Sacred Band of Thebes

[PMBardunias]

The most interesting thing to me is when the Sacred Band is moved from forming as a veneer of trained troops along the front of the phalanx to their own unit deployed on a more narrow front. I think this was to directly counter the Hippeis, which by that date may have been the only purely Spartiate unit on the battlefield.

[Ghostmojo]

The most interesting thing to me is when the Sacred Band is moved from forming as a veneer of trained troops along the front of the phalanx to their own unit deployed on a more narrow front. I think this was to directly counter the Hippeis, which by that date may have been the only purely Spartiate unit on the battlefield.

Possibly - depending upon how large or small you consider a unit to be. In the early 4thC BC when The Sacred Band appears; Lakedaimonian armies certainly contained sections of Spartiates; other Spartans; Periokoi etc. - but I would guess that the smallest units or Enomotia (sworn bands) still had their basis in the communal mess of 32-36 men. Therefore, these smallest 'units' would still be Spartiate. How many of them remained pure up to the next level is again guesswork but I would argue that Pentekosties (72 men) could easily have been entirely Spartiate - and even further up to a Lokhos (144 men). After all, these units are still smaller than the Hippeis size.

Once we get up to a Mora the problem becomes more acute. Where they composed of separate entirely Spartiate and entirely Periokoi Lokhoi? Possibly/probably ...

But in apologising to the original poster who may feel their thread has been hijacked by Spartanophiles like us - I too have an interest in The Sacred Band of Thebes - not least its name. Was it borrowed from the Carthaginian unit of the same name?

Why was it considered 'sacred'? Did the Thebans sanctify institutional pederasty in such a manner?

[Paralus]

I too have an interest in The Sacred Band of Thebes - not least its name. Was it borrowed from the Carthaginian unit of the same name?

Why was it considered 'sacred'? Did the Thebans sanctify institutional pederasty in such a manner?

Plutarch is the source for the derivation of the name. It was also called the "city band" after its domicile on the Cadmeia:

Plut.Pelop. 18.1
The sacred band, we are told, was first formed by Gorgidas, of three hundred chosen men, to whom the city furnished exercise and maintenance, and who encamped in the Cadmeia; for which reason, too, they were called the city band; for citadels in those days were properly called cities. But some say that this band was composed of lovers and beloved.

Plutarch goes on to explain the rationale behind lovers fighting alongside each other and states that the name is apt based on Plato's observation that lovers are "inspired of God"...

Symp.179a-b
such men as these, when fighting side by side, one might almost consider able to make even a little band victorious over all the world. For a man in love would surely choose to have all the rest of the host rather than his favorite see him forsaking his station or flinging away his arms; sooner than this, he would prefer to die many deaths: while, as for leaving his favorite in the lurch, or not succoring him in his peril, no man is such a craven that Love's own influence cannot inspire him with a valor that makes him equal to the bravest born; and without doubt what Homer calls a “fury inspired” by a god in certain heroes is the effect produced on lovers by Love's peculiar power.

[Ghostmojo]

I believe that the pairs were entitled charioteer and companion, and one was always older than the other in typical Greek pederastic fashion.

They fought at Tegyra, Leuktra and Khaironeia and certainly made their mark in their brief 40 year existence. The initial notion of spreading them throughout the ranks can't have lasted very long if they were formed in 378BC and fought as a unit at Tegyra in 375BC.

Has there been any studies into any specific distinguishing features they may have had? Any uniformity of dress, armour, shield design etc.?

The Theban Sacred Band are perhaps the brief 'shining light' in the otherwise dubious history of that Boiotian city - often the 'black sheep' of the Hellenic family of states. All the Greek city-states were highly self-interested, but even Sparta occasionally acted for the greater good - and - recognised the actions of those who also acted in the greater good. After the Peloponnesian War, Thebes (and others it must be said) were all too keen to see Athens razed from the Attikan landscape. The Spartans refused citing Athens' worthy behaviour in the Persian Wars. They also no doubt did this to spite Thebes (and to keep an arrow in the Boiotian League's side) but generally I don't believe they were quite so vindictive as Thebes.

Thebes - and Argos - were often the non-joiners in events of pan-Hellenic import. They both 'medized' to some degree or remained neutral. Their latterday Pan-Greekness at Khaironeia was a very late development of common conscience (if indeed it was that at all) ...

[Paralus]

All the Greek city-states were highly self-interested, but even Sparta occasionally acted for the greater good - and - recognised the actions of those who also acted in the greater good. After the Peloponnesian War, Thebes (and others it must be said) were all too keen to see Athens razed from the Attikan landscape. The Spartans refused citing Athens' worthy behaviour in the Persian Wars. They also no doubt did this to spite Thebes (and to keep an arrow in the Boiotian League's side) but generally I don't believe they were quite so vindictive as Thebes.

All Greek states were indeed highly self interested and would, in general, act on that self-interest. Whether one was more self-interested than another is a matter based, necessarily, in some subjectivity.

There was a great deal of hatred in Greece toward Athens at war's end and the view of the Thebans was, in no way, confined simply to them (Xen.Anab.2.2.19):

When they arrived, the ephors called an assembly, at which the Corinthians and Thebans in particular, though many other Greeks agreed with them, opposed making a treaty with the Athenians and favoured destroying their city.

Whilst there may well have been Spartans unwilling to see Athens destroyed, the "arrow" in Thebes' side is far more the likely reason. The imperialists in Lacedaemon were unlikely to throw away what Antigonus Monophthalmos would later call the "gangway to Greece".

In 427 the Spartans, on orders from home, asked the Plataeans if they'd surrender their city to Sparta after near four years of siege. This was done so as to keep the place in the event of a peace (Thuc.2.52.2). Five days later the judges from Sparta arrived and the Plataeans were brought before them (2.52.4):

Upon their (the judges) arrival no charge was preferred; they simply called up the Plataeans, and asked them whether they had done the Lacedaemonians and allies any service in the war then raging.

The question was, of course, both as fatuous as it was contrived. The Plataeans could only answer none and the Spartans well knew it (2.68.1):

they (the Spartans) brought them in again one by one and asked each of them the same question, that is to say, whether they had done the Lacedaemonians and allies any service in the war; and upon their saying that they had not, took them out and slew them all without exception.

The result, as Thucydides reports, was murder of the citizenry and destruction of Plataea (2.68.2-3):

The number of Plataeans thus massacred was not less than two hundred, with twenty-five Athenians who had shared in the siege. The women were taken as slaves. The city the Thebans gave for about a year to some political emigrants from Megara, and to the surviving Plataeans of their own party to inhabit, and afterwards razed it to the ground from the very foundations...

This was no strategic outpost of empire for the Athenians; no overarching territorial gain accrued to the Spartans as a result. What gain was there in such an atrocious act? Neatly slotted between the Athenians' treatment of Mytilene and the the civil war on Corcyra, Thucydides - correctly - supplies the answer (2.68.4):

The adverse attitude of the Lacedaemonians — in the whole Plataean affair - was mainly adopted to please the Thebans, who were thought to be useful in the war at that moment raging.

Plataea's actions for the "greater good" - both at Marathon and during the "great invasion" - mattered not one whit.

Clearly, the relationship (if only strategic) between Sparta and Thebes was slightly different in 404. Sparta of 404, too, was not the "ideological creature" of 432/1, Then she could claim the status of "liberator of the Hellenes'("we were going to war with the Athenians in order to free Hellas" Thuc.4.82.1). In 411 that changed and changed forever when the Spartans, in pursuit of Persian gold and ships, signed their first treaty with the Great King. The second point in the royal rescript Thucydides reports as (8.58.2):

The country of the king in Asia shall be the king's, and the king shall treat his own country as he pleases.

The Spartans will have been only too well aware of what that meant ("the Persians believe all Asia to belong to themselves and whoever is their king" Her.9.116) and thus the triple reporting of the treaty by Thucydides. Not a few Spartans might have disagreed with the signing away of these "Greeks of Asia". In time Sparta came to accept this as business as usual as the rescript of the Peace of Antalkidas makes absolutely plain (Xen.Hell. 5.1.31):

King Artaxerxes thinks it just that the cities in Asia should belong to him, as well as Clazomenae and Cyprus among the islands

This is a logical outcome of Spartan policy (suggested by Archidamus) at war’s beginning. Then (1.82.1) Archidamus tells the Spartans to "seek the acquisition of allies, Hellenic or barbarian it matters not, so long as they are an accession to our strength naval or pecuniary" and which they followed at 2.7.1 ("They resolved to send embassies to the king and to such other of the barbarian powers as either party could look to for assistance…"). One Persian response to these embassies is seen in the capture of Artaphernes in 425. His letters to Sparta "in substance told the Lacedaemonians that the king did not know what they wanted, as of the many ambassadors they had sent him no two ever told the same story" (4.50.2). One can well imagine what "story" was the crux: the King’s ancestral right to his lands – including all of Asia.

Thebes - and Argos - were often the non-joiners in events of pan-Hellenic import. They both 'medized' to some degree or remained neutral. Their latterday Pan-Greekness at Khaironeia was a very late development of common conscience (if indeed it was that at all) ...

Actually Thebes is remarkably consistent. Despite the venom reserved for them by Xenophon, they stuck very much to the programme. Thebes would abide by the King's Peace and acknowledge the terms of its renewals. The difference being the "autonomy" of the Boeotian states which Thebes saw (rightly) reflected in the status of Messenia. After Sparta's eclipse Thebes would call on the Greeks to ratify that same peace only this time with herself as Persia's "cop". Decades later she would call Greeks to defend liberty - in accordance with that common peace - against Macedonia. The Persians would call upon the Greek Islands to do the same about the time of Issus.

Never doubt self-interest: it trumps high minded rhetoric near every time when it comes to geopolitical gain.

[PMBardunias]

Thebes would abide by the King's Peace and acknowledge the terms of its renewals. The difference being the "autonomy" of the Boeotian states which Thebes saw (rightly) reflected in the status of Messenia.

That this was "right" is a bit of a stretch. It would be like comparing the hold that the EU has over portugal to that of the US over the state of New Jersey. Messenia was largely created of whole cloth when "liberated".

[Paralus]

That this was "right" is a bit of a stretch [...] Messenia was largely created of whole cloth when "liberated".

I seriously doubt the Messenians of the time would have agreed; those who fought Sparta in the three wars of conquest even less.

Wondered when you'd bite...

[MARCvSVIBIvSMAvRINvS]

Did they ever bring out any albums ?

(sorry, couldnt resist)

M.VIB.M.

[Ghostmojo]

The Spartans (and other Greeks) would make use of Persian influence or money or even military activity as a lever against each other. That is true of course. Never so much as during either Peloponnesian war or uprisings against Makedonian Hegemony. But neither Spartan nor Athenian was ready to live directly under the rule of the Persian Great King. Let other Greeks (Ionia) suffer that fate if it was expedient or unavoidable - but not in Mother Hellas! The Athenians might have threatened an alternative (to up sticks en masse and re-settle in Sicily) but the Lakedaimonians were going nowhere. I agree Spartan pan-Hellenism wavered from time to time. I agree all Greeks were self-interested (I think I said that before as a basic caveat) and the Spartans no less than anybody else.

But unlike Thebes - they never acquiesced to the notion of the foreigner taking over mainland Greece. Squabbles amongst themselves were perhaps 'in the family' and notwithstanding the fate of poor Plataia, or indeed later that of Thebes itself by Alexander, there was no selling out or allowing the Persians to rob them of their poverty.

[Paralus]

The Spartans (and other Greeks) would make use of Persian influence or money or even military activity as a lever against each other. That is true of course. Never so much as during either Peloponnesian war or uprisings against Makedonian Hegemony.

That might better be said the other way around. The Persians, after the diplomatic detente known as the Peace of Kallias, were far more intent on getting their own house into order. Even as the Peloponnesian War raged the Great King refrained from taking advantage of Athens' distraction. Spartan wavering over the terms of possible Persian aid (never telling "the same story") kept it that way until Athens' alarmingly stupid support of Amorges.

From the moment negotiations began between Sparta and Persia in 412, the Great king set about restoring his rule over the Asia Minor littoral. Once Sparta agreed to those terms the King's business was in keeping the Greeks "occupied" in Persia's interest. The "King's Peace" of 387 (originally negotiated in 392) was the end game of that diplomacy. Sparta would be "hegemon" and sign the peace with the King as his "policeman". The other States would also sign up and thus the mechanism for "controlling" the Greeks was set in place. Yes it broke down and wars eventuated - this did not bother the King so long as the policeman could interpret "autonomy" in its own interest and enforce same. All the while the Greeks of Asia settled back to their pre-Persian War vassal status.

It was this common peace that Thebes tried to organise in 367 and to which Thebes appealed in 335. The Persians, too, could do so in 334/3. Persian support of one side or the other always brought the major combatants to the table (Sparta in 392 and Athens in 388/7). The Greeks did indeed "make use of Persian influence or money or even military activity as a lever against each other"; that lever was, though, always Persia's.

I agree Spartan pan-Hellenism wavered from time to time. I agree all Greeks were self-interested (I think I said that before as a basic caveat) and the Spartans no less than anybody else.

Xenophon's idealism and his hero Agesilaos aside, I don't believe there were too many pan-Hellenists in Lacedaemon. Sparta was notoriously insular and Peloponnesian in its outlook. Her attempt at empire rudely showed up her unsuitability for such and eventually destroyed that long standing diplomatic construct (the Peloponnesian League) which had served her so well and for so long. Yes she led during the Persian invasion but that was a rather different matter. The danger over she retreated to her ancestral interests.

Despite her desultory Asian campaigning and Agesilaos' flag waving and treaty-making in the shadows of Cyrus' abortive rebellion, Sparta was never likely to lead any pan-Hellenic invasion of the East. She had very little choice in having a bet each-way with Cyrus as he'd financed Lysander's victory. With Cyrus dead the King took a wholly different view of his ally who'd clearly broken their alliance and reacted accordingly. If Sparta had forgotten whence came her backing for empire she was starkly reminded by the destruction of her naval power by a Persian fleet at Cnidus (this was not the only time the King would so remind his errant ally). With a resurgent Athens, financed by Persia and re-girt by long walls, Sparta "pulled her head in".

[kazeryu]

Is it possible that "300" was in fact a nominal (or target) strength rather than an exact headcount? This would help to reconcile the 254 skeletons with the idea that they "were killed to the last man".

[PMBardunias]

"Wondered when you'd bite..."

Predictable as the wiley Murray Cod I am.

With a resurgent Athens, financed by Persia...".

See, those trecherous bastards! It was their fault to begin with, with all that hiring spindle-throwers and naval warfare- no way for men to fight a war. What's a poor hegemon to do?

[Ghostmojo]

No. I am inclined to think it was an actually total (2 x 150 pairs).

The 300 figure is a recurring one in ancient units.

Possibly on the day the unit was understrength - perhaps some survived - perhaps some where elsewhere on the battlefield for some reason.

But it has always confounded me how the 300 figure integrates with the usual more 4/8/16/32 kind of arrangement that seems to be suggested in phalanx arrangements. I guess it doesn't because the unit was always separate (when it fought as a unit)...

[Ghostmojo]

Is it possible that "300" was in fact a nominal (or target) strength rather than an exact headcount? This would help to reconcile the 254 skeletons with the idea that they "were killed to the last man".

No. I am inclined to think it was an actual total (2 x 150 pairs).

The 300 figure is a recurring one in ancient units.

But yes, possibly on the day the unit was understrength - perhaps some survived - perhaps some where elsewhere on the battlefield for some reason. The figure may well have been variable once you considered who actually led these men.

But it has always confounded me how the 300 figure integrates with the usual more 36/72/144/576 kind of arrangement that seems to be suggested in phalanx arrangements. I guess it doesn't because the unit was always separate (when it fought as a unit). However, it does easily break down (and incorporate itself) into near similar subtotals of 30/75/150/600.

It is interesting that the Spartans used the 300 number for the Hippeis and also used that figurative strength on other occasions besides the Hippeis unit themselves. Scott M. Rusch in his latest work seems to suggest (as I believe also) that the 3 Hippagretai were not just selectors - but also commanders of this unit. Its figurative strength would then be at least 303 and the '300' might be just a general rounding up (or down) of the total number. If the King and perhaps his personal champions were included in this unit (when occasion dictated/allowed) it could have been 304+. That actual number is divisible by 4,8,16 [but not 12]; whereas 300 is also divisible by 4,12 [but not 8,16].

Whether you support the notion that the 300 Hippeis were a Royal Guard (at least if required) or not, or just a corps d'elite - one has to consider how the unit was commanded and by who? The same would be true of the Sacred Band (of whom we have named commanders like Gorgidas and later Pelopidas and Theagenes).

Normal Spartan units of the regular formation/regiments are usually given as Lochos or Mora strengths of 512/576 - figures that divide down well into the supposed ideal sub-unit strengths of 32/36 (Enomotia); 72/128 (Pentakosty); 144/512 (Lochos); 512/576 (Mora). Such exacting figures contrast sharply with the more rounded 300 Hippeis, 600 Skiritai and 700 Brasideioi numbers.

Back to the Theban Sacred Band whose 300 may well have been a rounded figure. If their commander was included in the unit (and perhaps his subcommanders) and they weren't part of the 150 pairs of 'lovers' - then that unit too might well have been around 304 strong. Historical reference to these brave bands by rounded numbers such as 300 may well just refer to the enlisted/selected men themselves, without including the handful of officers who would also have been present.