Hippeis, not Hippies

[PMBardunias]

There was a reluctance to innovate even after the lessons of Iphikrates, Epaminondas and Phillip II.

This almost a cliche, but it doesn't really stand up to the evidence. To what Paul M-S posted I would add the great success of Agiselaos' horse and light troops in Asia and back home. The most important thing to consider in this context is that the other poleis were "innovating" specifically to counter a percieved Spartan superiority in the status quo. If the Spartans lagged in their response to the strategems of other poleis in negating their superiority, surely they took no longer than the other states took to initially counter the Spartans.

It is in this context that Agiselaos "schooled" the Thebans, perhaps as Napoleon did his opponents in europe. Any tactic can be countered if it becomes obvious. Sometimes the less inspired Spartan leaders appear to almost be fighting the battle according to a playbook and are less than flexible. Saddly this was probably not written as Vegetius suggests, but was the sort of thing that was passed around and discussed in phiditia. Note that the "mistake" at Tegyra is exactly the opposite of the "mistake" Agiselaos makes in Xenophon's eyes at Coronea's second phase. It would be interesting to know if Xenophon omits reference for that reason.

As a comparison, think of the innovation of Phillip II. It surely originates as a means of countering the superiority of hoplites over the lighter troop types available to the Macedonians in large numbers. Thus there is no impetus for Greek states to have come up with sarissaphoroi on their own or to swiftly follow suit when they appear.

I think it should be borne in mind here, that we should not call Spartan troops 'elite', in the sense of modern commandos or SAS or other 'supertroops'.

More like "elite" in the sense of a championship team, lets say paddlers, who excel because they know how to move as a group and predict the behavior of their companions. But I do think that "elite unit" covers this more than implying a group of individual Ubermenschen. Think of that American olympic basketball "dream team" that lost so baddly because they were all prima donnas. True elite units don't act that way.

Maybe in the case of other states Paul - but surely not with Sparta? Given that the homoioi were effectively elite-type troops compared with other Greek rank-and-file, and arguably the Hippeis were only marginally better than the average very good Spartiate (in relative terms); I see no particular use for such a unit in the way you suggest. After all, the Spartans did not pioneer this shock tactic that Pelopidas used to Epaminondas' advantage.

First, we have no reason to believe they did not in fact pioneer the shock tactics of Epaminondas. They may have been quite able to do so without the amateur's need for added depth. Second, Spartan units were a veneer of Spartiates backed by non-citizens as we discussed elsewhere. The true worth of the Hippeis might be that they were the all Spartiate unit, and thus should not be dispersed along the front. This would make the Sacred band a double analogy as it developed. Initially akin to the "cutting edge" of Spartiates along the battle-line, then later analogous to the all Spartiate Hippeis.

I don’t think lack of courage was an issue. That said, homoioi were men and as such suffered all the foibles. Their courage deserted them on the odd occasion they were faced with certain defeat and death (Sphacteria, Tegyra and Leuktra for example).

As pericles noted, Spartiates were driven by fear- hence the shrine to Phobos attached to the Ephorate's mess. It was a fear not of death, but of the Law and shame in the eyes of their peers and the very real loss of social standing that entailed. In this there is a very good analogy to Japanese soldiers in WWII. Expected not to surrender, they often broke easily when they were captured for they had no preperation for the event and were driven by shame at their survival to even turn on their own. Spartiates were not expected to lose by their society, so when loss was eminent, the shock to their courage was all the greater.

Both of the former two might easily have sacked Sparta and made a “settlement” in the manner of Doson. Far easier – and far less costly in manpower – was to partition off Spartan agrarian holdings, whilst a supine Sparta watched, to other not disinterested Peloponnesian states

Simply drivel :roll: We've been over this before. Even Doson did not fight his way into Sparta. Both Epameinondas and Pyrrus tried hard to take the city.

Diodours XV

But Agesilaüs, who had been left on guard and had learned only shortly before from the Cretans all about the enemy's plan, straightway p185devoted his utmost energy to the care of the city's defence. 3 He placed the oldest children and the aged on the roofs of the houses and instructed them from there to defend themselves against the enemy if he forced a way into the city, while he himself lined up the men in the prime of life and apportioned them to the obstacles in front of the city and to the approaches, and, having blocked all places that could offer passage, he awaited the attack of the enemy. 4 Epameinondas, after dividing his soldiers into several columns, attacked everywhere at once, but when he saw the disposition of the Spartans, he knew immediately that his move had been revealed. Nevertheless he made the assault on all the positions one after the other, and, though he was at a disadvantage because of the obstacles, closed in a hand-to hand combat. 5 Many a blow he received and dealt and did not call off the zealous rivalry until the army of the Lacedaemonians re-entered Sparta. Then as many came to the assistance of the besieged and night intervened, he desisted from the siege.

Plutarch Agiselaos

For when the Mantineans changed their allegiance,82 revolted from Thebes, and called in the Lacedaemonians to help them, Epaminondas, learning that Agesilaüs had marched out from Sparta with his forces and was approaching, set out by night from Tegea, without the knowledge of the Mantineans, and led his army against Sparta itself. He passed by Agesilaüs, and came p97within a little of suddenly seizing the city in a defenceless state.83 4 But Euthynus, a Thespian, as Callisthenes says, or, according to Xenophon,84 a certain Cretan, brought word to Agesilaüs, who quickly sent on a horseman to warn the people in Sparta, and not long after he himself also entered the city. Soon after his arrival the Thebans were crossing the Eurotas and attacking the city, while Agesilaüs defended it right vigorously and in a manner not to be expected of his years. 5 For he did not think, as on a former occasion, that the crisis demanded safe and cautious measures, but rather deeds of desperate daring. In these he had never put confidence before, nor had he employed them, but then it was only by their aid that he repelled the danger, snatching the city out of the grasp of Epaminondas, erecting a trophy of victory, and showing their wives and children that the Lacedaemonians were making the fairest of all returns to their country for its rearing of them. 6 Archidamus, too, fought among the foremost, conspicuous for his impetuous courage and for his agility, running swiftly through the narrow streets to the endangered points in the battle, and everywhere pressing hard upon the enemy with his few followers.85 But I think that Isidas, the son of Phoebidas, must have been a strange and marvellous sight, not only to his fellow-citizens, but also to his enemies. 7 He was of conspicuous beauty and stature, and at an age when the human flower has the greatest charm, as the boy merges into the man. Naked as he was, without either defensive p99armour or clothing, — for he had just anointed his body with oil, — he took a spear in one hand, and a sword in the other, leaped forth from his house, and after pushing his way through the midst of the combatants, ranged up and down among the enemy, smiting and laying low all who encountered him. 8 And no man gave him a wound, whether it was that a god shielded him on account of his valour, or that the enemy thought him taller and mightier than a mere man could be. For this exploit it is said that the ephors put a garland on his head, and then fined him a thousand drachmas, because he had dared to hazard his life in battle without armour.

Rhipsaspides! :
Polyaenus

10 Epaminondas once attempted to gain control of Lacedaemon by a night attack, while the Lacedaemonian forces were absent. But Agesilaus, who had been informed of this plan by deserters, entered the city after a forced march with a body of troops; and after preparing to receive the enemy, he drove them back with great loss. Amidst the confusion, many of the Theban soldiers, who had been routed in the night and were being vigorously pursued by the Lacedaemonians, threw away their shields. When Epaminondas observed this, in order to conceal their disgrace, he ordered the troops to hand over their shields to the keepers of the baggage, and to follow their general with only their swords and their spears. This earned him the gratitude of those who had thrown away their shields; and in return for that act of favour, they were most alert from then on in executing his commands.

Taking a city was very difficult at this date- surely Spartan women had as many roof tiles as their Argive peers. I'm willing to entertain the thought that Alexander was nuts enough to keep at it despite the losses and take Sparta if he had done so...if...