11-26-2009, 09:27 PM
Happy Thanksgiving to everyone (and happiness to those whom it doesn't really apply). My apologies, if anyone noticed; my last post was a mess with unfinished sentences and grammatical errors. I was in a hurry and wrote too fast. Anyway, I edited much of it. With the issue of Cleombrotus I and his men at Leuctra, I'll reiterate as we pick up some more there. Moreover, I haven't read anything since my last post, so forgive me if I run through with the semblance of not paying attention to others. I just want to post this as quickly as possible (a rough draft from earlier). Pressed for time before I get called away for Thanksgiving (my mother is like, 'not today with that stuff!). I'll try to exercise a less hasty approach, though, so I can make some clear indication what I am trying to exactly state in such a convoluted topic. I can be guilty of the hypocrisy of getting on others if they aren't clear enough.
To add to our detail with the etymology of ????? and ?????? in Xenophon's opening statements of Leuctra, the cavalry who joined battle and were speedily worsted are described as ??????, the same word for the royal bodyguard (hence the retained title of 'Horsemen' for the royal bodyguard). Thus if ????? remained in Book 6.4.14 of the texts of the Hellenica which it was first found, it would read,
"...when Deinon, the polemarch, Sphodrias, one of the king's tent-companions, and Cleonymus, the son of Sphodrias, had been killed, then the horses, the so-called aides of the polemarch, and the others fell back under the pressure of the Theban mass, while those who were on the left wing of the Lacedaemonians, when they saw that the right wing was being pushed back, gave way..."
Of course, that may not be conclusive because somebody may explain that the original ancient Greek doesn't necessarily and precisely mean that, and perhaps add that English translations didn't fully understand this. Well, my retort would be that the best native translators in linguistics of all kinds would have been consulted. But, can I prove that?
Xenophon does reveal, however, the defining overview of the novel Theban strategy which won the battle - that they were 'massed not less than fifty shields deep, calculating that if they conquered that part of the army which was around the king (the Spartan right), all the rest of it would be easy to overcome' (Hellenica, Book 6.4.12). However, it surely wasn’t that simple, as Spartan ranks could maintain discipline on a singular level, and the intricacies behind othismos is a debate amid academia which reveals no clearer verdict than another. But that the Spartan lines on their right were broken by a concentration of force is not in question. If Epaminondas couldn't overwhelm the Spartan right quickly enough, his refused right could be outflanked by the Spartan left. As it unraveled, the Spartans on their left couldn’t be brought to bear before the cohesion among their elite was smashed.
In conjunction with apprising us of the Theban concentration of mass on their left, Plutarch tells us that Epaminondas advanced his army echeloned left (Life of Pelopidas, Ch. 23), hence his weakened center and right (in terms of quantity) were refused from battle, and he marched diagonally. This novel adoption was masked with his cavalry (perhaps in concert with the hammipoi, though we read of them specifically only at Mantinea nine years later with Epaminondas), the latter used to create a dust screen and clear away the Spartan cavalry (conjecture). But as much as he needed to conceal his intentions from the Spartans initially (he perhaps dressed off his entire front, in addition to the dust screen created from his cavalry), he needed them to see his right moving in a manner to avoid battle, hence the Spartans would move forward from their left and divide their ranks. The Spartans, too, probably had their cavalry out in front to create a screen. Thus cavalry and light-trooped screens hid both from each other for some time. Epaminondas surely figured his horsemen would vanquish their Spartan counterparts, but also presumed Cleombrotus wouldn’t be too concerned after that occurred, as he figured the Spartan king would be confident with the main upcoming infantry clash. As it turned out, it was a handsome bonus for the Thebans that, whatever the details and preplanned intentions from either side with their cavalry, many of the Spartan mounts ran afoul with their infantry when they were scattered by the superior Boeotian horsemen. Thus, with a vision of throwing the Spartan right into confusion with his concentration of force, they already were afflicted a little before he hit them (Polybius would presumably describe such an occurrence as ????). But geniuses like Epaminondas (also a pragmatist to the full, I'm sure) certainly have many contingencies figured into their plans, and that the Spartan horse could be defeated and scattered, resulting in some of them thrown back into their own ranks (horses could surely become unmanageable at times under battle stress), was a likelihood.
Both Xenophon and Plutarch tell the battle from opposite views of the antagonists, but Plutarch’s Life of Pelopidas centers more on Pelopidas' role and the action of the Sacred Band (if only we had Plutarch's Life of Epaminondas!); the Theban Sacred Band's position and action escapes us, but it seems likely that Pelopidas hit the Spartan right, amid the melee they were already disadvantaged with, before they could turn the Theban left, thus preventing what they achieved at Mantinea in 418 B.C. The only discrepancy from Diodorus is an almost sure fancy about a Spartan attack on both Theban wings with their phalanx in crescent formation (Bibliotheca Historica, Book 15.55.3). Of course this part of the army which was around the king, in this sense, constituted far more than the 300 Hippeis, whom we’ve been touching on repeatedly in this thread as being 'around the king'.
Sure enough, the battle was decided on the Spartan right with a concentration of force, which in turn created a ripple effect along the rest of the Spartan army. But overall, he mentions nothing of planned tactics or dispositions (we must filter and infer from Diodorus and Plutarch to reconstruct more of the battle the best we can), and never mentions the names of Epaminondas or Pelopidas. Moreover, Plutarch and Diodorus never mention the cavalry on either side (albeit Plutarch’s main account would be in his Life of Epaminondas, now lost). Diodorus does not mention the cavalry at Cynoscephalae (364 B.C.) either, where we know it was paramount; thus his non-mention of cavalry action at Chaeronea likely means very little for sticklers of the 'clear evidence factor', in terms of the advocates' arguments against Philip II's cavalry tactics there. In the field of forensic science, the absence of evidence is ultimately a deciding factor; that the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence is applicable to ancient historiography, but not a license to entertain ourselves with historical novels. There will always remain some loose ends and unanswered questions, but I hope a middle ground (not literally!) can be found. But the path of discourse to all of it can be a lot of fun. Deep studies, if I may speak for many, in what we very much enjoy can be extremely gratifying.
The four Spartan morai were deployed on their right, and Deinon was one of the polemarchoi who perished; it is highly unlikely he was commanding anyone and anywhere but the mora in front, whom the Lacedaemonian cavalry ran afoul over, which aided the Theban advance. Sphodrias had been a harmost (????????, a Spartan military governor and garrison commander of his charge) at the beginning of the decade, and got himself into trouble by raiding Athenian territory (our sources tell mixed stories) without the authority of the Ephors. His enterprise went awry, and his retreat involved much plunder in Attica. He was tried in his absence, but acquitted through the influence of Agesilaus II, whose son Archidamus was an intimate friend of Cleonymus, the son of Shodrias. Hence, perhaps, Xenophon’s isolated mention of these figures at Leuctra, but not Archidamus (whom Diodorus states was there, commanding the Spartan left), was presumably to toe a certain line; part of his brief account was to spare his best friend Agesilaus any shame. We never read anywhere else in the ancient literature of a polemarch’s 'aide-de-camp'. Sphodrias’ role at the battle was probably that of an escort to the king (Cleombrotus had given him his command as harmost at Thespiae, in 378 B.C.), in making personal emends, etc.
Anyway, there's no way to deduce from Xenophon's account over any detailed dispositions which can confirm or deny anything regarding our broad question about the Hippeis; Xenophon does tell us that the royal bodyguard was there as the part of 'and the others' he mentions as giving way in the face of the Theban mass, and they would have been at no other place than proximate to Cleombrotus (but not necessarily in his tent beforehand, nor rubbing up against him in battle). The Hippeis formed their own separate corps in battle, whereas the other hebontes (those who were not among the 100 chosen from each of the three hippagretai) surely 'were brigaded indiscriminately into the normal army units' (cf. Nigel M. Kennell, The Gymnasium of Virtue: Education and Culture in Ancient Sparta, pg. 129). But as for them carrying out other duties other than what the Theban Sacred Band were formed for, we simply cannot know: if Herodotus' comment of the escort for Themistocles was within a closer timeframe to, or even within, the late 5th and early 4th century B.C. (when restructuring of the lochoi and morai, etc., took place in some form), then we may argue more strongly for the verity that they functioned as both. But a good question may spring up that, if the 300 Hippeis were on campaign with a Spartan king, who was the 'royal bodyguard' on duty with the other king at home (remember, a law in Sparta passed that both kings could not co-command, as of c. 506 B.C.)?
Athenaeus helps us again with a passage from another historian, Agatharchides of Cnidus (fl. 2nd century B.C.), from the work Affairs in Europe:
Athenaeus, The Deipnosophists, Book 12, 550b-d,
"...Agatharchides, in the 16th book of his History of Europe, says that Magas, who was king of Cyrene for fifty years, and who never had any wars, but spent all his time in luxury, became, towards the end of his life, so immensely bulky and burdensome to himself, that he was at last actually choked by his fat, from the inactivity of his body, and the enormous quantity of food which he consumed. But among the Lacedaemonians, the same man relates, in his 27th book, that it is thought a proof of no ordinary infamy if any one is of an unmanly appearance, or if any one appears at all inclined to have a large belly; as the young men are exhibited naked before the ephors every ten days. And the ephors used every day to take notice both of the clothes and bedding of the young men; and very properly..."
As for where Cleombrotus and the men around his person where stationed:
Xenophon, Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, Book 13.6,
"When the King leads, provided that no enemy appears, no one precedes him except the Sciritae and the mounted vedettes [ie, mounted sentries]. But if ever they think there will be fighting, he takes the lead of the first regiment and wheels to the right, until he is between two regiments and two colonels. The troops that are to support these are marshaled by the senior member of the King's staff. The staff consists of all peers who are members of the royal mess, seers, doctors, fluteplayers, commanding officers and any volunteers who happen to be present. Thus nothing that has to be done causes any difficulty, for everything is duly provided for."
The above data from Xenophon is all we have to make an estimate that Cleombrotus was positioned on the right wing of his army with his 'friends' and Hippeis (??????) at Leuctra, almost certainly positioned between the first and second morai. John K. Anderson and John Buckler are certain of this, and John F. Lazenby supports its plausibility (Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon, pg. 218; The Theban Hegemony, 371-362 B.C., pg. 63; The Spartan Army, pg. 156).
Oh, there's the call! I gotta run...
I'll continue soon.
Everyone, there's a new book out by Nigel Kennell, the author of The Gymnasium of Virtue: Education and Culture in Ancient Sparta, titled Spartans: A New History. I just began glancing at it the other day when I was called away on my radio :x
Food for thought
Thanks, James
To add to our detail with the etymology of ????? and ?????? in Xenophon's opening statements of Leuctra, the cavalry who joined battle and were speedily worsted are described as ??????, the same word for the royal bodyguard (hence the retained title of 'Horsemen' for the royal bodyguard). Thus if ????? remained in Book 6.4.14 of the texts of the Hellenica which it was first found, it would read,
"...when Deinon, the polemarch, Sphodrias, one of the king's tent-companions, and Cleonymus, the son of Sphodrias, had been killed, then the horses, the so-called aides of the polemarch, and the others fell back under the pressure of the Theban mass, while those who were on the left wing of the Lacedaemonians, when they saw that the right wing was being pushed back, gave way..."
Of course, that may not be conclusive because somebody may explain that the original ancient Greek doesn't necessarily and precisely mean that, and perhaps add that English translations didn't fully understand this. Well, my retort would be that the best native translators in linguistics of all kinds would have been consulted. But, can I prove that?
Quote:...This is the problem. That assumption, based on next to nothing has then biased all translations having to do with the elite unit...:? Why would early 20th century translators, etc., be bias in favor of the Spartan royal bodyguard on such a vast scale, so as to emend the original texts because they intrinsically desire the Hippeis to be presented in a way which glorifies them out of (relative) proportion? That was a rhetorical question. Mistakes are not always a result of some agenda behind them. But I disagree.
Quote:…The king and these important men are wounded or die first, then in a second phrase the Hippeis and whatever the Polemarch's own are pushed back by the Theban crowd. There are many around the king. Where were the first men listed standing? There is no indication that they were part of the Hippeis any more than part of the polemarchs own or the "others" as the english translation would make it seem. If anything you could make a case that his tent companions (and their children!) fought around him…What difference does that make? Of course the first men listed were not with the Hippeis. How does that signify anything against an argument that the Hippeis had both functions of a Royal Bodyguard when not in battle next to the king and a corps d'elite on the battlefield? Here they obviously were functioning as the latter (but there's no substantial evidence they were the same who performed both; I am aware of that). With the Battle of Leuctra, Xenophon displays a limited patchiness which cannot conform to an 'inverted pyramid' of text arrangement. They don't necessarily 'die first', other than almost certainly the polemarch, who was personally with the first mora; they all died contemporaneously in the action which threw the entire Spartan right out of sync (the Theban left was anchored by the Sacred Band, which probably hit Cleombrotus on his right side as he attempted to stabilize things, or, if he re establish enough order, fell on him to prevent his attempt to turn the Theban left ). I don't feel that the English translations misrepresented anything, even in some clumsily inadvertent manner; the original texts were merely transliterated concerning these few sentences.
Xenophon does reveal, however, the defining overview of the novel Theban strategy which won the battle - that they were 'massed not less than fifty shields deep, calculating that if they conquered that part of the army which was around the king (the Spartan right), all the rest of it would be easy to overcome' (Hellenica, Book 6.4.12). However, it surely wasn’t that simple, as Spartan ranks could maintain discipline on a singular level, and the intricacies behind othismos is a debate amid academia which reveals no clearer verdict than another. But that the Spartan lines on their right were broken by a concentration of force is not in question. If Epaminondas couldn't overwhelm the Spartan right quickly enough, his refused right could be outflanked by the Spartan left. As it unraveled, the Spartans on their left couldn’t be brought to bear before the cohesion among their elite was smashed.
In conjunction with apprising us of the Theban concentration of mass on their left, Plutarch tells us that Epaminondas advanced his army echeloned left (Life of Pelopidas, Ch. 23), hence his weakened center and right (in terms of quantity) were refused from battle, and he marched diagonally. This novel adoption was masked with his cavalry (perhaps in concert with the hammipoi, though we read of them specifically only at Mantinea nine years later with Epaminondas), the latter used to create a dust screen and clear away the Spartan cavalry (conjecture). But as much as he needed to conceal his intentions from the Spartans initially (he perhaps dressed off his entire front, in addition to the dust screen created from his cavalry), he needed them to see his right moving in a manner to avoid battle, hence the Spartans would move forward from their left and divide their ranks. The Spartans, too, probably had their cavalry out in front to create a screen. Thus cavalry and light-trooped screens hid both from each other for some time. Epaminondas surely figured his horsemen would vanquish their Spartan counterparts, but also presumed Cleombrotus wouldn’t be too concerned after that occurred, as he figured the Spartan king would be confident with the main upcoming infantry clash. As it turned out, it was a handsome bonus for the Thebans that, whatever the details and preplanned intentions from either side with their cavalry, many of the Spartan mounts ran afoul with their infantry when they were scattered by the superior Boeotian horsemen. Thus, with a vision of throwing the Spartan right into confusion with his concentration of force, they already were afflicted a little before he hit them (Polybius would presumably describe such an occurrence as ????). But geniuses like Epaminondas (also a pragmatist to the full, I'm sure) certainly have many contingencies figured into their plans, and that the Spartan horse could be defeated and scattered, resulting in some of them thrown back into their own ranks (horses could surely become unmanageable at times under battle stress), was a likelihood.
Both Xenophon and Plutarch tell the battle from opposite views of the antagonists, but Plutarch’s Life of Pelopidas centers more on Pelopidas' role and the action of the Sacred Band (if only we had Plutarch's Life of Epaminondas!); the Theban Sacred Band's position and action escapes us, but it seems likely that Pelopidas hit the Spartan right, amid the melee they were already disadvantaged with, before they could turn the Theban left, thus preventing what they achieved at Mantinea in 418 B.C. The only discrepancy from Diodorus is an almost sure fancy about a Spartan attack on both Theban wings with their phalanx in crescent formation (Bibliotheca Historica, Book 15.55.3). Of course this part of the army which was around the king, in this sense, constituted far more than the 300 Hippeis, whom we’ve been touching on repeatedly in this thread as being 'around the king'.
Sure enough, the battle was decided on the Spartan right with a concentration of force, which in turn created a ripple effect along the rest of the Spartan army. But overall, he mentions nothing of planned tactics or dispositions (we must filter and infer from Diodorus and Plutarch to reconstruct more of the battle the best we can), and never mentions the names of Epaminondas or Pelopidas. Moreover, Plutarch and Diodorus never mention the cavalry on either side (albeit Plutarch’s main account would be in his Life of Epaminondas, now lost). Diodorus does not mention the cavalry at Cynoscephalae (364 B.C.) either, where we know it was paramount; thus his non-mention of cavalry action at Chaeronea likely means very little for sticklers of the 'clear evidence factor', in terms of the advocates' arguments against Philip II's cavalry tactics there. In the field of forensic science, the absence of evidence is ultimately a deciding factor; that the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence is applicable to ancient historiography, but not a license to entertain ourselves with historical novels. There will always remain some loose ends and unanswered questions, but I hope a middle ground (not literally!) can be found. But the path of discourse to all of it can be a lot of fun. Deep studies, if I may speak for many, in what we very much enjoy can be extremely gratifying.
The four Spartan morai were deployed on their right, and Deinon was one of the polemarchoi who perished; it is highly unlikely he was commanding anyone and anywhere but the mora in front, whom the Lacedaemonian cavalry ran afoul over, which aided the Theban advance. Sphodrias had been a harmost (????????, a Spartan military governor and garrison commander of his charge) at the beginning of the decade, and got himself into trouble by raiding Athenian territory (our sources tell mixed stories) without the authority of the Ephors. His enterprise went awry, and his retreat involved much plunder in Attica. He was tried in his absence, but acquitted through the influence of Agesilaus II, whose son Archidamus was an intimate friend of Cleonymus, the son of Shodrias. Hence, perhaps, Xenophon’s isolated mention of these figures at Leuctra, but not Archidamus (whom Diodorus states was there, commanding the Spartan left), was presumably to toe a certain line; part of his brief account was to spare his best friend Agesilaus any shame. We never read anywhere else in the ancient literature of a polemarch’s 'aide-de-camp'. Sphodrias’ role at the battle was probably that of an escort to the king (Cleombrotus had given him his command as harmost at Thespiae, in 378 B.C.), in making personal emends, etc.
Anyway, there's no way to deduce from Xenophon's account over any detailed dispositions which can confirm or deny anything regarding our broad question about the Hippeis; Xenophon does tell us that the royal bodyguard was there as the part of 'and the others' he mentions as giving way in the face of the Theban mass, and they would have been at no other place than proximate to Cleombrotus (but not necessarily in his tent beforehand, nor rubbing up against him in battle). The Hippeis formed their own separate corps in battle, whereas the other hebontes (those who were not among the 100 chosen from each of the three hippagretai) surely 'were brigaded indiscriminately into the normal army units' (cf. Nigel M. Kennell, The Gymnasium of Virtue: Education and Culture in Ancient Sparta, pg. 129). But as for them carrying out other duties other than what the Theban Sacred Band were formed for, we simply cannot know: if Herodotus' comment of the escort for Themistocles was within a closer timeframe to, or even within, the late 5th and early 4th century B.C. (when restructuring of the lochoi and morai, etc., took place in some form), then we may argue more strongly for the verity that they functioned as both. But a good question may spring up that, if the 300 Hippeis were on campaign with a Spartan king, who was the 'royal bodyguard' on duty with the other king at home (remember, a law in Sparta passed that both kings could not co-command, as of c. 506 B.C.)?
Athenaeus helps us again with a passage from another historian, Agatharchides of Cnidus (fl. 2nd century B.C.), from the work Affairs in Europe:
Athenaeus, The Deipnosophists, Book 12, 550b-d,
"...Agatharchides, in the 16th book of his History of Europe, says that Magas, who was king of Cyrene for fifty years, and who never had any wars, but spent all his time in luxury, became, towards the end of his life, so immensely bulky and burdensome to himself, that he was at last actually choked by his fat, from the inactivity of his body, and the enormous quantity of food which he consumed. But among the Lacedaemonians, the same man relates, in his 27th book, that it is thought a proof of no ordinary infamy if any one is of an unmanly appearance, or if any one appears at all inclined to have a large belly; as the young men are exhibited naked before the ephors every ten days. And the ephors used every day to take notice both of the clothes and bedding of the young men; and very properly..."
As for where Cleombrotus and the men around his person where stationed:
Xenophon, Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, Book 13.6,
"When the King leads, provided that no enemy appears, no one precedes him except the Sciritae and the mounted vedettes [ie, mounted sentries]. But if ever they think there will be fighting, he takes the lead of the first regiment and wheels to the right, until he is between two regiments and two colonels. The troops that are to support these are marshaled by the senior member of the King's staff. The staff consists of all peers who are members of the royal mess, seers, doctors, fluteplayers, commanding officers and any volunteers who happen to be present. Thus nothing that has to be done causes any difficulty, for everything is duly provided for."
The above data from Xenophon is all we have to make an estimate that Cleombrotus was positioned on the right wing of his army with his 'friends' and Hippeis (??????) at Leuctra, almost certainly positioned between the first and second morai. John K. Anderson and John Buckler are certain of this, and John F. Lazenby supports its plausibility (Military Theory and Practice in the Age of Xenophon, pg. 218; The Theban Hegemony, 371-362 B.C., pg. 63; The Spartan Army, pg. 156).
Quote:...Of course there was. The 300 of the Sacred band had a function that had nothing to do with a king, as did the 1,000 picked men of the Argives. The Sacred Band or the Argive chosen could easily have been an honor guard as the Hippeis were for Themistocles, without pretensions to giving him a royal guard...OK. 'Of course there was' a distinction, or there 'easily could have been' a distinction? Sorry. I know what you mean, and you could be right, but what is certain is that Thebes and Argos were not Sparta, who was the most unique among the ancient Greeks in her ways. There wasn't any Theban 'king', but the four boeotarchs were commanders of the mustered armies not unlike the Spartan kings as commanders of their full armies, and they had to still ultimately answer to the ephors over many issues. Themistocles' escort was the 300 'picked knights' (Herodotus, The Histories, Book 8.124.3) - the same number picked by 'the very best' (??????????) three 'Commanders of the Guard' (hippagretai; ??????????), as Xenophon relates (Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, Book 4.3). Coincidence? I can't prove it isn't :x
Oh, there's the call! I gotta run...
I'll continue soon.
Everyone, there's a new book out by Nigel Kennell, the author of The Gymnasium of Virtue: Education and Culture in Ancient Sparta, titled Spartans: A New History. I just began glancing at it the other day when I was called away on my radio :x
Food for thought
Thanks, James
"A ship in harbor is safe - but that is not what ships are built for."
James K MacKinnon
James K MacKinnon
