07-03-2014, 02:29 PM
Mark wrote:
More at issue - we here have also brought up examples of the Romans trying to break up things like 'phalanxes' by getting past the pikes even, let alone an actual gap left between formations. The 'manipular tactic', the 'saw formation' (one and the same?), the 'wedge', the 'boars head', the 'column', and the pike phalanx itself all are apparently designed to achieve that break-through of the 'line'.
Ignore what I wrote about breaking phalanxes earlier in this thread. Matter of factor, ignore everything I wrote about cohort sized gaps, piston tactics, and maniples in deep formations operating as "wedges." Though I made a few good points about gaps existing, using sources, as to the width or purpose, everything else was unsupported conjecture. But I don't need to describe how maniples beat phalanxes (pike, not hoplite type). Polybius already did that (Pol. 18.27-32). Maniples formations can more easier maneuver on bad terrain common on many battlefields and can break apart for smaller unit actions, such as exploiting gaps in an enemy force (Pydna as example), while a phalanx (continuous line type) can't without sacrificing the integrity of the line. Phalanxes generally have only one line, so its important they hold that one. Romans have many lines (in most fights) so the second or third lines can support exploitation efforts against the first.
Cohort formation staggered front to back would have been no real different from a normal maniple triplex acies except for the fact that the units would be more confident in one another to be properly supported from the rear (or less, should they know the rest of maniples in cohort aren't actually very good). If a cohort was staged with maniples formed side to side, like in the description of Caesar's 4-3-3 formation, it could still mean either small maneuver gaps between maniples or larger maniple sized versions between them.
Whilst Roman military history may be my favorite, I have studied most of them at one time or another. Stopping an enemy from penetrating that front line (whether it is contiguous on a single battlefield, or dispersed over a wide and mobile front), has been a basic precept throughout. Forces and methods have been developed to also try and accomplish just that.
I agree completely if the unit only has one main line and possibly a smaller reserve that shouldn't be committed too early. However the Roman bread and butter formation had three lines, the second which was almost immediately behind the first, directly supporting it, though outside of hand to hand combat or missile range. That's one of the methods that has been developed to counter the thread of having your lines broken and the enemy pouring through them. In the case of the Romans, only a completely disordered retreat by the hastatus could lead to the collapse of the principes or triari. An ordered retreat of maniples to be relieved, or an advance of units of the second or third line could plug exploitations in gaps immediately.
But I think the use of gaps would have been situational dependent. The terrain and enemy faced, as well as overall strength, are some pretty large factors to contemplate when thinking about putting large gaps (maniple in closed array wide) between units. Small gaps would always exist in a healthy fighting line between flexible units, even in contact, as units need some wiggle room to move freely through bad terrain and to advance/retreat. Jamming units/men up against each other in line and expecting them to walk around a tree or bush, or hop over a small creek bed, would be quit amusing to watch.
More at issue - we here have also brought up examples of the Romans trying to break up things like 'phalanxes' by getting past the pikes even, let alone an actual gap left between formations. The 'manipular tactic', the 'saw formation' (one and the same?), the 'wedge', the 'boars head', the 'column', and the pike phalanx itself all are apparently designed to achieve that break-through of the 'line'.
Ignore what I wrote about breaking phalanxes earlier in this thread. Matter of factor, ignore everything I wrote about cohort sized gaps, piston tactics, and maniples in deep formations operating as "wedges." Though I made a few good points about gaps existing, using sources, as to the width or purpose, everything else was unsupported conjecture. But I don't need to describe how maniples beat phalanxes (pike, not hoplite type). Polybius already did that (Pol. 18.27-32). Maniples formations can more easier maneuver on bad terrain common on many battlefields and can break apart for smaller unit actions, such as exploiting gaps in an enemy force (Pydna as example), while a phalanx (continuous line type) can't without sacrificing the integrity of the line. Phalanxes generally have only one line, so its important they hold that one. Romans have many lines (in most fights) so the second or third lines can support exploitation efforts against the first.
Cohort formation staggered front to back would have been no real different from a normal maniple triplex acies except for the fact that the units would be more confident in one another to be properly supported from the rear (or less, should they know the rest of maniples in cohort aren't actually very good). If a cohort was staged with maniples formed side to side, like in the description of Caesar's 4-3-3 formation, it could still mean either small maneuver gaps between maniples or larger maniple sized versions between them.
Whilst Roman military history may be my favorite, I have studied most of them at one time or another. Stopping an enemy from penetrating that front line (whether it is contiguous on a single battlefield, or dispersed over a wide and mobile front), has been a basic precept throughout. Forces and methods have been developed to also try and accomplish just that.
I agree completely if the unit only has one main line and possibly a smaller reserve that shouldn't be committed too early. However the Roman bread and butter formation had three lines, the second which was almost immediately behind the first, directly supporting it, though outside of hand to hand combat or missile range. That's one of the methods that has been developed to counter the thread of having your lines broken and the enemy pouring through them. In the case of the Romans, only a completely disordered retreat by the hastatus could lead to the collapse of the principes or triari. An ordered retreat of maniples to be relieved, or an advance of units of the second or third line could plug exploitations in gaps immediately.
But I think the use of gaps would have been situational dependent. The terrain and enemy faced, as well as overall strength, are some pretty large factors to contemplate when thinking about putting large gaps (maniple in closed array wide) between units. Small gaps would always exist in a healthy fighting line between flexible units, even in contact, as units need some wiggle room to move freely through bad terrain and to advance/retreat. Jamming units/men up against each other in line and expecting them to walk around a tree or bush, or hop over a small creek bed, would be quit amusing to watch.
