Plague of Athens

[Timotheus]

Looking for opinions here.

How much did the Plague of Athens help with the Athens losing the war against Sparta?

[Jona Lendering]

How much did the Plague of Athens help with the Athens losing the war against Sparta?

Nothing at all. It won the war!

At least, it won the Archidamian War, which ended in 421 (Peace of Nicias); Sparta had to admit that it had been unable to reach its war aims: dismantling the Delian League. Sparta's coalition crumbled: several members sided with Athens (e.g., Mantinea, Elis). It was only in 418, in the Battle of Mantinea, that Sparta recovered its lost prestige.

During the Sicilian Expedition, Athens lost many soldiers, but it still came close to victory. Sparta offered peace twice during the Ionian or Decelean War (415-404). What in the end killed Athens, was the fact that Sparta was supported by Persia, so that Lysander could build a navy. The decisive moment was the support Athens offered to Amorges, which brought the Great King into the war. Supporting Amorges was an incredible blunder.

(See Hornblower, Thucydides, Kagan, The Peloponnesian War, or just Andocides, On the Peace §28-32.)

[Giannis K. Hoplite]

Well,Kagan explains very well how many decisions of the Athenians that just don't seem right,can be explained by the fact they had lost too many soldiers. They didn;t have men to equip their fleet,plus they feared too much if they lost even more. It did influence the Athenian policy in the Archidamian(and not only) war. !/4 or some say close to 1/3 of the citizens is a dreadful number! It influence Athens even financially. It influenced the siege of Potidaea,too,the most costly expedition of the Archidamian war. Jona,I think it is too " shallow" look to say it it didn't influence the war or losing it. Athens wouldn't be able to recover from such loses even in 25 years,when she finally lost the war. And don't forget,war was all about morale.
I admit though,it may have driven back the Spartans from extended sieges because of the fear of carrying the disease into their own army. But it surely made the Athenians think more against Pericles' policy. They may have followed it for the first stage of the war,by although they didn't lose,they surely abandoned it after the Archidamian war. The plague was one of the main reasons.
Khaire
Giannis

[Jona Lendering]

it surely made the Athenians think more against Pericles' policy. They may have followed it for the first stage of the war,by although they didn't lose,they surely abandoned it after the Archidamian war. The plague was one of the main reasons.

The main reason was that the Periclean strategy was too expensive; if the Plague helped to lead the Athenians away from it, it would have improved its chance to win the war. It was the new, cheap tactics of men like Demosthenes that made Athens survive the Archidamian war.

[Giannis K. Hoplite]

Athens lost the War. If you search the reasons,the plague will always be somewhere in the begining of the chain. And after all,it killed Pericles himself. We don't even know what the "Periclean policy" would be had the disead not killed Pericles!
Khaire
Giannis

[Paralus]

They didn;t have men to equip their fleet,plus they feared too much if they lost even more.

Money, Giannis, was all. For a city that feared losing “even moreâ€

[Giannis K. Hoplite]

I don't underestimate any of the above reasons as factors that influenced the history of the War. The contrary. But I still think that excluding the plague from the reasons Athens lost the war is wrong. For one,in the batle of Arginusae,the Spartans were confident for the first time to give a big scale naval battle with Athens. Of cource they had already lost many in the Sicilian campaign,but it was only 15 years that the plague had killed 1/4 of the population. Finally,in Arginusae battle,they equiped everyone able to row. Children,slaves etc.And as we know a big amount of the fleet was consisted of allied cities' men. They won,yes,but I think it was more because of Athenian experience rather than superior skill.
I think that the message "Mindaros dead,ships gone,men starving,what shall we do" was sent after Cyzicus and not after Cynos Sema.
War is mostly psychology and morale,or at least whatever the result is,psychology and morale play a big role in it. The Plague was in the beginning of the War,not near the end,this is true,but it did influence the Athenian(and Spartan) policy.Its policy changed many times(three of them are the distinctive ones,that also named the three parts of the war) but as we know,these policies lead Athens to defeat. If we search and name the reason,we'll realize that the possible reasons everyone will bring are uncountable. Luck was one of the reasons,too(as always). But excluding the plague completely is also wrong.
Khairete
Giannis

[Jona Lendering]

Its policy changed many times(three of them are the distinctive ones,that also named the three parts of the war) but as we know,these policies lead Athens to defeat.

No, Athens' first strategy change was succesful. Abandoning the Periclean strategy (by which I mean: naval attacks and allowing Attica to be pilaged) was necessary because it was too expensive, and the switch to cheap expeditions saved Athens and made it win the Archidamian War.

On the other hand, I think you are right that the impression that the Plague made, did indeed play a role in the Decelean/Ionian War.

[Paralus]

I think that the message "Mindaros dead,ships gone,men starving,what shall we do" was sent after Cyzicus and not after Cynos Sema.

Dead right: mea culpa. No excuse. Unless, of course, the Spartans resurrected Midarus for Cyzicus….

That error aside, the battle(s) of Cynossema (and Abydos which followed immediately) were of the utmost importance. Athens, with some 76 ships (over 15,000 men) had to face a superior fleet that had taken up residence across its gullet: the Hellespont. There was no choice; fight or starve. The Spartans had the numbers and they had the initiative. Athens had lost horribly in Sicily and had recently lost something much more important: Euboea. Thrasyllus and Thrasybulus tossed the Attic Owl here and came up Athena. What is significant is the fact that the Peloponnesian’s naval skill still did not match the Athenian’s (Diod. 13.39.5):

Consequently they kept sailing around each other for a long time, endeavouring to block off the straits and struggling for an advantageous position; for the battle took place between Abydus and Sestus and it so happened that the current was of no little hindrance where the strait was narrow. However, the pilots of the Athenian fleet, being far superior in experience, contributed greatly to the victory.

It is lack of skill that sees the Spartans defeated. It seems that Athens – plague, Sicily or revolts – was quite capable of attracting the better sailors. This fleet was still operating by Arginusae – losses at the largely insignificant battle of Notium and sans defections to the Spartans for Persian silver aside. Athens’ problem was that it was bottled up at Lesbos, hence the building and manning of a new fleet of 110 ships.

But I still think that excluding the plague from the reasons Athens lost the war is wrong. For one, in the batle of Arginusae,the Spartans were confident for the first time to give a big scale naval battle with Athens. Of cource they had already lost many in the Sicilian campaign,but it was only 15 years that the plague had killed 1/4 of the population.

Again, dealt with above. Athens seemed to have little problem – outside of money – in recruiting the better sailors. The Spartans – their recidivist mothrax admiral aside – backed by Persian silver should well have felt confident: they’d a fleet supplied with sailors from Asia Minor and money from Persia and still should not have fought this battle. The Athenians, not trusting their newly enrolled crews (their experienced crews of earlier battles being bottled up at Lesbos), formed a defensive line and Callicratidas divided his force into two so as to deal with the Athenian double lined wings. He should not have fought. It was a huge tactical blunder. There is little doubt that Athens could not have financed the fleet assembled at Arginusae for terribly long.

In earlier years Athens will simply have recruited the crews necessary. With Cyrus’ money in Callicaratidas’ hands, the Peloponnesians paid the better rate and seemed to have the upper hand to boot. As it turned out, the Spartans lost badly. It was a battle they need not have fought.

Finally,in Arginusae battle,they equiped everyone able to row. Children,slaves etc.And as we know a big amount of the fleet was consisted of allied cities' men. They won,yes,but I think it was more because of Athenian experience rather than superior skill.

The fleet always consisted of men from the allies: whether rowing, piloting or as marines. The difference here is that those experienced men are under blockade on Lesbos.

The victory here is down to two main reasons: the Athenian generals and their defensive tactics (to suit their crews) and the impetuousness of Callicratidas who in no way needed to fight this battle at this time. He might well have continued the blockade at Lesbos and drawn the Athenian fleet , as short on Attic owls as the Spartans were flush with “Daricsâ€

[PMBardunias]

The persian money for a fleet was decisive, but mostly for a reason that had to do with the Spartan political system. The Spartans were woefully ill equipped politically for foreign war. Their whole system was set up for internal stability, and this inertia undercuts any grand strategy they could have developed. Brasidas obviously knew what needed to be done to truly hurt Athens, yet he was given minimal support from the Spartan government.

There was an odd loophole in the system, and that was the power and autonomy given to admirals to conduct war- a counterpart to the power that Kings had when leading armies in the field. This is where Lysander comes in, since the "Fox" was an admiral, he could leave the control of the conservative "Lions" at home to a large extent.

[Giannis K. Hoplite]

After the plague, the death of Pericles and the revolt of Mytilene it is still Sparta who sues for peace after Sphacteria. It is Sparta who, by the time of the "peace of Nicias", is in dire need of repairing that which matters to it: its carefully constructed net of alliances that allowed it a free hand in the Peloponnese. It had sought peace with Athens without consulting its allies and the battle of Mantinea in 418 showed starkly how weak its position had become.

Yet I think this situation was illusionary,at least in the end of the Archidamian War. By the time Sparta took the men from Sphacteria back,and even when most of the Athenian castles inside Peloponnessos(like Pylos) had not been given back as the Peace of Nikias said,they seemed not much loyal to the peace. Even before the peace,they didn't drive Brasidas back,and at least once they tried to send support from the South via Thessaly(they didn't mannage to). At the same time,Sparta had lost almost nothing in the end of the Archidamian war. Not many men,not much money while Athens had lost extraordinary amounds of money and extraordinary numbers of men. Sparta was much less weakened at the end of the war than Athens,compared to the state in 430 bc. Athens had not won the war. It managed not to lose the war. Pericles' policy was and was not successful. Athens was still standing with a Hegemony and a fleet. But it didn't convince Spartans that it was invincible. The peace of Nikias was not a "favour" to the Spartans. The warlike party was becoming stronger by the first day of the Peace,and new warlike Ephors were elected. Obviously no one had won,and this is why the war lasted another 20 years. OK,I ought to mention that the allies of Sparta mostly played a big role in the beginning of the war again.
Khairete
Giannis

[Paullus Scipio]

A nice debateable subject, Timothy, and one which Historians have wrangled over for many years.......
By way of background information, Fifth century Athens population is estimated at 250-300,000 at the time, all up - citizens,women, children, metics slaves etc of which about 30-40,000 at most were voting male citizens ( not exactly democracy as we know it,eh?? ....another good subject? :lol: ).
The plague first struck in the second year of the war, 430 BC, again in 429 BC and finally in the winter of 427/426.Losses were severe, as always in such epidemics and the dead and dying left on the streets, mass graves ( one containing a thousand or so was uncovered in the 1990's) etc all typical of such events were present. Just exactly what it was has been debated for years, but in January 1999, the University of Maryland devoted their fifth annual medical conference, dedicated to notorious case histories, to the Plague of Athens. They concluded that the disease that killed the Athenians and Pericles, was Epidemic typhus. ( see here http://www.umm.edu/news/releases/athens.htm )
In January 2006 in a recent DNA study on fossilised dental pulp from an ancient Plague burial pit, the University of Athens, found DNA sequences similar to Salmonella Enterica, the bacteria that causes Typhoid fever.Their methodology has since been heavily criticised.
Typhoid Fever is most commonly transmitted through poor hygiene habits and public sanitation conditions; during the period in question, the whole population of Attica was besieged within the Long Walls and lived in tents.
Epidemic typhus (also called "Jail Fever", "Hospital Fever", "Ship fever", "Famine fever", "Petechial Fever", and "louse-borne typhus") is so named because the disease often causes epidemics following wars and natural disasters. The causative organism is Rickettsia prowazekii, transmitted by the human body louse (Pediculus humanus corporis).

Given the Athenian Plague's rumoured Ethiopian origin, Epidemic Typhus would seem the more likely.

Whichever form of Typhus it was, the effects were devastaing...again only estimates are possible, but it is thought that between one quarter and a maximum of one third of the population died. At one point, the rising smoke from so many funeral pyres so alarmed the besieging Spartans, that they withdrew.....

The Wiki entry for 'Plague of Athens' has quite a good summary for those interested.

Certainly such a disaster had an effect on the prosecution of the war, and undoubtedly weakened Athens - for example it would be 415 BC before Athens again mounted a major military expedition ( to Sicily).But was it a major factor in the outcome of the War? Evidently not.At the time, not even a truce was called ( the one year truce between Athens and Sparta didn't come until 423, and the Peace of Nicias until the winter of 422/1) The war lasted until 404 BC and was decided by Persian Gold Darics, as Paralus and Paul B. have pointed out.

By comparison, Typhus has ravaged almost every War since - from the Spanish siege of Granada ( 1489) onwards, we have accurate descriptions of it - as 'jail fever' it killed 10% of England's population in Elizabeth I's reign, (1577-1579).
Epidemics occurred throughout Europe from the 16th to the 19th centuries, and occurred during the English Civil War, the Thirty Years' War, the Seven years War and the Napoleonic Wars, and pretty much every other War. During Napoleon's retreat from Moscow in 1812, more French soldiers died of typhus than were killed by the Russians. Major epidemics occurred in Ireland between 1816-19, and again in the late 1830s, and yet another major typhus epidemic occurred during the Great Irish Famine between 1846 and 1849. The Irish typhus spread to England, where it was sometimes called "Irish fever" and was noted for its virulence. It killed people of all social classes, since lice were endemic and inescapable, but it hit particularly hard in the lower or "unwashed" social strata.
Typhus fever was also a significant killer during the US Civil War, although typhoid fever was the more prevalent cause of US Civil War "camp fever". Typhoid is a completely different disease from typhus, as noted above.
During World War I typhus caused three million deaths in Russia and more in Poland and Romania. De-lousing stations were established for troops on the Western front, so the disease's effects were minimal, but the disease ravaged the armies of the Eastern front, with over 150,000 dying in Serbia alone. Fatalities were generally between 10 to 40 percent of those infected, and the disease was a major cause of death for those nursing the sick. ( just as in Athens, as described by Thucydides). In Russia after World War I, during the civil war between the White and Red armies, typhus killed three million, largely civilians.During World War II typhus struck the German army as it invaded Russia in 1941. In 1942 and 1943 typhus hit French North Africa, Egypt and Iran particularly hard. Typhus epidemics killed many inmates in the Nazi concentration camps.

Even larger epidemics in the post-war chaos of Europe were only averted by the widespread use of the newly discovered DDT to kill the lice on millions of refugees and displaced persons.
It is only following the development of a vaccine during World War II, the massive use of DDT at the time, and the use of antibiotics since, that the disease is no longer common in the Western World. Even in my lifetime, I and millions of others have been vaccinated against Typhus as a matter of course.

But I am getting off-topic :oops: :oops:

The point is, that despite its dread effects, the Typhus Plague was rarely decisive in any War, and was not a significant factor in the Peloponnesian War either, in my view. 8)

[Paralus]

Yet I think this situation was illusionary,at least in the end of the Archidamian War. By the time Sparta took the men from Sphacteria back,and even when most of the Athenian castles inside Peloponnessos(like Pylos) had not been given back as the Peace of Nikias said,they seemed not much loyal to the peace. ...

Sparta reneged on the peace almost from day one. I think it way too simple to put this down to a new batch of ephors. Sparta – likely through jealousy and fear of personal prestige – had not fully supported Brasidas in Thrace. To give back Amphipolis (and others) would go against everything it had started the war for. The Athenians were well within their rights to refuse to hand back Pylos et al given Spartan intransigence in meeting the peace terms

...At the same time,Sparta had lost almost nothing in the end of the Archidamian war. Not many men,not much money while Athens had lost extraordinary amounds of money and extraordinary numbers of men. Sparta was much less weakened at the end of the war than Athens,compared to the state in 430 bc. Athens had not won the war.

Which altered Athens’ prosecution of the war not one whit. It still had – as you correctly point out – an empire from which to draw funds to pay for its fleets and it did so.You had argued at the beginning that the plague had reduced Athens to a state where it was in some desperate need to seek peace due to the fact that it had lost too many men; that Athens “didn;t have men to equip their fleet,plus they feared too much if they lost even moreâ€

[PMBardunias]

In January 2006 in a recent DNA study on fossilised dental pulp from an ancient Plague burial pit, the University of Athens, found DNA sequences similar to Salmonella Enterica, the bacteria that causes Typhoid fever.Their methodology has since been heavily criticised

I have the paper and some of the critics as well if anyone wants it.

The debacle at Sphacteria showed two interesting things about Sparta to her allies. A) She could be defeated and her hoplites surrender. This was not Leuktra, especially since the spartans were beaten by "spindles" which probably served to disgrace their attackers almost as much as them, but the possibility of a non-spartan dominated peloponnesse suddenly became imaginable. B) Sparta clearly showed one weakness of joining into a coalition with a small, insular group of elites: they value the lives of their own far above that of all the rest of the allies put together, or even the war aims.