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goldsworthy\'s punics
#1
Finally got Goldsworthy's "Punic Wars" two days ago and I am almost finished! (Yes, I am on vacation!). Wonderful. I am impressed by the way this Goldsworthy writes.<br>
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But apart from Goldworthy's talents what impresses me are the many drammatic sub-stories and characters that these Wars are full of. Of course Hannibal is wonderful but I liked very much the vivid telling of other lesser known episodes and personalities. The roman system kept putting in the spot light new leaders, each vigorously trying to make an impression in the short time span he was alotted. No wonder the roman were so aggressive. Of course some weren't talented but the system kept the pressure on the next guy that to have a chance had best learn the lessons, military and political, of those before him. Few were lasting figures but all were determined to leave a mark, and determination is important. No wonder the romans won.<br>
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Many things caught my attention: mention is made of a solution of the cavalry problem adopted in a particular theater in sothern Italy. The winning idea had some light infantry ride along together with and behind the cavalry. During a fight they would dismount and form a formation behind which the cavalry in distress could re-assemble and muster up energy and determination for another charge. Interesting that this successful solution wasn't used systematically and elsewhere. Goldsworthy indeed comments that it isn't to be considered an evolution of roman fighting but only a particular solution to a specific problem.<br>
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Another thing on cavalry. Goldsworthy suggests the four-horned saddle, possibly a Gaulic invention, was already known back then. But then he also describes a few cavalry battles were the troopers got off their horses to fight almost stand-still battles. To me it this seems to contradict the notion that the four-horned saddle garanteed cavalry men a certain stability. Why get off the horse to fight? Did I read those passages wrongly? Anyone?<br>
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One of many things that I didn't know (as I was ignorant of these wars, besides the usual over digested info) was that in several occasions Carthaginian armies used elephants - not Hannibal, that had only one left. But I still gather, from Goldsworthy's telling, that they basically added to confusion and never really determined the outcome of the fighting. Just another obsolete weapon platform that the military insisted in using. History is full of examples.<br>
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Another thing that Goldsworthy mentions repeatedly with many incedible examples is the lack of "intelligence". It is drammatic how scouting parties and armies would miss or find each other almost by accident. The first example in the second war was the miss of Hannibal with Publius Scipio at the Rhone. I admire the roman's judgement and decision not follow then and there Hannibal but send his army onwards to Spain.<br>
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Could go on for hours. Better stop here.<br>
ciao<br>
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P.S. Looking at the larger picture of the wars, and not just at the genius Hannibal, the Romans were just as clever and inventive as the Carthaginans, not only in the first war (when the romans turned thenselves into sea fighters), but also in the second one when they had to keep Hannibal in check and fight against the other Carthaginian forces. I do believe that secondary characters and stories are more telling than the greater ones. <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/ugoffredo.showPublicProfile?language=EN>goffredo</A> at: 8/6/01 2:17:55 pm<br></i>
Jeffery Wyss
"Si vos es non secui of solutio tunc vos es secui of preciptate."
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#2
"Many things caught my attention: mention is made of a solution of the cavalry problem adopted in a particular theater in sothern Italy. The winning idea had some light infantry ride along together with and behind the cavalry. During a fight they would dismount and form a formation behind which the cavalry in distress could re-assemble and muster up energy and determination for another charge. Interesting that this successful solution wasn't used systematically and elsewhere. Goldsworthy indeed comments that it isn't to be considered an evolution of roman fighting but only a particular solution to a specific problem."<br>
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Well, that's interesting. Will have to go and look for that page. Which one was it?<br>
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Maybe sheds some light on the curious composition of the later cohors equitata of the Principate? Anyone care to speculate on why coh eq were structured as they were?<br>
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<br>
J. <p></p><i></i>
Cheers,
Jenny
Founder, Roman Army Talk and RomanArmy.com

We are all travelers in the wilderness of this world, and the best we can find in our travels is an honest friend.
-- Robert Louis Stevenson
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#3
THE PUNIC WARS, ADrian Goldsworthy, pg. 234 mid page (second paragraph)<br>
"In 211 the seige of Capua remained the main priority...<br>
The Campanian horse continued to enjoy frequent successes, until a Roman centurion, one Quintus Naevius, came up with the idea of forming a picked body of velites who would ride behind the Roman horsemen. In action they dismounted and fought in close support of the cavalry, acting as a solid bulwark in the shelter of which the horsemen could rally and reform to charge again. The new tactic gave the advantage to the Romans in all subsequent encounters. This incident has sometimes been depicted as a major reform of the cavalry and the light infantry of the legions, but infact it was simply a local expedient to deal with a particular situation. It reflected the growing experience of the Roman armies, rather than any fundamental change in their composition." <p></p><i></i>
Jeffery Wyss
"Si vos es non secui of solutio tunc vos es secui of preciptate."
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#4
Salve,<br>
<br>
As often I dare to speculate a bit.<br>
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Mixed units<br>
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The imperial <i> cohors equitata</i> was not very anomalous in composition as it seems. The imperial army had various formations incoporating both infantry and cavalry. At various times the predominantly infantry <i> cohortes praetoriae</i> had their mounted <i> speculatores</i>, <i> equites praetoriani</i> and <i> equites promoti</i>, the legions their <i> equites legionis</i>, <i> speculatores</i>, <i> stratores</i>, <i> singulares</i>, <i> protectores</i>, <i> stablesiani</i> and <i> equites promoti</i>. For both praetorian and legionary troopers it is unsure to what extent these categories overlapped. That the <i> auxilia</i> had similar units combining troops of both sorts is thus not peculiar to this branch of the armed forces. While it was once thought that since <i> equites cohortales</i> were inferior to the <i> alares</i> the infantrymen of the <i> cohortes equitatae</i> should correspondingly have been inferior to those of the <i> cohortes peditatae</i> there appear to have been no differences in status between these foot soldiers.<br>
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Numbers<br>
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The relative strength of the horse component attached to infantry units varied. While both literary sources (Pseudo-Hyginus, Josephus) and surviving unit strength records indicate a strength of some hundred twenty horsemen for a quingenary unit and double the number for a milliary unit, the legionary horse comprised just some ninety to hundred twenty men in available source material (Josephus, Tetrarchic rations papyrus). The praetorian horse numbered at least four hundred and possibly a thousand troopers judging by the work Pseudo-Hyginus. The strength of some three hundred horsemen attributed to the guard <i> speculatores</i> in modern works is guesswork. Thus there seems to have been no general standard guiding the ratio of cavalrymen to foot soldiers in the various formations.<br>
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Recruitment<br>
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The cavalrymen attached to infantry units were at least in part recruited from the ranks of the infantry. Some of such horsemen were called <i> equites promoti</i> indicating that becoming a horseman was deemed a type of promotion. The extra pay and higher prestige of the horse soldier probably made this a coveted position. The revolting Batavian auxiliaries demanded among other things an increase in the number of horsemen attached to their units. Though the equipment and horses of the <i> equites cohortales</i> were, as indicated by a speech of Hadrianus to such forces, inferior to those of the <i> alares</i>, these troopers could nevertheless be detached to the elite <i> singulares</i> of the governor's guard. Service in this type of unit brought further chances of career advancements.<br>
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Armament<br>
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According to the available evidence the <i> cohortes equitatae</i> comprised both standard type auxiliary units as well as archers, their structure apparently thus not determined by type of equipment and weaponry. Their equipment and mounts were of inferior quality to those used by the troopers of the 'true' cavalry regiments but otherwise similar in style combining both ranged weapons and close quarters weapons and defensive armour. That the horsemen of the part-mounted units could have splendid equipment of their own is indicated by the lavishly decorated Theilenhofen helmet.<br>
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Tactical use<br>
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One of the things remarked upon in the <i> Bellum Gallicum</i> was the mixing of horsemen and light infantry by the Germanic tribes that came with Ariovistus to Gaul. This tactic was later copied by Caesar when he used specially armed legionary <i> expediti</i> and <i> antesignani</i> to operate alongside his cavalry in the African campaign.<br>
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It used to be thought that similar tactics were employed by the imperial era <i> cohortes equitatae</i>. However for this period the available indications for the mounted soldiers attached to infantry formations of various kinds appear to point to separate use of such forces, their numbers being brigaded into special formations and operating alongside the 'true' cavalry units. The cavalry of the <i> cohortes equitatae</i> thus seem to have been used tactically independent from their infantry and not employed for mixed cavalry/light infantry tactics. Rather the cavalry component seems to have been intended to give units an all arms capability without breaking up the elite striking force of the <i> alae</i> for such purposes.<br>
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Development<br>
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The horsemen of the <i> cohortes equitatae</i> were generally brigaded together and formed into special campaigning formations that became increasingly permanently detached from their mother units. Cavalry brigades like that would as <i> vexillationes</i> eventually become the elite horse formations of the Roman army of the later third century and after, thus ironically reversing the original distinction between lower grade <i> cohortales</i> and superior <i> alares</i>.<br>
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The most relevant works are:<br>
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Davies, R., <i> Service in the Roman army</i> (Edinburgh 1989) 336p.<br>
Goldsworthy, A.K., <i> The Roman army at war 100 BC-200AD</i> (Oxford 1996) 311p.<br>
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Davies has an article on the subject while Goldsworthy discusses the use of cavalry with supporting infantry.<br>
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Regards,<br>
<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst<br>
<p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/bromanarmytalk.showLocalUserPublicProfile?login=sandervandorst>Sander van Dorst</A> at: 8/18/01 12:58:27 am<br></i>
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#5
Salve,<br>
<br>
The tactic of using infantry as a defensive bulwark to protect the cavalry and as a base of support from which the cavalry could sally forth and retreat to was retained in Roman army tactics and indeed long afterwards by the Byzantine empire and, probably through contact with this state's armed forces, to the armies of medieval Europe and the crusader states. Disciplined infantry could in general be more relied upon than horses not to collapse under the moral strain of a charge and by not exposing the horses to danger there was less risk of these taking along their riders in headlong flight. However an important difference between later examples of this tactic and those employed at the siege of Capua was that later on heavy infantry was usually employed and that the foot soldiers did not hitch a ride with the cavalry. Arrian deployed his infantry in a strong defensive formation which protected the cavalry behind it, which was only to advance through openings made in the infantry line when the initial Alan charge had been withstood. A very similar formation is described in the late 6th century <i> Strategikon</i>, book twelve, of Mauricius which goes more into detail how the infantry was to create such gaps to let the cavalry come through. Finally crusader armies operating in the east in particular adopted similar methods, using infantry formations which protected the cavalry against enemy charges and from which safe haven they could charge.<br>
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<br>
Dennis, G.T., <i> Maurice's Strategikon. handbook of Byzantine military strategy</i> ( Philadelphia 1984)178p.<br>
DeVoto, J.G., <i> Flavius Arrianus: Technè Taktika (Tactical handbook) and Ektaxis kata Alanoon (The expedition against the Alans)</i> (Chicago 1993) 132p.<br>
Haldon, J., <i> Warfare, state and society in the Byzantine world 565-1204</i> (London 1999) 389p.<br>
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Regards,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/bromanarmytalk.showLocalUserPublicProfile?login=sandervandorst>Sander van Dorst</A> at: 8/21/01 7:36:43 am<br></i>
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#6
Thanks, Sander -- as always, a thorough and helpful answer!<br>
<br>
Jenny <p></p><i></i>
Cheers,
Jenny
Founder, Roman Army Talk and RomanArmy.com

We are all travelers in the wilderness of this world, and the best we can find in our travels is an honest friend.
-- Robert Louis Stevenson
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#7
No thanks, that's the point of visiting this forum.<br>
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Regarding dismounting cavalry to receive enemy troops one can think of the problems that horsed cavalry has to hold ground. The horses can be unnerved quite easily and cause panic. Infantry on the other hand can much better defend a spot, even if only the reduced chances of escaping quickly instills the will to resist.<br>
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Regards,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst <p></p><i></i>
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#8
Any comments on Goldsworthy's hypothesis that horned saddles already existed during the punic wars? I thought it was a later development and Goldworthy's comment that it could have been used that early took me by surprise. But then many things do as I am ignorant.<br>
But my comment still remains: If those saddles existed and they truely gave a good support to the trooper then why dismount to fight? I agree that horses where difficult to train but this has always been true. I don't think horse training methods changed much over the centuries (wouldn't be surprised to find out that those used today are same as those used 5000 years ago!). So I make the following question: Are there any descriptions from the later battles of the empire, when the horned saddles were certainly used, of cavalry troopers dismounting to fight the opposing cavalry force as Goldsworthy describes happening during the second punic war? <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/ugoffredo.showPublicProfile?language=EN>goffredo</A> at: 8/18/01 10:42:43 pm<br></i>
Jeffery Wyss
"Si vos es non secui of solutio tunc vos es secui of preciptate."
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#9
Salve,<br>
<br>
There are several recorded instances of Roman and Byzantine cavalry dismounting to fight on foot. Caesar used horsemen in an assault on the Pharos of Alexandria (<i> Bellum Africum</i> 29). Tacitus mentions dismounted cavalrymen being used to assist auxiliary infantry in storming British fortifications in the campaigns of P. Ostorius against Caratacus (<i> Annales</i> 12.31). Josephus likewise mentions dismounted troopers forming the vanguard of an assault party (<i> BJ</i> 3.254) and Traianus ordered his cavalry to storm Hatra, very likely on foot. Byzantine cavalry is also reported to have dismounted for combat on foot. At Mammes in 534 CE dismounted troopers assaulted a defensive Moorish formation. At Taginae in 552 CE dismounted cavalrymen withstood a Gothic cavalry charge. At the battle at Solachon in 586 CE Byzantine cavalry was ordered to dismount and thereafter succeeded in driving away the opposing cavalry. The <i> Strategikon</i> 12.13 advises hard pressed cavalry to dismount and defend themselves on foot. Book 8.2.85 also refers to horsemen being used for dismounted combat.<br>
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Regards,<br>
<br>
Sander van Dorst <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/bromanarmytalk.showLocalUserPublicProfile?login=sandervandorst>Sander van Dorst</A> at: 8/21/01 7:37:28 am<br></i>
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#10
That cavalry dismounted to fight when needed in strange situations does NOT really suprise me, also because I now do remember reading similar passages. But it is interesting that they would do it against other cavalry. They must have had training to fight on foot as a group because I imagine that individuals on foot have the disadvantage against mounted ones.<br>
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QUESTION: If the cavalry trooper is not armoured and, especially, the horse is not (unlike Cataphracts), what were the odds in a one-on-one fight between a foot soldier and a cavalry man (before stirrups)? I would think that the advantage of having a heavy horse to use to physically bump the man on foot might be somewhat cancelled by the possibility of the foot soldier to wound the large horse with a javelin, spear or sword (didn't Ceasar's men at Phalarsus stab at the bellies of the Pompeian horse?). <p></p><i>Edited by: <A HREF=http://pub45.ezboard.com/ugoffredo.showPublicProfile?language=EN>goffredo</A> at: 8/22/01 10:06:29 am<br></i>
Jeffery Wyss
"Si vos es non secui of solutio tunc vos es secui of preciptate."
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