Zama: The Battle That Never Was?

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There is far too much in this thread to respond to, but since Steven says it is the numbers that primarily interest him, I feel I must point out a possible numerical misinterpretation that he has repeated several times.

The second is Polybius’ comment that Hannibal’s third line and the Roman were nearly equal in number. 

This is NOT in fact what Polybius says. After telling us that that the beaten survivors of Hannibal's first two lines fled back toward the third line, he tells us that Hannibal did not admit them, so they were forced out to form up on the wings of the third line, while some fled into the open ground beyond ( as we might expect ).
Polybius goes on to say that it was the whole of the two "phalanxes" i.e the whole infantry lines that were 'nearly equal in numbers'. The Hastati, Principes and Triarii in a single line on the Roman side, and Hannibal's veterans and the remnants of the first two lines together in a single line on the Punic side.

Digression: Why did Hannibal force the first and second line survivors onto the wings to extend his line? He knew Scipio would use his favourite envelopment tactics by posting the fresh Principes and Triarii on his wings ( as he had done at Baecula, Ilipa, and Great Plains.) The surviving first and second line troops would prevent the third line veterans from being surrounded......

Hi all,
slightly off-topic, my 2 cents don´t come from sources knowledge and study but from attending a lesson from the most acknowledged expert of Hannibal and Scipio in Italy, Giovanni Brizzi, who studied their lives for more than 25 years and surely didn´t base his knowledge on Polybious only.
For the battle of Zama he reports the following numbers (sorry, for the numbers´ justifications you have to buy his books):
Hannibal
4000 Cavalry
36000 Infantry of which 15000 veterans from Italy, 11000 mercenaries from Mago, 10000 Libyan and Chartaginians conscripts  and 80 elephants.

The army from Scipio: he distinguishes primarily between heavy roman infantry (hastati, Principes and triarii) in the numbers of 16000 and the rest (including Massinissa´s infantry) as Levis thus not counting wrt the bulk of the battle. Plus cavalry.

Brizzi claims Zama to be the failed masterpiece of Hannibal which looses the battle although tactically dominating his opponent.
And now his reconstruction.

Wearing Hannibal´s shoes, he realizes that if Scipio would use Alexander´s tactics of anvil and hammer, the hammer being his vastly superior cavalry, there is no chance for the Punics. But Hannibal (who also studied his opponent´s victories) counts on two factors that can give him a chance: Scipio is an Infantry commander and his ego would push him to show his "master" that he was able to improve Hannibal´s tactics by using the scheme he brought to perfection at the Campi Magni.

Brizzi says that the use of the elephants was adopted by Hannibal not as a real strong punch to be followed by the infantry but as a way to induce Scipio to place his troops in columns instead of the usual chessboard disposition, while the punic cavalry is instructed not to get involved in the battle with the adversary cavalry and instead to soon fake a retreat to lure them as faraway as possible.

And while the first line of mercenaries and the second one of his compatriots march against the romans, he commands the third line to remain a stadion behind the second line so to impede Scipio´s tactics and even use it against himself.

So, after the elephants´ charge deploys and is neutrlized by the Velites, the Numidians and the noises from the Cornicem, when the dust from the moves settles down and Scipio is about to order his Principes and Triarii to open to the sides to encircle the Punics, he discovers with horror that the veterans cannot be caught in the maneuver, that his hastati are facing in columns the first 2 lines of Hannibal and that the enemy lines are now opening to the sides to encircle them. 

At this point Scipio must choose whether to open his army and thin the ranks or be destroyed with his own tactics.

Not everything goes as Hannibal plans for, since the rout of the elphants disrupts his cavalry´s organization on the right flank and the Hastati charge at the moment when some of the undiciplined mercenaries are falling down towards the second line instead of the side and are caught in the attack while brawling with the africans: a very difficult moment in which the losses should have accounted for 4/5 thousands against maybe a thousand legionaries. An acceptable sacrifice anyway.

Now, on extremely long and stretched lines, 16000 heavy infantry (the only ones that counted at that moment) are facing a force double in numbers with the veterans from Italy now pushing on the centre.

And it´s in this situation that, against all odds, by resisting beyond the unthinkable until the arrival of the cavalry, Scipio´s forces catch the unhoped-for victory.

Of the 20000 Chartaginian losses, the vast majority belonged to the veterans from Italy which, given the position, couldn´t run away.  

Please let me know your thoughts about this version of which I have seen no references in the discussion. But be aware that I can´t talk for Professor Brizzi...

Regards
Claudio