06-01-2010, 04:45 PM
Wow, this should generate some comments! Actually, while I do believe that the Greeks had a strong tendency toward mathematical ratios in all things (military as well as archetectural), I also think that the 3-1 ratio of sarisaphoroi to doryphoroi (hypaspists) in the armies of Philip II and Alexander III was an idealized, 'nominal' composition reported in the literature and that actual 'parade' ratios might well have varied somewhat. Still, seeking a fixed ratio of troop types probably wasn't a mere numerical fetish, but rather reflected tactical objectives of the early Macedonian phalanx. A 'strike wing' on the right which constitued at least 25% of the phalanx seems to have been a key component to link with the Companion horse in providing the offensive 'push' that broke enemy left wings on the way to victory after victory for the Macedonians. At times either the horsemen or the hoplites might play the larger role, depending on circumstances and opponent capabilities, yet it was a combined effort in the overall scheme of things. As for ratios outside of major actions, where only small forces were employed for a variety of tasks, I don't see why a fixed ratio of troop types would be applied. Surely, these 'task' forces were put together with a mind toward customizing them for the job at hand. That the force under discussion here was composed of 1,000 hypaspists and 3,000 phalangites is no sure thing, but the 4,000-man total certainly does fit suspiciously well with the aforementioned ratio and makes sense if even a semi-fixed combat were anticipated. I must say, however, that to think of committing cavalry against missile armed oppositon without screening light foot seems odd indeed (if this was the case - as suggested earlier, it's possible that skirmishers were included but simply not noted separate from the cavalry to which they were 'organically' attached).
Actually, Diodorus does provide some numbers for the Macedonian army prior to Alexander's expedition, citing 10,000 foot and 600 horsemen (XVI.4) in the expedition against Bardylis of Illyria in 358 (presumably used in the immediately preceeding campaign in Paeonia as well). I believe that the infantry cited here contained a heavy merceneary component as Philip is unlikely to have had much more than 6,000 native foot from Macedonia's lowland districts on hand (10,000 less the 4,000 'lost' as causalties and within captured highland districts as a result of his brother's recent defeat against Bardylis). The logical composition of this army was two 4,000-man increments of heavy foot (essentially one Macedonian and one mercenary, though there might have been some seeding of the latter into the former's ranks to steady men 'green' in the ways of phalanx fighting) plus 2,000 foot skirmishers for flank security and to screen in front of the cavalry. Later, after battlefield victory had restored the upland districts siezed by Bardylis, Polyaenus noted that Philip was able to double his manpower, though I would propose that this applied only to his native forces (another 4,000-man increment plus additonal horse and light foot) since his acquisition of the precious metal mines of Crenides still lay in the future and he probably lacked funds to do more than retain the hired men already had on hand.
As for the number of Macedonians at Chaeronea, I too wonder if the 24,000 figure applies, though it should be given some serious consideration. I certainly feel that there was a strong mercenary contingent present and that this could have been enough of a force to allow considerable reduction in estimates of native Macedonians required for this action. In particular, the number of hypaspists might be lower, since mercenary hoplites could easily be substituted for a part of their function in Philip's battle plan. Chaeronea is something on which my thoughts are still in the formative stage and I'm quite eager to hear what anyone has to say about it. At any rate, I do see a long tradition of mercenary employment by Philip II and wouldn't be at all surprised to find that his son used hired men for a portion of the guard left behind when he headed off to Asia (again, the hypaspist component of the army would have been one area especially well suited for filling with mercenaries). Regards, Fred
Actually, Diodorus does provide some numbers for the Macedonian army prior to Alexander's expedition, citing 10,000 foot and 600 horsemen (XVI.4) in the expedition against Bardylis of Illyria in 358 (presumably used in the immediately preceeding campaign in Paeonia as well). I believe that the infantry cited here contained a heavy merceneary component as Philip is unlikely to have had much more than 6,000 native foot from Macedonia's lowland districts on hand (10,000 less the 4,000 'lost' as causalties and within captured highland districts as a result of his brother's recent defeat against Bardylis). The logical composition of this army was two 4,000-man increments of heavy foot (essentially one Macedonian and one mercenary, though there might have been some seeding of the latter into the former's ranks to steady men 'green' in the ways of phalanx fighting) plus 2,000 foot skirmishers for flank security and to screen in front of the cavalry. Later, after battlefield victory had restored the upland districts siezed by Bardylis, Polyaenus noted that Philip was able to double his manpower, though I would propose that this applied only to his native forces (another 4,000-man increment plus additonal horse and light foot) since his acquisition of the precious metal mines of Crenides still lay in the future and he probably lacked funds to do more than retain the hired men already had on hand.
As for the number of Macedonians at Chaeronea, I too wonder if the 24,000 figure applies, though it should be given some serious consideration. I certainly feel that there was a strong mercenary contingent present and that this could have been enough of a force to allow considerable reduction in estimates of native Macedonians required for this action. In particular, the number of hypaspists might be lower, since mercenary hoplites could easily be substituted for a part of their function in Philip's battle plan. Chaeronea is something on which my thoughts are still in the formative stage and I'm quite eager to hear what anyone has to say about it. At any rate, I do see a long tradition of mercenary employment by Philip II and wouldn't be at all surprised to find that his son used hired men for a portion of the guard left behind when he headed off to Asia (again, the hypaspist component of the army would have been one area especially well suited for filling with mercenaries). Regards, Fred
It\'s only by appreciating accurate accounts of real combat past and present that we can begin to approach the Greek hoplite\'s hard-won awareness of war\'s potential merits and ultimate limitations.
- Fred Eugene Ray (aka "Old Husker")
- Fred Eugene Ray (aka "Old Husker")
