04-18-2002, 08:25 PM
StrategyM wrote:<br>
<i><br>
I've read rebuttals of the supposed long term effects that you mention for all of the above battles.<br>
</i><br>
<Robert de Niro voice><br>
'You talkin' to me?'<br>
</Robert de Niro voice><br>
<i><br>
As Sander says, Roman activity in Germania didn't stop after Teutoburger Wald. There is not much evidence, IMO, that supports that this battle actually prevented Roman conquest. Much more important would seem the lack of an adequate societal structure that the Romans couldv "conquor", as well as the poor returns on such conquest.<br>
</i><br>
The Germanic peoples had about as much 'societal structure' as several other tribal peoples that the Romans managed to conquer quite happily. Unless you have some evidence of a vast or significance difference between the societal structure of the tribes in Germania and those, for example, in Britannia, I really can't see how this argument will wash. The argument that the conquest gave poor economic returns is far more likely to have been a factor, but that alone doesn't explain why the Romans didn't return to Germania Magna to re-conquer it after Varus' defeat. There were good strategic reasons for the conquest of the area between the Rhine and the Elbe in the first place - it created a larger and more easily defended buffer north of Italy and reduced the enormous salient in the northern frontier created by the Rhine/Danube frontier.<br>
<br>
Clearly, Tiberius decided the cost in lives and resources was not worth the prize of changing this frontier. But that realisation was brought about by Arminius' defeat of Varus, and Germanicus' failure to either reconquer the province or bring Arminius to heel. No-one said the Romans never campaigned beyond the Rhine again, and it's quite likely that Germanicus' campaigns were at least partially intended to bring the lost province back under Roman control. The point is - after the Varian Disaster (and Germanicus' inconclusive campaign) Germania was written off by Rome as a lost cause.<br>
<br>
If it was simply these economic and strategic concerns which caused this decision, do you really think the Romans would have withdrawn <i> without</i> the Varian Defeat? If the answer is 'No' (and it clearly is), then the Teutoburgerwald was highly significant both strategically and tactically.<br>
<br>
A chap called Augustus certainly seemed to think so, even if some modern writers like to gloss over its significance.<br>
<i><br>
As for Adrianople, I've read at least one paper that rebutts the "myth" of a diaster crippling the Roman state. For one, the Roman army at this battle was probably not very large. Secondly, the Gothic army fragmented shortly after. Much more important was the inability of Theodosius to defeat the Gothic tribes in the 4 years of campaigning following Adrianople.<br>
</i><br>
In all my reading on Adrianople, I've never even come across this 'myth', so I'm hardly likely to be arguing in support of it. And I'm often in the position of arguing with those who'd like to believe Valens army was bigger than the evidence indicates, so I would never support that position either.<br>
<br>
But the battle was a significant tactical defeat because an army of elite Eastern Roman units was crushed by a far less disciplined and generally weaker force which had been on the defensive. And it was signficant strategically for precisely the reason you mention - the best chance the Romans had of bringing the Goths to heel was lost at Adrianople. If Valens had won (or if he'd waited for Gratian) or even if he'd accepted Fritigern's offers to negotiate a settlement, Theodosius would not have been required to deal with the Goths at all. Those opportunities were swept away in Fritigern's victory.<br>
<br>
And while elements of the Gothic army at Adrianople split away from the main force - particularly Alatheus and Saphrax's Greuthungians, Alans and Huns - enough of the Tervingians and their allies remained as a force to be reckoned with. This force was large enough to hold off Theodosius, force a settlement from him and go on to follow Alaric to Italy and carve out a kingdom in Gaul. That's sounds pretty much like strategic significance to me.<br>
Cheers,<br>
<br>
<p>Tim O'Neill / Thiudareiks Flavius<BR>
<P>
Visit Clades Variana - Home of the Varus Film Project<br>
</p><i></i>
<i><br>
I've read rebuttals of the supposed long term effects that you mention for all of the above battles.<br>
</i><br>
<Robert de Niro voice><br>
'You talkin' to me?'<br>
</Robert de Niro voice><br>
<i><br>
As Sander says, Roman activity in Germania didn't stop after Teutoburger Wald. There is not much evidence, IMO, that supports that this battle actually prevented Roman conquest. Much more important would seem the lack of an adequate societal structure that the Romans couldv "conquor", as well as the poor returns on such conquest.<br>
</i><br>
The Germanic peoples had about as much 'societal structure' as several other tribal peoples that the Romans managed to conquer quite happily. Unless you have some evidence of a vast or significance difference between the societal structure of the tribes in Germania and those, for example, in Britannia, I really can't see how this argument will wash. The argument that the conquest gave poor economic returns is far more likely to have been a factor, but that alone doesn't explain why the Romans didn't return to Germania Magna to re-conquer it after Varus' defeat. There were good strategic reasons for the conquest of the area between the Rhine and the Elbe in the first place - it created a larger and more easily defended buffer north of Italy and reduced the enormous salient in the northern frontier created by the Rhine/Danube frontier.<br>
<br>
Clearly, Tiberius decided the cost in lives and resources was not worth the prize of changing this frontier. But that realisation was brought about by Arminius' defeat of Varus, and Germanicus' failure to either reconquer the province or bring Arminius to heel. No-one said the Romans never campaigned beyond the Rhine again, and it's quite likely that Germanicus' campaigns were at least partially intended to bring the lost province back under Roman control. The point is - after the Varian Disaster (and Germanicus' inconclusive campaign) Germania was written off by Rome as a lost cause.<br>
<br>
If it was simply these economic and strategic concerns which caused this decision, do you really think the Romans would have withdrawn <i> without</i> the Varian Defeat? If the answer is 'No' (and it clearly is), then the Teutoburgerwald was highly significant both strategically and tactically.<br>
<br>
A chap called Augustus certainly seemed to think so, even if some modern writers like to gloss over its significance.<br>
<i><br>
As for Adrianople, I've read at least one paper that rebutts the "myth" of a diaster crippling the Roman state. For one, the Roman army at this battle was probably not very large. Secondly, the Gothic army fragmented shortly after. Much more important was the inability of Theodosius to defeat the Gothic tribes in the 4 years of campaigning following Adrianople.<br>
</i><br>
In all my reading on Adrianople, I've never even come across this 'myth', so I'm hardly likely to be arguing in support of it. And I'm often in the position of arguing with those who'd like to believe Valens army was bigger than the evidence indicates, so I would never support that position either.<br>
<br>
But the battle was a significant tactical defeat because an army of elite Eastern Roman units was crushed by a far less disciplined and generally weaker force which had been on the defensive. And it was signficant strategically for precisely the reason you mention - the best chance the Romans had of bringing the Goths to heel was lost at Adrianople. If Valens had won (or if he'd waited for Gratian) or even if he'd accepted Fritigern's offers to negotiate a settlement, Theodosius would not have been required to deal with the Goths at all. Those opportunities were swept away in Fritigern's victory.<br>
<br>
And while elements of the Gothic army at Adrianople split away from the main force - particularly Alatheus and Saphrax's Greuthungians, Alans and Huns - enough of the Tervingians and their allies remained as a force to be reckoned with. This force was large enough to hold off Theodosius, force a settlement from him and go on to follow Alaric to Italy and carve out a kingdom in Gaul. That's sounds pretty much like strategic significance to me.<br>
Cheers,<br>
<br>
<p>Tim O'Neill / Thiudareiks Flavius<BR>
<P>
Visit Clades Variana - Home of the Varus Film Project<br>
</p><i></i>
Tim ONeill / Thiudareiks Flavius /Thiudareiks Gunthigg
HISTORY FOR ATHEISTS - New Atheists Getting History Wrong
HISTORY FOR ATHEISTS - New Atheists Getting History Wrong
