The Makedonian phalanx -- why such depth?

[Paralus]

How do you arrive at these figures? If the most commonly identified location of the battle is used it was around 3 miles/4.8 kilometres wide at the river between sea and hills. The 20-21,000 man Phalanx would occupy a frontage of 2,500 yards -2,625 yards, whether in ‘open’ or ‘close’ order…..

Don't have the time at present: off to the Central Coast for the 25th wedding anniversary so this will be quick.

The nub of the problem is that you are deducing that the phalanx only marched in open order. I don't necessarily disagree. This, though, is different and Polybios doesn’t realise it. There is no reason to believe that it was a mandatory matter for the phalanx to assume "close order" only within the last 100 yards. Circumstances dictate the tactics. It is highly unlikely that a commander will have marched on the enemy – in possession of the field and with his cavalry deployed across the river in the van – in open order. Alexander, as any decent commander should have, deployed “ready for battle”, that is in close order, until the plain allowed for the deployment of cavalry to the wings. All the source material is consistent here.

This, as well as Polybios’ impossible ground (though I note, in passing, that Alexander’s phalanx did, indeed, cross this ground and the river) necessitated the “leisurely advance” whilst dressing the line.

It is abundantly clear – at Granicus, Issos and Gaugamela (not to mention Hydaspes) that the main battle line of Alexander was his national draft. This is – eventually – made plain at Gaugamela: it is only light infantry that support the cavalry on the wings.

The addressing the men “Greeks, Macedonians, et al” is a motif utilised in both major battles. It does not follow that Alexander rode along the battle line addressing the Greeks as part of the front line. Indeed the sources are clear they did not form a part of this line as they are enumerated. The idea that they have been “forgotten” does not wash: Gaugamela gives an indication as to where they might have been.

Alexander fought his “majors” with his national troops as the front line. To insist otherwise is to conjecture what the sources do not support.

How do you arrive at these figures? If the most commonly identified location of the battle is used it was around 3 miles/4.8 kilometres wide at the river between sea and hills. The 20-21,000 man Phalanx would occupy a frontage of 2,500 yards -2,625 yards, whether in ‘open’ or ‘close’ order…..

The distance of the field is Kallisthenes’ 14 stades: some 2.5 kilometres.

[Paullus Scipio]

A quick response..... :wink: :wink:
Paralus/Michael wrote:
"Don't have the time at present: off to the Central Coast for the 25th wedding anniversary so this will be quick.

The nub of the problem is that you are deducing that the phalanx only marched in open order. I don't necessarily disagree. This, though, is different and Polybios doesn’t realise it. There is no reason to believe that it was a mandatory matter for the phalanx to assume "close order" only within the last 100 yards.
True, but that this was the norm is all but certain. Heavy Infantry, even against cavalry 100yards away had ample time to ‘close up’. In any event as Alexander advanced, Darius withdrew his cavalry back across the river long before the Phalanx got near, and re-deployed them. The eight deep formation occurs “ as he approached the enemy” (Callisthenes) – just where we would expect them to ‘close up’. Curtius (III.ix.12) refers to the 32 deep formation, then subsequently “their usual order” i.e. 16 deep. (which Polybius tells us categorically was in open order)

Circumstances dictate the tactics. It is highly unlikely that a commander will have marched on the enemy – in possession of the field and with his cavalry deployed across the river in the van – in open order. Alexander, as any decent commander should have, deployed “ready for battle”, that is in close order,
Here is where we differ. I believe it was normal for Greek and Macedonian ( and Roman too, for that matter) to deploy in open order, advance on the foe to within 100-200 yards and only then close up and charge.There are many examples of this 'charge distance' in the literature....

As I understand it, you are postulating that the '16 deep' formation was in close order - but that flatly contradicts what Polybius says, namely that the Macedonian Phalanx was in open order when at this depth -"For with the proper intervals for marching order a stade, when the men are sixteen deep, will hold sixteen hundred, each man being at a distance of six feet from the next" i.e. in open order. Even if what you speculate about Alexander's deployment on this occasion is correct ( and I will come to problems with this shortly), Polybius' statement must still be generally true. Further, Alexander would not, indeed could not because of the rough ground, have carried out his approach march in the close-packed order used for the final "charge/contact".( Recall that he advanced 40 stades/4.5 miles/7.3 km in this extended line)
Then you have the other problem that Polybius refers to, namely that if the Phalanx was already in close order at 16 deep, it can only get to 8 deep by 'doubling' it's frontage - expanding from a front (assuming 20,000 or so) of a mere 1,250 yards to 2,500 yards -which, if the formation halted to do this, would take 20-30 minutes at least. Not to mention that the flanking cavalry/light troops would also have to "shift over" this distance ! Far more likely that the Phalanx advanced 16 deep on a frontage of around 2,500 yards - which is close enough to the 11 stades/2,200 yards Polybius reckons should have been available to them, and incidently 'filling' the field, (or if the Greeks were not in the Phalanx, a mere 1,750 yards/8.75 stades and thus not 'filling the field') - and then finally 'closed up' into 8 deep when close to the enemy, just as described.

until the plain allowed for the deployment of cavalry to the wings. All the source material is consistent here.

This, as well as Polybios’ impossible ground (though I note, in passing, that Alexander’s phalanx did, indeed, cross this ground and the river) necessitated the “leisurely advance” whilst dressing the line.

It is abundantly clear – at Granicus, Issos and Gaugamela (not to mention Hydaspes) that the main battle line of Alexander was his national draft. This is – eventually – made plain at Gaugamela: it is only light infantry that support the cavalry on the wings.

The addressing the men “Greeks, Macedonians, et al” is a motif utilised in both major battles. It does not follow that Alexander rode along the battle line addressing the Greeks as part of the front line. Indeed the sources are clear they did not form a part of this line as they are enumerated. The idea that they have been “forgotten” does not wash: Gaugamela gives an indication as to where they might have been.

Alexander fought his “majors” with his national troops as the front line. To insist otherwise is to conjecture what the sources do not support.
This generalisation is not correct - each battle involved differing deployments in different situations...I don’t ‘insist’, merely mention it as a possibility. It may be that the speech is a ‘motif’ as you say, but there is no mention of a ‘reserve’ or second line. In fact Arrian specifically has Alexander “ strengthened his right by a contingent of Agrianes and Greek mercenaries whom he drew up in line and so outflanked the Persian left..” Granted these Greeks may be peltasts, it nevertheless demonstrates that the Line did not just consist of native Macedonians, as you assert . Knowing that he was seriously outnumbered, and threatened with outflanking on the hilly/mountainous right, would a competent commander leave one third of his Heavy Infantry out of his Main Battle Line ?

Gaugamela is a special case where Alexander, outnumbered and outflanked, formed up in a large rectangular formation around the baggage to secure his flanks – similar to the later ‘Squares’ against cavalry - and the Greeks, in much larger numbers than present at Issus, and roughly equivalent to the Macedonians, formed the rear of the ‘rectangle’. There is no suggestion in any of our sources that anything similar occurred at Issus...
Paullus Scipio wrote:
How do you arrive at these figures? If the most commonly identified location of the battle is used it was around 3 miles/4.8 kilometres wide at the river between sea and hills. The 20-21,000 man Phalanx, if we include the Greeks, would occupy a frontage of 2,500 yards -2,625 yards, whether in ‘open’ or ‘close’ order, or 1750 yards if the Phalanx excludes the Greeks......


The distance of the field is Kallisthenes’ 14 stades: some 2.5 kilometres.

Actually (Polybius XII.21) says “less than 14 stades” i.e. less than 2,800 yards from sea to the foot of the hills – but we don’t know exactly which part of the gradually widening field Callisthenes was referring to…. Add to which Callisthenes has the river “running obliquely across this space”, so the ‘battle front’ may be much longer…..
Better to go by actual Geography…

[Paralus]

I’m returned….a little worse for wear and tear (in the words of Mick Jagger).

We are not disagreeing on much in this. My contention is that Polybios has, in his need to justly tear apart Kallisthenes, overlooked other possibilities. Firstly, Polybios' main concern is the "not more than fourteen stades" and so, for me, this is the battlefield.

AAs I understand it, you are postulating that the '16 deep' formation was in close order - but that flatly contradicts what Polybius says, namely that the Macedonian Phalanx was in open order when at this depth -"For with the proper intervals for marching order a stade, when the men are sixteen deep, will hold sixteen hundred, each man being at a distance of six feet from the next"

I do not find it strange that the Macedonian lined deployed into to close order as it debouched onto this “isosceles triangle” (to borrow Peter Green’s description of the field). It has, by the description we’ve been left, marched through a pass via a none too wide road onto a slowly widening coastal strip. The forces are clearly enumerated and the heavy infantry is in the van with the cavalry following. There will have been intelligence of what was in the field awaiting. It would appear that Alexander was intent on placing phalangite boots on the ground before covering his wings with cavalry.

At the approach of dawn he began to descend from the pass along the road; and as long as the space was narrow everywhere, he led his army in column, but when the mountains parted so as to leave a plain between them, he kept on opening out the column into the phalanx, marching one line of heavy armed infantry after another up into line towards the mountain on the right and towards the sea on the left.

The enemy’s cavalry (30,000!) along with attendant light infantry (20,000!!) are deployed across the river as the Macedonians come up the beach…so to speak.

You would say that 16 deep is the “normal marching order” for the phalanx and that 8 deep is, by implication, “close order”. Now, I have contended that the phalanx deployed in close order. There is the possibility that it did not but there is the possibility that it did as I do not see this as the “usual” situation. The army is marching from the pass (where it is likely no more than four to six in column – more likely four) and the infantry – the Macedonian heavy infantry alone – will have been some 3.6 - 5.5 kilometres long. Either way, it is of little moment as Alexander deploys his phalanx as the ground permits. When, at yet another “rest stop”, he reforms into eight deep, he does so – occupying some 1,500 yards of the available space – leaving some 600 or so yards on each wing for his cavalry and their attendant light troops.

[ Polybius has here chosen to refer to the 16 depth, because, as the manuals tell us, this was the standard depth of a Macedonian Phalanx. Note here that Polybius takes it as read that the stated depth applies to ‘open ’order, with each man on a six foot front…[/i]

Except that at 17.29.2-30.1 he contradicts that by describing the charge of the phalanx 16 deep:

For since, when it has closed up for action, each man, with his arms, occupies a space of three feet in breadth […] The consequence is that while the pikes of the second, third, and fourth ranks extend farther than those of the fifth rank, those of that rank extend two cubits beyond the bodies of the men in the first rank, when the phalanx has its characteristic close order as regards both depth and breadth […] From this we can easily conceive what is the nature and force of a charge by the whole phalanx when it is sixteen deep. In this case those further back and the fifth rank cannot use their pikes so as to take any active part in the battle.

So it is entirely possible that the phalanx, 16 deep, was deployed “closed up”.

The last point is that there exists no description of allied Greek hoplites forming a part of the heavy infantry line. All descriptions of the “majors” show the battle line made up of the same national forces. I have already listed Arrian’s description here which clearly enunciates Macedonian forces only and allows for the usual Agrianes with the cavalry wing (as well as Grecian peltasts), the Thracians and archers and other light armed to deal with those “behind” on the foothills.

Granicus:
Close to these (the cavalry of the right) were posted the Companions who were shield-bearing infantry under the command of Nicanor, son of Parmenio. Next to these the brigade of Perdiccas, son of Orontes; then that of Coenus, son of Polemocrates; then that of Craterus, son of Alexander; then that of Amyntas, son of Andromenes; finally, the men commanded by Philip, son of Amyntas.

Gaugamela:
Of the phalanx of Macedonian infantry, nearest to the cavalry had been posted first the select corps of shield-bearing guards, and then the rest of the shield-bearing guards, under the command of Nicanor, son of Parmenio. Next to these was the brigade of Coenus, son of Polemocrates; after these that of Perdiccas, son of Orontes; then that of Meleager, son of Neoptolemus; then that of Polysperchon, son of Simmias; and last that of Amyntas, son of Andromenes, under the command of Simmias, because Amyntas had been despatched to Macedonia to levy an army. The brigade of Craterus, son of Alexander, held the left end of the Macedonian phalanx, and this general commanded the left wing of the infantry. Next to him was the allied Grecian cavalry under the command of Erigyius, son of Larichus.

And on it goes enumerating the other cavalry units making up the left wing under Parmenio. In all battles the main battle line is held by the Macedonian national levy bracketed by its cavalry wings – often bolstered with archers and javelin men. Thus Polybios needs only to account for 12,000 heavy infantry – eight deep – in the main line. The others are off in the hills, out front with slings, javelins and bows (Curtius) or likely behind, as Jona has them in his description, in the event that the left fails to hold – as at Gaugamela. Those “off in the hills” are those troops we find amongst the right wing cavalry at Gaugamela (Agrianes and Greek light armed).

So then, it would seem, by Polybios’ own description a charge by a 16 deep phalanx – its normal depth – was something to behold. Further, it seems the phalanx did not have to reduce to eight deep to “close up for action”; it could do that 16 deep with the rear rankers adding their weight and so adding to “its force”.

Your “box” or “square” description of Gaugamela is intriguing. Devine? I’ve always leant towards Marsden myself. I cannot envisage the baggage in the centre of a battle ground. I believe the Greeks (assuming that it was them) were arrayed in the second line to protect the rear in the near certain event of a breakthrough or wing being enveloped before Alexander has rolled left. The wings are echeloned back from the main line. But that is another discussion….

[Mythos_Ruler]

Okay, question then from you guys. It is often said that Philip II "learned" a lot as a Theban hostage and applied this knowledge to his own phalanx many years later. Then what exactly did he learn and apply if the Macedonian phalanx fought in a depth of 8 men, a similar depth to the old-school phalanx employed by the city-states? I mean, wasn't the chief innovation of the Thebans a deeper phalanx used to smash the typical 8 or 12-deep formation or am I missing something?

[PMBardunias]

I'll preface this by saying that there are few if any "Innovations" at thebes in this period. What there was was an excellent use of tactical elements that originated with earlier Thebans, Spartans, and others.

The deep phalanx is only one of these elements. The efficient use of combnations of multiple troop types, specifically the integration of cavalry and infantry, was perhaps just as important.

The deep phalanx itself was a means of countering the higher quality of the spartan hoplite (though its origin is Pagondas breaking through the Athenian phalanx at Delium). The lesson that Phillip may have learned was simply to use unorthodox means to counter hoplites of better quality. Thus we see the birth of close-packed ranks of sarissa armed men who outreach the hoplite and make pushing against their spear points hazardous for the greeks.

Also, recall that there was a tie between Phillip and Iphicrates, who also used unorthodox solutions to create hoplites out of lesser quality troops. Though I must admit that I have come to doubt the direct descent of sarissaphoroi from Iphicratids.

[fhaggis]

I'm going to jump completly into the deep end here, which is completly out of my depth.

I know little about ancient Greece and the Phalanx. However there is somthing about the Phalanx that doesn't sit right with me. (As i saidin the Phalanx topic).

The teory is that the Phalanx was vunerable at the sides and rear right? i have always wondered why didn't they have a "front" (Wall of spears or pikes) on all side or at least the front and side? it make perfect sense to me, particuarly since only a certain number are actually involved in the fighting at the one time.

Is this possibly why the Macedonian Phalanx was increased in size better protect the flanks?

p.s please be nice :oops:

[Paralus]

Okay, question then from you guys. It is often said that Philip II "learned" a lot as a Theban hostage and applied this knowledge to his own phalanx many years later.

What is generally thought to be put down to Philip’s time at Thebes are:

• The elite infantry (the pezhetairoi) unit - "professionally" trained

• The application of that unit in echeloned advance

• The combination of cavalry and infantry at a point exposed by the echeloned advance

In summary, the directed application of force at a single point to achieve a breakthrough rather than the Greek crash of hoplites in a push and shove match. Bardyllis found out the effectiveness of this tactic – to his immense cost – when he lost 7,000 Illyrians to it at Philip’s hands. This likely also saw him deepen his phalanx (ten then 16 deep) when, as the sources make plain, he “invented” it (for Macedon).

What sometimes goes unremarked is the same tactics in “international relations”. Epaminondas wrote chapter and verse on the neutering of Spartan hegemonic ambitions during his “visits” after Leuktra. Philip showed this was not lost on him when he similarly emasculated Sparta’s ability to project any force internationally with his apportioning off of Spartan territories to his allies after Chaeronaea. Henceforth Sparta was reduced to an unhealthy fixation with Magalopolis for it could do little without the recovery of Messenia.

[Paullus Scipio]

The battle with Bardylis, King of Illyria, occurred quite early in Philip's reign ( he was just 24) and is recorded by Diodorus, almost certainly relying on the lost history of the contemporary Theopompus. The relevant passage is Book XVI.4-7 (translation courtesy of Lacus Curtius site)
"4 When Eucharistus was archon at Athens, the Romans elected as consuls Quintus Servilius and Quintus Genucius. During their term of office Philip sent ambassadors to Athens and persuaded the assembly to make peace with him on the ground that he abandoned for all time any claim to Amphipolis.
2 Now that he was relieved of the war with the Athenians and had information that the king of the Paeonians, Agis, was dead, he conceived that he had the opportunity to attack the Paeonians. Accordingly, having conducted an expedition into Paeonia and defeated the barbarians in a battle, he compelled the tribe to acknowledge allegiance to the Macedonians.
3 And since the Illyrians were still left as enemies, he was ambitious to defeat them in war also. So, having quickly called an assembly and exhorted his soldiers for the war in a fitting speech, he led an expedition into the Illyrian territory, having no less than ten thousand foot-soldiers and six hundred horsemen.
4 Bardylis, the king of the Illyrians, having learned of the presence of the enemy, first dispatched envoys to arrange for a cessation of hostilities on the condition that both sides remained possessed of the cities which they then controlled.
But when Philip said that he indeed desired peace but would not, however, concur in that proposal unless the Illyrians should withdraw from all the Macedonian cities, the envoys returned without having accomplished their purpose, and Bardylis, relying upon his previous victories and the gallant conduct of the Illyrians, came out to meet the enemy with his army; and he had ten thousand picked infantry soldiers and about five hundred cavalry.
5 When the armies approached each other and with a great outcry clashed in the battle, Philip, commanding the right wing, which consisted of the flower of the Macedonians serving under him, ordered his cavalry to ride past the ranks of the barbarians and attack them on the flank, while he himself falling on the enemy in a frontal assault began bitter combat.
6 But the Illyrians, forming themselves into a square, courageously entered the fray. And at first for a long while the battle was evenly poised because of the exceeding gallantry displayed on both sides, and as many were slain and still more wounded, the fortune of battle vacillated first one way then the other, being constantly swayed by the valorous deeds of the combatants; but later as the horsemen pressed on from the flank and rear and Philip with the flower of his troops fought with true heroism, the mass of the Illyrians was compelled to take hastily to flight.
7 When the pursuit had been kept up for a considerable distance and many had been slain in their flight, Philip recalled the Macedonians with the trumpet and erecting a trophy of victory buried his own dead, while the Illyrians, having sent ambassadors and withdrawn from all the Macedonian cities, obtained peace. But more than seven thousand Illyrians were slain in this battle. "

Whilst it may be true that Philip learned of Epaminondas' echeloned attacks at Thebes, he does not seem to have used them on this occasion, his first major battle. Instead, as can be seen above he launches the usual frontal assault by the Phalanx, and launches a 'right hook' with his cavalry ( what were the almost as numerous Illyrian cavalry doing, one wonders? - they are not mentioned).The Illyrians counter the cavalry flank attack by forming square and a long drawn out Infantry 'slog' ensues. Eventually the Macedonians prevail. The reference to the 'flower of the Macedonians' almost certainly means Philip's bodyguard. Forming up the Phalanx with the strongest/Guard unit on the right, around the King/General had long been something of a 'standard' formation in Hoplite warfare generally, and was not something Theban.
We do not know when Philip brought in the 'new' formation depth of 16 in open order - probably at the same time the sarissa was introduced by him, if the weapon itself had not been introduced earlier and Philip's reforms confined to drill and discipline and equipment, and we don't know when that was either. That earlier Macedonian infantry had formed up 10 deep is surmise from the reference to a file-leader as a 'Dekarch'(lit:leader of ten ). One may speculate that this first battle was fought before Philip's 'new model army' reforms, since the long, even struggle with the Illyrian infantry, who were largely armed as peltasts - light round shields and longche ( the short dual purpose throwing/thrusting spear) implies that the Macedonian Infantry were similarly armed.
Macedonian infantry were apparently using 'javelins' against Onomarchos in 353 BC, and sarissa heads have not been found among the detritus of the siege of Olynthus (349 BC), but apparently several come from the battlefield of Chaeroneia (against Thebes and Athens in 338 BC), but again I emphasise that we simply don't know when these reforms were introduced.
However, if the main thing Philip learnt militarily was Epaminondas' 'oblique attack' to bring pressure to bear on part of the enemy line only ( and I don't believe that this was a 'brilliant tactic' invented by him, rather it came about accidently through force of circumstances - but that is another topic!) I would agree with you that he may have observed and learnt from Theban diplomacy and 'international relations'. Philip was very patient, and achieved more by this means than through warfare. Indeed he was apparently prouder of his cleverness as Strategist/Diplomat than his bravery in battle ( see Diodorus' obituary). Examples are his giving up of the city of Amphipolis to Athens, so as to obtain peace when he first came to the throne ( he re-took it several years later), his clever alliance with the Chalkidean league, the way in which he outmanouevred Athens diplomatically, and countless other examples. Philip's true genius lay in the way he combined warfare and diplomacy to achive his strategic aims.

[Paullus Scipio]

Mythos Ruler wrote:

Then what exactly did he learn and apply if the Macedonian phalanx fought in a depth of 8 men, a similar depth to the old-school phalanx employed by the city-states? I mean, wasn't the chief innovation of the Thebans a deeper phalanx used to smash the typical 8 or 12-deep formation or am I missing something?

I think you may have missed something I wrote in an earlier post by me......

Similarly, an 'average' depth for a Hoplite spear armed phalanx was 8 deep ( though 12 and 16 and even deeper by the Thebans are known, the latter when using 'column' against line) and this too is in 'open' order, so that when 'closed up' into 'pyknosis' the line is just 4 deep, with each man on a 3 foot frontage, as Xenophon famously tells us. The front 3 ranks of Hoplites could use their spears, with a rear rank of 'file closers', again not wasting the 'fighting strength' of the formation.....

....so the Macedonian Phalanx depth is still double/deeper than that of a typical Hoplite phalanx.....the Hoplites in close order are typically 4 deep to the Macedonian 8.

Note also that the Theban 'deep' phalanx is usually only part of their overall line - tactically it forms a 'column' whose depth/weight is used against part of a phalanx line to burst through.... classic 'Column versus Line'.

[MeinPanzer]

Macedonian infantry were apparently using 'javelins' against Onomarchos in 353 BC, and sarissa heads have not been found among the detritus of the siege of Olynthus (349 BC), but apparently several come from the battlefield of Chaeroneia (against Thebes and Athens in 338 BC), but again I emphasise that we simply don't know when these reforms were introduced.

Just to jump in here, the identification of spearheads found at both Olynthus and the site of Chaeroneia is subjective, and finds from both sites have been identified by some as sarissa heads and by others as javelins. Whether you wish to identify the finds from each site as belonging to sarissae depends on which school of thought you adhere to with respect to the form of the sarissa.

[Paullus Scipio]

....and it might be argued that sarissas would be of little use in a siege, being too cumbersome and that on such occasions ( in fact everything except major Battles) the sarissaphoroi reverted to the traditional Macedonian armament of two or more longche( short dual purpose throwing/thrusting spear).......which I think was the case.

Paralus wrote:

Quote:For since, when it has closed up for action, each man, with his arms, occupies a space of three feet in breadth […] The consequence is that while the pikes of the second, third, and fourth ranks extend farther than those of the fifth rank, those of that rank extend two cubits beyond the bodies of the men in the first rank, when the phalanx has its characteristic close order as regards both depth and breadth […] From this we can easily conceive what is the nature and force of a charge by the whole phalanx when it is sixteen deep. In this case those further back and the fifth rank cannot use their pikes so as to take any active part in the battle.

I'm afraid that the way in which you have condensed Polybius' words here is a little misleading. It may not be the case that Polybius has contradicted himself, because the reference to 'close order', and the reference to 16 deep occur in two separate paragraphs, and after describing close order in the first paragraph, in the second one Polybius has reverted to describing what I believe is the 'convention' among Greek authors to refer to depth in 'normal'/open order, and readers would know that such a formation would 'close up' as described in the manuals, and halve it's depth. Thus:
Poybius XVIII.29-30 ( translation courtesy of Bill Thayer's Lacus Curtius site)....Btw Book 17 that you give is lost in it's entirety... :wink:

29 That when the phalanx has its characteristic virtue and strength nothing can sustain its frontal attack or withstand the charge can easily be understood for many reasons. For since, when it has closed up for action, each man, with his arms, occupies a space of two cubits/three feet in breadth, and the length of the pikes is according to the original design sixteen cubits, but as adapted to actual need fourteen cubits, from which we must subtract the distance between the bearer's two hands and the length of the weighted portion of the pike behind which serves to keep it couched — four cubits in all — it is evident that it must extend ten cubits beyond the body of each hoplite when he charges the enemy grasping it with both hands. The consequence is that while the pikes of the second, third, and fourth ranks extend farther than those of the fifth rank, those of that rank extend two cubits beyond the bodies of the men in the first rank, when the phalanx has its characteristic close order as regards both depth and breadth, as Homer expresses it in these verses:

Spear crowded spear,
Shield, helmet, man press'd helmet, man, and shield;
The hairy crests of their resplendent casques
Kiss'd close at every nod, so wedged they stood.
This description is both true and fine, and it is evident that each man of the first rank must have the points of five pikes extending beyond him, each at a distance of two cubits( 3 ft) from the next.

30 From this we can easily conceive what is the nature and force of a charge by the whole phalanx when it is sixteen deep. In this case those further back than the fifth rank cannot use their pikes so as to take any active part in the battle. They therefore do not severally level their pikes, but hold them slanting up in the air over the shoulders of those in front of them, so as to protect the whole formation from above, keeping off by this serried mass of pikes all missiles which, passing over the heads of the first ranks, might fall on those immediately in front of and behind them. But these men by the sheer pressure of their bodily weight in the charge add to its force, and it is quite impossible for the first ranks to face about.

....in the first paragraph, he outlines the 'porcupine' effect of 'close order', and in the second he is referring to "a sixteen deep phalanx" i.e. it's normal formation as opposed to some other depth - again with all depths being referred to in 'normal'/open formation.

[Paralus]

Whilst it may be true that Philip learned of Epaminondas' echeloned attacks at Thebes, he does not seem to have used them on this occasion, his first major battle.

Diodorus needs to be read with Frontinus:

Front. Strat. 2.3.2
When Philip, king of the Macedonians, was waging war against the Hyllians (Illyrians), he noticed that the front of the enemy consisted entirely of men picked from the whole army, while their flanks were weaker. Accordingly he placed the stoutest of his own men on the right wing, attacked the enemy's left, and by throwing their whole line into confusion won a complete victory.

It is unlikely, unless echeloned back, that the left stood idle whilst the right attacked.

I'm afraid that the way in which you have condensed Polybius' words here is a little misleading. It may not be the case that Polybius has contradicted himself, because the reference to 'close order', and the reference to 16 deep occur in two separate paragraphs, and after describing close order in the first paragraph, in the second one Polybius has reverted to describing what I believe is the 'convention' among Greek authors to refer to depth in 'normal'/open order, and readers would know that such a formation would 'close up' as described in the manuals, and halve it's depth.

I do not think it misleading at all. Your suggestion might be considered pushing the source a little though...

Polybios is clearly describing a phalanx “closed up for action” in the first paragraph in chapter and verse. He then illustrates this description via the Homeric quote. Following directly on that he makes it abundantly clear that the charge he is describing is by a phalanx 16 deep:

From this we can easily conceive what is the nature and force of a charge by the whole phalanx when it is sixteen deep.

In other words, from "what I have just described, we can see just how scary and effective is the charge of a 16 man phalanx".

Clear as a bell.

Or are you suggesting that Polybios insists the sixteen man pahalnx charges in "open order"?

[Paullus Scipio]

Whilst it may be true that Philip learned of Epaminondas' echeloned attacks at Thebes, he does not seem to have used them on this occasion, his first major battle.

Diodorus needs to be read with Frontinus:

Front. Strat. 2.3.2
When Philip, king of the Macedonians, was waging war against the Hyllians (Illyrians), he noticed that the front of the enemy consisted entirely of men picked from the whole army, while their flanks were weaker. Accordingly he placed the stoutest of his own men on the right wing, attacked the enemy's left, and by throwing their whole line into confusion won a complete victory.

It is unlikely, unless echeloned back, that the left stood idle whilst the right attacked.
Frontinus' anecdote, like many of his others, can be seen as a dubious interpretation of the very same sources we have. As we have seen, it was common in Phalanx warfare for the 'elite' unit, whether guards,Agema etc to lead the army on the march, and be on the right wing in battle. Frontinus' "stoutest of his own men" is surely just Diodorus (or his source) "flower of the Macedonians". Frontinus, like Diodorus, has the left wing of the Thracians giving way first ( but doesn't mention the outflanking cavalry). Neither mentions any echeloned or oblique attack, which, had it occurred would surely have been the focus of Frontinus' anecdotal stratagem.

I'm afraid that the way in which you have condensed Polybius' words here is a little misleading. It may not be the case that Polybius has contradicted himself, because the reference to 'close order', and the reference to 16 deep occur in two separate paragraphs, and after describing close order in the first paragraph, in the second one Polybius has reverted to describing what I believe is the 'convention' among Greek authors to refer to depth in 'normal'/open order, and readers would know that such a formation would 'close up' as described in the manuals, and halve it's depth.

I do not think it misleading at all. Your suggestion might be considered pushing the source a little though...

We shall have to agree to differ, I guess. My interpretation at least has the virtue of keeping Polybius uncontradictory and consistent with, I believe, other Greek authors in describing depths in 'normal/open' order, and the manuals. Bear in mind that the Phalanx, Hoplite or Sarissaphoroi, marches and moves in this order all the time off the battlefield and 90% of the time on the battlefield, typically only 'closing up' after the withdrawal through it of skirmishers to it's front for the final charge/advance to contact of 100 metres or so......
Your interpretation would have Polybius completely contradict himself...

Polybios is clearly describing a phalanx “closed up for action” in the first paragraph in chapter and verse. He then illustrates this description via the Homeric quote. Following directly on that he makes it abundantly clear that the charge he is describing is by a phalanx 16 deep:

From this we can easily conceive what is the nature and force of a charge by the whole phalanx when it is sixteen deep.

In other words, from "what I have just described, we can see just how scary and effective is the charge of a 16 deep phalanx".

Clear as a bell.
...absolutely agreed ! D But I postulate that the term "sixteen deep phalanx" means one in 'normal/open' order, 6 ft per man, and that this was a convention used by Greek authors.

Or are you suggesting that Polybios insists the sixteen man pahalnx charges in "open order"?

No, not at all.....I believe, and I think Polybius' Greek readers would know/understand, that a 'sixteen deep' phalanx closed up by means of the rear half-file moving up, so that each man was on a 3 ft frontage, and the phalanx becomes 8 deep, just as Callisthenes says. Similarly, according to Xenophon, a Hoplite battle formation is 4 deep, whereas Hoplites are often described as "8 deep", which is therefore likely also to mean in 'normal/open' order. This hypothesis solves all difficulties and anomalies regarding depths of various phalanxes, and the fact that depths of 8,10 or 12 for Hoplites and 16 or more for Sarissaphoroi are on the face of it, excessively deep. Incidently, I am not the only proponent of this hypothesis - a close examination of Peter Connolly's illustrations of Hoplite drill shows the same 8 deep in open order moving into 4 deep in close order....
Also, you haven't addressed the major difficulty with the idea that 16 deep was in close order that I raised earlier, namely how do they ( the six units of sarissaphoroi, 12,000 strong) get from 16 deep in close order, on a front of a mere 750 yards, to 8 deep on a front of 1500 yards? And this doubling of front, involving troops moving almost half a mile is carried out 'close to the enemy', and must of necessity involve the flanking cavalry and light troops to move sideways, or in echelon perhaps ? This is , I venture to suggest, impossible! This is where actual experience of drilling large numbers of men, or watching mass drill helps! Far more likely that the phalanx expands from 32 deep in open order ( frontage 750 yards), to 16 deep as the rear half moves up from column into line (frontage now 1500 yards), and finally when 'close to the enemy', closes up to 8 deep, on the same frontage, thus not displacing cavalry or light troops and conforming with what we know or can infer of Greek and Hellenistic phalanx drill.

[Paralus]

Frontinus' anecdote, like many of his others, can be seen as a dubious interpretation of the very same sources we have. As we have seen, it was common in Phalanx warfare for the 'elite' unit, whether guards,Agema etc to lead the army on the march, and be on the right wing in battle. Frontinus' "stoutest of his own men" is surely just Diodorus (or his source) "flower of the Macedonians". Frontinus, like Diodorus, has the left wing of the Thracians giving way first ( but doesn't mention the outflanking cavalry). Neither mentions any echeloned or oblique attack, which, had it occurred would surely have been the focus of Frontinus' anecdotal stratagem.

I rely on Hammond’s reconstruction (Philip of Macedon and A History of Greece). I personally don’t think it pushes the source material too far but wouldn’t die defending it. The "flower" will likely be his pezhetairoi which he appears to be leading on foot.

We shall have to agree to differ, I guess. My interpretation at least has the virtue of keeping Polybius uncontradictory and consistent with, I believe, other Greek authors in describing depths in 'normal/open' order, and the manuals.
Your interpretation would have Polybius completely contradict himself...

Polybios, like Thucydides, is not free from error. As I’ve stated, I think the error here arises from his ardent desire to trash Kallisthenes. More on the “open order” thingy below.

But I postulate that the term "sixteen deep phalanx" means one in 'normal/open' order …I believe, and I think Polybius' Greek readers would know/understand, that a 'sixteen deep' phalanx closed up by means of the rear half-file moving up, so that each man was on a 3 ft frontage, and the phalanx becomes 8 deep, just as Callisthenes says.

I realise that you do and I have no problem with marching in "open order sixteen deep" generally - just in this battle. Problem is I’m not interpreting anything Polybios has written; I’m simply stating what he has clearly said. That is, to repeat the final paragraph:

From this we can easily conceive what is the nature and force of a charge by the whole phalanx when it is sixteen deep. In this case those further back than the fifth rank cannot use their pikes so as to take any active part in the battle. They therefore do not severally level their pikes, but hold them slanting up in the air over the shoulders of those in front of them, so as to protect the whole formation from above, keeping off by this serried mass of pikes all missiles which, passing over the heads of the first ranks, might fall on those immediately in front of and behind them. But these men by the sheer pressure of their bodily weight in the charge add to its force, and it is quite impossible for the first ranks to face about.

“By the whole phalanx when it is sixteen deep”, not eight, ten or four. He then goes on to describe what the task of the other eleven phalangites is: the sheer pressure of their bodily weight in the charge and keeping the missiles off with their “serried mass of pikes”. I’d observe that eleven rows would constitute a “mass” serried, Anglican or Roman Catholic; three a hopeful prayer. Ditto with the "sheer pressure" added by six as opposed to fifteen.

He is clearly, in black and white, describing a charge delivered by a sixteen deep phalanx. To claim he is assuming that his readers will realise he really means eight is to interpret his words – to an end.

Also, you haven't addressed the major difficulty with the idea that 16 deep was in close order that I raised earlier, namely how do they ( the six units of sarissaphoroi, 12,000 strong) get from 16 deep in close order, on a front of a mere 750 yards, to 8 deep on a front of 1500 yards? And this doubling of front, involving troops moving almost half a mile is carried out 'close to the enemy', and must of necessity involve the flanking cavalry and light troops to move sideways, or in echelon perhaps ?

Alexander did take half the day to cover the distance from the pass to the ultimate battlefield and Darius was occupying a well prepared defensive position – he was not making the first move. Arrian is clear that Alexander’s entire advance was a leisurely matter. As well he is abundantly clear that the cavalry dispositions were attended to as the final part of setting his line. At the risk of being misleading I shall abbreviate Arrian to save space:

Up to this time his cavalry had been ranged behind the infantry; but when they advanced into the open country, he began to draw up his army in order of battle […]As Alexander advanced, he found that the ground spread out a little in breadth, and he accordingly brought up his horsemen, both those called Companions, and the Thessalians as well as the Macedonians, and posted them with himself on the right wing. The Peloponnesians and the rest of the allied force of Greeks he sent to Parmenio on the left

Note that this is after the phalanx has deployed, eventually, into battle line. Alexander then resumes his leisurely approach with stops to dress his line and address his men as they closed the distance between the armies. Kallisthenes’ 32 to 16 to 8 has, I’d suggest, already occurred for as Arrian clearly states several lines later:

Alexander rode about in every direction to exhort his troops to show their valour, mentioning with befitting epithets the names, not only of the generals, but also those of the captains of cavalry and infantry, and of the Grecian mercenaries as many as were more distinguished either by reputation or any deed of valour. From all sides arose a shout not to delay but to attack the enemy. At first he still led them on in close array with measured step, although he had the forces of Darius already in distant view, lest by a too hasty march any part of the phalanx should fluctuate from the line and get separated from the rest. But when they came within range of darts….

Note that the Macedonians were “still” being led on “in close array” - not open order - whilst Darius’s forces are in “distant view”. Evidently, to be "still led" they had been led to this point “in close array”. Distant would not imply under 100 yards as Arrian clearly indicates that they came within range of the darts only after they had been led on in close array and in measured step until, one presumes, the Persians were no longer “distant”.

It is highly likely that Ptolemy (Arrian) has based his account on Kallisthenes as we agree. In that case it must have been apparent in that account that the final deployment to eight deep and close array did not take place “close to the enemy” but whilst they were, at the closest, “in distant view”. It is perhaps Polybios that is indulging in “misleading” quoting?

[Sean Manning]

I also think that the most natural way to interpret Polybius's phalanx is as 16 ranks deep with 2 cubits per file. No comment on the other sources!