09-25-2019, 10:05 AM
"Hannibal moves his army closer to Scipio and camps on ground with little water,..."
Appian Punic Wars 8.40
The town of Cilla was in the neighborhood and near it was a hill well adapted for a camp. Hannibal, perceiving this, sent a detachment forward to seize it and lay out a camp. Then he started and moved forward as though he were already in possession of it. Scipio having anticipated him and seized it beforehand, Hannibal was cut off in the midst of a plain without water and was engaged all night digging wells. His army, by toiling in the sand, with great difficulty obtained a little muddy water to drink, and so they passed the night without food, without care for their bodies, and some of them without removing their arms.
Zonoras 14.1
For Hannibal now gave no thought to battle, but was desirous of shifting his camp to a more favourable place. Scipio, gaining this information from deserters, broke camp by night and occupied the spot which was the goal of Hannibal's efforts. And when the Carthaginians had reached a valley [also translated as "a depressed part of the road"] unsuited for a camping place, he suddenly confronted them. Hannibal refused to fight, but in his efforts to pitch camp there and to dig wells he had a hard time of it all night long. Thus Scipio forced the enemy, while at a disadvantage from weariness and thirst, to offer battle in spite of themselves.
http://grandmanoeuvre.co.uk/wp-content/u...jaypeg.jpg
The google earth image above is from 2nd August 2014, so try to visualise that in mid-October 202 BC this landscape would look more verdant due to the seasonal rains that would have started in late September perhaps.
I think the terrain at Kbor Klib fits the descriptions, but there is some indication perhaps that the author had elaborated slightly - "toiling in the sand" does not match with the geology of the Kbor Klib area and the soils in area of Kbor Kilb are calcisols; that is derived from weathered limestones. The impression that Appian or his source gives us here is of a very dry, desert-like environment.
I am a little suspicious of this manoeuvring for position and a single camp site prior to the great battle of Zama, as of course, it is another example of Hannibal being out-manoeuvred in his own backyard. Hannibal seems far too sloppy here to risk camping so close without information as to the topography and without sufficient regard to supplying his army.
And I find it hard to accept that this failure of pre-battle manoeuvre, would have forced Hannibal to close the distance between the armies and would have forced him to give battle.
In addition to this doubt, it is also, in the sequence of events described, associated with the three spies story and an attempt to justify the meeting of the two armies, when little was to be gained by either side in fighting a full-scale engagement.
The cavalry battle was probably included in the earlier histories of the campaign (e.g. Alimentus), and this was followed by the main battle itself and the manoeuvring for campsites, etc., but perhaps the first part always was missing from Scipio`s memoirs and from his son`s history too. Polybius then rejected the cavalry battle and chose the family history instead, converting the three spies strategy into a deception plan to justify the aleady fabricated accounts of a large battle.
Appian Punic Wars 8.40
The town of Cilla was in the neighborhood and near it was a hill well adapted for a camp. Hannibal, perceiving this, sent a detachment forward to seize it and lay out a camp. Then he started and moved forward as though he were already in possession of it. Scipio having anticipated him and seized it beforehand, Hannibal was cut off in the midst of a plain without water and was engaged all night digging wells. His army, by toiling in the sand, with great difficulty obtained a little muddy water to drink, and so they passed the night without food, without care for their bodies, and some of them without removing their arms.
Zonoras 14.1
For Hannibal now gave no thought to battle, but was desirous of shifting his camp to a more favourable place. Scipio, gaining this information from deserters, broke camp by night and occupied the spot which was the goal of Hannibal's efforts. And when the Carthaginians had reached a valley [also translated as "a depressed part of the road"] unsuited for a camping place, he suddenly confronted them. Hannibal refused to fight, but in his efforts to pitch camp there and to dig wells he had a hard time of it all night long. Thus Scipio forced the enemy, while at a disadvantage from weariness and thirst, to offer battle in spite of themselves.
http://grandmanoeuvre.co.uk/wp-content/u...jaypeg.jpg
The google earth image above is from 2nd August 2014, so try to visualise that in mid-October 202 BC this landscape would look more verdant due to the seasonal rains that would have started in late September perhaps.
I think the terrain at Kbor Klib fits the descriptions, but there is some indication perhaps that the author had elaborated slightly - "toiling in the sand" does not match with the geology of the Kbor Klib area and the soils in area of Kbor Kilb are calcisols; that is derived from weathered limestones. The impression that Appian or his source gives us here is of a very dry, desert-like environment.
I am a little suspicious of this manoeuvring for position and a single camp site prior to the great battle of Zama, as of course, it is another example of Hannibal being out-manoeuvred in his own backyard. Hannibal seems far too sloppy here to risk camping so close without information as to the topography and without sufficient regard to supplying his army.
And I find it hard to accept that this failure of pre-battle manoeuvre, would have forced Hannibal to close the distance between the armies and would have forced him to give battle.
In addition to this doubt, it is also, in the sequence of events described, associated with the three spies story and an attempt to justify the meeting of the two armies, when little was to be gained by either side in fighting a full-scale engagement.
The cavalry battle was probably included in the earlier histories of the campaign (e.g. Alimentus), and this was followed by the main battle itself and the manoeuvring for campsites, etc., but perhaps the first part always was missing from Scipio`s memoirs and from his son`s history too. Polybius then rejected the cavalry battle and chose the family history instead, converting the three spies strategy into a deception plan to justify the aleady fabricated accounts of a large battle.
