :
“Still they fought, though no longer in line, yet singly, or in maniples, which faced about to meet those who charged them on the flanks.”, Pol.3.115.12
Again it is not that evident until we read the Greek text :
“οὗτοι μὲν οὖν οὐκέτι φαλαγγηδόν, ἀλλὰ κατ᾽ ἄνδρα καὶ κατὰ σπείρας στρεφόμενοι πρὸς τοὺς ἐκ τῶν πλαγίων”
We tend to read “line” and think of a general battle line. But here we have three different modes of fighting clearly expressed by Polybius!
“they fought not like a phalanx, but as single men or as maniples…”
To me Polybius is describing that the line was facing to the front so if fell to individuals or maniples at the sides to turn to meet the African units flanking them which was insignificant to stop them. Since they were so densely packed, the Maniples from the second line couldn't maneuver effectively to engage them. It also to me implies that there was a gap/interval between the Gaulic line and the formations of Africans on the wings. If not then how were they able to maneuver so freely to perform such a flanking maneuver without being engaged with the Roman lines until the pincer was closed?
Who would give the command for the second line to attack? Would that attack be coordinated or made by single units “as situation demanded”? What would happen if certain units were hard pressed while others were actually victorious, would all be “relieved” or just the ones suffering?
Polybius gives the power to deploy the second line Zama to Scipio. But I think that he got it wrong, the tribunes, legatus and the commander controlled deploying the second lines. My take is that unless told beforehand not to commit the second or third line "without my approval" then it would fall on the initiative of the local tribunes to make that decision. Some units would have help up better than others so the battlefield would have been fluid. It called delegating authority.
Another reason Polybius got it wrong is because it is easier to simplify a multi-hour long battle into a few paragraphs by simplifying the tactics of it. For the sake of telling a story he gives orders from the commander which wouldn't be necessary in real life. Why have former consuls commanding the legions at Cannae? Or why you would even have tribunes in the Army? If you read Polybius then I guess they are their for moral support and to serve as messenger boys since all big decisions come from the commander of the army. Or maybe Polybius simplified it for a better story. Like one man giving a battlefield speech to 80,000 men. Kind of hard to do but sounds better on paper.
