Alexander the Great was antiquity\'s greatest commander

[Paralus]

Paralus wrote : But nothing near what his father faced. To use an Athenian comparison, Alexander succeeded Pericles whereas Philip found himself in the position of Conon post Aegespotami.

No, the challenges faced by Alexander were far more diverse than those faced by Philip. Philip might have organized a powerful Macedonian state and had he lived more, he might have done everything Alexander did and more. Yet, he died before being able to realize his Eastern campaign and so the comparison must be made accordingly.

And so in fifty-six words the work of Philip is consigned to an Alexandrian prologue of Justinian dimensions.

Comparisons, as is often said, are odious but one really wonders just what Alexander might have done if he were in Philip’s thoroughly unprepossessing position of 359. Philip died having achieved absolutely everything necessary for an Alexander to attempt what he did do.

When the great conqueror was being born his father was busy elsewhere dealing with a league that had used Macedon as a plaything; one whose territory was there to be taken piecemeal in return for the temporary support of the current monarch. Already he’d put an end to Bardyllis’ ambitions and the Paeonians’. All the while dealing with the “pretenders” supported by Thrace and Athens. His reign would see the constant development of the Macedonian forces – including the expansion of the “institution” of the hetairoi.

By the time Philip died he’d not only created the Macedonian State he’d established the Macedonian Empire in Europe. Greece was a lackey – legalistic comforts of Hellenic League aside – at the bidding of its master as subsequent events rammed home.

Alexander, no matter the achievement of his conquering, created little; certainly nothing like his father. For conquering is simply what he did: defeat the current regime and assume its position even whilst re-appointing its administrators so as to expedite more conquering.

How do you come to this conclusion? The most powerful state in Europe? Why not Carthage or Rome? Unchallenged on the battlefield? Why? Because Philip won at Cheronea?

Indeed because Philip won at Chaeronaea. Rome is not to be considered and Carthage is not, I’m afraid, in Europe. Macedon had trashed the best infantry available at Chaeronaea and was supreme. She was, as Philip walked into the theatre, unchallenged by any power.

Alexander and Antipater also had to fight against European opponents, so there were forces who doubted the Macedonian military might.

Alexander had to settle those who “were meditating a change of policy” in the north before he left. This was due, naturally, to the succession. What occasioned the Illyrians (and the unrest in Greece) was the “pothos” that Arrian says seized Alexander to cross the Danube – for no strategic purpose – and gut the Getae. Why? Because they’d collected at the river in case he attempted to cross. Others, later, would learn this was simply an invitation. They were there and, funnily enough, so were Alexander’s ships that had come up the Danube. So Alexander emboldened enemies to the south with an unnecessary excursus into the lands of the Getae because of his “pothos” (cf certain Indian tribes and the Arabs mentioned in earlier posts).

Antipater is, I’m afraid, an entirely different matter. With Greece “seething” Alexander continued to drain Macedon of its manpower for his eastern campaign. Amyntas had just left with yet another draft of Macedonian troops, mercenaries, et al when Memnon, seemingly, poked a Thracian ants’ nest too hard and rebellion was in the air. Whilst the Old Rope sorted this the Peloponnesians took their planned chance. Antipater was not in anything like the position of Philip at Chaeronaea and to compare it is to compare apples and oranges. By the time we get to Lamia that is apples and pits.

Of course he was at the battles and of course he led his army. But, he is not attested, even in those passages, to fight at the head of the cavalry or fight hand to hand. He always is in full tactical control of the situation somewhere among the lines. His "leading"his army does not imply his rushing against an enemy. All this has nothing to do with the image of Alexander fighting on the head of the Companion wedge, stabbing at his opponents, being the target of thrusts, storming walls, as we later hear in Asia...

The logic behind that is that, somehow, Alexander suddenly developed this “fighting on the head of the Companion wedge, stabbing at his opponents, being the target of thrusts” as a result of landing in Asia. I’m afraid that’s plain nonsense.

In the quotes presented Alexander is, like his father, leading the hypaspists. One suspects he is hiding out back when he leads “the agema and the hypaspists” at the enemy. The notion that he has to somehow be on horseback at “the head of the Companion wedge, stabbing at his opponents” to be heavily involved is a topos from the anabasis. Does one think he’s leading his infantry agema and the hypaspists on some parade drill? This is the king’s position on foot as much as in the ile basilikoi on horseback.

Claiming that this is different because it “has nothing to do with the image of Alexander fighting on the head of the Companion wedge, stabbing at his opponents” is, I’m afraid, horse-s..hair-splitting.

There are only two opportunities for Alexander to “storm cities” in Greece before he heads to his appointment with “madness” in Asia: Pelium and Thebes. At the first he was absolutely outmanoeuvred and had to rethink matters totally. At the second he is described as waiting for Thebans – Philip’s to be sure – to come to their senses (the Macedonian army surrounds the city). When they do not Alexander is described as “presenting himself now in one place now in another” as the city is taken.

Phlilip had only sent a small expeditionary force to incite the Ionian cities into rebellion. This was not the force of Alexander crossing the Hellespont of which we have details. Alexander commenced his campaign 2 years after his father's death making all the tactical decisions himself. Was he influenced by his father? Of course he was,

That “small” force was some 10,000. It is doubtful – in the extreme to my mind – that Alexander changed anything greatly at all. The army he inherited – yes I know you dislike that but fact is, I’m afraid, fact – was his father’s and commanded by his nobility. Whilst Alexander could – and did – eliminate any and all threats to his regnal position, he could hardly do so within the army. Acclaimed, at Antipater’s instigation, he bought Parmenion and secured the loyalty of the current command. Suggestions that he made any major changes to an invasion underway (via the expeditionary advance force) and the Macedonian army should remain just that: suggestions. Alexander needed the support of the barons; he could ill afford to begin wholesale necking and replacement of same.

First of all there was no such thing as a "strategos" in the Macedonian army. There were many subordinate commanders who took part in the war councils and were trusted with various tasks and responsibilities. Parmenion was of course not Philip's "only general", nor was he Alexander's. And his son was one of Alexander's, not Philip's. You are trying to find parallels were there are none. What we are calling "Generals", as I already mentioned in my initial position is nothing more than "subordinate commanders". And of all these, of course Parmenion stood out for his ability, experience and loyalty. And among these able men, some were old guard (like Antigonus and Cleitus the Black) and others belonged to the Young Guard (Hephaesteon, Philotas or Perdiccas).

Semantics are of no interest: call them what you will. Alexander’s securing of the “non-general” Parmenion is plain (my reference was to Philip’s famous quote). Deprecate the position of the other “hegemones” as you will but Parmenion’s family had the gonads of the army plain and simple.

Philotas was older than Alexander and a syntrophos of Amyntas Perdikka. If there is any historicity to the story told by Plutarch, Alexander can have harboured little love for him. Subsequent events clearly support that lack of love. Alexander’s man? I think not. Hephaestion is irrelevant: he holds no position of any merit until he commands the agema of the hypaspists at Guagamela. Again, the bulk of the hegemones are, in no way, “Alexander’s men” until after 331 when they inexorably rise to the top. Rising at the expense of which house?

Alexander had to use and coordinate Agrianians, Paeonians, Thracians, Southern Greek infantry and cavalry. Actually the Macedonians in his army were only a minority (12.000 pezetairoi, some 2.000 etairoi and a number of light troops). Had Alexander any experience in commanding such non-homogenous armies? Maybe yes, maybe not. We know that Philip had Greek allies at Cheronea but their role in the battle is completely unknown.

And so we touch on that which has been ignored all this time: the poor attestation of Philip’s campaigns. You see we no longer possess the histories of period. We do not possess an Arrian for his time and so make do with an abridged Reader’s Digest of those histories via Diodorus.

Anyone who seriously conceives of 24,000 or more Macedonian infantry at Chaeronaea needs to seriously rethink matters. Philip is hardly to have denuded Macedon of infantry whilst he campaigned to the south. Taking a majority, he will also have taken those liable to make trouble: Illyrians, Thracians, Paeonians, etc just as his son did. He also made great use of mercenaries. Suggestions that the Agrianians were only used by Alexander are only that: the relationship described in Arrian clealr existed under Philip.

As for the southern Greek infantry (the “League” infantry), they were never trusted with front row seats it seems.

What we do know is that Alexander took these men and was able to competently marshal them all the way to India. And what does it really matter? Are you proposing that Alexander just sit back and enjoyed the ride up to Hydaspes? That this war machine operated on its own, just because half of it was well-oiled by Philip? I guess that there is little parthenogenesis in most army compositions.

*Thud* The sound of the ‘keeper’s gloves taking the cricket ball.