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Calling all armchair generals! Boudica's Last Stand.
(03-10-2021, 12:06 AM)Theoderic Wrote:
(03-09-2021, 11:26 PM)Renatus Wrote: There was a typo in the last sentence of my last post which I have now corrected.  I have added 'not' before 'imply'.
 
I think that is fine.

The included diagram shows that the wagons could have enclosed the site. 

Where the waggons are situated there is a full view of the battlefield.

As you can see from the Roman lines the waggons wrap around the battle site, because they have to.

OK,i will admit i've still not read all the posts ,but I think it is time to reconsider what we should be looking for based on our knowledge of Roman warfare and Paulinus's miltary career.Briefly,no very briefly,Gaius Suetonius Paulinus had a good reputation as a miltary commander following his campaign in North Africa and was chosen to continue the conquest of Britain.At this time the Roman army built Marching camps ,where they stayed for a few days while suppressing the local tribes.This provided them with a safe base where they could rest and prepare for the following days.Paulinus was a careful commander,not one for rash behaviour,so we are told.So surely with a few days to prepare,he would build a camp.He built camps everywhere he went so to think he did not build one for his troops and the civillians beefore the battle would seem out of character for him and the Roman army.Fighting up hill,thats no good ,and the wagons spreading out ,but being unable to move doesnt work either.If they are spread out,then they can easily move.If they are crammed into a narrow area then there movement is constricted.Wherever the battlefield is Paulinus thought it held enough advantages that he gave up London and St Albans.I cant see waiting in a ditch below your enemy has that much going for it,sorry.
Ian
Reply
Owein Walker wrote:

Briefly,no very briefly,Gaius Suetonius Paulinus had a good reputation as a miltary commander following his campaign in North Africa and was chosen to continue the conquest of Britain.

Absoloutely and in that context, have we been misled and not given Seutonius Paulinus the credit a general of his standing deserves?

A general that had three successful campaign seasons in conquering the Ordovices and destroying the Druids on Mona as well as his earlier military successes in North Africa.

The translation of Tacitus has given us the impression that he was in the process of withdrawing and was forced to eventually fight to survive.

On the other hand the phrase “breaking off delay” could imply that he had time to regroup and to pick a location that gave him the opportunity to pull in as many forces as possible from other forts, by also choosing in advance a site that could defend his forces but where he could win decisively.

So this puts a different perspective on the battle plan for Seutonius Paulinus as being proactive rather than reactive because now he knew what he had to do to and what he needed to prepare for, including food and water in desert and mountainous conditions.

Owein Walker wrote:

At this time the Roman army built Marching camps ,where they stayed for a few days while suppressing the local tribes.This provided them with a safe base where they could rest and prepare for the following days.

Paulinus was a careful commander, not one for rash behaviour, so we are told.

So surely with a few days to prepare, he would build a camp. He built camps everywhere he went so to think he did not build one for his troops and the civilians before the battle would seem out of character for him and the Roman army.

Absoloutely true or is it? This is not exactly waging war as the Roman Army would do normally and they may have been under canvass which would leave little trace but even if it were the chances of finding a marching camp or battle debris is rare.   

The only site that I have come across that had that type of access (although it being a land bridge joining Aylesbury Plain to the raised area) was at Pitstone Hill near Ivinghoe Beacon. Whilst I was looking at this I also noticed on closer inspection that there was another defile on the other side of the open space and also that the combined entrances and the space in between was in the shape of a gullet.

Could this have been the missing piece that caused confusion? of course it could be co-incidence 

I have come to believe that this is indeed the site as it fits a number of criteria that are mentioned:

1.      It has only one an access point that is narrow for wagons and a large number of fleeing men.

2.      A further defile (800 yards) that can be used as a protection for the Roman Army. 

3.      Surrounding hills that can be used as a trap.

4.      A battlefield that is a third of a mile deep and three quarters of a mile wide

5.      Protected by woods and a step sided valley as described.

6.      Near two major military road (Watling Street and Akeman Street)

7.      Overlooks the Icknield Way

8.      Within one day’s march of St Albans

9.      Water within 1.8 miles

10.     Room for a camp.

[b]Owein Walker wrote:[/b]

[b]Fighting up hill, that is no good ,and the wagons spreading out ,but being unable to move doesn't work either. If they are spread   they can easily move. If they are crammed into a narrow area then there movement is constricted.[/b]

 
This site is all about topography and SP using it. 

If you look at the map of the area you will see that there is only one entrance and exit. Although it would be possible for individuals on foot to clamber away from the battle site, wagons could not due to the precipitous nature of the topography, and would have to leave via the one access point onto the Aylesbury plain, adding to the congestion and chaos as you say.

Owein Walker wrote:

I cant see waiting in a ditch below your enemy has that much going for it, sorry.

To beat the Brythons SP needed them to attack him in a fullscale battle and to do that it had to seem like the place he chose was advantageous to the Boudiccan army but actually was to their detriment without them being aware of that.

He had to set a trap.

The Roman army had never been beaten by the Brythons in a full scale engagement, Brythonic successes had been only when they had superior numbers and surprise on their side and normally when they realised that they were losing they would swiftly withdraw away from Roman retribution.

Typically they would mount a guerrilla war of ambush or siege tactics, towns were a creation of the Roman system which is why it was difficult to bring a Brythonic Army to a formal battle on a large scale.

The key to them being thoroughly defeated was to attract them into the field of battle and then when they were retreating to prevent them from escaping by using the terrain.

The other major issue was that SP had far fewer men than the huge number of Brythons. He needed to use the terrain to not only protect his men but to even up the odds in order that not only could they not be overwhelmed but that they had a realistic chance of beating the Brythons by application of the correct battlefield tactics.

The trick was to ensure that the Brythons didn’t feel that they were enclosed or trapped and were totally in command of the situation in order that they would come onto the battlefield and attack.

In other words Seutonius Paulinus’ challenge was to turn what was normally a disadvantage into an advantage.

The clue may be in the speech that SP gives to his men prior to the battle Only close up the ranks, and having discharged your javelins, then with shields and swords continue the work of bloodshed and destruction, without a thought of plunder. When once the victory has been won, everything will be in your power."

I believe that his intention was to attack so ferociously that the Brythons would turn back on themselves to withdraw swiftly as normal but because they were trying to retreat uphill and they were hemmed in by the terrain they were slaughtered as they turned to flee. 

The siting of the wagons adding to the blockage at the entrance was a bonus for the Roman army. 
 
 
 
Deryk
Reply
(03-18-2021, 10:26 PM)Theoderic Wrote: Owein Walker wrote:

Briefly,no very briefly,Gaius Suetonius Paulinus had a good reputation as a miltary commander following his campaign in North Africa and was chosen to continue the conquest of Britain.

Absoloutely and in that context, have we been misled and not given Seutonius Paulinus the credit a general of his standing deserves?

A general that had three successful campaign seasons in conquering the Ordovices and destroying the Druids on Mona as well as his earlier military successes in North Africa.

The translation of Tacitus has given us the impression that he was in the process of withdrawing and was forced to eventually fight to survive.

On the other hand the phrase “breaking off delay” could imply that he had time to regroup and to pick a location that gave him the opportunity to pull in as many forces as possible from other forts, by also choosing in advance a site that could defend his forces but where he could win decisively.

So this puts a different perspective on the battle plan for Seutonius Paulinus as being proactive rather than reactive because now he knew what he had to do to and what he needed to prepare for, including food and water in desert and mountainous conditions.

Owein Walker wrote:

At this time the Roman army built Marching camps ,where they stayed for a few days while suppressing the local tribes.This provided them with a safe base where they could rest and prepare for the following days.

Paulinus was a careful commander, not one for rash behaviour, so we are told.

So surely with a few days to prepare, he would build a camp. He built camps everywhere he went so to think he did not build one for his troops and the civilians before the battle would seem out of character for him and the Roman army.

Absoloutely true or is it? This is not exactly waging war as the Roman Army would do normally and they may have been under canvass which would leave little trace but even if it were the chances of finding a marching camp or battle debris is rare.   

The only site that I have come across that had that type of access (although it being a land bridge joining Aylesbury Plain to the raised area) was at Pitstone Hill near Ivinghoe Beacon. Whilst I was looking at this I also noticed on closer inspection that there was another defile on the other side of the open space and also that the combined entrances and the space in between was in the shape of a gullet.

Could this have been the missing piece that caused confusion? of course it could be co-incidence 

I have come to believe that this is indeed the site as it fits a number of criteria that are mentioned:

1.      It has only one an access point that is narrow for wagons and a large number of fleeing men.

2.      A further defile (800 yards) that can be used as a protection for the Roman Army. 

3.      Surrounding hills that can be used as a trap.

4.      A battlefield that is a third of a mile deep and three quarters of a mile wide

5.      Protected by woods and a step sided valley as described.

6.      Near two major military road (Watling Street and Akeman Street)

7.      Overlooks the Icknield Way

8.      Within one day’s march of St Albans

9.      Water within 1.8 miles

10.     Room for a camp.

[b]Owein Walker wrote:[/b]

[b]Fighting up hill, that is no good ,and the wagons spreading out ,but being unable to move doesn't work either. If they are spread   they can easily move. If they are crammed into a narrow area then there movement is constricted.[/b]

 
This site is all about topography and SP using it. 

If you look at the map of the area you will see that there is only one entrance and exit. Although it would be possible for individuals on foot to clamber away from the battle site, wagons could not due to the precipitous nature of the topography, and would have to leave via the one access point onto the Aylesbury plain, adding to the congestion and chaos as you say.

Owein Walker wrote:

I cant see waiting in a ditch below your enemy has that much going for it, sorry.

To beat the Brythons SP needed them to attack him in a fullscale battle and to do that it had to seem like the place he chose was advantageous to the Boudiccan army but actually was to their detriment without them being aware of that.

He had to set a trap.

The Roman army had never been beaten by the Brythons in a full scale engagement, Brythonic successes had been only when they had superior numbers and surprise on their side and normally when they realised that they were losing they would swiftly withdraw away from Roman retribution.

Typically they would mount a guerrilla war of ambush or siege tactics, towns were a creation of the Roman system which is why it was difficult to bring a Brythonic Army to a formal battle on a large scale.

The key to them being thoroughly defeated was to attract them into the field of battle and then when they were retreating to prevent them from escaping by using the terrain.

The other major issue was that SP had far fewer men than the huge number of Brythons. He needed to use the terrain to not only protect his men but to even up the odds in order that not only could they not be overwhelmed but that they had a realistic chance of beating the Brythons by application of the correct battlefield tactics.

The trick was to ensure that the Brythons didn’t feel that they were enclosed or trapped and were totally in command of the situation in order that they would come onto the battlefield and attack.

In other words Seutonius Paulinus’ challenge was to turn what was normally a disadvantage into an advantage.

The clue may be in the speech that SP gives to his men prior to the battle Only close up the ranks, and having discharged your javelins, then with shields and swords continue the work of bloodshed and destruction, without a thought of plunder. When once the victory has been won, everything will be in your power."

I believe that his intention was to attack so ferociously that the Brythons would turn back on themselves to withdraw swiftly as normal but because they were trying to retreat uphill and they were hemmed in by the terrain they were slaughtered as they turned to flee. 

The siting of the wagons adding to the blockage at the entrance was a bonus for the Roman army. 
 
.To say this was not exactly 'waging war as the Roman army would do normally' stumped me to be honest,I didnt realise  there was another way.SP had fought the same way for nearly 20 years and at this critical moment decided to just try something different!? Different being put your troops in a ditch with no water and just wait for your enemy to come running down the hill,then block themselves in,hopefully?This is not a miltary plan fit for any commander,sorry.Just think for one minute,does it really make sense? Is this how you would CHOOSE to fight?
Ian
Reply
Owein Walker wrote:
 
To say this was not exactly 'waging war as the Roman army would do normally' stumped me to be honest, I didnt realise  there was another way. SP had fought the same way for nearly 20 years and at this critical moment decided to just try something different!? 
 
We have always thought of SP as being very staid, cautious and careful and although I think that he was all of these things I also have come to realise that that I may have under estimated him in his problem solving and risk analysis. If he had fought in the "Roman Way" as you put it, his easiest option would have been to take his force and the civilians from London and St Albans to the safety of Cirencester or Gloucester. 
 
We all recognise he could move swiftly and could have been in Gloucester in 4 / 5 days from St Albans if he chose and reformed his army and attacked in the next season with 3 full Legions but he didn't, he chose to fight.  

So perhaps not so cautious as we assume.
 
I would agree that he reacted in a very Roman manner when he first marched down to London heading straight for the enemy and possibly requesting the Legions to join him at a pre-arranged rendezvous (possibly St Albans).
 
He had to change his plans because the available legionary troops from the 9th had been destroyed and the remaining cavalry from the 9th were bottled up (which implies they were put under siege in the fort they escaped to, which also implies the enemy were expecting this) and did not join with SP.
 
SP then had to change his plans again when the reinforcements from the 2nd didn’t arrive either, although the 20th veterans may have joined him with a couple of cavalry wings from Kingsholme and Cirencester respectively.
 
He decided to retire from London and then from St Albans taking civilians with him from both places, again not very Roman.
 
It is my conjecture that at this point he realised that the enemy had learnt from watching the Roman Army fight over the previous 18 years that they had a standard play book and were playing it back at him. (It was a bit like breaking the Enigma Code, they knew that given certain circumstances how the typical Roman General would react).
 
When Colchester was burnt to the ground, they knew that Cerialis (being the nearest Legionary Commander) would come to attack them so they ambushed the 9th on the way to Colchester. It is almost inconceivable that Cerialis would have abandoned his forces in a structured battle and left the field unscathed.
 
So using the Roman playbook wasn’t going to work.
 
 
Owein Walker wrote:
Different being put your troops in a ditch with no water and just wait for your enemy to come running down the hill,then block themselves in,hopefully?
 
I think that you have answered your own question here.
 
Firstly it isn’t a ditch which you keep trying to infer it is. The battlefield is  a slope that runs down at the rate of 60 feet over about a half mile stretch, which then flattens out into a defile that is around 1,000 yards wide and 300 yards deep with a wide escape route at the rear.
 
Regarding the water issue, SP had taken an army over the Atlas Mountains (the first Roman General to do so) and into the deserts of North Africa so would know about the importance of carrying water with him, which as he chose this position, it would be logical to assume that he was prepared for this.
 
The wagons are really irrelevant. It is the topography that slows the retreating enemy (something that this enemy did all the time in a pitched battle against a set Roman battle) by restricting the room for thousands to escape in a panic.
 
As I said before the wagons and non combatants that were caught up in the slaughter couldn’t escape because they could not just turn their wagons around here because of the steepness of the slopes to the Aylesbury Plain. In all the other battle sites, you would be correct, but not here.
 
Owein Walker wrote:
This is not a military plan fit for any commander, sorry. Just think for one minute, does it really make sense?  Is this how you would CHOOSE to fight?
 
Yes I would, otherwise I would not have suggested it. If you could visit the site as I have, you might think differently.
Deryk
Reply
I just thought I'd add a brief additional note here, which may interest some people.

I've been reading lately about agriculture in medieval England, and I realise that I've been quite mistaken about the sowing and harvesting seasons (which were presumably the same in the Roman era, as the germination time of wheat cannot have changed much). I was assuming that the main wheat crop was sown in the spring, but it is, of course, almost entirely sown in the autumn. I think Deryk tried to point this out to me several times - sorry, Deryk!

Traditionally, the wheat harvest begins at the start of August (Lammas), and is mostly finished by the end of that month. September is for winnowing and threshing the grain, and preparing the ground, which is then sown with the new seed, beginning in October.

So Tacitus's point that the Iceni faced famine after the revolt "for they had been careless about sowing corn, people of every age having gone to the war, while they reckoned on our supplies as their own" relates to people being away at war in late autumn, not the spring or summer.

But what about the preceding harvest? Why would the Iceni need to seize Roman supplies if they'd only just harvested their own crops? I think this might point to one of the most important reasons for the revolt, and one which could easily have been overlooked by Roman historians at the time.

If the harvest of AD61 was very poor, the Iceni would have been facing a hungry winter. Worse, their new Roman overlords would be expecting taxes paid in kind - all the more frustrating for the Britons to know that they would have to hand over part of their meagre crop to the Romans, who meanwhile had their own supplies of grain brought from Gaul to feed their troops. With the recent memory of the atrocities carried out by the Romans against the family of the late king, and the absence of the Roman governor and his army in Wales, this could have provided the spark for rebellion.

By the end of August, Paulinus would have been wrapping up his conquest of Anglesey, as both Tacitus and Dio point out. If the revolt started gathering momentum among the harvest workers late in the month, Paulinus could have received word of it and have got his troops on the road by the beginning of September.

With this chronology, the attack on Colchester falls around the end of the first week of September. Paulinus reaches London shortly after that, and London is sacked by the Iceni around the second half of that month. A short period of delay ensues (not too long, or Paulinus would have been reinforced by his remaining troops in Wales), and then the final battle happens in the first few days of October. That still leaves just enough time for the reinforcements from the Rhine to arrive before the close of the sailing season and to go into winter quarters in Britain. The visit of the Polyclitus mission from Rome and finally the arrival of new governor Turpilianus probably happened after spring 62.

Anyway, I think that's the only timescale that makes sense of the note in Tacitus. It does make the events of the revolt, from the initial uprising to the main battle, very compressed though - no more than a month, really. Certainly no time for lengthy long-distance manoeuvres, or for the Iceni to return to their lands and sally forth again later, for example.
Nathan Ross
Reply
Very interesting.  However, Tacitus specifically relates the famine to the failure to sow corn, which means that, if the revolt broke out after the harvest of AD61, whether good or bad, the resulting famine would not have occurred during the winter of 61-62 but during the winter of 62-63.  This means that the hardship would have followed on from Suetonius's campaign of retribution, rather than being contemporaneous with it, and would accordingly have prolonged the distress of the tribe.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
(05-12-2021, 05:20 PM)Renatus Wrote: ...the resulting famine would not have occurred during the winter of 61-62 but during the winter of 62-63.

Yes, I suppose so. Although if the Iceni knew there would be no respite at harvest time in AD62 they would have had to spread what little food they did have very thinly to try and make it last, and this could have led to famine situations for at least some of population even earlier in the year.
Nathan Ross
Reply
I have spoken of famine during the winter of AD62-63 but actually the period is longer than that, right up to harvest time in 63, and it could have been even longer than that, if they had been compelled to eat the seed corn, or a substantial part of it, that should have been sowed in 61, that had been held back for planting in 62 but then eaten instead.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
I have just read an interesting paper by Grahame A. Appleby on the Boudiccan revolt. He concludes that the final battle was at Arbury Banks (SAM 20759; TL 2612 3870) near Ashwell (Herts).

https://www.academia.edu/241523/The_Boud..._to_defeat
Reply
Nathan wrote

I've been reading lately about agriculture in medieval England, and I realise that I've been quite mistaken about the sowing and harvesting seasons (which were presumably the same in the Roman era, as the germination time of wheat cannot have changed much). I was assuming that the main wheat crop was sown in the spring, but it is, of course, almost entirely sown in the autumn. I think Deryk tried to point this out to me several times - sorry, Deryk!

Thanks Nathan, I couldn't make sense of it either.

I couldn't see the relevance of Tacitus’ chronological statement “for they had been careless about sowing corn, people of every age having gone to the war, while they reckoned on our supplies as their own" and trying to fit it into the previously recognised timelines which I couldn’t.

Tacitus and Dio make references to the importance of the wheat crop both for the Brythons regarding a famine after the end of the war and for SP and the Fourteenth who were running out of food during on the march prior to the battle.

What I am proposing is perhaps that the underlying reason for the annexation of land from the Iceni, the invasion of Anglesey and also the spark for the rebellion (as Nathan has proposed) was wheat supply.

Harvests around the Mediterranean were inconsistent around this period as referenced in the Bible and there were major shortages in other parts of the Roman world. 

The Roman army of 40,000 based in Britannia would have been a major drain of wheat supply, a huge logistics nightmare in the supply chain and unsustainable in the long run.

Whereas as Britain had in the past exported wheat to the Roman Empire now this crop needed to be used locally to feed the army and could only be done either from State Farms or by taxation.  

As a policy this made sense to the Romans and was possibly standard practice. 

So the confiscation of lands after the legal agreement with Prasatugus of Client King had finished would create the State Farms, taxation on wheat grown elsewhere would provide more and finally invading a fertile region such as Anglesey would create further State Farms.   

Although Anglesey was the spiritual home of the Druids and an affront to the Romans (mainly because the Druids in a higher body than the state and therefore were a threat to the state) merely by invading it would not eradicate the religion. Any Druid leader would have been evacuated.

What Anglesey was known for was its huge copper deposits and as the “breadbasket of Wales” due to its abundance of wheat.  

So the confiscation of Iceni lands duly went ahead and possibly the defiling of Boudica and her daughters at the same time but there was little that the Brythons could do about it as the army was omnipresent at that time. 

The insult would never be forgotten but the practicalities of trying to feed the Roman Army and themselves on now depleted land acreage may have been the final tipping point and plans may have been laid to give Rome a tribute with a sting in the tail.

Roman policy ground on and SP duly successfully invaded Anglesey, and installed forts to guard the harbour, the island and the fort Segontium  at the straight etc.

Everything was going to plan but just as SP was about to leave to disband the army to its winter quarters he gets news that there has been an uprising and Colchester has been destroyed.

One of the other mysteries is why did no one set up defences around Colchester at all and why were only 200 poorly armed soldiers sent there from Catus and no troops sent from Cerialis if there was even a mild threat to the Roman capital of Britain?

If we start to look at this as an issue around wheat, it is possible that the wheat tax was to be delivered to the nearest administrative centre by the Iceni as part of the wheat tax normally delivered to Colchester by the Trinovantes at the same time ( the second / third  week of August).

This would have been the first time that both tribes would have done this and as it had been an accepted and peaceful practice by the Trinovantes in the past it was regarded as a normal event but with possible risks due to the numbers of people assembling.

It would make sense, as this was an administrative action that Catus would be responsible for policing the event and ensuring that the wheat was stored in the granaries or on to ships at a later stage.

Sending 200 hundred soldiers to police a festival would seem reasonable in normal circumstances but it was a major mistake by Catus who had totally underestimated the feelings that had been provoked by the treatment of the Iceni aristocracy and was a huge failure in administration.

As it happened this was a perfect scenario for the Iceni and the Trinovantes to literally walk into Colchester and create mayhem rather than join in to the planned festival – perhaps the Augustali  to celebrate the harvest.

Obviously someone sent messengers to Catus and Cerialis once the attack had begun and Catus fled to escape retribution possibly from his own countrymen and Cerialis gathered what forces he had, sent a messenger to SP and marched with all speed to Colchester and either met the returning Iceni or was ambushed, the latter being more likely as the cavalry survived and the foot soldiers perished indicating the two were separated.

A further message was then sent to SP from Cerialis informing him of the loss of Colchester and 2,000 legionaries.  

The main purpose having been accomplished, the Trinovantes now re-occupied their lost holdings from the veterans settlers and State across their land and the Iceni went back to their homelands, all awaiting the Roman retribution that was inevitable. The only question would have been how many troops and from which direction would the army come from?

In this scenario SP would have been in London by the 2nd or 3rd week of September, taken stock of the situation and be back in Verulamium by the end of September.

The harvest had all been collected and it now remained for the main crop to be resown which would have been the normal amount that the Iceni were used to but as Tacitus states “for they had been careless about sowing corn, people of every age having gone to the war, while they reckoned on our supplies as their own".

[Although this has always been interpreted as the tribes were expecting to rely on supplies that the roman army actually had (although it would seem that they were struggling themselves),  does he actually mean that although they had sown and grown the wheat that they would normally need for themselves, that they had not taken into account that a substantial portion had to be given to the Roman State as taxation and that the taxation was taken in AD62 leading to the subsequent famine in AD62 /63.]

My hypothesis is that the Trinovantes mobilised to attack London once they knew that SP was there and the Iceni mobilised once they realised that SP had retreated to Verulamium. There is evidence that the Brythons could communicate effectively to time attacks in different areas to great effect. 

It is my supposition that the Trinovantes approached from London and the Iceni from the East reaching SPs chosen battle site at around the first week in October.

SP overcame the Brythons but not only kept his field army (Fourteenth Legion) together but also pulled in troops from Wales and then waged a war of attrition (fire and sword) on the tribes who had rebelled, to the extent rather than capture valuable slaves for the State he was happier killing them.

One would expect that Nero would have waited until there was a successful outcome before investing in more troops.

The procurator who succeeded Catus Decianus, Julius Classicanus observed the carnage that SP was visiting on the tribes and called for another Governor and typically of a large Administration an enquiry was set up under the freedman Polyclitus, possibly in the spring of AD62 as Nathan proposes and to assess the value of the province and its governance.

Polyclitus actually did a fine job by getting the wasteful Governor replaced and recommending a further investment that duly came in the form troops from the continent, possibly sent with the replacement Governor at their head.

 
Deryk
Reply
Upper Arncott, near Bicester, has been put forward as 'the' battle site by Martyn Tagg. 

https://boudiccaslostbattlefield.com/main-article/

I believe this is a new suggestion and not mentioned before on RAT - I might be wrong.

Regards, Steve Kaye
Reply
(05-17-2021, 07:54 AM)Steve Kaye Wrote: Upper Arncott, near Bicester, has been put forward as 'the' battle site by Martyn Tagg. 

Too many unverified assumptions (coupled with a number of silly mistakes, a mistranslation and a map that does not show what it purports to show) to be convincing.  Nevertheless, the site itself looks interesting and consistent with Suetonius withdrawing westwards from St Albans and awaiting reinforcements from North Wales.
Michael King Macdona

And do as adversaries do in law, -
Strive mightily, but eat and drink as friends.
(The Taming of the Shrew: Act 1, Scene 2)
Reply
Thanks Steve, it's great to see a new theory with proper "neck on the block" prose (in shoutie caps) "THIS IS THE AREA! AND WHETHER YOU AGREE FULLY WITH MY REASONING, THE LOCATION IS EVERYTHING – IT ENCOMPASSES ALL OF BOTH TACITUS AND DIO CASSUIS CRITERIA!"

591,152
Reply
New way to calculate route options between Mona and Londinium.

https://orbis.stanford.edu/

I had to use Deva, 8.8 days by sea 5.1 days by road. But if from Mona seas distance is shorter and road distance ins longer so possibly an even split.....
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(05-26-2021, 08:29 PM)John1 Wrote: New way to calculate route options... Deva, 8.8 days by sea 5.1 days by road.

Aha, another introduction for the repeatedly-introduced Orbis! [Image: smile.png]

(They have rejigged it a bit recently, to be fair, and funnily enough you're the second person I've seen mentioning it today...)

As we discussed before, 10-20 days would be more likely for a sea voyage from Mona to London. Ancient ships cannot sail at a steady speed 24 hours a day. The risks involved would make it an insanely bad idea for anyone in Paulinus's position.

Their 'rapid military march' is a grinding 36 miles a day. I'd say their standard 30km/18 mpd scale is more likely - 10 days Deva to Londinium. Mona strait would add another 3 days to that - all very much in line with the estimates we've been using so far. Up the pace to 20 miles a day and they could do it in 11.5 days.


John1 Wrote: Wrote:a new theory with proper "neck on the block" prose (in shoutie caps)

I confess I couldn't get to the end of that one - the shouty caps were giving me a tension headache... But I agree with Michael about the mistakes and assumptions - principal among the latter being that Paulinus could only have heard about the revolt after Colchester had already fallen.
Nathan Ross
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