06-02-2010, 04:50 PM
I would propose that the hypaspists (I agree that this more common term is preferable, though I would point out in defense of Diodorus' alternate terminology that he is closer to being a contempory of Alexander than our other surviving sources) likely grew from a small base of professional bodyguards that Philip had retained prior to his becoming king (Parke in Greek Mercenary Soldiers, cites an ancedote from Carystius to suggest this contingent dated from at least 364). As for when the Macedonian army turned fully professional, I am not sure, but a date later than 358 would seem preferable. While Philip could have scrapped together the funds to hire a few thousand mercenaries on the cheap (see below), he surely lacked the greater sum required to pay his entire army, However, this would have soon become a necessity due to training demands and keeping his men well motivated alongside mercenaries doing the same jobs and getting money for doing them. Quite possibly, the campaign to Crenides in 356 was inspired almost entirely by his need for cash to pay both mercenaries and Macedonian regulars alike.
With regard to the mercenary force in 358, I don't think that there is a better way to explain either the sudden expanson (a virtual doubling) of Philip's infantry manpower compared to the previous campaign season nor the relatively high level of performance by his native troops, who (with the presumed exception of his personal guards) had absolutely no previous experience of phalanx warfare. And this was a unique moment for inexpensive hiring as well. Thousands of mercenary Greeks had begun losing their jobs in nearby Asia Minor when the Great Satraps' Revolt had run out of gas in 360; more specifically, a crucial group of these had just come free in 359 with the assasination of the last rebellious satrap, Datames. Datames is likely to have retained the Greek troops he inherited in Egypt from Iphicrates and these included not only hoplites but also a substantial force of men that Greek general had outfitted with sarissai and peltai. These were prototypes for the improved phalangites that Iphicrates' adopted brother, Philip II, later led to fame. Thus, we have a host of unemployed mercenaries returning from Asia via Macedonia and desperate for work at any price during the exact time Philip needed troops and with their precise skills (both hoplite and phalangite). It's far too much of a combination of circumstances to dismiss as mere coincidence. Philip would also have needed these men (especially the sarissaphoroi) to instruct and provide examples for his raw national levies. Indeed, this reflected a hard lesson learned by way of his maternal ancestor, Arrhabaeus (late 5th century warlord of Upper Macedonian Lyncestis), who had armed a large force of his skirmishers in 423 with hoplite gear only to see these green spearmen quickly routed by a better-drilled Greek phalanx.
I think that it's important in talking about the events of 359 to note that the native hypaspists were indeed 'picked men', but not yet 'elites' in any functional sense of that word. I don't have any problem with seeing nervous troops who had never before held spear or shield or stood in formation being quite glad to have a scattering of mercenary 'old sweats' in their ranks, whether these be members of the king's pezhetairoi or grizzled vets of the satrapal wars. This would apply with even greater force to the neophytes holding sarissai in Philip's new-style phalanx.
As for the lack of light infantry across the Danube, my suggestion remains that these might have gone unmentioned in being organically attached to the cavalry. This is not based on any posture assumed by the heavy infantry but rather by the description of an effective mounted action. Horsemen, especially 'shock' cavalry, would be committing suicice by charging at light missilemen of any sort without a preceeding screen of their own missile-armed skirmishers. Any riders not killed outright would likely have been rapidly turned into foot soldiers after their mounts (horses being huge targets) were shot down before ever being able to carry their masters into fighting range. - Regards, Fred
With regard to the mercenary force in 358, I don't think that there is a better way to explain either the sudden expanson (a virtual doubling) of Philip's infantry manpower compared to the previous campaign season nor the relatively high level of performance by his native troops, who (with the presumed exception of his personal guards) had absolutely no previous experience of phalanx warfare. And this was a unique moment for inexpensive hiring as well. Thousands of mercenary Greeks had begun losing their jobs in nearby Asia Minor when the Great Satraps' Revolt had run out of gas in 360; more specifically, a crucial group of these had just come free in 359 with the assasination of the last rebellious satrap, Datames. Datames is likely to have retained the Greek troops he inherited in Egypt from Iphicrates and these included not only hoplites but also a substantial force of men that Greek general had outfitted with sarissai and peltai. These were prototypes for the improved phalangites that Iphicrates' adopted brother, Philip II, later led to fame. Thus, we have a host of unemployed mercenaries returning from Asia via Macedonia and desperate for work at any price during the exact time Philip needed troops and with their precise skills (both hoplite and phalangite). It's far too much of a combination of circumstances to dismiss as mere coincidence. Philip would also have needed these men (especially the sarissaphoroi) to instruct and provide examples for his raw national levies. Indeed, this reflected a hard lesson learned by way of his maternal ancestor, Arrhabaeus (late 5th century warlord of Upper Macedonian Lyncestis), who had armed a large force of his skirmishers in 423 with hoplite gear only to see these green spearmen quickly routed by a better-drilled Greek phalanx.
I think that it's important in talking about the events of 359 to note that the native hypaspists were indeed 'picked men', but not yet 'elites' in any functional sense of that word. I don't have any problem with seeing nervous troops who had never before held spear or shield or stood in formation being quite glad to have a scattering of mercenary 'old sweats' in their ranks, whether these be members of the king's pezhetairoi or grizzled vets of the satrapal wars. This would apply with even greater force to the neophytes holding sarissai in Philip's new-style phalanx.
As for the lack of light infantry across the Danube, my suggestion remains that these might have gone unmentioned in being organically attached to the cavalry. This is not based on any posture assumed by the heavy infantry but rather by the description of an effective mounted action. Horsemen, especially 'shock' cavalry, would be committing suicice by charging at light missilemen of any sort without a preceeding screen of their own missile-armed skirmishers. Any riders not killed outright would likely have been rapidly turned into foot soldiers after their mounts (horses being huge targets) were shot down before ever being able to carry their masters into fighting range. - Regards, Fred
It\'s only by appreciating accurate accounts of real combat past and present that we can begin to approach the Greek hoplite\'s hard-won awareness of war\'s potential merits and ultimate limitations.
- Fred Eugene Ray (aka "Old Husker")
- Fred Eugene Ray (aka "Old Husker")
