Hippeis, not Hippies

[Paralus]

To what Paul M-S posted I would add the great success of Agiselaos' horse and light troops in Asia and back home.

Troops hired by necessity: Sparta was not about to supply the “Agamemnon” of the early fourth century and supposed “liberator of the Hellenes of Asia” with the army Archidamus. Agesilaos had to make do with what he could hire; Xenophon’s formerly “criminal” mercenaries at a pinch.

Whilst I would not argue with Paul Mac’s “innovations”, it is well to remember that much of this hiring and use of differing troop types was facilitated by victory in the Peloponnesian war and, more so, Sparta’s stretching of an ever thinning resource.

Allied to this is the restructure of the Peloponnesian League, along the lines of the Athenian Empire it supplanted ironically enough, whereby members could contribute money in lieu of troops. Thus Sparta hired her troops increasingly.

First, we have no reason to believe they did not in fact pioneer the shock tactics of Epaminondas. They may have been quite able to do so without the amateur's need for added depth.

Now that, I believe, to be amongst your “snider” moments.

This will not be a debate about othismos and, in any case, the "amatuers" clearly won the day over the jaded and juiced "pros"...

As pericles noted, Spartiates were driven by fear- hence the shrine to Phobos attached to the Ephorate's mess. It was a fear not of death, but of the Law and shame in the eyes of their peers and the very real loss of social standing that entailed. In this there is a very good analogy to Japanese soldiers in WWII. Expected not to surrender, they often broke easily when they were captured for they had no preperation for the event and were driven by shame at their survival to even turn on their own. Spartiates were not expected to lose by their society, so when loss was eminent, the shock to their courage was all the greater.

Whilst that may have some basis in fact it is an exculpation worthy of Xenophon at his best. As you feel free to quote from Plutarch, so shall I (well though I know it to be a life of no consequence to Xenophon – aside from 367/6):

Pel. 17.3-4:
The onset being made on both sides particularly where the commanders themselves stood, in the first place, the Lacedaemonian polemarchs clashed with Pelopidas and fell; then, when those about them were being wounded and slain, their whole army was seized with fear and opened up a lane for the Thebans, imagining that they wished to force their way through to the opposite side and get away. But Pelopidas used the path thus opened to lead his men against those of the enemy who still held together, and slew them as he went along, so that finally all turned and fled.

Ibid 23.4:
At this time, however, since the phalanx of Epaminondas bore down upon them alone and neglected the rest of their force, and since Pelopidas engaged them with incredible speed and boldness, their courage and skill were so confounded that there was a flight and slaughter of the Spartans such as had never before been seen.

In the first two “divisions” (mora) are confronted by the “Sacred Band and a few horsemen”. Their answer to Pelopidas’ onslaught is to part and allow the Thebans to “escape”. In the end they are routed and flee the field. The second is self explanatory.

In both instances the Spartans are fleeing not because they were never expected to lose and so this was a shock, nor was it due to fear of shame. It was fear of imminent death – pure and simple – just as any other mortal man.

Both of the former two might easily have sacked Sparta and made a “settlement” in the manner of Doson. Far easier – and far less costly in manpower – was to partition off Spartan agrarian holdings, whilst a supine Sparta watched, to other not disinterested Peloponnesian states

Simply drivel :roll: We've been over this before. Even Doson did not fight his way into Sparta. Both Epameinondas and Pyrrus tried hard to take the city […] Taking a city was very difficult at this date- surely Spartan women had as many roof tiles as their Argive peers.

You might have left off the quotes and simply gone onto the latter statement. And it is not "simply drivel": Sparta indeed watched as first Epaminondas and then Philip carved up what had been "ancestral" Spartan territory and parcelled it out to disliked or even hated enemies.

Taking cities was indeed a difficult matter. More so with a conglomerate army and time constraints (that saw Epaminondas fined if I recall). There simply was no reason to engage in a street by street battle if it was not necessary. The surprise attack failed and so the result was to geld Sparta and depart leaving the Peloponnese divided into blocks with Theban favouring governments (aside from Corinth).

Philip II, with even more pressing time constraints and money problems, stitched up just that little more and for exactly the same reasons. Both he and his son had other matters they wished to attend to and the cloak of Greek revenge propaganda would not be dealt any favours by razing either Sparta or Athens (a city Philip was exceptionally careful with).

The statement with respect to Doson is simply fallacious. Doson did not have to “fight his way into Sparta” because he had already done that in destroying her resistance at a sideshow called Sellasia. There were no Spartan forces left to resist Doson and there was no octogenarian Agesilaos to rally women to its defence for the great Spartan patriot and King, Cleomenes, had scarpered to Egypt in its aftermath to meet a very ignominious end.

One might just as well claim that Philip never "fought his way into" Thebes after Chaeronea or Alexander into Babylon after Gaugamela or Persepolis after the “Persian Gates” encounter. For that matter, the Spartans never "fought their way" into Athens after Aegespotami either: the Athenians let them in.

A wonderful life is the sophist's....