The Dacians: Rome\'s Greatest Enemy?

[diegis]

In these circumstances Caesar's 'proposed' Dacian campaign appear not merely credible but almost inevitable'. Syme also stresses the fact that even if Burebista were removed and the threat to Italy averted, Caesar's proposed campaigns in the Balkans would not lose their justification...Burebista or not Burebista, this would have to be done sooner or later'.
The accurate examination of Caesar’s military disposition and the number and distribution of the legions made Syme conclude that ‘the army of six legions in Macedonia would be adequate for any operations in the Balkans: and the fact that there were fewer legions available in Macedonia than in all the eastern provinces taken together is really no evidence that the expedition against the Dacians was thought of as easier then or subordinate to the proposed Parthian campaign’. Pg89

I think the authors above might just missed the Appian mention of another 16 legions and 10,000 cavalrymen send by him from Italy to Ilyria in advance of his arrival (which may imply he would come with another small amount of troops, personal guard etc).
If we count as well those 6 legions from Macedonia we see that Roman army gathered at Dacian borders reached 22 legions and at least 10,000 cavalrymen (similar in number with almost another 2 legions). This number come close to army used by Trajan later.

Back then Dacia southern border was on the southern slopes of Haemus mountains reaching Ilyria and Macedonia which Getae/Dacians plundered before, right during the time Caesar was governor of Ilyria for example.
Such army massed at Dacian borders was surely intended to participate to an invasion of Dacia, if not all troops at least most of them

As shown by Tettius Julianus, Dacia didn't need the extreme amount of legions to defeat, and Syme points out that Julius Caesar needed only ‘the army of six legions' for Dacia. I'll have to check on the 16 legions.

Syme seem to have missed those at least other 16 legions and 10,000 cavalrymen that Caesar send from Italia over the Adriatic Sea for this campaign.

And Tettius raid defeated at most a small Dacian army gathered in a hurry at Tapae, he didnt defeated Dacia.
His raid was done right before the end of the season, meaning his intention wasnt at all to conquer anything in Dacia, just to show that Romans can fight back.
He knew he can't defeat Dacia or conquer it, but cleverly chose the autumn for attack, as was the season when crops and fruits are gathered and people prepare themselves for the coming winter (meaning look after fire woods, make repairings at houses, gather food for animals to have over the winter and such).

So he knew the Dacians who made the "big army" was mostly busy, and he can face just the smaller professional/permanent Dacian army, which was as well scatered all over the teritory with garrison duties and such.

As a war oriented society, with a warlike religion, all Dacians was prepared for war and had weapons, is just that just a small part of them was full time soldiers forming a standing permanent army, the others was just part time warriors even if war might have occupy an important period of their time life. To call all people able to fight requires quite a time. If we look at how that was done here in medieval era (and I think it was similar in Dacian times), when enemy army was spotted there was huge fires lightened on top of peaks, forming a chain in several directions (anyway if was rain, fog or low clouds it was more difficult for that). Then guardians in towns or villages used trumpets or drums to announce the people in the town or village that an alarm is raised and they need to prepare for war.

Then people who need to form the army gathered and marched togehter in places already established, were they would meet the king emissaries or generals. When an enough big army was formed they marched were was needed to fight the battle or executed the maneuvres ordered. This require probably more then a week, all over the country, and even if those using horses can move quicker those on foot require more time to gather and march were was needed

Tettius deliberately chose the shorter but much harder road, basing himself on the surprise of his advance. Thats why Dacians managed to gather just a little army at Tapae, a place chosen as good to stop the Romans. This small army was probably made from a part of Dacian garrisons in the area and from locals from that area that was gathered in a hurry. They eventualy may lost to Romans, however seeing how Roman authors avoided to talk about Roman losses or even give any details about the battles with Dacians, and how Domitian celebrated all kind of victories when same authors say that he actually celebrate the loss of his legions, i kinda doubt about such a great Roman success. Especially as Dio inspire himself more probably from Roman propaganda writings of Domitian period. It was probably a tactical victory and as Tettius knew he can't do more anyway and probably sufered himself significant losses he retreated back to Roman forts.

To explain to Roman civilians back home why Roman army didnt do more they invented probably that stuf with Dacian wooden army who scared them and such, so they celebrated anyway something and made it a great victory

Romans kept many troops at the border with Dacia anyway to prevent a new invasion of Decebalus, this being probably the main reason why Domitian lost to Marcomani, against who he goes with a smaller army