Hippeis, not Hippies

[PMBardunias]

Troops hired by necessity: Sparta was not about to supply the “Agamemnon” of the early fourth century and supposed “liberator of the Hellenes of Asia” with the army Archidamus. Agesilaos had to make do with what he could hire; Xenophon’s formerly “criminal” mercenaries at a pinch.

The point is not why he needed the troops, but how he trained them and how he used them. The idea that Spartans were somehow unfamiliar with the innovative uses of peltasts and cavalry is simply not true. Interestingly, the way Agiselaos raises quality cavalry in Asia, by allowing rich men to buy their way out of service by providing horses and men in their stead, is the same system that Xenophon blames for the low quality of the cavalry at Leuktra.

This will not be a debate about othismos and, in any case, the "amatuers" clearly won the day over the jaded and juiced "pros"...

That is the whole point of the added depth- to allow the amateurs to stand up to a better trained and more cohesive phalanx. If you are the more cohesive phalanx, you don't need the depth. Note this transcends othismos, since it would hold true no matter the benefit of depth.

In both instances the Spartans are fleeing not because they were never expected to lose and so this was a shock, nor was it due to fear of shame. It was fear of imminent death – pure and simple – just as any other mortal man.

Men don't flee simply from a fear of death. Were that the case, men would never charge in the first place. What causes a rout is a perception that your side is losing, spawned by disorder within the ranks. This feeling of hopelessness is what does an army in and causes an "every man for himself" mentality that is the death of armies. Because Spartans were expected to win and usually did in major battles, when they are being beaten, especially at their own game, the shock to their morale is perhaps greater than to an Argive who runs away like his father did or an Athenian who is fighting with a new aspis because some Thracian is sledding down a mountain with his old one.

You might have left off the quotes and simply gone onto the latter statement. And it is not "simply drivel": Sparta indeed watched as first Epaminondas and then Philip carved up what had been "ancestral" Spartan territory and parcelled it out to disliked or even hated enemies.

A very different thing than the scenario you presented: "Both of the former two might easily have sacked Sparta"

There simply was no reason to engage in a street by street battle if it was not necessary. The surprise attack failed and so the result was to geld Sparta and depart leaving the Peloponnese divided into blocks with Theban favouring governments (aside from Corinth).

I agree completely with that statement, but it is a fact that Epameinondas tried, not once, but twice, to assault Sparta and failed both times because he got his butt kicked.

I forgot to include Xenophon in the earlier list of quotes. Heres what happened when Epameinondas unsuccessfully probed Sparta during the first Theban invasion (what is the greek word for Spanking?):

[30]
Now when, in its onward march, the army of the enemy came opposite Amyclae, at this point they crossed the Eurotas. And wherever the Thebans encamped they at once threw down in front of their lines the greatest possible quantity of the trees which1 they cut down, and in this way guarded themselves; the Arcadians, however, did nothing of this sort, but left their camp behind them and turned their attention to plundering the houses. After this, on the third or fourth day of the invasion, the horsemen advanced to the race-course in the sanctuary of Poseidon Gaeaochus by divisions, the Thebans in full force, the Eleans, and all the horsemen who were there of the Phocians, Thessalians, or Locrians.
[31] And the horsemen of the Lacedaemonians, seemingly very few in number, were formed in line against them. Meanwhile the Lacedaemonians had set an ambush of the younger hoplites, about three hundred in number, in the house of the Tyndaridae,1 and at the same moment these men rushed forth and their horsemen charged. The enemy, however, did not await their attack, but gave way. And on seeing this, many of the foot-soldiers also took to flight. But when the pursuers stopped and the army of the Thebans stood firm, the enemy encamped again.

And his second attempt- italics for emphasis:

[11]
Now when Epaminondas had arrived within the city1 of the Spartiatae, he did not attempt to enter at the point where his troops would be likely to have to fight on the ground-level and be pelted from the house-tops, nor where they would fight with no advantage over the few, although they were many; but after gaining the precise position from which he believed that he would enjoy an advantage, he undertook to descend (instead of ascending) into the city.
[12] As for what happened thereupon, one may either hold the deity responsible, or one may say that nobody could withstand desperate men. For when Archidamus led the advance with not so much as a hundred men and, after crossing the very thing1 which seemed to present an obstacle, marched uphill against the adversary, at that moment the fire-breathers, the men who had defeated the Lacedaemonians, the men who were altogether superior in numbers and were occupying higher ground besides, did not withstand the attack of the troops under Archidamus, but gave way.
[13] And those in the van of Epaminondas' army were slain, but when the troops from within the city, exulting in their victory, pursued farther than was fitting, they in their turn were slain; for, as it seems, the line had been drawn by the deity indicating how far victory had been granted them. Archidamus accordingly set up a trophy at the spot where he had won the victory, and gave back under a truce those of the enemy who had fallen there.
[14] Epaminondas, on the other hand, reflecting1 that the Arcadians would be coming to Lacedaemon to bring aid, had no desire to fight against them and against all the Lacedaemonians after they had come together,2 especially since they had met with success and his men with disaster; so he marched back as rapidly as he could to Tegea, and allowed his hoplites to rest there, but sent his horsemen on to Mantinea, begging them to endure this additional effort and explaining to them that probably all the cattle of the Mantineans were outside the city and likewise all the people, particularly as it was harvest time.

This is not a shrewd assessment of the cost of taking Sparta and a decision to simply bypass it. This is a clear attempt to take it and an ignoble defeat followed by a quick rationalization that they did not need to take the city afterall.

The statement with respect to Doson is simply fallacious... One might just as well claim that Philip never "fought his way into" Thebes after Chaeronea or Alexander into Babylon after Gaugamela or Persepolis after the “Persian Gates” encounter. For that matter, the Spartans never "fought their way" into Athens after Aegespotami either: the Athenians let them in.

Um...yes, that was my point exactly. Phillip did not fight his way into Thebes. By this logic, Hannibal "might easily have sacked Rome." Clearly beating an army in the field and having a polis handed to you by the remaining faction of its citizens is not the same as taking a city by storm. Doson did not take the city of Sparta by assault.