11-14-2010, 12:32 PM
Quote:We seem to have drifted from "Alexander the commander" to an overall "Alexander the man". For me, the last two posts seem to sum up the man as a whole.Both are well thought out and deserve our late lamented laudes.
But what of Alexander the commander? What military obstacles did he overcome compared to a Hannibal or a Pyrrhus, for example? What military innovations did he introduce? What battle tactics? ( new or otherwise)? Did he even have a military strategy beyond; "The next field looks greener, therefore attack it, destroy it and loot it", only stopping when he actually met significant military resistance ( in India)?He was an undoubted megalamaniac, who in the end perhaps genuinely believed his achievements surpassed those of Dionysius and Heracles, and were worthy of a God, but when we strip away legend, what military skills did he demonstrate? As a ruler, perhaps he deserves the sobriquet "Great"; as a 'military commander', I think not.......Alexander was like Gengis Khan, the fortunate inheritor of a superior military system.....
Alexander had to overcome many more challenges than Hannibal and Pyrrhus put together.
1. He inherited his kingdom at a very young age, so he had to first be able to convince his own men and then the rest of Greece and barbarian world that he was no puppy on a throne. With an iron hand he secured his position, earned his men's trust and love and the respect and fear of potential enemies and friends.
2. His campaigns soon brought him deep into the barbarian Balkans, where Phillip had never even thought of venturing before, clearly showing the extent of his ambition. He even crossed the Istros (Danube) and generally displayed shrewdness and remarkable ability in waging war against the number and variety of barbarian populations leaving in the north of Greece. Surely the tactics/strategemata he employed had little to do with those he used in the east against the Persians. As proof that he was not as "reckless" as we consider him to be (again forgetting how commanders of the era generally fought), he did not fight in the first line against the Illyrians, I don't remember him receiving wounds during that campaign nor did he storm himself any Greek city soon afterwards as he did later on. We can see how he fought the Illyrians, giving a reportedly stunning display of drill competence and then charge a terrified opponent, crossed the Danube in record time and against any expectations, used another successful stratagem to counter the Thracian carts rolling down the hill, quickly adopting to situations and even his swift comeback to Greece was no little deed. In so little time he succeded in practically terrorizing-subjugating-pacifying a huge region, a task no Greek ever had achieved before, Philip included. We generally tend to completely overlook this campaign, which proved his military, organizational, tactical and strategical genius and certainly armed him with invaluable experience and insight. The results of this campaign were critical as the barbarian threat was eliminated for many years to come. Even if for some reason Alexander had stopped there, getting murdered or something, he would still have been regarded as great as Philip...
3. Back in Greece he again showed political competence, he quickly and unequivocally crushed any thoughts of challenge, he (to my opinion) showed resoluteness and ability for administering strict punishment when he "did not object" to the raze of Thebes, keeping for himself the excuse that it was his allies who made the decision, a political and religious excuse that would have come handy if things did not go as planned. And then the preparation for his eastern campaign came...
Now, at this point we usually say "So, Alex took the army of his father, his father's tactics and generals and..." but
- Alexander and not Philip was the one who decided on the number and composition of the invading army. By now many of his generals (in the broad sense that we use the term in the Macedonian army of the era, more like commanders) were his and not Philip's Companions and allies. He had at his disposal troops that Philip did not, he had to learn how to field and co-ordinate them, how to use and keep them happy. The fact that he had devised a general plan of operation against Persians is evident in his first major battle at Granicus, where we can see the speed in which he completes a battleplan certainly different than any used against Greeks or Balkan barbarians.
- Alexander used his Companion cavalry in a way unattested in any battle of Philip. He had it accompanied by hamippoi, charge the enemy leaders (a very logical innovation since the Persian leaders were usually stationed in cavalry and not infantry units...), redeployed them from flank to flank according to need, kept them at reserve to guard against enemy light infantry, he generally used cavalry in a much more sophisticated way than any other Greek before him. But this is what he had to do to win, since cavalry was the arm of the enemy army he feared most. At Jaxartes, we see a huge tactical victory of Alexander against an opponent seemingly invulnerable and across a river (and not a stream as Granicus or Issus) that again had nothing to do with anything Philip ever had to deal with. Later on, his cavalry had to face and maneuver among elephants, again a challenge he came through victoriously. So, he adopted and used tactics his father did never devise or implement. And in the end, he also used Asian cavalry, even horse archers further broadening his scope of field tactics.
- Even his infantry tactics had to adopt to the changing circumstances. How many battles do we know of where Philip had to attack across a river or stream? At Gaugamela he used an oblique formation of phalangites along with a second line of heavy infantry moving obliquely... At Hydaspes he only used part of his phalanx in the main assault. His infantry faced chariot, cavalry and elephant assaults certainly prepared in advance as to how exactly they should deal with them. He often detached forces of Hypaspists, Comapnions and light infantry to quickly exploit opportunities. As for more details, he insisted that his men shave and cut their hair, he (according to Polyaenus) introduced the hemithorakion as his preferred armor, he may have made the sarissa longer, he surely was no stranger to innovation as further attested in his so-called "experimantal phalanx" which was of course not some experiment to change the phalanx but sheer adoption of a form of infantry array in order to fully exploit the tactical capabilities of a certain body of men against certain opponents.
4. As to challenges, Alexander had to face more and more varied opponents than Pyrrhus or Hannibal. He, of course, did not have to fight Romans, but :
- He fought Greeks (regular heavy spearmen with some competent cavalry)
- He fought Persians (less competent spearmen with a huge number of ligt troops archers, chariots, heavy and light cavalry)
- He fought Thracians, Dacians, Illyrians etc (Balkan barbarian, mainly infantry armies)
- He fought Scythians (purely light cavalry skirmishers)
- He fought Indians (spearmen, longbows, light chariots, trained war-elephants)
- He fought Phoenicians (regular spearmen)
- He fought a number of tribal armies in many places along the way...
Hannibal fought against Iberian barbarians and Romans, Pyrrhus against Greeks armed in the Macedonian fashion, hoplite Greeks, Romans and Carthaginians. One may claim that the Romans that Hannibal faced were by far the most competent army of all the above, another that Pyrrhus fought against equally competent Romans and sarissa armed armies. I would propose that it is always easy to attribute competence to those who won and incompetence to those who lost and as such decrease the fighting value of Alexander's enemies. Surely and objectively Alexander had to fight the most types of enemies under the most diverse of conditions, terrain etc.
- He fought against armies far stronger in number than his
- He fought against armies with seemingly tactical advantages (high grounds, rivers, open terrain - far less cavalry, mobility)
- He never is attested to have suffered defeat
- He never is attested to have lost an objective apart from moving on through India giving in to his men's wish to return.
Pyrrhus fought against armies usually as large as his, Hannibal also fought and won a great battle he had less army in (Cannae), although again we can diminish such a victory by whining about how the Roman army was incompetently commanded, hastily recruited etc . Hannibal showed extreme competence in fighting where he chose to, ambushing and obliterating Roman legions and getting advantageous positions in the battefields before the battle. Again one could propose that Alexander did not know how to get an advantageous battlefield and thus attribute his victories to fortune, but that is far from true. Alexander was the one seeking for battle as were the Romans against Hannibal. He who seeks battles usually has the disadvantage at the battlefield. On the contrary, Alexander showed remarkable ability to exploit every feature of the terrain, his army's capabilities and his enemies' weaknesses to turn his disadvantages into advantages. They both suffered defeat (Beneventum - Zama). They both lost many objectives, which strategically cost them the war...
- He had to fight or cross under enemy presence across streams (Granicus, Issus)
- ... sizable rivers (Hydaspes, Jaxartes, Istros)
- He had to march through hostile territories fit for ambush by the local barbrian enemies (Balkans, Afghanistan)
- He had to cross huge mountain ranges (the Hindokush) - a feat as great as Hannibal's crossing the Alps
- He had to march through deserts (Gedrosia)
- He took countless cities and fortresses by force and stratagem
Hannibal crossed the Alps, both have a very limited resume as experts in siege craft...
- He had to control vast areas
- He effectively annexed his conquests to his empire
- He had to secure his dominions as he campaigned on and deal with insurgents who wished to exploit his absence
- He organized an efficient administrative system to keep his exploits under control to produce supply and safeguard his supply lines in no time
- He built and organized countless cities to further establish his control
- He earned the respect/fear/love or better the obedience by any means of his newly conquered subjects
Hannibal was able to shift many Italians, Gauls and Greeks to his side but he easily lost control. He was unable to really keep open lines with Iberia. Pyrrhus was also unable to establish his hold over any of his dominions except his homeland. Italy, Sicilly, Macedonia... all were lost relatively quickly as was the support he enjoyed from his allies and subjects. Hannibal was not really a conqueror but he seems to have based his every ambition on destroying the Romans, Pyrrhus was a mercenary king with limited political ability. Both were also excellent commanders.
- He died still organizing more campaigns
- His body and memory was a prize for decades to come
Hannibal seems to have fallen into obscurity, a wanted man, never to rise again as a commander. Pyrrhus died in battle, not as honorably as he would have wanted but from a war wound, even if it was inflicted by an old woman with a roofing tile. Both were not really missed...
If Alexander was something that both Pyrrhus and Hannibal were not, this is successful. A megalomaniac? How do you define a "megalomaniac"? A man who feels the need to achieve great things? Then, yes, Alexander was one. But the word may also imply delusions of grandeur and certainly Alexander suffered from no delusions... I do not understand how Pyrrhus was not a "megalomaniac" or Hannibal just a "hate-driven idiot". In order to do great things or to be a conqueror one has to believe in oneself and have the drive necessary to go on. Alexander could have stopped in Byzantium... And Philip could have stopped at Thebes... Hannibal at the Alps, Pyrrhus in Greece, Caesar in Alesia, Napoleon in Austerlitz, Genghis Khan somewhere in Siberia... So what? Alexander was, like most such great men not a "megalomaniac" (a negatively charged term), just "megas". What about the deeds of Heracles and Dionysus? They both were not godly figures of myth but to Alexander and the Greeks of his time they were historical personas (they most probably were) who had campaigned to the east as Alexander did and were both not as successful as he was. They were later deified, as modern Christians ordain their saints. And what if Alexander wanted to be venerated as a God? So were so many other Greeks (and many more non-Greeks), even during their lives... And from all these, Alexander probably deserved this the most. To try to judge Alexander's apotheosis attempts with modern standards will really take us nowhere. According to our modern "humanitarian" ethical standards we pretend to believe in, he was a savage murderer and a delusional religious fanatic... And Caesar was a dictatorial fag and a mass murderer...
I do not understand how people can read about Alexander's countless battles and exploits and attribute them to luck?, other Generals? or some super powerful army that worked on its own... And while it is true that he in fact inherited a great army, I do not understand how this could be a factor, since so did most conquerors. Hannibal did not invent any new troops, nor did Pyrrhus, nor did Caesar or Leonidas. What makes anyone claim that we should only admire commanders of small, weak tribes with no military past? Those double standards seem to be very popular and I really do not understand them. If Scipio's problem was that Hannibal did not consider him a better commander, after Alexander and Pyrrhus, then how can we, learned arm-chair generals claim that Alexander not only does not deserve to be in that triad but that he was just a lucky megalomaniac mediocre commander who just happened to inherit a mighty army?
