Seleucus versus Ptolemy

[Jona Lendering]

"What if..." questions may be unscientific, that does not mean that they are irrelevant: they help to give meaning to the past. So here is a question: what is Seleucus had, after the Battle of Ipsus, decided to attack Ptolemy?

Context: in the Battle of Ipsus, Ptolemy, Lysander, and Cassander defeated Antigonus and Demetrius. The Antigonid kingdom was divided between the victors, and Seleucus was to have Greater Syria. However, Ptolemy, who had not been present during the fight, swiftly moved to the northeast and seized Palestine and southern Syria. Seleucus had a moral right to launch a war against Ptolemy, but decided not to attack, because he had once received an army of the Egyptian king.

Very polite and decent, of course, but the land Ptolemy had occupied, usually called Coele Syria, was to be the object of six or seven major wars (more...). My idea is that if Seleucus had attacked, he would have prevented all these wars: his army was well-trained and highly motivated after a long series of successful campaigns in Babylonia, Iran, the Punjab, and Anatolia; besides, it was well-equipped with no less than 500 elephants.

So, how wise was Seleucus' decision? Any thoughts?

[D B Campbell]

... in the Battle of Ipsus, Ptolemy, Lysander, and Cassander defeated Antigonus and Demetrius.

Lysimachus, Jona. Clearly just a typo.

[Eleatic Guest]

So, how wise was Seleucus' decision? Any thoughts?

With the benefit of hindsight, there can be only one right answer: It was a terminal mistake which determined in the long run the fate of both kingdoms and of Greek Hellenism in the east (as opposed to later Roman Hellenism there), because, while both opponents may well have long felt that the power of balance between them had not greatly changed, they both actually lost a lot of substance vis-a-vis the rising powers at the peripherry, that is Parthia and Rome, over southern Syria.

It is a sad case that the Hellenistic kingdoms peaked almost immediately after their creation, and then went in a slow and long political decline. In ideal circumstances, with wise and circumspect leaders on both sides, Ptolemy should have ceded Coele Syria and Seleukos should have given in turn long-term garanties for the integrity of Egypt proper, and if necessary, Cyprus. Since Alexandria largely pursued a maritime strategy, while the Seleucid empire could only be sustained as a land empire, a clean division of influence spheres might have worked. But unfortunately both overstretched their power by repeatedly intervening in the Aegean Sea and Greece proper.

[Sean Manning]

That is an interesting question! It would be interesting to know how permanent the victors of Ipsus felt their division of the empire was. Were they looking for a lasting peace, or just a few years' breathing room before the wars started up again?

Assuming that Seleucus could conquer the Levant (which seems likely) what next? I guess the question would be whether later Seleucids would try to invade Egypt, or later Ptolemies Syria and Palestine. Its not hard to imagine the two empires settling down into small wars over Cyprus and territories in the Aegean which would be less devastating while letting the kings fulfill their roles as heroic warriors.

I think that Eleatic Guest's scheme goes a bit too far. As late as Mithridates, the Hellenistic world had a lot of political life left in it. His failure, and those of the Seleucids and and Antigonids before him, weren't by any means certain, and neither was the rise of Rome.

[Dutchhoplite]

Hmmm, alternate history...

Always good for some nice discussions and foaming at the mouth

Another point to consider in case of a Seleucid attack on Coele Syria are the attitudes of Cassander and Lysander. What would Lysander and Cassander have done?? Would they just sit and watch the big guys slug it out or would they have sought an alliance with Ptolemy out of fear with Seleucus and start another round of fighting?

[Jona Lendering]

Good points, thanks all; anyone else?

[Paralus]

Another point to consider in case of a Seleucid attack on Coele Syria are the attitudes of Cassander and Lysander.

And therein lies the answer.

The coalition that tackled Antigonus was, for want of a better term, politically specific. That is, it was, like those before and after, formed to deal with a specific threat (in this case Antigonus). It had little reason for existence having dealt with that threat. Further, these coalitions were a matter of self interest: if there was little gain for one dynast in a coalition he stayed out. Lysimachus especially shows this in his dealings with Cassander.

It might be thought that Seleucus stayed his hand out of a sense of obligation. Ptolemy had taken Seleucus in after Antigonus had evicted him from Babylonia in the summer of 316. This goes too far I’d think. The reason has more to do with the nature of these coalitions noted above. Lysimachus, post Ipsos, was entirely focussed on consolidating his gains in Anatolia and the same can be said of Cassander who set about his Carian interests.

Had Seleucus decided to press his ‘advantage’ after Ipsos he will have done so alone. It is unlikely, in my opinion, that he failed to grasp this. Would he take on his former ally alone? Doubtful.

The what if is interesting though. Ptolemy, without doubt, is the next biggest loser at Ipsos after Antigonus. Having swallowed Antigonus’ disinformation that the coalition had been defeated he retired to fortress Egypt. Thus the spoils were denied him even though he was part of this coalition prior to the battle.

A potted point form speculation:

Seleucus, flush with victory(ies) as Jona describes, would then turn south – alone – to take on his erstwhile “mentor”. It is at this point that Lysimachus and Cassander will have had to decide where their advantage lay. Demonstrably there is little for either in such an expedition and they will have withdrawn. Ptolemy, never one to whack the last talents in his kick bang on the nose, will have bet each-way and retired to Egypt (having garrisoned his major cities). At this stage Seleucus will have been faced with a similar situation to Antigonus in 306. Ptolemy, eager to secure his “open flank”, immediately presses his daughter Ptolemais into the arms of Demetrius and thus secures the Antigonid fleet and its bases still in Antigonid hands in Asia. Sleucus, sans fleet, either tilts and loses or, more likely, reaches a rapraochment.

[Jona Lendering]

Seleucus, sans fleet, either tilts and loses or, more likely, reaches a rapraochment.

Which is more or less what Stefan suggested; very plausible.

[abou]

A bit of necromancy, but in perusing the older threads this one piqued my interest.

As much of a fan of the Seleukids as I am, I'd have to say that unless Seleukos hired a hell of a lot of mercenaries, he would probably lose. I'm assuming here that the forces he brought to Ipsos are representative of the army he could raise at the time and the lack of heavy infantry probably colored his decision not to attack Ptolemy more so than any conception of friendship. 20 years later at Korupedion, despite the lack of details, we are probably seeing a much different army than the cavalry and light infantry dominated force he had at the end of the 4th century. But again, that's 20 years of work.

It is such an army that probably decided the outcome of Seleukos' foray into India. Unless he lost all his heavy infantry in the fighting there (unlikely), I would imagine that he saw little chance in a straightforward military victory. I would also like to imagine that Seleukos decided to take a symbolic loss rather than a physical one decided on the battlefield, which allowed him to immediately make a peace treaty, which didn't turn out so bad for him: 500 elephants, exchange of territory, and a promise of a stable border.

So, in conclusion, a Seleukid loss against Ptolemy.

[Macedon]

Alternative history questions are always interesting. We have to keep in mind that decisions such as when to fight, when to discuss and when to back stab are usually taken with one rule in mind. Interest and interest is based on and carved out of the information you have and your ability to correctly analyze the current situation. Seleucus did not fight Ptolemy at this exact point because he thought it was not worth it, because he was afraid of how the rest of the Epigoni would react, because he knew that his military power was not adequate, because he had other priorities, because he stroke an agreement with Ptolemy under the table etc etc etc. Certainly not because he loved and admired him - personal feelings seldom get in the way, once a victor he could still show his magnanimity and admiration. As for the later Syrian Wars, I do not really think they would have been avoided, provided both the Lagid and the Seleucid kingdom had survived the consequences of a quick war then and there and had grown to be the powers they were. A rich border region such as Coele Syria would always be a thorn, a buffer zone for much coveted by both kings, no matter who had won the first battle over it.

[Timotheus]

A bit of necromancy, but in perusing the older threads this one piqued my interest.

As much of a fan of the Seleukids as I am, I'd have to say that unless Seleukos hired a hell of a lot of mercenaries, he would probably lose.

Antigonus was just defeated. I would expect that if Seleukos had the money he could have picked up some now unemployed heavy infantry looking for a new patron.

If he pulls this off then I see him defeat Ptolo\\emy without much if a battle. I expect Ptolemy would as others said garrisoned the cities he thought he could hold on the coast and pulled back from more interior positions he could not supply from the sea.

[Lysimachos]

I suspect that if Seleucus had tried to recover Coele Syria, he might have succeeded, but this still would have been the beginning of a series of Syrian Wars. The Ptolemies would claim that they had a right to those cities, saying that even if they didn't make it to Ipsus, the attack on Coele Syria had some negative impact on the ability of Antigonus to fight, and therefore they had helped the allies and earned their spoils. Eventually, they would try to recover their losses.

If, on the other hand, Seleucus tried to press his advantage and invade Egypt, I imagine Cassander and Lysimachus would have allied with Ptolemy to prevent Seleucus from getting too strong. While Seleucus is tied up in Egypt, Lysimachus invades from the north and Cassander assaults Coele Syria by sea, and possibly sends reinforcements to Ptolemy. In the meantime, the services of Demetrius go to the highest bidder.

In any case, I imagine that in the aftermath of Ipsus, the allies were eyeing each other suspiciously, lest one of them try to become the new Antigonus. They were probably mostly defensively oriented at the time, consolidating control over their new territory and trying to get a handle on exactly what the new balance of power was before making any rash moves.