07-21-2011, 08:43 PM
[quote="Epictetus" post=292179]
I've long wondered if some of this is Caesarean propaganda, portraying the disorder and confusion of democracy versus the firm control (and success) of autocracy. For example:
[quote]
You make a fair point, but i think that wasn't the case. We have to ask ourselves how did it occur that Pompey decided to go into battle? No doubt that he was in a better position. Backed up by the senate, with strategically better position of the camp, larger army and provisions of all kind. Caesar's position was the opposite. The only way he could have changed his position (ending hunger and low morale of his army) is if Pompey offered battle. Pompey mush have known this, and the fact who he was fighting against. He was, as i said, a calculated general. To enter in a battle with recruits and mercenaries (who haven't been trained in roman formation of great scale) against hungry veterans (10 years of constant warfare) who were fighting for their lives is a mistake some ill trained, and ill experienced general would do, not Pompey. Even more, his formation and tactics at Pharsalus show how untrained his army was.
When the armies were in formation, he didn't order an advance - which Caesar later said was a mistake, but actually, it was the best move in given time. He didn't order an advance because his army was untrained in battle march and his first line would, in a simple march, be broken and looked more like a letter S. (because of the different speed with which soldiers would march). After entering battle all he could do is try to outflank Caesar with his cavalry, a move no roman general would do in a pitched battle, but Pompey had to. (in fact it was Labienus' tactics)
We know for a fact that the senate in exile put pressure on Pompey to end Caesar. Some historians say that he did not have the 'political experience' to contradict the senate in this matter. For all his tactics show that he wanted to exhaust Caesar's army and force it to surrender. But he went into battle, accepting the plan of the senate. Contradictory, isn't it? My only regret is we will never find out what was going on in his mind when he ordered a battle cry. My guess is that he knew he would be defeated, but had to try something no man has tried and succesfully succeeded- to win a battle with cavalry.
I've long wondered if some of this is Caesarean propaganda, portraying the disorder and confusion of democracy versus the firm control (and success) of autocracy. For example:
[quote]
You make a fair point, but i think that wasn't the case. We have to ask ourselves how did it occur that Pompey decided to go into battle? No doubt that he was in a better position. Backed up by the senate, with strategically better position of the camp, larger army and provisions of all kind. Caesar's position was the opposite. The only way he could have changed his position (ending hunger and low morale of his army) is if Pompey offered battle. Pompey mush have known this, and the fact who he was fighting against. He was, as i said, a calculated general. To enter in a battle with recruits and mercenaries (who haven't been trained in roman formation of great scale) against hungry veterans (10 years of constant warfare) who were fighting for their lives is a mistake some ill trained, and ill experienced general would do, not Pompey. Even more, his formation and tactics at Pharsalus show how untrained his army was.
When the armies were in formation, he didn't order an advance - which Caesar later said was a mistake, but actually, it was the best move in given time. He didn't order an advance because his army was untrained in battle march and his first line would, in a simple march, be broken and looked more like a letter S. (because of the different speed with which soldiers would march). After entering battle all he could do is try to outflank Caesar with his cavalry, a move no roman general would do in a pitched battle, but Pompey had to. (in fact it was Labienus' tactics)
We know for a fact that the senate in exile put pressure on Pompey to end Caesar. Some historians say that he did not have the 'political experience' to contradict the senate in this matter. For all his tactics show that he wanted to exhaust Caesar's army and force it to surrender. But he went into battle, accepting the plan of the senate. Contradictory, isn't it? My only regret is we will never find out what was going on in his mind when he ordered a battle cry. My guess is that he knew he would be defeated, but had to try something no man has tried and succesfully succeeded- to win a battle with cavalry.
It is not these well-fed long-haired men that I fear, but the pale and the hungry-looking.
Fedja.
Fedja.
