04-26-2001, 08:37 AM
Salve,<br>
<br>
Though I consider Luttwak's <i> Grand strategy</i> essential reading, the model proposed remains a simplified and therefore much clearer and understandable representation of reality. His division of the three types of grand strategy not only according to their nature, but chronologically as well to some extent disguises the fact that elements of his models can be found outside the periods concerned. The defence in depth of the third century and later seems to have been replaced with a return to a preclusive defence when deemed possible and / or necessary. Both systems could also operate at the same time in deifferent parts of the empire, with provinces where troops had been withdrawn to other sectors adopting the passive defence in depth and other areas seeing a concentration of forces for attacks, retaliatory or not, into the <i> barbaricum</i>. To some extent this is recognised in Luttwak by ascribing a shallow defence in depth to Diocletianus, though at other moments in the fourth century evidence for a similar return to a more preclusive type of defence appear. Priorities thus appear to have shifted from time to time. Though Hadrianus found it necessary to destroy the bridge over the Danube built by Traianus to prevent its use as an easy invasion route by an enemy, the late Roman army built bridges linking the empire with the <i> barbaricum</i> (eg at Cologne), indicating a confident and aggressive attitude. Such permanent bridges as well as the establishment of fortified bridgeheads for secure landing of ship borne troops are signs of a strategy that emphasized operations in enemy territory, even if defence in depth was adopted at other times.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst <p></p><i></i>
<br>
Though I consider Luttwak's <i> Grand strategy</i> essential reading, the model proposed remains a simplified and therefore much clearer and understandable representation of reality. His division of the three types of grand strategy not only according to their nature, but chronologically as well to some extent disguises the fact that elements of his models can be found outside the periods concerned. The defence in depth of the third century and later seems to have been replaced with a return to a preclusive defence when deemed possible and / or necessary. Both systems could also operate at the same time in deifferent parts of the empire, with provinces where troops had been withdrawn to other sectors adopting the passive defence in depth and other areas seeing a concentration of forces for attacks, retaliatory or not, into the <i> barbaricum</i>. To some extent this is recognised in Luttwak by ascribing a shallow defence in depth to Diocletianus, though at other moments in the fourth century evidence for a similar return to a more preclusive type of defence appear. Priorities thus appear to have shifted from time to time. Though Hadrianus found it necessary to destroy the bridge over the Danube built by Traianus to prevent its use as an easy invasion route by an enemy, the late Roman army built bridges linking the empire with the <i> barbaricum</i> (eg at Cologne), indicating a confident and aggressive attitude. Such permanent bridges as well as the establishment of fortified bridgeheads for secure landing of ship borne troops are signs of a strategy that emphasized operations in enemy territory, even if defence in depth was adopted at other times.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst <p></p><i></i>
