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Spartan Mora regiments at Battle of Plataea
#31
There are some interesting aspects to this which surely have to be taken in light of possible changes that weren't recorded. For example the remnant of Brasidas's unit might not have amounted to exactly 700 even if it was recorded earlier as being so. Following his death, a new commander might have reorganised these Brasideioi along more regular lines perhaps, and allowing for deaths, desertions and so on might not this unit have decreased substantially or significantly? Conversely it might have been augmented with other liberated helots. However, I favour the Brasideioi remaining a separate unit with another separate unit of Neodamodeis raised in immitation of this successful 'new citizen' unit.

The term Lakedaimonians is also a difficult one to be specific about because of the way the ancients used it. Sometimes specifically meaning just Spartans or even just Spartiates, sometimes clearly referring to the whole Spartan led host (at least those from Lakonia) including Periokoi and Helots. Add to that the secretive nature of the Spartans and their unwillingness to either confirm or deny exact figure breakdowns within an army on campaign who can say for sure what Lakedaimonian (Lacedaemonian) meant at any given time? I have always taken the term to allow for the larger grouping rather than smaller strata of society when considering an army in the field. Surely, the secretive nature of the Spartan system is reinforced to an enemy not really knowing for certain if the unit they faced was fully Spartiates - Hypomeniones - Perioikoi - or Neodamdodeis? The arrival of the lambda shield device would further enhance the lack of clarity.

The manpower shortages could be concealed to some extent in this way, although it is at times like this I wish I could lay hands on my photocopy of Lazenby's book. It is buried under some stuff up in my loft or my parents loft perhaps (I've moved house a few times in recent years), and I was always fascinated by some of his assertions. His own views certainly moved towards the calculation of actual Spartans within the ranks as being perhaps greater than many would believe. He makes very good arguments for it (as I remember) and perhaps somebody could help me out here by quoting the relevant passage/s? I also wish I could remember exactly where I read the Hippeis formed part of the first mora (or fought with it). He also discusses at length the whole lochos/mora dichotomy.

I do wish somebody would publish Lazenby's The Spartan Army again. When you consider some of the very obscure books which are available through specialist publishers (admittedly often expensive) it surely would be worth someody tackling this one? I once wrote to the original publishers but never got a reply...

I also recognise we have wandered away from the original Plataia aspect of this, but hey ho, that's the way these threads go.
[size=75:2kpklzm3]Ghostmojo / Howard Johnston[/size]

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[size=75:2kpklzm3]Xerxes - "What did the guy in the pass say?" ... Scout - "Μολὼν λαβέ my Lord - and he meant it!!!"[/size]
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#32
Quote:To address your first point, the proponents of this theory must come up with a plausible reason for a sudden "halving" of numbers in the Spartan Army after Leuktra, which after all was more a bloody draw than a decisive victory, even if the Spartans did formally concede.

Absolutely fascinating. Leuktra was the batle that destroyed Spartan military hegemony throughout Greece yet is only a "bloody draw"? I'd suggest that the majority of blood spilled was homoioi and, given the Spartans fled the field (Xenophon's thoroughly excusatory description notwithstanding), the result was an overwhelming victory for Thebes.

Indeed the "disgrace" was so great that some of the surviving homoioi wished to fight so as to reclaim their fallen. Cooler heads prevailed: Sparta could ill afford the remaining homoioi to join their very dead comrades.

Quote:Further, many commentators believe there is a corruption of the text in this passage of the 'Constitution' and that for example a copyist has read "duo" (two) as "d' " (four)... an emendation of the text to "duo" gives us a total of twelve 'Lochoi', consistent with Xenophon elsewhere.

And if proponents of the "halving of numbers theory" adduce textual evidence from Sphacteria to lack of the word "mora" after the above battle, opponents employ the favourite recourse to source material that does not suit: argue corruption and emend the text to suit. When that doesn't quite carry the day some run the line that Xenophon is not the author of the "Lacedaemonian Constitution" and therefore this is to be discounted.

One needs to make a very strong case before altering a passage to suit.
Paralus|Michael Park

Ἐπὶ τοὺς πατέρας, ὦ κακαὶ κεφαλαί, τοὺς μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου τὰ ὅλα κατειργασμένους

Wicked men, you are sinning against your fathers, who conquered the whole world under Philip and Alexander!

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#33
Paralus wrote:
Quote:Absolutely fascinating. Leuktra was the batle that destroyed Spartan military hegemony throughout Greece yet is only a "bloody draw"? I'd suggest that the majority of blood spilled was homoioi and, given the Spartans fled the field (Xenophon's thoroughly excusatory description notwithstanding), the result was an overwhelming victory for Thebes.
....I was speaking militarily, as I had hoped I made clear - while Spartan losses may have been heavier ( "almost a thousand" to probably "300" on the Theban side), and they withdrew from the field - we need not read too much into Diodorus' and Plutarch's "fled" and Diodorus' "not less than 4,000 Lacedaemonians fell" as typical exaggeration/spin from a Theban viewpoint ( and Xenophon, of course, writes from a pro-Spartan viewpoint).

What is clear from all sources is that:
*The Spartans withdrew behind the ditch of their camp, and reformed with many wishing to renew the battle and recover the dead, rather than formally concede the battle and request their dead under a truce (though they ultimately did this)
* The Thebans did not pursue them
* Hearing that Spartan re-inforcements were on the way ( Prince Archidamus with the other two Morai and allies from Sparta), the Thebans allowed the Spartans to depart unmolested ( Epaminondas gave the famous excuse that he would rather fight the next battle in Lacedaemon than in Boeotia - indicating that he realised that the battle had not been decisive and had been a 'Pyrrhic' victory, though Boeotia was "saved" - a 'bloody draw' was sufficient to end the Lacedaemonian invasion. He knew the War would continue, as it did)
* The Spartan Army was not destroyed, and continued operations, gaining some measure of revenge at second Mantinea with the death of Epaminondas (362 BC) - another 'bloody draw' .

Now, though Leuktra was not decisive militarily in reality, itself; that is not to say that the long term Strategic effect was not decisive. All Greece was astonished, because it was the cream of the Spartans themselves who had been defeated ( the 'Homioi') with large casualties, including King Kleombrotus. Spartan hegemony in the Peloponnese came to an end, as the Peloponnesians broke away, especially the Arcadians....Sparta was very much on the defensive, the Thebans duly invaded Lakedaemon and Epaminondas set up the Arcadian 'Mega-City'/Megalopolis, and gave the Messenians independence. Arguably, it was these two events which were 'decisive' ( rather than any battle or military action), and ended Sparta's domination of the Peloponnese forever......

Quote:And if proponents of the "halving of numbers theory" adduce textual evidence from Sphacteria to lack of the word "mora" after the above battle, not quite sure what you mean here....as we have seen it is likely that Xenophon's casual use of "3 of the 12 lochoi" rather than "one-and-a-half Morai of the six Morai" is probably simply the avoidance of clumsy language - the phrases "the Spartan Army", "the six Morai" and "the twelve Lochoi" were all used and are synonyms....
opponents employ the favourite recourse to source material that does not suit: argue corruption and emend the text to suit. When that doesn't quite carry the day some run the line that Xenophon is not the author of the "Lacedaemonian Constitution" and therefore this is to be discounted.
Nonetheless, anyone who has even briefly studied the sources knows that translations are sometimes faulty, surviving texts of one source differ, few are 'intact/complete', repeated copying produces errors/corruption - especially when it comes to numbers. It is not simply correlation of texts here, but rather the full weight of all the evidence that leads to the conclusions that the Spartan Army consisted of six Morai/twelve Lochoi and numbered roughly 8,000....
One needs to make a very strong case before altering a passage to suit.
...which I, and other scholars, have done by considering all the evidence holistically, not just textual.
I notice that you profer no evidence from the "halving" proponents of what became of the other half of the Spartan Army ?
"dulce et decorum est pro patria mori " - Horace
(It is a sweet and proper thing to die for ones country)

"No son-of-a-bitch ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country" - George C Scott as General George S. Patton
Paul McDonnell-Staff
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#34
Ghostmojo wrote:
Quote:Following his death, a new commander might have reorganised these Brasideioi along more regular lines perhaps, and allowing for deaths, desertions and so on might not this unit have decreased substantially or significantly? Conversely it might have been augmented with other liberated helots. However, I favour the Brasideioi remaining a separate unit with another separate unit of Neodamodeis raised in immitation of this successful 'new citizen' unit.
...see above - the first Helot Hoplites were raised around 425, and perhaps numbered some 1-2,000. By 421 BC they had completed their service, been freed as a reward to become 'Neo-damodeis'/new citizens and been settled at Lepreum. In 424 a further 700 Helots were recruited and sent to Chalkidike inThrace under Brasidas and served him well, becoming known as 'Brasideoi'. In 421 after Brasidas' death, they return to Sparta under Clearidas following the Peace Treaty, are freed in turn and after initially being allowed to settle anywhere they liked, were ultimately sent to join the other 'neodamodeis' in Lepreum, just outside Laconia, and guarding the frontier. (Thuc V.34) There they seem to have had a similar status to 'Perioikoi', though of course they were 'spartans'. In 418 one 'lochos' 5-600 strong ,of each, (together equivalent to a 'Mora' )are recalled to the colours for first Mantinea as recounted above ( the remainder presumably still guarding the frontier as the garrison of Lepreum).

Quote:Surely, the secretive nature of the Spartan system is reinforced to an enemy not really knowing for certain if the unit they faced was fully Spartiates - Hypomeniones - Perioikoi - or Neodamdodeis? The arrival of the lambda shield device would further enhance the lack of clarity.

...indeed, and it is that very secrecy, remarked upon in ancient times, which led to vagueness and confusion about the Spartan Military by both ancient and modern commentators, and without which we would not be having this debate !! Smile D lol:

Quote:I do wish somebody would publish Lazenby's The Spartan Army again.

It does not seem to be readily available online....Amazon want $500 for it....when they can get it !! Confusedhock: Confusedhock: I certainly concur with pretty much all Lazenby's views on the subject, and he and J.K. Anderson's "Military Theory and practice in the Age of Xenophon" are the leading modern boks on the subject...
"dulce et decorum est pro patria mori " - Horace
(It is a sweet and proper thing to die for ones country)

"No son-of-a-bitch ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country" - George C Scott as General George S. Patton
Paul McDonnell-Staff
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#35
Quote:....I was speaking militarily, as I had hoped I made clear - while Spartan losses may have been heavier ( "almost a thousand" to probably "300" on the Theban side), and they withdrew from the field - we need not read too much into Diodorus' and Plutarch's "fled" and Diodorus' "not less than 4,000 Lacedaemonians fell" as typical exaggeration/spin from a Theban viewpoint ( and Xenophon, of course, writes from a pro-Spartan viewpoint).

What is clear from all sources is that:
*The Spartans withdrew behind the ditch of their camp, and reformed with many wishing to renew the battle and recover the dead, rather than formally concede the battle and request their dead under a truce (though they ultimately did this)
* The Thebans did not pursue them
* Hearing that Spartan re-inforcements were on the way ( Prince Archidamus with the other two Morai and allies from Sparta), the Thebans allowed the Spartans to depart unmolested ( Epaminondas gave the famous excuse that he would rather fight the next battle in Lacedaemon than in Boeotia - indicating that he realised that the battle had not been decisive and had been a 'Pyrrhic' victory, though Boeotia was "saved" - a 'bloody draw' was sufficient to end the Lacedaemonian invasion. He knew the War would continue, as it did)
* The Spartan Army was not destroyed, and continued operations, gaining some measure of revenge at second Mantinea with the death of Epaminondas (362 BC) - another 'bloody draw' .

No wonder you have named yourself “Xenophon” elsewhere: you are just as excusatory of the Spartans. I’m surprised you failed to mention the fact that the Spartan king got his senior officers pie-eyed before lunch!

You may paint Leuktra as you wish. History records it – as did the Greeks at the time – as major defeat. Your first * point does you in: the Spartans retired behind a ditch?! Why? Because they had been pushed from the field and were in headlong retreat. To make it simple: they’d lost the battle all ends up. The terribly excusatory Xenophon describes your “ditch of their camp” as a “trench which chanced to be in front of their camp”. Yes, righto then…

Of course Epaminondas wanted the next battle in Lacedaemon: the Thebans had fought quite enough on their own territory and, as history would prove, the Spartans were in no position to stop him from taking the fight to Sparta.

Your Pollyanna view of Leuktra fails – utterly – to take into account the state of the Peloponnesian League at this time. Not only did the Theban refused right not take part in the battle, nor did the Spartan left. This part of the League army – composed of the allies – stood back and near applauded the Spartan rout. Xenophon is at his understated best when he records that “the allies were one and all without heart for fighting, while some of them were not even displeased at what had taken place”. Not displeased indeed.

Epaminondas – as he would prove – well knew the weakness of his adversary.

You might paint it as a “bloody draw”. That, in my view, is incorrect: your view is myopically Spartan I’d suggest. The “tearless battle” of the following year shows just how badly Sparta had been defeated. Petty border confrontations become the equivalent of Plataea.

PS: I really do wish you'd stick to "quoting" and replying rather than quoting and inserting (coloured or not) "Old Man": it's most disconcerting. You plainly did not discern my meaning in the above.
Paralus|Michael Park

Ἐπὶ τοὺς πατέρας, ὦ κακαὶ κεφαλαί, τοὺς μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου τὰ ὅλα κατειργασμένους

Wicked men, you are sinning against your fathers, who conquered the whole world under Philip and Alexander!

Academia.edu
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#36
Paralus wrote:
Quote:No wonder you have named yourself “Xenophon” elsewhere: you are just as excusatory of the Spartans.Oh dear....sorry to see you getting so vexed....from this distance in history, unlike the real Xenophon, I am no 'laconophile' but rather a (hopefully) dispassionate objective spectator of history, keen to discover more about events long ago. If I pick "Xenophon" as a nom-de-plume, it is out of admiration for his skills as a Military Historian rather than his 'Laconophile' tendencies, which annoyingly obscure the facts from time to time, as everyone has noted ! :roll:
I’m surprised you failed to mention the fact that the Spartan king got his senior officers pissed before lunch!
Aside from the fact that this is an untrue exaggeration of one of Xenophon's remarks, what is the relevance to the current point in hand, namely whether Leuktra was a decisive military victory??


You may paint Leuktra as you wish.
emotive language ! ...lots of what is now called 'spin'...I don't 'paint' it any particular way - merely recite what we can glean from the sources, with , hopefully the most likely interpretation of events as they have come down to us. Since matters military are not your forte, allow me to elucidate. Leuktra was NOT a decisive military victory for the reasons I set out above - and mainly because Sparta's military capacity was not significantly damaged. Subsequent events WERE decisive - the desertion of the Peloponnese allies, the loss of Messenia, and the strengthening of Arcadia with the founding of Megalopolis etc. Contrast this with Cannae which WAS a decisive military victory - Rome's military capacity was largely destroyed at a stroke, but subsequent events were NOT decisive - Rome's core allies stayed loyal and Carthage was unable to permanently detach half of Rome's significant territory, or build up a rival city to counter Rome. There's a big difference ! Savvy?
History records it – as did the Greeks at the time – as major defeat. Aaah? You now downgrade Leuktra to 'major defeat' as opposed to 'decisive loss' ? AFIK, only the 'laconophile' Xenophon's account of Leuktra was contemporary - everyone else wrote centuries later with the benefit of 20-20 hindsight; at the time, even Epaminondas recognised that even if his victory had saved Boeotia and defeated the Spartan invasion, it had been a close run thing , the War was far from over, and the issue was still in doubt. Combine that with Xenophon's comments and you get a feel for how contemporaries viewed matters. So uncertain were matters that an appeal from Thebes to Athens to join in against Sparta fell on deaf ears....Athens stayed out because the outcome was uncertain....obviously they didn't feel Thebes had won a "Decisive Victory", even if they were as impressed as everyone else at the shock defeat of the cream ( the 'Hippeis/Homio') of Sparta's army.
Your first * point does you in: the Spartans retired behind a ditch?! Why? Because they had been pushed from the field and were in headlong retreat. Hardly ! We are told they withdrew in good order ( Yeah, I know, that's Xenophon's version - nevertheless all agree that there was no pursuit, and they were allowed to depart unmolested, even after Theban re-inforcements arrived...so defintely not militarily decisive...)Also, many Spartans wanted to renew the battle. 'Headlong retreat' and 'fled' is Theban 'spin' as repeated by Diodorus and Plutarch, writing centuries later....next you'll be telling me, along with Diodorus, that "4,000 Spartans fell" (BTW, if the Spartan army consisted only of six units of 512 men, and only four were present - some 2,000 odd - how could this be credible ?? ....despite the earthquake, did Spartan manpower 'double' by Xenophon's time ? :wink: :lol:
To make it simple: they’d lost the battle all ends up. The terribly excusatory Xenophon describes your “ditch of their camp” as a “trench which chanced to be in front of their camp”. ...not according to my 'Penguin' translation (VI.4.14) -see what I mean about translations? -which simply says "Nevertheless, although many had been killed and they had suffered a defeat, once they had crossed the ditch in front of their camp, they halted and grounded arms..." and then proceed to have a debate about whether to renew the battle but decide not to, largely because they realise the allies aren't up for it, and some are secretly pleased according to Xenophon. No pursuit. No renewal or attack by the Thebans, even when re-inforced by Jason of Pherae and his army ...instead a truce allowing the Spartans to depart in peace. Sounds much more like 'a bloody draw' than a decisive victory to me, and no amount of propaganda/spin can make it otherwise."Res Ipsa Loquitur/the facts speak for themselves" Yes, righto then…

Of course Epaminondas wanted the next battle in Lacedaemon: the Thebans had fought quite enough on their own territory and, as history would prove, the Spartans were in no position to stop him from taking the fight to Sparta.
Epaminondas' statement was in response to those who urged him to attack the Spartans after Leuktra - this was his response for not doing so, at a time when he had no intentions of invading Lacedaemon...In fact, if our sources ( e.g. XH VI.5.23-24) are to be believed, even with the desertion of the major Peloponnesian allies such as Mantinea and Tegea, Epaminondas was reluctant to invade....

Your Pollyanna view of Leuktra fails Tssk...tsssk! Such sarcasm is misplaced and unwarranted....I could respond in kind but won't - let us keep a debate civilised and not descend to parliamentary levels !! :wink: :wink:
– utterly – to take into account the state of the Peloponnesian League at this time. Not only did the Theban refused right not take part in the battle, nor did the Spartan left. This part of the League army – composed of the allies – stood back and near applauded the Spartan rout. Once again, an exaggerationXenophon is at his understated best when he records that “the allies were one and all without heart for fighting, while some of them were not even displeased at what had taken place”. Not displeased indeed. aah ! That's better....stick to what the sources actually say, or epitomise it without distortion. I have referred to this allied atitude above - and the subsequent "desertion" of the allies, so we are largely in agreement here. Had the Allies been enthusiastic, and the battle been renewed, one can visualise a very different sequence of events playing out, perhaps....

Epaminondas – as he would prove – well knew the weakness of his adversary.
On the contrary, he showed an abundance of caution, was well aware that the Spartan Tiger still had plenty of bite ( enough to kill him at second Mantinea!), and perhaps his true genius was to realise that the best way to destroy Sparta's power was OFF the battlefield....

You might paint it as a “bloody draw”. That, in my view, is incorrect: your view is myopically Spartan I’d suggest.
You distort my meaning: I said " was more a 'bloody draw than a decisive victory", and I hope I have demonstrated that this is correct
The “tearless battle” of the following year shows just how badly Sparta had been defeated. Petty border confrontations become the equivalent of Plataea....More hyperbole? The battle was clearly more than a border clash, since although we are not told much about it, the Arcadian League (Sparta's former allies Tegea and Mantinea plus others ) together with the Argive army faced the Spartans, who were evidently in full force. Potentially, we may estimate that the Argives could put 5-7,000 troops in the field, and the Arcadian League perhaps 4-6,000, but that they probably numbered about the same as the Spartans - 7-8,000 plus around 1-2,000 Celtic and Iberian mercenaries plus Cavalry sent to Sparta's aid by Dionysius of Syracuse - about 8-10,000 on each side will be the right order of magnitude. The Spartans lost not a single man ( largely because the Allies broke before contact -says something about the reputation of the Spartan Army after Leuktra, does it not?)), hence the name "Tearless Battle". The Celtic and Iberian mercenaries together with cavalry carried out a ruthless pursuit, and the Arcadians and Argives (XH VII.1.31 ) "were cut down in great numbers". The Arcadians evidently suffered significant losses, , since they then hastily built the walled city of Megalopolis. In purely military terms - one sided major battle, serious pursuit, significant damage to one side's military capacity, this was arguably more 'decisive' than Leuktra, though of course the strategic consequences were not....though Sparta too survived ( which she would not have had Archidamus' army been destroyed), and Sparta recovered territory too... :wink: :wink:

P.S: I find insertion gives more of a feel of dialogue, and saves the reader having to flick to and fro.....Pip! Pip!, dear boy.....I am thinking this debate has run its course....so wash it down with a fine glass of 'vin rouge', and we can joust again on another topic !! Smile D lol: :wink:
"dulce et decorum est pro patria mori " - Horace
(It is a sweet and proper thing to die for ones country)

"No son-of-a-bitch ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country" - George C Scott as General George S. Patton
Paul McDonnell-Staff
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#37
Quote:You may paint Leuktra as you wish.
emotive language !

I prefer “colourful” – particularly given the verb.

Quote:Such sarcasm is misplaced and unwarranted....I could respond in kind but won't - let us keep a debate civilised and not descend to parliamentary levels !! :wink: :wink:

I thought it rather good myself and far from “parliamentary”. No cat calls or name calling in that post. Perhaps I could change my nom de plume to Keating. In which case I might observe that Kleombrotus’ drinking indicates that he was “a shiver looking for a spine to run up!” (Always did like that: parliament is quite sleep inducing since the vitriol-master departed).

Quote: I’m surprised you failed to mention the fact that the Spartan king got his senior officers pie-eyed before lunch!
Aside from the fact that this is an untrue exaggeration of one of Xenophon's remarks, what is the relevance to the current point in hand, namely whether Leuktra was a decisive military victory??

I altered the Aussie parlance.

Personally I do not believe this is exaggerated. Xenophon mentions it as part of the exculpatory excursus that passes for his description of the battle. This is – as you’ve noted – not unexpected given his clear sympathies just as Ephorus’ (given he is the source of Diodorus’ narrative) sympathies colour his . That he does so – in the context of explaining away the defeat – strongly suggests that he thought their state contributed to the “out of character” performance on the field. There is no need for Xenophon to retail the story if Kleombrous and his officers had only the regulation libation over a sacrifice or such.

As a personal observation I believe this was more usual than not – people haven’t changed much over the years (leaving aside the Royal Navy’s rescinding of the daily rum ration!). “Liquoring up” some prior to battle was likely somewhat more prevalent than the sources indicate – even in Spartan armies.

Quote:[…] at the time, even Epaminondas recognised that even if his victory had saved Boeotia and defeated the Spartan invasion, it had been a close run thing , the War was far from over, and the issue was still in doubt.

We have strayed far from the topic but this is far more interesting! Leuktra was the end play in a concerted game plan by the Spartans to neuter Thebes. That should, perhaps, read Agesilaos rather than Spartans though, clearly, he had support.

It is often put about that Agesilaos and his hatred of the Thebans destroyed Sparta. It pays to look at it the other way around. The relationship between Thebes and Sparta had been somewhat “iffy” since the end of the Peloponnesian War. Clearly Sparta did not view a strong Thebes rising to dominance in central Greece with any glee. Thebes did, though, over the first quarter of the fourth century do just that. Agesilaos and his fellow travellers could read the inscriptions on the stone and took measures to keep Thebes where she should be. The culmination of their “meddling” (for want of a better word) was bringing Thebes to the battlefield at Leuktra in utter isolation.

Far from Agesilaos bringing Sparta down, the Spartan army and its officers failed the pugnacious king and their city. Had the Agesilaos of Coronea led that army Thebes may well have gone down to defeat. Just what Agesilaos might have done to the city (on exposed form) probably doesn’t bear thinking about.

Quote:Combine that with Xenophon's comments and you get a feel for how contemporaries viewed matters. So uncertain were matters that an appeal from Thebes to Athens to join in against Sparta fell on deaf ears....Athens stayed out because the outcome was uncertain....obviously they didn't feel Thebes had won a "Decisive Victory", even if they were as impressed as everyone else at the shock defeat of the cream ( the 'Hippeis/Homio') of Sparta's army.[/color][/i]

It’s not as clear cut as that. I don’t know that the word “hate” is appropriate but I doubt that Athens hated Sparta. That she disliked the Thebans is a given. Their argy-bargy over territorial disputes was reminiscent of kids arguing over toys. It was only Agesilaos’ chess playing with Thebes that threw Athens and Thebes together in on again / off again marriages of convenience. Athens likely viewed a strong and dominant Thebes with less pleasure than the Spartans. In fact, the most recent edition of the King’s Peace (prior to Leuktra) saw Sparta and Athens as hegemon by land and sea respectively.

Athens, shocked at the Spartan loss, was even more shocked by the realisation of what now lived on her doorstep. She took an immediate interest in arranging a negotiating table for the next edition of that peace so as to shore up her position. Subsequent events would see her allied to Sparta out of fear and distrust of her neighbour. She was right to do so: Epaminondas swiftly realised that Greek empires necessitate a fleet. He wasn’t about to use Athens’. Nor would he abide by her version of a peace: Pelopidas would travel to Susa and secure the golden goose: Thebes as prostatai of the King’s Peace.

Quote:Epaminondas – as he would prove – well knew the weakness of his adversary.
On the contrary, he showed an abundance of caution, was well aware that the Spartan Tiger still had plenty of bite ( enough to kill him at second Mantinea!), and perhaps his true genius was to realise that the best way to destroy Sparta's power was OFF the battlefield....

Something he could only achieve after militarily defeating the Lacedaemonians in the field.

Quote: […] so wash it down with a fine glass of 'vin rouge', and we can joust again on another topic !! Smile D lol: :wink:

I shall take that advice and drink it.
Paralus|Michael Park

Ἐπὶ τοὺς πατέρας, ὦ κακαὶ κεφαλαί, τοὺς μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου τὰ ὅλα κατειργασμένους

Wicked men, you are sinning against your fathers, who conquered the whole world under Philip and Alexander!

Academia.edu
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#38
I shall confine myself to a small observation.......if Xenophon passed all too briefly over the Spartan defeat at Leuktra, he also passed over in equal brevity their victory at "The Tearless Battle" - perhaps recognition that there had been a 'sea-change' in Greece with the shattering of the "myth" of Spartan invincibility. The 'cat was out of the bag', and another Spartan victory would not restore it.

An excellent and perspicacious post! .....the more so as I can find nothing to disagree with !!! Smile D lol: :lol: :lol:

.... and a toast ( with an Aussie 'Cab Sav', naturally ) to healthy debate and good fellowship !! 8) 8)
"dulce et decorum est pro patria mori " - Horace
(It is a sweet and proper thing to die for ones country)

"No son-of-a-bitch ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country" - George C Scott as General George S. Patton
Paul McDonnell-Staff
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#39
In any event, Theban hegemony was short-lived. What is clearly demonstrated from that period is the power of the charismatic leader since without Pelopidas and then Epaminondas, Thebes soon slid back to its more usual role of Boiotian intrigues.

One wonders just how the Spartans must have viewed events a mere 40 years later when Thebes had been destroyed by Alexander. One of their premier foes razed by another. In that case surely a situation of my enemy's enemy is (also) my enemy? Even though it reappeared 20 years later courtesy of Kassander, it never again amounted to much and by Roman times was little more than a village. Sparta - ever true to form - at least made several comebacks and under Kleomenes III could be argued to be once more on the breach of serious domination of the Peloponnese.

I suspect many Greeks in 335 [size=85:37m8eli3]BC[/size] were glad to see the back of Thebes even if it had briefly appeared to have some kind of pan-Hellenic pretentions (liberating Messenia etc.) in the previous generation. The post Persian War policy of punishing Medizers remained a issue with many who had been a part of the Hellenic League, and I can only assume Athens clearly remembered Thebes' own clamouring for the former's destruction after the Peloponnesian War - and was duly happy to stick the knife in when the time came.
[size=75:2kpklzm3]Ghostmojo / Howard Johnston[/size]

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[size=75:2kpklzm3]Xerxes - "What did the guy in the pass say?" ... Scout - "Μολὼν λαβέ my Lord - and he meant it!!!"[/size]
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#40
Quote:.......if Xenophon passed all too briefly over the Spartan defeat at Leuktra, he also passed over in equal brevity their victory at "The Tearless Battle" - perhaps recognition that there had been a 'sea-change' in Greece with the shattering of the "myth" of Spartan invincibility. The 'cat was out of the bag', and another Spartan victory would not restore it.

Absolutely on the latter. The “Tearless Battle” is something of an enigma. That Xenophon passes over it so quickly might indicate that it was not any great or momentous clash. Perhaps the enemy did break and run: Sparta was “backs-against-the-wall” and there is little point confronting a tiger pushed into a corner.

More likely is that Xenophon, by the time he came to write it, realised that it was of no consequence as it changed nothing. The reaction of the Spartans is telling though: as I wrote – one might be excused for thinking they’d just rerun Plataea or, more to the point, Mantinea 418.

Quote:An excellent and perspicacious post! .....the more so as I can find nothing to disagree with !!! Smile D lol: :lol: :lol:

Most pleasant.

Quote:.... and a toast ( with an Aussie 'Cab Sav', naturally ) to healthy debate and good fellowship !! 8) 8)

Hmmmm, the last time we did that it became quite “Macedonian”….


Quote:In any event, Theban hegemony was short-lived. What is clearly demonstrated from that period is the power of the charismatic leader since without Pelopidas and then Epaminondas, Thebes soon slid back to its more usual role of Boiotian intrigues.

Yes the “top soldier” and Theban “Pericles”. The vision was Epaminondas’. He stands out starkly as wide-ranging thinker and strategic planner – the more so given the age was replete with strife and confusion. His opposite, Agesilaos, strikes me as not quite as “gifted”; more a case of “rat cunning”. He came within an ace of destroying his hated rival.

Quote:I suspect many Greeks in 335 [size=85:20f8g92y]BC[/size] were glad to see the back of Thebes even if it had briefly appeared to have some kind of pan-Hellenic pretentions (liberating Messenia etc.) in the previous generation. The post Persian War policy of punishing Medizers remained a issue with many who had been a part of the Hellenic League, and I can only assume Athens clearly remembered Thebes' own clamouring for the former's destruction after the Peloponnesian War - and was duly happy to stick the knife in when the time came.

That last was not ever forgotten. Athens, though, would use Thebes to her benefit when the opportunity presented: her hoplites were rather useful.

Pretensions to panhellenism were exactly that. Whilst the strategy of Epaminondas benefited the states of the Peloponnesus and can be seen in something of a panhellenic light, it was strictly business as usual for Epaminondas and Thebes. Thebes, like Macedonia after her, was not about to invest significant manpower attempting to control the turbulent and often violent Peloponnesian politics. Better to set up competing blocks, friendly “governments” and alliances and let them sort themselves out. Certainly several of the Boeotian towns saw little panhellenism in Theban policy. The Corinthians, too, could read the inscriptions carved on the stone.

What exactly Epaminondas planned to do with his navy we can only speculate though it is worth remembering that Athens was travelling down the slippery-dip of the "Social War" at the time. Build a fleet and neuter Athens' struggling Second Confederacy? Sounds just like Epaminondas to me...
Paralus|Michael Park

Ἐπὶ τοὺς πατέρας, ὦ κακαὶ κεφαλαί, τοὺς μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου τὰ ὅλα κατειργασμένους

Wicked men, you are sinning against your fathers, who conquered the whole world under Philip and Alexander!

Academia.edu
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#41
Sometimes I think just about every internecine war in Greece should have been called a Social War. The war you suggest would merely have been the 867*th Social War (or thereabouts) since Troy! After all, virtually every Greek state, federation or kingdom that fought another had at one time previously been its ally. The Greeks were in fact terribly anti-social if you think about it :roll: . The Athenians of course brought about that strife via their typically high-handed approach during their Second Confederacy (you might have hoped they would have learnt from the Peloponnesian War) and ultimately Persian involvement was sufficient to settle matters.

Athens' relationship with Thebes and Sparta is worthy of serious study as a fatal ménage à trois. How the three needed each other, whilst plotting against each other, in every conceivable combination makes fascinating reading. There is also something of a historical domino effect within Greece as first one then another state becomes powerful, intimidates and fights just about everybody it can, wears itself out and then wanes. By the time the Romans arrived there might well have been practically nobody left standing! :lol: Hindsight is a great thing but there is something frighteningly predictable about this process which saw the rise and fall of Argos, Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Thessaly, Epeiros, Makedon, Akhaian and Aitoilian leagues in succession - and that is just the mainland Greeks. It all reminds me of one of those drunken bar-room brawls from an old western ...










[size=85:94m3bz5t](* a figure I plucked from the air obviously)[/size]
[size=75:2kpklzm3]Ghostmojo / Howard Johnston[/size]

[Image: A-TTLGAvatar-1-1.jpg]

[size=75:2kpklzm3]Xerxes - "What did the guy in the pass say?" ... Scout - "Μολὼν λαβέ my Lord - and he meant it!!!"[/size]
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#42
Quote:perioikoi did not serve in the peloponnese as a rule, nor in the Spartan Army itself, save for certain Aristocratic 'volunteers' who were permitted to accompany the King on campaign - but I don't want to digress into another debate about perioikoi !

Please digress, for this comes as a suprise to me (and evidently to Herodotus and Xenophon). Source me, baby!

Quote:Hdt. 9.11.3

[3] Having no knowledge of this, the envoys questioned them further as to the meaning of this and thereby learned the whole truth; they marvelled at this and hastened with all speed after the army. With them went five thousand men-at-arms (o??????) of the Lacedaemonian countrymen. (??? ????????? ?????????????)

Xen. Hell. 7.4.27
[27] As for the Lacedaemonians, they afterwards went against Cromnus again by night, made themselves masters of the stockade which was opposite the Argives, and immediately proceeded to call forth the Lacedaemonians who were besieged there. Now all who chanced to be nearest at hand and seized the opportunity promptly, came forth; but such as were forestalled by a large body of the Arcadians which came to the rescue, were shut off inside the stockade, captured, and distributed. And the Argives received one portion, the Thebans one, the Arcadians one, and the Messenians one. And the whole number who were captured of the Spartiatae and the Perioeci came to more than one hundred.

Someplace I have an old paper by Toynbee where he accounts for the missing lochoi at Mantinea by proposing that each Spartiate lochoi was brigaded with one made up of Periokoi- Thukydides simply calling the joint "mora" by the appellation Lakedaemonian.
Paul M. Bardunias
MODERATOR: [url:2dqwu8yc]http://www.romanarmytalk.com/rat/viewtopic.php?t=4100[/url]
A Spartan, being asked a question, answered "No." And when the questioner said, "You lie," the Spartan said, "You see, then, that it is stupid of you to ask questions to which you already know the answer!"
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#43
Paul B. wrote:
Quote:Please digress, for this comes as a suprise to me (and evidently to Herodotus and Xenophon). Source me, baby!

I'll enlarge a little..

Quote:"perioikoi did not serve in the peloponnese against fellow Peloponnesians as a rule, nor in the Spartan Army itself, save for certain Aristocratic 'volunteers' who were permitted to accompany the King on campaign - but I don't want to digress into another debate about perioikoi !"
......the Herodotus quote is not relevant to the statement, since it refers to the assembly of Pausanias' army ( the 5,000 Spartans, attended by Helots, had already marched) for the Plataea campaign, following the building of the wall across the ismuth of Corinth to defend against Xerxes. It does demonstrate however that at the time of the Persian Wars, the Periokoi served separately....

The Xenophon example refers to the period after Leuktra, when most of the Peloponnesian allies deserted, and is an exception, being after Sparta's heyday.Cromnus was a town near Megalopolis. That the garrison should contain both Spartans and Perioikoi at this late stage is no surpise, and it may even be that they may have served in the 'Morai' at such a late stage, though I tend to think not.....

To forestall your next point :- Xenophon describes Archidamus marching out "with the citizens" and garrisoning Cromnus with "3 of the twelve lochoi" which clearly implies that the 12 lochoi were all citizens, and hence could not include perioikoi, since these were not citizens, of which fact Xenophon was only too well aware. Yet in your quotation, the prisoners evidently included perioikoi. The likely explanation is that Xenophon has forgotten to mention them, or not mentioned perhaps that the initial garrison might have been relieved/rotated and replaced by a differently composed force. ( c.f. the various garrisons of Spacteria). The former explanation is the more likely since elsewhere Xenophon forgets to mention perioikoi e.g. Agesilaus army in Boeotia in 378 and 377 must have included perioikoi,( either units or volunteers) for he mentions casualties (XH V.4.39), but later at the end of the campaign Agesilaus "dismissed the allies and led the citizen army home".....again no mention of Perioikoi ( who were not citizens).

Neither Herodotus, Thucydides or Xenophon mention perioikoi serving against fellow peloponnesians until the revolt of the Peloponnesian allies after Leuktra, when Xenophon mentions them in connection with Agesilaos' campaigns against the Arcadians ( who were of course Peloponnesians.)
Significantly, at the end of this campaign against the Arcadians, Xenophon varies his formulaic "dismissal" phrase and this time he dismisses "the Spartans to their homes and the Perioikoi to their various cities" (XH VI.5.21), whereas before the defection of the Peloponnesian allies, there is no mention of perioikoi in connection with campaigns against peloponnesian enemies. Further support for this idea, although there can be no certainty, is that in a campaign against the Argives in 391, Agesilaos " disbanded the army of his allies and led the citizen army back to Sparta" (XH IV.4.19 ).Another example is after a campaign against Phleious in 379, he "allows the Allies to disperse and led his own troops back to Sparta" (XH V.3.25)........ presumably only Spartan troops would return to Sparta. In both cases against Peloponnesian enemies, no perioikoi are referred to.

The other exception is Sphacteria - but there they are defending the Peloponnese against Athenian invasion.

Toynbee's essay, in which he puts forward the idea that one lochos of the Morai was Spartan and the other perioikoi, appears in his 1969 book, "Some problems of Greek History", but that idea is not now generally accepted, for as we have seen above Xenophon describes all twelve lochoi as "the citizens" and again, it is certain that perioikoi were not citizens...
Quote:Thukydides simply calling the joint "mora" by the appellation Lakedaemonian.
...incorrect. Thucydides only refers to lochoi at Mantinea.

......and like I said, I don't want to get into a new debate about whether perioikoi served in the 'Morai' - suffice to say that I believe the weight of evidence tips against this possibility. :evil: :wink:
"dulce et decorum est pro patria mori " - Horace
(It is a sweet and proper thing to die for ones country)

"No son-of-a-bitch ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country" - George C Scott as General George S. Patton
Paul McDonnell-Staff
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#44
Quote:......the Herodotus quote is not relevant to the statement, since it refers to the assembly of Pausanias' army ( the 5,000 Spartans, attended by Helots, had already marched) for the Plataea campaign, following the building of the wall across the ismuth of Corinth to defend against Xerxes. It does demonstrate however that at the time of the Persian Wars, the Periokoi served separately...

That depends upon how one reads Herodotus. Clearly – and without any doubt – there were periocoi within the “Spartan” army at Plataea; an army Herodotus refers to as the “Spartans” or “the Lacedaemonians”. Paul Mac’s view would have these periocoi brigaded separately – due to the fact that they marched out separately no doubt. The problem is that Herodotus is replete with detail about the battle and its results. Amongst that description there is no mention of periocoi. To reinforce that Herodotus, when he describes the dead, has no periocoi dead – none.

Perhaps Herodotus forgot to mention them just as Paul Mac would have Xenophon forget them.

Perhaps they were ranged behind the homoioi – the best being in the front for the defence of Greece – and so suffered few (if any) casualties?? To mangle the great Crimean War poem:

Tegeans dropping to the left of them,
Homoioi to the right
Into the valley of death pushed the brave Periocoi,
Not a one them dead….

Hardly possible, one thinks, that no separately brigaded periocoi had to be buried?

As well, it might be well to keep in mind Xenophon’s description (5.1.33) of his hero – Agesilaos – leading the Spartan army out in 386:

Quote:Agesilaus, however, on account of his hatred for the Thebans, did not delay, but after winning over the ephors proceeded at once to perform his sacrifices. And when the offering at the frontier proved favourable, upon his arrival at Tegea he sent horsemen hither and thither among the Perioeci to hasten their coming, and likewise sent mustering officers to the various cities of the allies…

Oh dear, seems like the “Spartans” might have met up with the periocoi elsewhere more often than thought. It certainly puts Herodotus’ single line in a different light.

In the end nothing is absolute but, the action of Agesilaos at Tegea suggests – strongly to me – that the Spartans did not ever settle on the make-up of an army (including their “own”) until the “contingents” finally arrived. The Ephors might well have called up those homoioi from the year classes 20-35 but the army will not have taken “proper” order (by mora or lochoi) until the arrival of the periocoi (and allies).

There is no evidence that clearly indicates that the periocoi fought in separate units. Rather, the reality seems to be that the periocoi fought as a part of the mora/lochoi and died just as well the homoi. Either that or they were not at Mantinea (418) or Leuktra.

And then there is Isokrates (12.8.180):

Quote:And, having despoiled them [the periocoi] of all the rights which free men ought to share, they imposed upon them the greatest part in all dangers. For in the campaigns which were conducted by their kings they not only ranged them man for man side by side with themselves, but some they stationed in the first line, and whenever need arose to dispatch a relief-force anywhere and they themselves were afraid of the hardships or the dangers or the length of time involved, they sent them forth to take the brunt of the danger from all the rest.

Somewhat contiguous with Xenophon – though outliving him – one can only suppose that Isokrates invented this for a political reason?
Paralus|Michael Park

Ἐπὶ τοὺς πατέρας, ὦ κακαὶ κεφαλαί, τοὺς μετὰ Φιλίππου καὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου τὰ ὅλα κατειργασμένους

Wicked men, you are sinning against your fathers, who conquered the whole world under Philip and Alexander!

Academia.edu
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#45
Sorry?...... but your post seems addressed to a non-existent point. No-one is suggesting that the contingents of 'perioikoi' did not fight in the front line alongside their fellow Lakedaemonians in the Lakedaemonian army.....the question is whether 'perioikoi' formed part of the cherished Spartan 6 'Morai/12 'Lochoi'....and the answer, so far as I and other scholars are concerned is a resounding "No!"

You seem confused about who are "Spartans" and who are "Lakedaemonians". The terms are NOT synonymous. All Spartans are Lakedaemonians, but not all Lakedaemonians are Spartans. We may envisage concentric rings within a 'Spartan' or 'Lakedaemonian' army. The army as a whole might consist of 'Lakedaemonians' and 'peloponnesian Allies', such as the Arcadian Mantineans or Tegeans. The 'Lakedaemonians' consisted of 'Spartans' and 'Perioikoi' ( dwellers round about/citizens of neighbouring Lakedaemonian towns), but sometimes just 'Spartans". The 'Spartans' themselves consisted of 'Homioi' ( peers/Equals/ aristocrats/Full citizens) and 'Hypomeiones' ( 'inferiors' -Spartan citizens but not admitted to the 'messes/sysittia' of the 'Homioi'/full citizens.)

If one does not grasp these distinctions, it is pointless to even attempt to discuss this subject....

Quote:There is no evidence that clearly indicates that the periocoi fought in separate units.

This is the sort of uninformed comment which leads to confusion. When one looks holistically at all the evidence it is quite apparent that 'perioikoi' probably never served in Spartan 'Morai'. I re-iterate that mention of "citizen troops" cannot include 'perioikoi' since by definition, they were not citizens of Sparta. In truth there is no unequivocal evidence that 'perioikoi' ever served in 'Spartan' regiments....

Isokrates 'canard' must be taken with a grain of salt - he exagerrates to make his point, and no-one denies that 'perioikoi' didn't take their place in the front line of the 'Lakedaemonian' army. Note that Isokrates re-inforces the point that 'perioikoi' were NOT 'Spartan citizens', so when Xenophon speaks of "the citizens" or the "citizen troops" or "the citizen army", he means exclusive of 'perioikoi'. Whenever the 'Spartan/Lakedaemonian Army' was mobilised, naturally the 6 'Morai' of citizens, coming from Sparta, were the first ( and sometimes the only ) troops mobilised. The 'perioikoi', being scattered in 'cities'/villages all over Lakedaemonia naturally took longer to mobilise, as for the campaign against Xerxes described by Herodotus. In fact we sometimes hear of messengers sent by the 'Spartan' command to hurry them....BTW the "Skiritae", though technically not even Lakedaemonians seem to have enjoyed a similar staus to 'perioikoi'.....
"dulce et decorum est pro patria mori " - Horace
(It is a sweet and proper thing to die for ones country)

"No son-of-a-bitch ever won a war by dying for his country. He won it by making the other poor dumb bastard die for his country" - George C Scott as General George S. Patton
Paul McDonnell-Staff
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