08-15-2019, 05:58 AM
At present I am sifting through all the information relating to Baecula and Ilipa. This was followed by comparing all the similar events between the two battles. Some of the events that occurred at these battles are also repeated in other battles set in Iberia during the Second Punic War, so a lot of rehashed history is being retrograded left right and centre. Basically Baecula and Ilipa are one and the same. Someone wanted to break the battle into two so as to give Scipio the credit of defeating Hasdrubal Barca. Appian clearly states at Baecula it was Hasdrubal Gisgo that was defeated. All the evidence supports Appian.
However, Appian is not off the hook by a long shot. His account of the placement of the Roman cavalry at Zama behind the infantry, due to the Roman cavalry not being accustomed to elephants, is then contradicted by Appian having the Roman cavalry charged down the elephants lanes in a bid to defeat the elephants. At Cannae, Appian has Hannibal extend his cavalry thereby forcing the Romans to extend their cavalry to a dangerous thinness. Livy is adamant there was no room for manoeuvre at Cannae for the Roman cavalry. Appian has confused his battles. The two incidents do not belong to those battles, but a little investigation can reveal which battles they rightfully belong. Therefore, Appian’s mistakes are mana from heaven.
In truth I cannot blame Appian, or any other ancient historian. The problem would seem to be is they are all working from very conflicting sources, with some sources following the propaganda version of Rome’s history and others historical sources. For the Iberian war, Appian stands strong and follows a more historical narrative. However, when it comes to the big issues such as Zama, he tends to follow the historical account but also tries to mesh this with the propaganda version, or the popular pop culture tradition. Basically, the propaganda version of Roman history begins with the reign of the kings and ends around the Gallic wars. I recommend Michael that you study the Gallic wars from 204 BC to 193 BC. Many of the battles are replications especially Mago’s battle. Putting the elephants aside, then compare many of these battles with Zama.
My new insights into the Roman cavalry doctrine for selecting the guard cavalry has continued to yield more insights. The number of velites allocated to a squadron I originally had wrong. The numbers I had were based on numbers in the primary sources which were a red-herring, and a lesson not to take the numbers at face value. I made the mistake because I failed to follow through with the standard procedures I have learnt to apply to any of the data. The original number of velites to cavalry I had was a fraction, which was wrong, and a warning sign. The relation between the centuries in the legion was also a fraction. So the new figure works well and abides by the rules of the extraordinarii doctrine (no surprises there).
Unfortunately, most of the reading public have no idea that the Second Punic War is riddled with relentless contradiction. That is because no modern historian has bothered to expose it. Far too many have just followed the Polybian narrative. Polybius never tells us what happened to the dictator appointed after the Roman defeat at Cannae. Three other ancient historians, those rated by academic as less trustworthy write that in 216 BC, the dictator’s camp was overrun by Hannibal’s army. In 212 BC, we have another consular army defeated by Hannibal, which is explained away in Livy as being a rabble army of volunteers. Whoever Livy’s source is has a definite trademark and also numbers the legions with the light infantry omitted. This source interests me. So two legions equals 8,000 men, and one legion 4,000 men. Polybius uses this source and adds the 1,200 velites, thereby ending up with a legion of 5,200 men. My sixth sense says Fabius Pictor, but senses are not evidence.
However, Appian is not off the hook by a long shot. His account of the placement of the Roman cavalry at Zama behind the infantry, due to the Roman cavalry not being accustomed to elephants, is then contradicted by Appian having the Roman cavalry charged down the elephants lanes in a bid to defeat the elephants. At Cannae, Appian has Hannibal extend his cavalry thereby forcing the Romans to extend their cavalry to a dangerous thinness. Livy is adamant there was no room for manoeuvre at Cannae for the Roman cavalry. Appian has confused his battles. The two incidents do not belong to those battles, but a little investigation can reveal which battles they rightfully belong. Therefore, Appian’s mistakes are mana from heaven.
In truth I cannot blame Appian, or any other ancient historian. The problem would seem to be is they are all working from very conflicting sources, with some sources following the propaganda version of Rome’s history and others historical sources. For the Iberian war, Appian stands strong and follows a more historical narrative. However, when it comes to the big issues such as Zama, he tends to follow the historical account but also tries to mesh this with the propaganda version, or the popular pop culture tradition. Basically, the propaganda version of Roman history begins with the reign of the kings and ends around the Gallic wars. I recommend Michael that you study the Gallic wars from 204 BC to 193 BC. Many of the battles are replications especially Mago’s battle. Putting the elephants aside, then compare many of these battles with Zama.
My new insights into the Roman cavalry doctrine for selecting the guard cavalry has continued to yield more insights. The number of velites allocated to a squadron I originally had wrong. The numbers I had were based on numbers in the primary sources which were a red-herring, and a lesson not to take the numbers at face value. I made the mistake because I failed to follow through with the standard procedures I have learnt to apply to any of the data. The original number of velites to cavalry I had was a fraction, which was wrong, and a warning sign. The relation between the centuries in the legion was also a fraction. So the new figure works well and abides by the rules of the extraordinarii doctrine (no surprises there).
Unfortunately, most of the reading public have no idea that the Second Punic War is riddled with relentless contradiction. That is because no modern historian has bothered to expose it. Far too many have just followed the Polybian narrative. Polybius never tells us what happened to the dictator appointed after the Roman defeat at Cannae. Three other ancient historians, those rated by academic as less trustworthy write that in 216 BC, the dictator’s camp was overrun by Hannibal’s army. In 212 BC, we have another consular army defeated by Hannibal, which is explained away in Livy as being a rabble army of volunteers. Whoever Livy’s source is has a definite trademark and also numbers the legions with the light infantry omitted. This source interests me. So two legions equals 8,000 men, and one legion 4,000 men. Polybius uses this source and adds the 1,200 velites, thereby ending up with a legion of 5,200 men. My sixth sense says Fabius Pictor, but senses are not evidence.
