04-16-2014, 02:06 PM
The last year, I have been doing a lot of reading re: the infamous Battle of Adrianople, the events leading up to it, and its aftermath. The latest reading I have done is "The Day of The Barbarians" "Barbarians at Rome's Gate" and the essay posted at http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/anc...ilure.aspx
I have a number of questions/discussion points I would like to bring up.
First, why did Valens offer receptio on such attractice terms to the goths begin with? Were the romans that short of manpower on the frontier? Once they became aware of the size of the incoming "horde", why did they not mass more troops to control the process?
Second, it appears that in the preceding Battle of Ad Salices, the Romans suffered a bloody stalemate, despite (pressumably) being beter armed, supplied (they had been starving out the goths), and trained. From the accounts I have read, the goths were armed ad hoc with pilfered roman equipment and "fire hardened clubs." In my mind, the stalemate calls into question the assumed notion that the RA was still "superior" to the barbarians at this point. The notion of a half-starved rag-tag band of goths nearing defeating a contingent of the WRA by throwing wooden clubs from a lager wagon seems hard to believe. What else was going on here? If the Romans were severely outnumberd, why didn;t Richomeres just stick with the "block and starve" strategy.
Third, from the accounts I have read, it appears that the goths had a devastating effect on the balkans, esp after being joined with the armed gothic contingent from Marcianople. It appears they plundered and laid waste to the entire region. That they were again able to operate with impugnity after Adrianople seems to cut agains the notion that Adrianople "wasn't that big of a deal" that is seemingly popular these days.
Fourth, why was there not better coordination of troop movements between east and west before the battle. It seems that before Valens marched out, the romans had sent a number of smaller contingents that engaged the goths and were defeated or at least reduced in effective fighting capacity. Why not wait to concentrate forces instead of throwing raindrops on a fire?
Fifth, what led to the Roman intelligence failure as to the size of the gothic forces at Adrianople? It seems Valens rushed in without being prepared. Also, why did he feel the need to force march his forces for nearly a full day under a blazing hot sun before engaging, gather than following the standard practice of making camp, resting, and attacking the next morning? Was he really THAT inept? Would Gratian have been able to arrive and "steal the day", if Valens had waited 24 hours to attack?
Sixth it appears that the Roman auxilliaries and reserve line fled after the initial gothic cavalry charge during the battle. Why was there no attempt to regroup and reinforce once the main line was in trouble?
Seventh, why did the citizens of Adrianople not allow the suriving forces sanctuary in the city following their defeat. Surely, they would have been able to recognize their own forces?
Eighth, it appears that after the battle there was essentialy no effective fighting force left in the area and that the Goths had pretty much free reign in the balkans. Theodisius then enters the picture and again either loses battles or fights to costly stalemates, resuling in the Foedereti treaty. Again, why are the Romans incapable of a decesive victory at any point during the gothic war? It seems that "the worlds most professional fighting force" is being beaten again and again by relatively unorganized roaming gothic hordes. Again, this makes me question the whether the goths and romans were not more "evenly matched" in fighting ability at this time.
Finally, the more I read about the aftermath of the battle, the unprecedented terms offered to the goths, their mass enrollment as federates, being trained in the roman way of war, and the effect on overall roman fighting ability both east and west, the more I return to the classical view that Adrianople was indeed a catastrophe..arguably even worse than Cannae in that they were never able to recover from the loss or eject the goths from their terrority.
Before the battle and the gothic war, you have a feared, effective fighting force that while being hamstrung by Julian's losses, still semeed to be able to control its borders. After the gothic wars, Rome is dependent on what is really a large, independent and still hostile political entity operating within its borders; they have been forced to make a humiliating peace with their eastern enemies, and the rhine frontier is overrun again and again.
Adding together: 1) Julians losses in persia; 2) the losses during adrianople and the gothic war; 3) the losses during theodisius' subsequent two major civil wars with the west; and 4) the new found poltiical and military powe of the goths, I am in fact quite surpised the West was able to hold old as long as it did.
...Looking forward to the discussion. Thanks.
I have a number of questions/discussion points I would like to bring up.
First, why did Valens offer receptio on such attractice terms to the goths begin with? Were the romans that short of manpower on the frontier? Once they became aware of the size of the incoming "horde", why did they not mass more troops to control the process?
Second, it appears that in the preceding Battle of Ad Salices, the Romans suffered a bloody stalemate, despite (pressumably) being beter armed, supplied (they had been starving out the goths), and trained. From the accounts I have read, the goths were armed ad hoc with pilfered roman equipment and "fire hardened clubs." In my mind, the stalemate calls into question the assumed notion that the RA was still "superior" to the barbarians at this point. The notion of a half-starved rag-tag band of goths nearing defeating a contingent of the WRA by throwing wooden clubs from a lager wagon seems hard to believe. What else was going on here? If the Romans were severely outnumberd, why didn;t Richomeres just stick with the "block and starve" strategy.
Third, from the accounts I have read, it appears that the goths had a devastating effect on the balkans, esp after being joined with the armed gothic contingent from Marcianople. It appears they plundered and laid waste to the entire region. That they were again able to operate with impugnity after Adrianople seems to cut agains the notion that Adrianople "wasn't that big of a deal" that is seemingly popular these days.
Fourth, why was there not better coordination of troop movements between east and west before the battle. It seems that before Valens marched out, the romans had sent a number of smaller contingents that engaged the goths and were defeated or at least reduced in effective fighting capacity. Why not wait to concentrate forces instead of throwing raindrops on a fire?
Fifth, what led to the Roman intelligence failure as to the size of the gothic forces at Adrianople? It seems Valens rushed in without being prepared. Also, why did he feel the need to force march his forces for nearly a full day under a blazing hot sun before engaging, gather than following the standard practice of making camp, resting, and attacking the next morning? Was he really THAT inept? Would Gratian have been able to arrive and "steal the day", if Valens had waited 24 hours to attack?
Sixth it appears that the Roman auxilliaries and reserve line fled after the initial gothic cavalry charge during the battle. Why was there no attempt to regroup and reinforce once the main line was in trouble?
Seventh, why did the citizens of Adrianople not allow the suriving forces sanctuary in the city following their defeat. Surely, they would have been able to recognize their own forces?
Eighth, it appears that after the battle there was essentialy no effective fighting force left in the area and that the Goths had pretty much free reign in the balkans. Theodisius then enters the picture and again either loses battles or fights to costly stalemates, resuling in the Foedereti treaty. Again, why are the Romans incapable of a decesive victory at any point during the gothic war? It seems that "the worlds most professional fighting force" is being beaten again and again by relatively unorganized roaming gothic hordes. Again, this makes me question the whether the goths and romans were not more "evenly matched" in fighting ability at this time.
Finally, the more I read about the aftermath of the battle, the unprecedented terms offered to the goths, their mass enrollment as federates, being trained in the roman way of war, and the effect on overall roman fighting ability both east and west, the more I return to the classical view that Adrianople was indeed a catastrophe..arguably even worse than Cannae in that they were never able to recover from the loss or eject the goths from their terrority.
Before the battle and the gothic war, you have a feared, effective fighting force that while being hamstrung by Julian's losses, still semeed to be able to control its borders. After the gothic wars, Rome is dependent on what is really a large, independent and still hostile political entity operating within its borders; they have been forced to make a humiliating peace with their eastern enemies, and the rhine frontier is overrun again and again.
Adding together: 1) Julians losses in persia; 2) the losses during adrianople and the gothic war; 3) the losses during theodisius' subsequent two major civil wars with the west; and 4) the new found poltiical and military powe of the goths, I am in fact quite surpised the West was able to hold old as long as it did.
...Looking forward to the discussion. Thanks.
There are some who call me ......... Tim?
