02-15-2003, 04:27 PM
I'll try for a change to keep this short<br>
<br>
I think on Archery we are maninly in agreement, it is merely the degree or importance of it to which we disagree. I haven't changed my views on it I merely think archer was decisive in the outcomes of certain battles. In a battle like Falkirk or Carrhae, though it could have been won by archery alone once the means of the Scots or Romans to effectively return fire was eliminated or neutralized, the mounted warriors of the English and Parthians would not have stood by and anot participated.<br>
<br>
As for cavalry your initial statement that got my attention was:<br>
<br>
"Cavalry have advantages over infantry, but not on the field of battle itself - the advantage of cavalry lies in its strategic mobility which allows it to strike at the supply system to great effect. On a one-to-one basis, Cavalry haven't got a hope against equally well-armed infantry (of course the infantry can't defeat the cavalry either since they can't catch them - but that is another problem)."<br>
<br>
you clearly state strategic and not operational legel advantage here. You further stated that heavy infantry could not defeat cavalry or vice versa. In most cases I agree however my studies of war indicate there is no such thing as always and never in battle. Therefore my contention that under certain conditions cavalry does have a battlefield advantage (and of course vice versa).<br>
<br>
You stated at Carrhae that most of the Roman casualties were in Publius' engagement. this is not correct. Plutarch plainly states that 30,000 of Crassus' army was lost (out of approximately 36,000 not conting the fickle Arab allies). As Publius' force consisted of 8 cohorts (perhaps4,000 probably much less due to previous casualties and the attrition along the march--which ancient historians never seem to mention), 500 archers and 1300 cavalry, the majority could not have been from that engagement. I think both of us would agree that the majority of casualties were probably lost during the retreat/rout. Plutarch also describes only the Gallic and other Roman cavalry of Publius being defeated in the melee. He says they fell back on the infantry and arrayed themselves on a small hill where they suffered an ineffective end, dwindling to the archery until they were too few to resist the final Parthian charge.<br>
<br>
As for Carrhae, Hannibal's infantry were too few to have encircled the Roman infantry alone. Infantry were also too slow to move to conduct that, thus the cavalry's battlefield mobility advantage. Roman fortified encampments in proximity of the battlefield often served as a rallying point for a defeated force (which had the resulte of saving the Romans from the mass of casualties suffered in the normal rout.<br>
<br>
At Adrianople the outcome of an infantry flank attack is much different from a cavalry attack smashing against. it. An infantry assault is more like the oceans incoming tide while a cavalry attack more like a rapid wave. Though an infantry flank attack has a good chance of defeating the Romans there is almost no chance of them being decisively defeated. the Romans with equal mobility can fall back.<br>
<br>
As for cavalry and routing my point was that heavy infantry up to modern times do not often cause a well ordered retreating enemy to rout. Time and again cavalry attacking an army attempting an orderly retreat turned it into a rout resulting inthe ehavier casualties.<br>
<br>
The other objection I have with the 'no batrlefield advantage' besides its absoluteness is the fact that throughout the Iron Age era commanders worked hard to ensure cavalry was on the battlefield to do preciseily the things it was better at than the infantry. Threaten enemy flanks, protecting your own, providing batlefield reconnaissance, providing battlefield mobility, the decisive charge, the covering charge, the pursuit or covering the retreat etc. If there was no advantage of cavalry commanders would not have bothered with it. They would have replaced a 500 strong cavalry unit and its horses with the 1000 man infantry force whose cost in supplies and equipment was almost the same.<br>
<br>
I do agree that in most cases well ordered, well trained and desciplined infantry will not be broken by cavalry. Infantry of that caliber is not always available, nor are they invulnerable in all conditions. Cavalry does have a battlefield advantage over infantry in some circumstances just as infantry does over cavalry in others. It is not at absolute.<br>
<br>
Oh well, not as short as i wanted. hey fascinating thread you are posting on in the military history section on Roman Battles. I'm monitering with great interest. <p></p><i></i>
<br>
I think on Archery we are maninly in agreement, it is merely the degree or importance of it to which we disagree. I haven't changed my views on it I merely think archer was decisive in the outcomes of certain battles. In a battle like Falkirk or Carrhae, though it could have been won by archery alone once the means of the Scots or Romans to effectively return fire was eliminated or neutralized, the mounted warriors of the English and Parthians would not have stood by and anot participated.<br>
<br>
As for cavalry your initial statement that got my attention was:<br>
<br>
"Cavalry have advantages over infantry, but not on the field of battle itself - the advantage of cavalry lies in its strategic mobility which allows it to strike at the supply system to great effect. On a one-to-one basis, Cavalry haven't got a hope against equally well-armed infantry (of course the infantry can't defeat the cavalry either since they can't catch them - but that is another problem)."<br>
<br>
you clearly state strategic and not operational legel advantage here. You further stated that heavy infantry could not defeat cavalry or vice versa. In most cases I agree however my studies of war indicate there is no such thing as always and never in battle. Therefore my contention that under certain conditions cavalry does have a battlefield advantage (and of course vice versa).<br>
<br>
You stated at Carrhae that most of the Roman casualties were in Publius' engagement. this is not correct. Plutarch plainly states that 30,000 of Crassus' army was lost (out of approximately 36,000 not conting the fickle Arab allies). As Publius' force consisted of 8 cohorts (perhaps4,000 probably much less due to previous casualties and the attrition along the march--which ancient historians never seem to mention), 500 archers and 1300 cavalry, the majority could not have been from that engagement. I think both of us would agree that the majority of casualties were probably lost during the retreat/rout. Plutarch also describes only the Gallic and other Roman cavalry of Publius being defeated in the melee. He says they fell back on the infantry and arrayed themselves on a small hill where they suffered an ineffective end, dwindling to the archery until they were too few to resist the final Parthian charge.<br>
<br>
As for Carrhae, Hannibal's infantry were too few to have encircled the Roman infantry alone. Infantry were also too slow to move to conduct that, thus the cavalry's battlefield mobility advantage. Roman fortified encampments in proximity of the battlefield often served as a rallying point for a defeated force (which had the resulte of saving the Romans from the mass of casualties suffered in the normal rout.<br>
<br>
At Adrianople the outcome of an infantry flank attack is much different from a cavalry attack smashing against. it. An infantry assault is more like the oceans incoming tide while a cavalry attack more like a rapid wave. Though an infantry flank attack has a good chance of defeating the Romans there is almost no chance of them being decisively defeated. the Romans with equal mobility can fall back.<br>
<br>
As for cavalry and routing my point was that heavy infantry up to modern times do not often cause a well ordered retreating enemy to rout. Time and again cavalry attacking an army attempting an orderly retreat turned it into a rout resulting inthe ehavier casualties.<br>
<br>
The other objection I have with the 'no batrlefield advantage' besides its absoluteness is the fact that throughout the Iron Age era commanders worked hard to ensure cavalry was on the battlefield to do preciseily the things it was better at than the infantry. Threaten enemy flanks, protecting your own, providing batlefield reconnaissance, providing battlefield mobility, the decisive charge, the covering charge, the pursuit or covering the retreat etc. If there was no advantage of cavalry commanders would not have bothered with it. They would have replaced a 500 strong cavalry unit and its horses with the 1000 man infantry force whose cost in supplies and equipment was almost the same.<br>
<br>
I do agree that in most cases well ordered, well trained and desciplined infantry will not be broken by cavalry. Infantry of that caliber is not always available, nor are they invulnerable in all conditions. Cavalry does have a battlefield advantage over infantry in some circumstances just as infantry does over cavalry in others. It is not at absolute.<br>
<br>
Oh well, not as short as i wanted. hey fascinating thread you are posting on in the military history section on Roman Battles. I'm monitering with great interest. <p></p><i></i>
