04-19-2002, 08:42 AM
Salve,<br>
<br>
The <i> clades Variana</i> was a major defeat, resulting in the loss of a significant portion of Roman military strength, but its implications on long term Roman military policy may have been more limited than at first sight seems to be the case. To the Roman eye a definite break with previous policy to conquer the Germanic north may not have been as apparent as to us, who have the benefit of hindsight. It may have been the result of a range of ad hoc decisions influenced by a range of considerations rather than a single strategic choice inspired by a single event. Augustus may have given up hopes of immediate reconquest and have advised his successor to leave the empire more or less what it was (thus securing his own image of greatness), but this did not prevent other emperors to seek new conquests.<br>
<br>
The Roman view of their empire was not so much one that held territories as well as one that consisted of people. It was more fluid than the modern concept of empires defined by geographical maps. Roman Dacia was for instance eventually evacuated, but the (relevant) people resettled on the western bank of the Danube where a new province of Dacia was created. The Roman empire also used various means and degrees of control. At various times parts of the empire were placed in the hands of client states and client tribes. Thus parts of the Germans across the Rhine would at certain times have been considered clients well within the sphere of Roman influence, though due to the social structure where arrangements and treaties were dependent on the personal relations between the two parties, void when one or both of them died, such influence was always tenuous. Roman power periodically and iregularly extended beyond the Rhine, though the looser nature of barbarian groupings made these extensions not permanent.<br>
<br>
Roman knowledge of the world outside the immediate borders of their empire was sketchy and they are likely to have been much less aware of the exact lay of the land than modern man with his better maps. Though lack of precise maps on a relatively small scale can still bug the modern military from time to time, due to aerial - and space reconnaissance the great outlines at least are known. Such knowledge was not available to the Romans. Though the territories within the borders could be measured and mapped with some degree of accuracy, the Romans faced huge difficulties when trying to figure out what was in the <i> barbaricum</i>. Our modern perception is so distorted by our better understanding of geography that there might be a tendency to see logical arrangements and conclusions where the Romans through lack of information would have been in the dark.<br>
<br>
Some reading on strategy, intelligence and establishment of frontiers<br>
<br>
Austin, N.J.E. and N.B. Rankov, <i> Exploratio. Military intelligence in the Roman world from the second Punic war to the battle of Adrianople</i> (London 1995)<br>
292p.<br>
Dilke, O.A.W., <i> Greek and Roman maps</i> (London 1985) 224p.<br>
Luttwak, E.N., <i> The grand strategy of the Roman Empire</i> (Baltimore 1976) 255p.<br>
Mann, J.C., 'The frontiers of the principate' in: <i> ANRW</i> II-1 (1975), 508-533.<br>
Mann, J.C., 'Power, force and the frontiers of the empire' in: <i> JRS</i> 69 (1979), 175-183.<br>
Mattern, S.P., <i> Rome and the enemy. Imperial strategy in the principate</i> (Berkeley 1999) 259p.<br>
Millar, F., 'Emperors, frontiers and foreign relations, 31 BC to AD 378' in: <i> Britannia</i> 13 (1982), 1-23.<br>
Sherk, R.K., 'Roman geographical exploration and military maps' in: <i> ANRW</i> II-1 (1974), 534-562.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/bromanarmytalk.showLocalUserPublicProfile?login=sandervandorst>Sander van Dorst</A> at: 4/19/02 10:45:39 am<br></i>
<br>
The <i> clades Variana</i> was a major defeat, resulting in the loss of a significant portion of Roman military strength, but its implications on long term Roman military policy may have been more limited than at first sight seems to be the case. To the Roman eye a definite break with previous policy to conquer the Germanic north may not have been as apparent as to us, who have the benefit of hindsight. It may have been the result of a range of ad hoc decisions influenced by a range of considerations rather than a single strategic choice inspired by a single event. Augustus may have given up hopes of immediate reconquest and have advised his successor to leave the empire more or less what it was (thus securing his own image of greatness), but this did not prevent other emperors to seek new conquests.<br>
<br>
The Roman view of their empire was not so much one that held territories as well as one that consisted of people. It was more fluid than the modern concept of empires defined by geographical maps. Roman Dacia was for instance eventually evacuated, but the (relevant) people resettled on the western bank of the Danube where a new province of Dacia was created. The Roman empire also used various means and degrees of control. At various times parts of the empire were placed in the hands of client states and client tribes. Thus parts of the Germans across the Rhine would at certain times have been considered clients well within the sphere of Roman influence, though due to the social structure where arrangements and treaties were dependent on the personal relations between the two parties, void when one or both of them died, such influence was always tenuous. Roman power periodically and iregularly extended beyond the Rhine, though the looser nature of barbarian groupings made these extensions not permanent.<br>
<br>
Roman knowledge of the world outside the immediate borders of their empire was sketchy and they are likely to have been much less aware of the exact lay of the land than modern man with his better maps. Though lack of precise maps on a relatively small scale can still bug the modern military from time to time, due to aerial - and space reconnaissance the great outlines at least are known. Such knowledge was not available to the Romans. Though the territories within the borders could be measured and mapped with some degree of accuracy, the Romans faced huge difficulties when trying to figure out what was in the <i> barbaricum</i>. Our modern perception is so distorted by our better understanding of geography that there might be a tendency to see logical arrangements and conclusions where the Romans through lack of information would have been in the dark.<br>
<br>
Some reading on strategy, intelligence and establishment of frontiers<br>
<br>
Austin, N.J.E. and N.B. Rankov, <i> Exploratio. Military intelligence in the Roman world from the second Punic war to the battle of Adrianople</i> (London 1995)<br>
292p.<br>
Dilke, O.A.W., <i> Greek and Roman maps</i> (London 1985) 224p.<br>
Luttwak, E.N., <i> The grand strategy of the Roman Empire</i> (Baltimore 1976) 255p.<br>
Mann, J.C., 'The frontiers of the principate' in: <i> ANRW</i> II-1 (1975), 508-533.<br>
Mann, J.C., 'Power, force and the frontiers of the empire' in: <i> JRS</i> 69 (1979), 175-183.<br>
Mattern, S.P., <i> Rome and the enemy. Imperial strategy in the principate</i> (Berkeley 1999) 259p.<br>
Millar, F., 'Emperors, frontiers and foreign relations, 31 BC to AD 378' in: <i> Britannia</i> 13 (1982), 1-23.<br>
Sherk, R.K., 'Roman geographical exploration and military maps' in: <i> ANRW</i> II-1 (1974), 534-562.<br>
<br>
Regards,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/bromanarmytalk.showLocalUserPublicProfile?login=sandervandorst>Sander van Dorst</A> at: 4/19/02 10:45:39 am<br></i>
