The Fall of the Roman Empire by Peter Heather (review)

[markusaurelius]

My review of Peter Heathers book, “The Fall of the Roman Empireâ€

[Robert Vermaat]

markusaurelius\\n[quote]When you start to see the core of Peter’s arguments you find yourself playing the “what ifâ€

[Virilis]

I have read this book also about a year ago. The "forte" of the book is in my opinion the writers knowledge about germanic / gothic peoples. The main weakness is perhaps the lack of deeper understanding of the late roman society.

I re-read the Michael Grant`s (a great populizer of history) "The Fall of the Roman Empire" last summer and found the non-sensationalist listing of the factors affecting "the fall" to be quite credible. The chapters in the book are:

-the failure of the army
-the gulfs between the classes
-the credibility cap
-the partnership that failed
-the groups that opted out
-the underminig of effort

In my opinion we don`t necessarily need a new wawe of "relative histories" ("in fact goths were highly cultured" etc.) to understand the fall of the western part of the empire, yet again new interpretations are always welcome (but not necessarily better) :wink: ...

[markusaurelius]

I think you both raise some important points to counter Peters book.

The problem I have is that the later Roman empire had less "internal strife" than the 3rd Century did, yet it survived then. I think if the Barbarians had not pushed across the borders, and if the Romans had won a few of the key battles that started the landslide down hill then I think we would have seen an empire that lasted as long as the East had. The same Roman system had survived, Emperos assasinations for centuries before the final fall in the 5th Century.

One of Peter's arguments is the fact that the East survived relatively unharmed. The East did no suffer long term economic losses from the attacks. The West lost Africa and Spain, both rich areas of tax revenue. The continuous plundering in the Northern provinces also slowed their production down as well. I also think that as the army continued to fail to make the killing blow to the barbarians, the local people would have slowly started to loose faith in that Army to continue in its capacity.

I agree that the late Roman army was no barbarian force. It still had a substantial leg up on the other armies, however as Peter shows, the newly revitalized border barbarian nations certainly were more advanced than their 2nd Century counterparts that Hadrian battled.

It definitely is a complex period and may not be as simple as Peter puts it. I do have find his logic appealing.

[Virilis]

The problem I have is that the later Roman empire had less "internal strife" than the 3rd Century did, yet it survived then.

You`re right, Markus, it is a bit more complicated than people usually think. I think it is impossible to isolate centuries and look at them like a separate artefacts. For example the effects of the third century were especially felt in the fourth century, despite the seemingly recuperation...

[Theodosius the Great]

Avete Markus et Virilis,

The problem I have is that the later Roman empire had less "internal strife" than the 3rd Century did, yet it survived then.

You`re right, Markus, it is a bit more complicated than people usually think. I think it is impossible to isolate centuries and look at them like a separate artefacts. For example the effects of the third century were especially felt in the fourth century, despite the seemingly recuperation...

According to what I read the explanation seems much simpler and I've revised my original conclusion which was that the 4th century was more peaceful internally and therefore civil wars were less costly to Rome. The first part is true but not the second.

This has to do with Diocletian's and/or Constantine's reorganization of the classical legions into Comitatenses and Limitanei. When the Comitatenses, or field armies, battled each other in civil wars the outcome was a much bloodier affair than in prior civil wars from the third century. The 3rd century was more chaotic but the forces available to every would-be emperor were tiny by comparison.

By the fourth century the empire could not endure civil wars as frequently as it had in the past because it would involve far larger battles and, therefore, more casualties. So, IMO, the military brittleness of the empire in the fourth century has little to do with the effects of the third century crisis. Sic transit gloria mundi

~Theo

[markusaurelius]

Interesting points Theo. Makes sense to me. I think there is obvious evidence that MANY factors played a roll. The dice just happened to put them all on the same table, which is why the Empire fell.

Such is Fate.

[Paullus Scipio]

Markus wrote:-

I think there is obvious evidence that MANY factors played a roll. The dice just happened to put them all on the same table, which is why the Empire fell.

...exactly so ! Whilst we all yearn for simple, easy to understand answers to questions like this, the reality is that a myriad factors all play their part in driving events, which is why the "what ifs?" postulated earlier might well have influenced events to a different outcome.....

[Robert Vermaat]

So, IMO, the military brittleness of the empire in the fourth century has little to do with the effects of the third century crisis.

I disagree. The military structure of the 4th century is a direct evolution from the events of the 3rd century.

The brittleness of the military of the 4th c. was, imho, also a direct rsult of the heavy blow that was dealt to the military during the constant wars of the 3rd c. This was when the traditional legionary/auxilia structure was shattered, many legions desintegrated from the constant need for vexillations being sent to yet another pretender or yet another failed border defense.

Also, the constitutional situation of the 4th c. was a direct result of the problems of the 3rd c. For one, the need to split up the empire in two sometimes more parts was an answer to the ungovernable situation during the 3rd. c. This then took a full century to settle, for most emperors never wanted to accept this split into two equal parts, with much internal strife as a result.

The unlawlessness and myriad of pretenders also had their effect on the military during the 4th c. and after (the military stricktly supporting a dynastic family as sole inheritors of the throne) was a direct result from the many pretenders of the century before that.

Remember also that the 4th c. saw a new policy of short-term hiring of barbarian troops, which were needed to fight the internal battles between both halves of the empire.
This slowly evolved into such troops being needed on a semi-permanent bais, resulting first under Gratian and Theodosius in agreements where such groups could settle within the empire under their own leadership. This then took a century before the switch was made from allegiance from the main allegiance to the emperor to the local king. End of Empire.

[markusaurelius]

One thing that struck me from Peter's argument was the Persians. His argument for the restructuring of the army was as a direct result of the devastating wars against Persia (As I recall an emperor was captured and killed by them). They needed a more mobile and Larger standing army.

I also think that the recruitment of barbarians had happened a lot prior as well. Caesar himself used barbarian "allies" to help swing the tide of a battle if required. However by the 5th Century the standing arm had been so devastated (Peter estimates that 30,000 of the professional soldiers were killed at Hadrianople), that they had to rely more and more on the barbarian armies. Peter also argues that these barbarians were also more evenly armed and equipped due to their economic growth and close connection with the Roman frontier.