Spartan hype?

[hoplite07]

Okay, theres these guys on this one comic website saying basically that Sparta was full of morons and that they sucked. They say the only reason they won battles was because of their rep as being 'the best' which really wasnt true, as they said. They also mentioned Sparta was slow on adopting new tactics and thats why they lost against the Thebans in the 4th century BC.

Someone help me here.

-thx.

[PMBardunias]

What is the website? I don't think you are the one who needs help :wink:

The idea that Spartans were slow to adopt new Theban tactics is to not realize that the tactics were specifically designed to counter Spartan superiority on the battlefield. A 50 rank phalanx of Homoioi would have been less than 20 ranks wide in 362- not so impressive.

Considering that Mantinea was the biggest draw in the ancient world, the Spartans and Mantineans did quite well in killing Epaminondas and all the other Thebans with the authority to carry on his hegemony. The problem lay more with the Athenians on the other wing failing to capitolize on the mayhem to their right.

[hoplite07]

Yeah, someone said that the Spartans had more numbers, but the Thebans still beat them because they formed a deeper phalanx which broke the Spartans' line of defense. And they said the Spartans were dumb because they never employed any tactics like this at all.

And what u said about the Thebans is what I thought that they had to study the Spartans after all these years and they finally broke their code, and the Spartans who didnt expect the Thebans to employ such tactics went in with a normal phalanx and lost. Not to mention though, Sparta was pretty much screwed after the earthquake in 464, and I read that it highly effected their military well-being.

[Paullus Scipio]

I wouldn't bother with a website that put forth such un-informed views if I were you, Brazelton.
The Spartans were the leading proponents of Hoplite warfare, and anyone studying their battles at the height of their power rapidly realises their tactical skills, sophisticated drill and manoeuvres and clear superiority to other Hoplite armies generally.
Epaminondas' "battering ram" approach was achieved at the sacrifice of their allies ( the Spartans too could be this ruthless).It was the culmination of Theban tactics going back to the battle of Delion (424 B.C. ). It was used, like Napoleonic french conscripts in column, because the Thebans were not able to drill as well as Spartans in line, and to boost morale.
At Leuktra, the Theban "battering ram", some 50 deep, was stopped in its tracks by the cream of the Spartan army ( on the right) including the Hippeis, in line, just 12 deep or 6 once closed up.This was despite being disorganised by their own retreating cavalry, and being caught mid-manouevre ( they were attempting to extend their line in order to envelop the deep Theban column, but Pelopidas saved the Theban day by seeing what was happening and leading the Sacred Band forward at the double, to forestall this.) King Cleombrotus was an early Spartan casualty, and was carried from the field dying, which proves the Spartan line, despite the afore-mentioned handicaps, was holding its own.Eventually, and in desperation, Epaminondas utters his famous "grant me one pace forward, and we'll have victory!"
It was narrowly won, and of the 700 Homioi present, some 400 including most of the 300Hippeis around the King died where they stood.
Sound to you as if the Spartans had lost any of their prowess?
It is true though, that the Spartans conceded the battle by formally asking a truce to recover their dead. For his part, Epaminondas did not attack the Spartan camp, and they departed unmolested.
As to numbers, while the Spartans and their allies outnumbered the Thebans and their allies, both sets of allies were reluctant to get involved and the actual battle was between 4,000 Thebans and 2,540 Spartans in their Morai.
If Epaminondas' master stroke was to put his best troops on the left, and not the traditional right, so as to oppose the Spartan cream, he was very lucky to prevail. Lucky the Theban cavalry drove the Spartan cavalry back into their own men, lucky Pelopidas spotted that the Spartans were manouevring to overlap the column and prevented it, lucky that King Cleombrotus was mortally wounded early on.
The Spartans despised the Theban crude tactics, saw what the Thebans were doing and manouevred ( while the enemy column approached !! ) to counter it, and were unlucky not to succeed. They knew perfectly well what to do , and were not "dumb" - whoever suggested that merely demonstrated their own lack of knowledge.
If they made a mistake, it was that their long list of victories led them to think they could do what they liked, manouevre-wise, and that they would always have the initiative.
Epaminondas achievement was to seize the initiative, and demonstrate that the Spartan army was not invincible, as most of Greece believed it to be.

[Zenodoros]

I believe I have come across the website before... nothing more than a miniatures wargamer that thinks Thebes deserves the limelight of the Spartans... he just took it a bit too obssessively. :wink:

[Aetius Helvius Merula]

^Yeah, you've got that right...jeesh, these people frighten me a little! If the Spartans 'sucked' so much, how'd they get such a fearsome reputation, and why do people 2400 years later still talk about them so much?

Okay, theres these guys on this one comic website saying basically that Sparta was full of morons and that they sucked. They say the only reason they won battles was because of their rep as being 'the best' which really wasnt true, as they said. They also mentioned Sparta was slow on adopting new tactics and thats why they lost against the Thebans in the 4th century BC.

Someone help me here.

-thx.

Links, hoplite07, just for laughs?

[Paullus Scipio]

..doubt it is the same site, zenodoros, since Brazelton refers to "a comic website" and "they", but it hardly matters since no doubt there are plenty of websites like that out there, spouting un-informed opinions.

...hope he posts the links, it might be fun to see what other'gems' this site has to offer... )

[geala]

I would agree that Sparta sucks (I don't like this state :wink: ).

But to be honest: a too technical view to battles and military history in general is always problematic. It results in commonplaces like: the Romans beat the Greeks because of the flexible legions, the English beat the French because of the famous longbow, blablabla. There are many more conditions that influence the going of history.

Each battle has to be examined carefully. As is mentioned before, Leuktra and Mantinea were no clear victories of an ingenius army over dumb fools. The Theban tactics were special and prone to fail, depending on the circumstances.

Sparta faced indeed more and more problems in the 4th and 3rd century. One was the growing use of epilektoi hoplites by other states. The Sacred Band of Theban is just one example. These warriors were at least as good as the Spartans. No classical Greek phalanx army (except perhaps the Spartans) would have been able to solve the problems of the Thebans at Leuktra, when their attack was stopped. Pelopidas realized the problem and (and underlined) was able to lead the Sacred Band at the right place; that sounds easy, but it was really a great feat in phalanx combat.

Another problem was that the "myth" (myths don't come from nothing, Sparta had earned the fame of invincibility by deeds) of the Spartan hoplites eroded more and more. It started in the Peloponesian war. For example at Sphakteria 425 BC the Athenians (800 hoplites, 800 peltasts, 800 archers and about 6000 rowers) were first very reluctant to attack the Spartans (420 hoplites plus helots) because of their fear of Spartan hoplite invincibility. That fear was partly gone in the 4th c. BC.

And a very real problem was the loss in manpower that Sparta faced. The number of Spartan homoioi (full members of the leading fighting class) decreased more and more due to battle losses, low fertility and esp. poverty of many former members (corresponding with growing wealth of few others). One of the biggest weaknesses of the Greek poleis was always the restrictive manner with which the right of citizenship was handled. In Sparta the problem was doubled. Trials of reforms in Sparta in the 3rd c. BC failed more or less.

Pure battle tactics were not the main problem and would not have been the solution for Sparta.

[PMBardunias]

I admit off the bat to being a Laconophile, but to me Epaminondas gets too much credit for tactical genius. His true genius was political.

Lets see what he is usually credited with by the casual historian:

The deep phalanx- this should go to Pagondas, not Epaminondas.

The use of the Sacred band as cutting edge to his phalanx- Pelopidas, who deserves far more respect.

Attacking in echelon at Leuktra- I'm not sure this really ever happened. The Thebans may have simply outstripped the other troops in their hasty and opportune advance.

Strengthening his left wing- Brasidas did this before Amphipolis.

The one thing he did do was attack the Spartans directly as the "head of the snake". This was as much a political move as a tactical one. The creation of Megalopolis as well shows his political/strategic genius.

When it comes to the battlefield, Epaminondas stood on the backs of other tactical geniuses.

[Paullus Scipio]

Well said, Geala ! a most incisive post, and a laudes for you !
And also Bardunias - Epaminondas' skills were most definitely more political than military, but to be fair he did acknowledge his debt to Pelopidas (IIRC). A laudes for you too !!

[qcarr]

Laudes to all for this discussion! Leuctra is a fascinating battle in that it certainly could have gone either way. Give credit to the Thebans for pulling off a significant victory.

The Spartans were beaten, but certainly weren't crushed as Xenophon states in A History of My Times, VI.4.14-VI.4.15:

"Nevertheless, although many had been killed and they had suffered a defeat, once they had crossed the ditch in front of their camp, they halted and grounded arms at the place from which they had started out... And at this point there were some Spartans who could not bear to contemplate what had happened and who said that they ought to prevent the enemy from putting up a trophy and that, instead of recovering the bodies of their dead under a truce, they ought to win them back by fighting."

Sounds like there were still plenty of Spartans with the will to fight and the left of their line never came to grips with the enemy. What would have happened in a second engagement? Running an accurate simulation would be interesting indeed! In the end, cooler - and probably wiser - heads prevailed and the Spartans asked for a truce.

[PMBardunias]

Paullus: I noted that you portray the Spartans as engaging the enemy in Demi-phylae of 6 men. Can you tell me why you believe this was so? (as opposed to deploying into full phylae from enomotia)

Paul

[Paullus Scipio]

"Paullus: I noted that you portray the Spartans as engaging the enemy in Demi-phylae of 6 men. Can you tell me why you believe this was so? (as opposed to deploying into full phylae from enomotia)

Paul"

.....(sigh! ) roll:
However, I have been studying ancient warfare for more than 35 years, continuously, and have not reached certain conclusions without a lot of thought. That does not mean I can refer to 'certainties' - there are none, short of the "time-machine" referred to elsewhere - merely what I believe to be the most inherently likely, given what few pieces of information are there. Studying ancient history in particular is fraught with frustration at just how little data we have to play with - I have likened it elsewhere to trying to do a jigsaw with large numbers of pieces missing !! Which is half the fun, I guess.

I'm afraid a full answer to your question would take up a thesis, on its own, and involve the study of everything we are told about the Spartan Army, and consideration and weighing up of all surviving ancient drill manuals, not to mention personal experience in drill and drill instruction, but I shall try to give a short answer.

I shall assume you are familiar with Spartan military practices. The depth of the phalanx depended on the number of age classes called out. At Leuctra, we know the Spartan phalanx was drawn 12 deep (Xenophon tells us so ), thus each enomotia in 3 files.The tricky part is that we are not told directly the interval between files -"open" (6ft) or "closed"(3ft)
The later Makedonian Phalanx drew up 16 deep in "open order" to manouevre, but "closed up" to 3ft, 8 deep, to fight (see Arrian et al), by the rear half of the file filling the intervals, on the 'shield side'.This corresponds to Xenophon's forming each file (he uses the word lochos) in twos (or half files)- see Cyropaedia. Xenophon also tells us elsewhere that the ten thousand were able to open their ranks at Cunaxa to let cavalry etc go through harmlessly, and that Agesilaus does the same at Coronea to let Thebans through. In addition, the "laconian countermarch" to the rear is done just like a modern military band reversing direction, and this requires intervals between men. This, and much more, convinces me that manouevre was carried out in "open order" i.e. 6ft intervals.
However, like everyone else, combat took place in close order - a continuous 'shield wall' - see both Xenophon and Thucydides.This means "close order" (3ft ), with the rear half of the file closed up i.e. 6 deep. Xenophon also tells us the Spartan view on depth through the fictional words of Cyrus in the Cyropaedia; "When a phalanx is too deep for the men to reach the enemy with their weapons, what harm do you think they do to the enemy or good to their friends? ". A depth of six would allow , say, the three front ranks to engage, two ranks to replace casualties plus the 'file-closers' in the sixth rank to keep order.

Convinced ?? ) )

[PMBardunias]

.....(sigh! ) I shouldn't have mentioned this, because it will likely start yet another debate.

I can hear the violins :wink: I can tell a fellow lover of tactical discussion when I see one.

I see where you are coming from, but I don't agree for a variety of reasons. First off, I don't believe that the most important designation that the Greeks had for their formation, depth of ranks, did not refer to the strength they engaged in. When Isocrates speaks of the Spartans forming in one rank for battle, your scheme would have them deployed in half-men. (Everyone knows that only Athenians were half-men) A corrolary of this is that I do not believe hoplites, other than perhaps Spartans, could pull off a deployment like you describe in the face of the enemy.

Reguardless of the depth they formed in prior to battle, as they advanced, sometimes rapidly and over a few hundred meters, they invariably bunched together. The fact that when the shield is raised in front your body is a bit twisted right and the urge to get behind the overhang of the shield to your right combine to cause packing and the right-drift described by Thukydides. By the time the two lines engaged there would be no room for men to filter inbetween the files.

I am a bit leery of Arrian and his description of phalanx tactics. He was far removed and well versed in another tactical doctrine which must have clouded his interpretation. Se the thread on Testudo in the roman section for a paper that discusses Arrian.

The Cyropaedia is another suspect source if only because he is clearly drawing on traditions beyond simple Greek tactics. The line you quoted about depth would make fools of The Thebans and their deep phalanx.

The heart of this difference in opinion obviously devolves to our interpretation of Othismos- which is another thread I recently commented on, linking to a critique I made of Goldsworthy's paper.

[Paullus Scipio]

.....(sigh! ) I shouldn't have mentioned this, because it will likely start yet another debate.

I can hear the violins :wink: I can tell a fellow lover of tactical discussion when I see one.

Oh, alright...you got me !

I see where you are coming from, but I don't agree for a variety of reasons.

Of course you don't !......and we can debate until doomsday without reaching consensus........ ( .

First off, I don't believe that the most important designation that the Greeks had for their formation, depth of ranks, did not refer to the strength they engaged in.

No disagreement there. Thet spent most (90%?) of their time moving around in a file 12 deep - on the road, forming up for battle, advancing, letting skirmishers through forward and later to the rear....etc .

When Isocrates speaks of the Spartans forming in one rank for battle, your scheme would have them deployed in half-men. (Everyone knows that only Athenians were half-men)

Silly argument! "Half men" indeed! :lol:

A corrolary of this is that I do not believe hoplites, other than perhaps Spartans, could pull off a deployment like you describe in the face of the enemy.

Nonsense, I could teach recruits to do this type of manouevre by ranks i.e. open order to close order and back in half an hour( and have done! ), let alone by files/half-files, which is much easier. Xenophon describes how it was practised by the files going to their mess etc.The Ten Thousand, hoplites from all over Greece, and not Spartans don't seem to have had any trouble moving from open to close order and vice versa.
Any Hoplites could do this in a heartbeat. wink:

Reguardless of the depth they formed in prior to battle, as they advanced, sometimes rapidly and over a few hundred meters, they invariably bunched together.

Maybe, but you should quote sources for such an assertion - and I don't mean Thucydides assertion about the 'tendency' to drift right, which is not the same thing as 'bunching'. Can you give examples from battle accounts ? And if so, are they exceptional?

The fact that when the shield is raised in front your body is a bit twisted right and the urge to get behind the overhang of the shield to your right combine to cause packing and the right-drift described by Thukydides. By the time the two lines engaged there would be no room for men to filter inbetween the files.

Quite right ! Once the half-files moved up into close order 'shield to shield', no manouevre other than advance was possible - one of the main reasons to do this, along with creating a solid fighting 'wall'.......so your psiloi had better have been recalled before you closed up !!

I am a bit leery of Arrian and his description of phalanx tactics. He was far removed and well versed in another tactical doctrine which must have clouded his interpretation.

Why ? He had obviously studied the subject and had access to more and better sources than you and I. His and the other 'drill manuals' are really all we have to go on, so why disregard them in favour of modern, totally theoretical ideas ??.

Se the thread on Testudo in the roman section for a paper that discusses Arrian.

Yes read it , and ??....
The Cyropaedia is another suspect source if only because he is clearly drawing on traditions beyond simple Greek tactics.

You want to hose down another primary source ??? :roll: :roll:
And if you read it carefully, he is describing hoplite warfare, almost pure and simple, and in particular addressing the Thebans and their tactics, as well as what the Spartans should do in his fictional battle of "Thymbrara". This has long been accepted by authorities on the subject see e.g. J.K. Anderson " Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon" 1970 .

The line you quoted about depth would make fools of The Thebans and their deep phalanx.

Which is what Xenophon was trying to do...He and the Spartans knew that despite Leuctra, the Theban column was a bad tactical idea, easily countered as Xenophon describes....

The heart of this difference in opinion obviously devolves to our interpretation of Othismos- which is another thread I recently commented on, linking to a critique I made of Goldsworthy's paper.

No, othismos is a separate subject, dealing with what may have happened when two lines in close order physically clashed. The idea that a line hundreds of metres long could exert a concerted shove is plain nonsense in my view - see the thread 'Late Roman formations' for a lengthy debate on this. That 'shoving' by groups here and there took place is possible, even likely, see e.g. footage of riots, but on a co-ordinated lengthy front, never !! - read your critique with interest,BTW..

If I were to accept your premise, that Hoplite armies ( with the possible exception of the Spartans) were incapable of doing anything other than forming up/advancing in close order, then how do you explain troops opening up to allow psiloi through, or cavalry etc ?
How do you explain 'counter-marching' ?
'Doubling' (a.k.a halving) the file ?
Each lochagoi leading his file 'two by two'? - Cyropaedia
The references to files of 'tens and fives', and 'twelves and sixes' ? - ibid
The Ten Thousand's "Battle formation" i.e. close order as four deep?.....
I could pose many more similar questions..... D lol: