The Dacians: Rome\'s Greatest Enemy?

[Frostwulf]

As usual dont have much time so I will reply you now just to this

I sympathize with you, as I have the same problem, hence the time between my replies.

I gived you just primary sources, which some of historians you quoted seem to not know or connect them or you seem to not quote them properly.

You gave me "some" primary sources, certainly not all. This is the reason I seek the professional opinion because they generally have the bigger picture, as you will now see. It was not they nor I(not quoting them properly) that the mistake is with.

So let me tell you again. When Caesar was governor of Ilyria (and Galia Cisalpina and Transalpina) Dacians used to plunder at will Roman provinces as Macedonia and Ilyria, as Strabo I think say. However, Caesar, which was the governor in Ilyria, avoided to make any campaign against Dacians. 7.3.11

Roman provinces were not raided during the reign of Burebista:

And he began to be formidable even to the Romans, because he would cross the Ister with impunity and plunder Thrace as far as Macedonia and the Illyrian country; and he not only laid waste the country of the Celti who were intermingled2 with the Thracians and the Illyrians, but actually caused the complete disappearance of the Boii3 who were under the rule of Critasirus,4 and also of the Taurisci.5 To help him secure the complete obedience of his tribe he had as his coadjutor

He plundered as "far as" but not including Macedonia and Illyria(least not the Roman part). Have another quote about this further down. Please note, this is of Burebista as king, nothing before or after.

He abandoned the situation in Ilyria and chose a weaker, more easier prey, Ariovistus and Gauls, both to escape the pressure home because of his inaction against Dacians, and to get some money and glory as he wasnt quite OK financially from what i understand. Going against Getae he knew he have more chances to end at least without any glory or money if not worse.

Here is Goldsworthy's quote which you may think I posted incorrectly:

In 58 BC it was not obvious where Caesar’s campaigns would lead him. He had first been granted Cisalpine Gaul and Illyricum as his province, and Transalpine Gaul was only added after the sudden death of its governor. Caesar’s original intention may well have been a Balkan campaign, probably to curb the growing power of the Dacian king Burebista, who was carving out a powerful empire around his heartland in what is now Transylvania. The region was wealthy, and scarcely explored by Roman armies, offering the glory attached to defeating a people never before encountered. He may well have been planning to advance in that direction, both in 58 BC and in later years, but events continued to provide him with ready opportunities for military adventures in Gaul, and the Balkan expedition never took place. Even so, it never left Caesar’s mind, for he was planning to move against Dacia in 44 BC when he was assassinated. Pg197

As you see he is hardly ignorant of the situation of Caesar and Illyricum, he also in earlier pages explains in detail how Caesar achieved getting Cisalpine Gaul, Illyricum and Transalpine Gaul.

So why does Goldsworthy, Matthias Gelzer(Caesar Politician and Statesman pg.82), James Sabben-Clare, C.Matthias(Caesar,C. Goudinau (Cesar et la Gaule) come to this conclusion of Caesar preparing to attack Burebista:

The province of Illyria incorporated little more than the strip of Dalmatian coast captured at the end of the third century and spasmodically patrolled thereafter so as to discourage piracy. The hinterland was not conquered until the time of Augustus. The country as a whole was extremely poor, but because of its proximity to Italy was sometimes treated as a training area for Roman arms. Pg.38

The province of Illyria by itself could not offer Caesar very much scope and it seems more likely that his reason for taking it was to enable him to come to grips with the expanding empire of the Getae. These people came from the Danube basin and seem to have been spreading their influence westwards at about this time under their king Burebistas. Pg39

Yet in the spring of 58 BC there was every sign that Caesar was wrong-footed by the Helvetii. Perhaps he had been surprised by the timing of the migration, or maybe its sheer scale. He had four legions at his command, but only one of these was in Transalpine Gaul. The remaining three were camped near Aquileia on the border of Cisalpine Gaul nearest to Illyricum. It is not known who stationed the troops there, but even if it had not been Caesar, then he had made no effort to alter this disposition. Even when he hastened to the Rhone he made no effort to send new orders to these troops. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that he was still thinking very much in terms of a Balkan campaign. Perhaps it was only when he arrived near Geneva that he appreciated the full scale of the problem. The Helvetii and the allied clans who joined them in the migration had piled their possessions into wagons and set off with great purpose. Pg.209

Caesar’s Illyrian provance is easily forgotten in face of his achievements in Gaul, but it had been assigned to him before Transalpine Gaul and it did offer immediate prospects of conquest; what is more, at the beginning of his command he had three legions stationed at Aquileia, the natural starting point for any campaign beyond the north-east frontier. Pg.66

Caesar was given governorship in 59 and was married shortly after that. He had 3 legions in place that could strike NE, so why didn't he? Well as Goldsworthy already stated the Helvetii came into play and Caesar had to force march north to meet the menace.

The situation that developed in Gaul effectively prevented Caesar from undertaking an Illyrian campaign at this time (see next chapter). However when thirteen years later his supremacy was finally established at Rome, he seems to have planned another eastern offensive, which may shed some light on his intentions in 58. Pg.41

After the Belgian campaign Caesar regarded the conquest of Gaul as virtually complete (see below), and he could take another look at the Illyrian situation. As a preliminary he sent Galba to open a route through the Alps which would give his troops direct access to Cisalpine Gaul and beyond, while he himself conducted a personal reconnaissance (winter 57/56). Pg.66

Caesar even went to Illyricum, why bother if he was afraid? The Roman territory was not yet in jeopardy. There are other things to consider, such as just before the civil war Caesar(or at least his allies) were willing to give up Gaul, but not Illyria! Then of course there is this:

I think that other Illyrian tribes besides those mentioned had previously come under Roman rule, but how, I do not know. Augustus did not describe the transactions of others so much as his own, telling how he brought back those who had revolted and compelled them again to pay tribute, how he subjugated others that had been independent from the beginning, and how he mastered all the tribes that inhabit the summits of the Alps, barbarous and warlike peoples, who often plundered the neighboring parts of Italy.

It is a wonder to me that so many great Roman armies traversing the Alps to conquer the Gauls and Spaniards, should have overlooked these tribes, and that even Gaius [Julius] Caesar, that most successful man of war, did not dispatch them during the ten years that he was fighting the Gauls and wintering in that very country. But the Romans seem to have been intent only upon getting through the Alpine region on the business they were bestirring themselves about, and Caesar seems to have delayed putting an end to the Illyrian troubles on account of the Gallic war and the strife with Pompey, which closely followed it. It appears that he was chosen commander of Illyria as well as of Gaul - not the whole of it, but as much as was then under Roman rule. [§15]

Yes this is speaking of the Illyrians, but if he couldn't take care of them because of the Gallic war and Pompey, he hardly could have gone after the Dacians either.