10-12-2011, 06:14 PM
Good questions,
"[3.89]Caesar, observing his former custom, had placed the tenth legion on the right, the ninth on the left, although it was very much weakened by the battles at Dyrrachium. He placed the eighth legion so close to the ninth, as to almost make one of the two, and ordered them to support one another. He drew up on the field eighty cohorts, making a total of twenty-two thousand men. He left two cohorts to guard the camp. He gave the command of the left wing to Antonius, of the right to P. Sulla, and of the center to Cn. Domitius: he himself took his post opposite Pompey. At the same time, fearing, from the disposition of the enemy which we have previously mentioned, lest his right wing might be surrounded by their numerous cavalry, he rapidly drafted a single cohort from each of the legions composing the third line, formed of them a fourth line, and opposed them to Pompey's cavalry, and, acquainting them with his wishes, admonished them that the success of that day depended on their courage. At the same time he ordered the third line, and the entire army not to charge without his command: that he would give the signal whenever he wished them to do so." DBC, 3.3.89
Unfortunately, the battle of Pharsalus, although documented and described by a number of authors in all or partly (Ceasar, Plutarch in bot the life of Caesar and that of Pompey, Appian, Frontinus...) to me still contains many shady parts. Caesar's mention of the 8th is taken as being posted to the right of the 9th, but where does anyone say that the 9th was posted in the first line? I do not know Latin, so I cannot speak with certainty about these texts, here I only know what the translations say. In my opinion, there are two possible scenarios regarding the placement of the 8th. The predominant one (the one readily accepted by most if not all) would be that it was posted on the right of the 9th at a very small distance, as the text says (almost to make one of the two).
So, if the 8th was placed to the left of the 9th there would normally be a narrow interval between them. The very fact that we are told of such a gap between two legions infers that there would be even smaller ones between cohorts, if any. I would view it absurd to have a 12 yard interval between legions and a 60 yard interval between cohorts, but then.. who can be really certain? So, if we take the scenario that wants the 9th on the right of the 8th, then the narrow gap would indeed enable the two legions to guard each other's common flank and give support to the outermost files, it is thus that I understand "support" here.
Another (I would admit totally unsupported by modern historiography) theory could have the 8th be posted behind the 9th. This is something that comes to mind since there is absence in the translation of any certain hint as to the relative position of the two here or in any part of the description of the battle. Then, Caesar's orders would be interpreted in another sense, the 8th would indeed as a whole support the 9th, effectively forming a second line very close to the front. Maybe the whole of the 9th would be deployed in single line? Now, such an idea is not supported by bibliography and may easily be dismissed by the Latin text itself if there is something there not clearly translated... As a tactical decision it would certainly though not be a first (told you we RomanArmy forumites are prone to wild theories!).
What most puzzled me was the translated text that reads "drafted a single cohort from each of the legions composing the third line". As stands it seems to imply that there were entire legions forming the third line, but that creates problems... Later Caesar informs us that the fourth line was comprised of six cohorts, which would mean that there were six legions in the third line... Too many by any standards! The original reads :
"Ipse contra Pompeium constitit. Simul his rebus animadversis, quas demonstravimus, timens, ne a multitudine equitum dextrum cornu circumveniretur, celeriter ex tertia acie singulas cohortes detraxit atque ex his quartam instituit equitatuique opposuit et, quid fieri vellet, ostendit monuitque eius diei victoriam in earum cohortium virtute constare."
I do not see the word "legio" here, so maybe again, the translation is misleading... Damn I wish I knew Latin! It might mean that one cohort was taken out from each legion but not the ones constituting the third line but from their third line... We know that Casear had 7 legions when he first landed in Greece, we have the numbers of 6 from this book (8,9,10,11,12 and 27), can it be that there were 6 legions on the field? Of course that would create other problems with the remaining cohorts (80 in total), which again implies 8 legions present or 20 rogue cohorts...
Anyways, I am digressing again. The thing is I am trying to see whether it would be possible to place the 8th behind the 9th instead of to its right, as every model of the battle suggests.
I do not think that there would have been a specific battle-plan in action that generals had to follow regarding the placement of legions. I think that they would have deployed them as they saw fit. That could be far apart, one legion here another on a hill nearby, in single line with small gaps, larger gaps, no gaps, one behind the other. I even see cohorts being drawn from legions to be assigned specific duties (such as forming the fourth line in Caesar’s formation at Pharsalus).
So, guessing that your question has to do with legions forming in line, I would see their usual deployment as with narrow gaps between each other, maybe 10-12 yards and even narrower or no gaps between the cohorts posted in front. Cohorts in subsequent lines would have smaller or larger gaps according to their anticipated use and relative strength. The very fact that the cohorts of the rear lines of the legion would most probably be less than those in the front, only seems to verify that support was given when and where necessary, the third line (when present/formed) being a last reserve and rear guard. I do not see whole lines exchange places here except from with the later described Byzantine system that had the front line retreating through the intervals (these could be sizable indeed) of the rear line only to speedily reform and attack filling in these intervals with their men.
The men on the corners of such formations would be in trouble. Of course they would be well armed and probably the best men in the unit but nevertheless, they would be in trouble… I see them getting support from the man on their rear and from light infantry posted in or right behind the interval, but yes, I do see them fight a a disadvantage. This is one reason why I am reluctant to accept any model of an orderly army that has many intervals. I do accept that some would have been retained but not many. Such gaps would also explain the disproportionate casualties sustained by centurions, since it would be them posted at the corners of cohorts and of course legions.
I guess you are talking about the marching order. Because you never know where and when the enemy will attack. If the enemy does not move, you would be able to redress. If the enemy did not leave you the initiative though, reforming the line would actually take much more time if not moving in marching but battle formation. Furthermore, the advancement itself is slower when in battle formation, which may make your troops more vulnerable to enemy skirmishes, give you less time to occupy the ground you want to occupy etc. The whole point of a marching formation would be to facilitate cohesion of units and relative order during march. An uninterrupted line marching through rough ground would have men getting detached from their units while circumventing sizable obstacles, that of course does not mean that it was not preferred when an enemy attack was anticipated. Marching in detached units (again, Greeks also employed such tactics) allowed the men to stay with their units and the unit itself marching around such obstacles without losing cohesion even when losing its order. But this has to do with the manipular system. In the case of the later cohortal legions, I see them preferring the relative safety of wide lines to the superior marching maneuverability of the maniples.
A common marching formation was the column. Part of the phalanx itself marching at a narrow width to take its position on the battlefield. Relatively safe when far from the enemy, it was the downfall of Philip at Cynoscephalae, where the right wing of the Romans attacked the Macedonians while they were still taking their places on the battleground reforming from a marching column - that is, still moving in column.
In all, marching and fighting formations address different, often interdependent, issues. This is why they were separate formations a competent general should master. A third type of formation would be the marching order employed in long marches.
Another interesting text is that of Livy in his 29th Book, remember this is about Scipio in Africa, so we are still in the era of the pure manipular era.
“[29.2].The Roman commanders, L. Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidinus, were determined not to let the war spread through any remissness on their part. They united their forces and marched with their combined strength through the Ausetanian territory, inflicting no injury on either the hostile or the peaceable districts, until they came to where the enemy was encamped. They fixed their own camp at a distance of three miles from that of the enemy, and sent envoys to persuade him to lay down his arms. When, however, the Spanish horse attacked a party of foragers, cavalry supports were at once hurried up from the Roman outposts, and a skirmish took place without any special advantage to either side. On the morrow the whole of the Spanish army marched under arms and in battle formation to within a mile of the Roman camp. The Ausetani formed the centre, the Ilergetes were on the right and the left was made up of various nameless tribes. Between the wings and the centre open spaces were left, wide enough to allow of the cavalry charging through when the right moment arrived. The Roman line was formed in the usual way, except that they so far copied the enemy as to leave spaces between the legions for their cavalry also to pass through. Lentulus, however, saw that this disposition would be of advantage to that side only who were the first to send their cavalry through the wide gaps in the opposing line. Accordingly he gave the military tribune, Servius Cornelius, orders to send his cavalry at full speed through the openings. He himself, finding that his infantry were making no progress, and that the twelfth legion, who were on the left, opposed to the Ilergetes, were beginning to give ground, brought up the thirteenth legion who were in reserve to their support. As soon as the battle was restored in this quarter he rode up to L. Manlius, who was at the front encouraging his men and bringing up assistance wherever it was required, and pointed out to him that all was safe on his left and that S. Cornelius, acting under his orders, would soon envelop the enemy with a whirlwind of cavalry. He had hardly said this when the Roman cavalry charging into the middle of the enemy threw his infantry into confusion, and at the same time barred the passage for the Spanish horse. These, finding themselves unable to act as cavalry, dismounted and fought on foot. When the Roman commanders saw the enemy's ranks in disorder, confusion and panic spreading and the standards swaying to and fro, they appealed to their men to break up the enemy while thus shaken and not let them re-form their line. The barbarians would not have withstood the furious attack which followed had not Indibilis and his dismounted cavalry placed themselves in front to screen the infantry. There was very violent fighting for some time, neither side giving way. The king though half dead kept his ground till he was pinned to the earth by a javelin, and then those who were fighting round him were at last overwhelmed beneath showers of missiles. A general flight began and the carnage was all the greater because the troopers had no time to recover their horses, and the Romans never relaxed the pursuit until they had stripped the enemy of his camp. 13,000 Spaniards were killed on that day and about 1800 prisoners taken. Of the Romans and allies a little more than 200 fell, mainly on the left wing. The Spaniards who had been routed on the field or driven out of their camp, dispersed amongst the fields, and finally returned to their respective communities.”
As usual, in my opinion, Livy seems to be describing a battle in terms of how warfare was done in his time. It is as if we are reading about a battle marshaled by Caesar! In any case, we can get precious (even if anachronistic) information.
1.”Between the wings and the centre open spaces were left, wide enough to allow of the cavalry charging through when the right moment arrived. The Roman line was formed in the usual way, except that they so far copied the enemy as to leave spaces between the legions for their cavalry also to pass through. Lentulus, however, saw that this disposition would be of advantage to that side only who were the first to send their cavalry through the wide gaps in the opposing line. Accordingly he gave the military tribune, Servius Cornelius, orders to send his cavalry at full speed through the openings.”
“when the Roman cavalry charging into the middle of the enemy threw his infantry into confusion, and at the same time barred the passage for the Spanish horse.”
The enemy formed sizable gaps for cavalry to pass through. The Romans did so too “between the legions”, copying the enemy. This implies that normally no sizable gaps would have been left. Then he criticizes the employment of such gaps and shows how the Romans took advantage of them, effectively winning the battle! So, we have the employment of sizable gaps by the enemy and the Romans criticizing them and devising a countermeasure to successfully bring them to their own advantage!
2. "brought up the thirteenth legion who were in reserve to their support."
"and bringing up assistance wherever it was required"
So, in the first instance we have a whole legion rushing to the support of another legion (sounds too cohortal, doesn’t it? A whole legion in reserve at the time of Scipio? Where is the triplex acies?) In the second we have the “wherever and whenever necessary” support I deem default.
Quote:Macedon,
I referenced a quote earlier a few times from Caesar's commentaries about how the 8th and 9th Legion had formed up close together at Pharsalus, close enough to support each other. What is your take on that?
"[3.89]Caesar, observing his former custom, had placed the tenth legion on the right, the ninth on the left, although it was very much weakened by the battles at Dyrrachium. He placed the eighth legion so close to the ninth, as to almost make one of the two, and ordered them to support one another. He drew up on the field eighty cohorts, making a total of twenty-two thousand men. He left two cohorts to guard the camp. He gave the command of the left wing to Antonius, of the right to P. Sulla, and of the center to Cn. Domitius: he himself took his post opposite Pompey. At the same time, fearing, from the disposition of the enemy which we have previously mentioned, lest his right wing might be surrounded by their numerous cavalry, he rapidly drafted a single cohort from each of the legions composing the third line, formed of them a fourth line, and opposed them to Pompey's cavalry, and, acquainting them with his wishes, admonished them that the success of that day depended on their courage. At the same time he ordered the third line, and the entire army not to charge without his command: that he would give the signal whenever he wished them to do so." DBC, 3.3.89
Unfortunately, the battle of Pharsalus, although documented and described by a number of authors in all or partly (Ceasar, Plutarch in bot the life of Caesar and that of Pompey, Appian, Frontinus...) to me still contains many shady parts. Caesar's mention of the 8th is taken as being posted to the right of the 9th, but where does anyone say that the 9th was posted in the first line? I do not know Latin, so I cannot speak with certainty about these texts, here I only know what the translations say. In my opinion, there are two possible scenarios regarding the placement of the 8th. The predominant one (the one readily accepted by most if not all) would be that it was posted on the right of the 9th at a very small distance, as the text says (almost to make one of the two).
So, if the 8th was placed to the left of the 9th there would normally be a narrow interval between them. The very fact that we are told of such a gap between two legions infers that there would be even smaller ones between cohorts, if any. I would view it absurd to have a 12 yard interval between legions and a 60 yard interval between cohorts, but then.. who can be really certain? So, if we take the scenario that wants the 9th on the right of the 8th, then the narrow gap would indeed enable the two legions to guard each other's common flank and give support to the outermost files, it is thus that I understand "support" here.
Another (I would admit totally unsupported by modern historiography) theory could have the 8th be posted behind the 9th. This is something that comes to mind since there is absence in the translation of any certain hint as to the relative position of the two here or in any part of the description of the battle. Then, Caesar's orders would be interpreted in another sense, the 8th would indeed as a whole support the 9th, effectively forming a second line very close to the front. Maybe the whole of the 9th would be deployed in single line? Now, such an idea is not supported by bibliography and may easily be dismissed by the Latin text itself if there is something there not clearly translated... As a tactical decision it would certainly though not be a first (told you we RomanArmy forumites are prone to wild theories!).
What most puzzled me was the translated text that reads "drafted a single cohort from each of the legions composing the third line". As stands it seems to imply that there were entire legions forming the third line, but that creates problems... Later Caesar informs us that the fourth line was comprised of six cohorts, which would mean that there were six legions in the third line... Too many by any standards! The original reads :
"Ipse contra Pompeium constitit. Simul his rebus animadversis, quas demonstravimus, timens, ne a multitudine equitum dextrum cornu circumveniretur, celeriter ex tertia acie singulas cohortes detraxit atque ex his quartam instituit equitatuique opposuit et, quid fieri vellet, ostendit monuitque eius diei victoriam in earum cohortium virtute constare."
I do not see the word "legio" here, so maybe again, the translation is misleading... Damn I wish I knew Latin! It might mean that one cohort was taken out from each legion but not the ones constituting the third line but from their third line... We know that Casear had 7 legions when he first landed in Greece, we have the numbers of 6 from this book (8,9,10,11,12 and 27), can it be that there were 6 legions on the field? Of course that would create other problems with the remaining cohorts (80 in total), which again implies 8 legions present or 20 rogue cohorts...
Anyways, I am digressing again. The thing is I am trying to see whether it would be possible to place the 8th behind the 9th instead of to its right, as every model of the battle suggests.
Quote: Do you think there were gaps/intervals separating legions during the cohort legions? What about the Primus Pilus Centurion of the 1st Cohort of each legion? How would have he fought off multiple men at once? How did four cohorts from each legion get relieved by three in the second line when the third line of cohorts wasn't committed until the route of Pompeius Magnus' army?
I do not think that there would have been a specific battle-plan in action that generals had to follow regarding the placement of legions. I think that they would have deployed them as they saw fit. That could be far apart, one legion here another on a hill nearby, in single line with small gaps, larger gaps, no gaps, one behind the other. I even see cohorts being drawn from legions to be assigned specific duties (such as forming the fourth line in Caesar’s formation at Pharsalus).
So, guessing that your question has to do with legions forming in line, I would see their usual deployment as with narrow gaps between each other, maybe 10-12 yards and even narrower or no gaps between the cohorts posted in front. Cohorts in subsequent lines would have smaller or larger gaps according to their anticipated use and relative strength. The very fact that the cohorts of the rear lines of the legion would most probably be less than those in the front, only seems to verify that support was given when and where necessary, the third line (when present/formed) being a last reserve and rear guard. I do not see whole lines exchange places here except from with the later described Byzantine system that had the front line retreating through the intervals (these could be sizable indeed) of the rear line only to speedily reform and attack filling in these intervals with their men.
The men on the corners of such formations would be in trouble. Of course they would be well armed and probably the best men in the unit but nevertheless, they would be in trouble… I see them getting support from the man on their rear and from light infantry posted in or right behind the interval, but yes, I do see them fight a a disadvantage. This is one reason why I am reluctant to accept any model of an orderly army that has many intervals. I do accept that some would have been retained but not many. Such gaps would also explain the disproportionate casualties sustained by centurions, since it would be them posted at the corners of cohorts and of course legions.
Quote: Why put gaps in the army when deploying when it wouldn't matter if they lose order because you can always redress the lines once they stop to prepare for the charge?
I guess you are talking about the marching order. Because you never know where and when the enemy will attack. If the enemy does not move, you would be able to redress. If the enemy did not leave you the initiative though, reforming the line would actually take much more time if not moving in marching but battle formation. Furthermore, the advancement itself is slower when in battle formation, which may make your troops more vulnerable to enemy skirmishes, give you less time to occupy the ground you want to occupy etc. The whole point of a marching formation would be to facilitate cohesion of units and relative order during march. An uninterrupted line marching through rough ground would have men getting detached from their units while circumventing sizable obstacles, that of course does not mean that it was not preferred when an enemy attack was anticipated. Marching in detached units (again, Greeks also employed such tactics) allowed the men to stay with their units and the unit itself marching around such obstacles without losing cohesion even when losing its order. But this has to do with the manipular system. In the case of the later cohortal legions, I see them preferring the relative safety of wide lines to the superior marching maneuverability of the maniples.
A common marching formation was the column. Part of the phalanx itself marching at a narrow width to take its position on the battlefield. Relatively safe when far from the enemy, it was the downfall of Philip at Cynoscephalae, where the right wing of the Romans attacked the Macedonians while they were still taking their places on the battleground reforming from a marching column - that is, still moving in column.
In all, marching and fighting formations address different, often interdependent, issues. This is why they were separate formations a competent general should master. A third type of formation would be the marching order employed in long marches.
Another interesting text is that of Livy in his 29th Book, remember this is about Scipio in Africa, so we are still in the era of the pure manipular era.
“[29.2].The Roman commanders, L. Lentulus and L. Manlius Acidinus, were determined not to let the war spread through any remissness on their part. They united their forces and marched with their combined strength through the Ausetanian territory, inflicting no injury on either the hostile or the peaceable districts, until they came to where the enemy was encamped. They fixed their own camp at a distance of three miles from that of the enemy, and sent envoys to persuade him to lay down his arms. When, however, the Spanish horse attacked a party of foragers, cavalry supports were at once hurried up from the Roman outposts, and a skirmish took place without any special advantage to either side. On the morrow the whole of the Spanish army marched under arms and in battle formation to within a mile of the Roman camp. The Ausetani formed the centre, the Ilergetes were on the right and the left was made up of various nameless tribes. Between the wings and the centre open spaces were left, wide enough to allow of the cavalry charging through when the right moment arrived. The Roman line was formed in the usual way, except that they so far copied the enemy as to leave spaces between the legions for their cavalry also to pass through. Lentulus, however, saw that this disposition would be of advantage to that side only who were the first to send their cavalry through the wide gaps in the opposing line. Accordingly he gave the military tribune, Servius Cornelius, orders to send his cavalry at full speed through the openings. He himself, finding that his infantry were making no progress, and that the twelfth legion, who were on the left, opposed to the Ilergetes, were beginning to give ground, brought up the thirteenth legion who were in reserve to their support. As soon as the battle was restored in this quarter he rode up to L. Manlius, who was at the front encouraging his men and bringing up assistance wherever it was required, and pointed out to him that all was safe on his left and that S. Cornelius, acting under his orders, would soon envelop the enemy with a whirlwind of cavalry. He had hardly said this when the Roman cavalry charging into the middle of the enemy threw his infantry into confusion, and at the same time barred the passage for the Spanish horse. These, finding themselves unable to act as cavalry, dismounted and fought on foot. When the Roman commanders saw the enemy's ranks in disorder, confusion and panic spreading and the standards swaying to and fro, they appealed to their men to break up the enemy while thus shaken and not let them re-form their line. The barbarians would not have withstood the furious attack which followed had not Indibilis and his dismounted cavalry placed themselves in front to screen the infantry. There was very violent fighting for some time, neither side giving way. The king though half dead kept his ground till he was pinned to the earth by a javelin, and then those who were fighting round him were at last overwhelmed beneath showers of missiles. A general flight began and the carnage was all the greater because the troopers had no time to recover their horses, and the Romans never relaxed the pursuit until they had stripped the enemy of his camp. 13,000 Spaniards were killed on that day and about 1800 prisoners taken. Of the Romans and allies a little more than 200 fell, mainly on the left wing. The Spaniards who had been routed on the field or driven out of their camp, dispersed amongst the fields, and finally returned to their respective communities.”
As usual, in my opinion, Livy seems to be describing a battle in terms of how warfare was done in his time. It is as if we are reading about a battle marshaled by Caesar! In any case, we can get precious (even if anachronistic) information.
1.”Between the wings and the centre open spaces were left, wide enough to allow of the cavalry charging through when the right moment arrived. The Roman line was formed in the usual way, except that they so far copied the enemy as to leave spaces between the legions for their cavalry also to pass through. Lentulus, however, saw that this disposition would be of advantage to that side only who were the first to send their cavalry through the wide gaps in the opposing line. Accordingly he gave the military tribune, Servius Cornelius, orders to send his cavalry at full speed through the openings.”
“when the Roman cavalry charging into the middle of the enemy threw his infantry into confusion, and at the same time barred the passage for the Spanish horse.”
The enemy formed sizable gaps for cavalry to pass through. The Romans did so too “between the legions”, copying the enemy. This implies that normally no sizable gaps would have been left. Then he criticizes the employment of such gaps and shows how the Romans took advantage of them, effectively winning the battle! So, we have the employment of sizable gaps by the enemy and the Romans criticizing them and devising a countermeasure to successfully bring them to their own advantage!
2. "brought up the thirteenth legion who were in reserve to their support."
"and bringing up assistance wherever it was required"
So, in the first instance we have a whole legion rushing to the support of another legion (sounds too cohortal, doesn’t it? A whole legion in reserve at the time of Scipio? Where is the triplex acies?) In the second we have the “wherever and whenever necessary” support I deem default.
